Online research in philosophy

Da Costa's C systems are surveyed and motivated, and significant failings of the systems are indicated. Variations are then made on these systems in an attempt to surmount their defects and limitations. The main system to emerge from this effort, system $CC_{\omega}$ , is investigated in some detail, and "dual-intuitionistic" semantical analyses are developed for it and surrounding systems. These semantics are then adapted for the original C systems, first in a rather unilluminating relational fashion, subsequently in a more illuminating (...) way through the introduction of impossible situations where and and or change roles. Finally other attempts to break out of impasses for the original and expanded C systems, by going inside them, are looked at, and further research directions suggested. (shrink)

Da Costa's C systems are surveyed and motivated, and significant failings of the systems are indicated. Variations are then made on these systems in an attempt to surmount their defects and limitations. The main system to emerge from this effort, system CC , is investigated in some detail, and dual-intuitionistic semantical analyses are developed for it and surrounding systems. These semantics are then adapted for the original C systems, first in a rather unilluminating relational fashion, subsequently in a more illuminating (...) way through the introduction of impossible situations where and and or change roles. Finally other attempts to break out of impasses for the original and expanded C systems, by going inside them, are looked at, and further research directions suggested. (shrink)

In comparison to other epistemic sources (perception, memory and reason) testimony is the only one dealing with the social aspects of gaining and justifying knowledge. One main problem of the current discussion about knowledge by testimony is the concept of testimony itself. It is quite unclear what the correct notion of testimony is supposed to be. In this essay I present a proposal to define the concept of testimony in making a distinction between the conditions which hold in the speaker’s (...) context and the ones necessary and sufficient for the hearer. Furthermore, I will briefly defend the thesis that there is not one general concept of testimony, but that there are different ones connected via a kind of specialisation relation. (shrink)

Intuitive-automatic processes are crucial for making judgements and decisions. The fascinating complexity of these processes has attracted many decision researchers, prompting them to start investigating intuition empirically and to develop numerous models. Dual-process models assume a clear distinction between intuitive and deliberate processes but provide no further differentiation within both categories. We go beyond these models and argue that intuition is not a homogeneous concept, but a label used for different cognitive mechanisms. We suggest that these mechanisms have to be (...) distinguished to allow for fruitful investigations of intuition. Specifically, we argue that researchers should concentrate on investigating the processes underlying intuition before making strong claims about its performance. We summarise current models for intuition and propose a categorisation according to the underlying cognitive processes: (a) associative intuition based on simple learning-retrieval processes, (b) matching intuition based on comparisons with prototypes/exemplars, (c) accumulative intuition based on automatic evidence accumulation, and (d) constructive intuition based on construction of mental representations. We discuss how this differentiation might help to clarify the relationship between affect and intuition and we derive a very general hypothesis as to when intuition will lead to good decisions and when it will go astray. (shrink)

The British Columbian members of the Canadian Guidance and Counselling Association were surveyed to explore their attitudes regarding dual relationships. Of 529 deliverable surveys, 206 usable returns yielded a response rate of 39%. Participants were asked to provide incidents of problematic dual relationships and to discuss the problematic aspect(s) of these dual relationships. Respondents provided a total of 110 useable incidents with 165 associated problematic aspects. Many respondents provided data not directly related to the original questions, which were also analyzed. (...) The results of this study draw attention to several issues: (a) counselors are dealing with a variety of problematic dual relationships, (b) counselors experience discomfort and negative effects on their personal/work life secondary to these dual relationships, and (c) counselors consider the unique context of each dual relationship to be important in their ethical decision-making processes. (shrink)

Intuitive-automatic processes are crucial for making judgements and decisions. The fascinating complexity of these processes has attracted many decision researchers, prompting them to start investigating intuition empirically and to develop numerous models. Dual-process models assume a clear distinction between intuitive and deliberate processes but provide no further differentiation within both categories. We go beyond these models and argue that intuition is not a homogeneous concept, but a label used for different cognitive mechanisms. We suggest that these mechanisms have to be (...) distinguished to allow for fruitful investigations of intuition. Specifically, we argue that researchers should concentrate on investigating the processes underlying intuition before making strong claims about its performance. We summarise current models for intuition and propose a categorisation according to the underlying cognitive processes: (a) associative intuition based on simple learning-retrieval processes, (b) matching intuition based on comparisons with prototypes/exemplars, (c) accumulative intuition based on automatic evidence accumulation, and (d) constructive intuition based on construction of mental representations. We discuss how this differentiation might help to clarify the relationship between affect and intuition and we derive a very general hypothesis as to when intuition will lead to good decisions and when it will go astray. (shrink)

Dual-earner families have been treated as if they are a homogenous group of individuals having to cope with similar demands. Yet these families vary in their rationale for both spouses working outside the home (from financial necessity to personal growth) and the responsibilities each spouse assumes in the home. Given the variations in work and home responsibilities it is proposed that members of dual-earner families should be studied on the basis of (a) the rationale each spouse has for working, (b) (...) the responsibility each spouse assumes in the home, and (c) the gender of the spouse. A model delineating the different problems experienced by individuals within these subgroups is developed based on an extensive review of the literature. (shrink)

: C.S. Peirce defines mathematics in two ways: first as "the science which draws necessary conclusions," and second as "the study of what is true of hypothetical states of things" (CP 4.227–244). Given the dual definition, Peirce notes, a question arises: Should we exclude the work of poietic hypothesis-making from the domain of pure mathematical reasoning? (CP 4.238). This paper examines Peirce's answer to the question. Some commentators hold that for Peirce the framing of mathematical hypotheses requires poietic genius but (...) is not scientific work. I propose, to the contrary, that although Peirce occasionally seems to exclude the poietic creation of hypotheses altogether from pure mathematical reasoning, Peirce's position is rather that the creation of mathematical hypotheses is poietic, but it is not merely poietic, and accordingly, that hypothesis-framing is part of mathematical reasoning that involves an element of poiesis but is not merely poietic either. Scientific considerations also inhere in the process of hypothesis-making, without excluding the poietic element. In the end, I propose that hypothesis-making in mathematics stands between artistic and scientific poietic creativity with respect to imaginative freedom from logical and actual constraints upon reasoning. (shrink)

Let (L; f) be a finite simple Ockham algebra and let (X;g) be its dual space. We first prove that every connected component of X is either a singleton or a generalised crown (i.e. an ordered set that is connected, has length 1, and all vertices of which have the same degree). The representation of a generalised crown by a square (0,1)-matrix in which all line sums are equal is used throughout, and a complete description of X, including the number (...) of connected components and the degree of the vertices, is given. We then examine the converse problem of when a generalised crown can be made into a connected component of (X; g). We also determine the number of non-isomorphic finite simple Ockham algebras that belong properly to a given subvariety P 2n,0. Finally, we show that the number of fixed points of (L; f) is 0,1, or 2 according to the nature of X. (shrink)

In common with a number of other authors I believe that there has been a paradigm shift in the psychology of reasoning, specifically the area traditionally labelled as the study of deduction. The deduction paradigm was founded in a philosophical tradition that assumed logicality as the basis for rational thought, and provided binary propositional logic as the agreed normative framework. By contrast, many contemporary authors assume that people have degrees of uncertainty in both premises and conclusions, and reject binary logic (...) as a workable normative system. I discuss a number of questions and challenges for this new psychology of reasoning, including the following: (a) Do we need an alternative normative system, such as Bayesianism, for the new paradigm? (b) Is there any longer a clear distinction between the study of deductive and inductive reasoning, the latter having its own tradition and literature? (c) Precisely how is the integrated study of reasoning and decision making facilitated by the new paradigm? (d) What difficulties with dual-processing approaches need to be resolved, if they are to take us forward? (shrink)

Introduction: Experiential deconstructive inquiry -- Foundational philosophies and spiritual methods -- Non-duality in Advaita Vedanta and Zen Buddhism -- Ontological differences and non-duality -- Meditative inquiry, questioning, and dialoguing as a means to spiritual insight -- The undoing or deconstruction of dualistic conceptions -- Advaita Vedanta : philosophical foundations and deconstructive strategies -- Sources of the tradition -- Upaniads that art thou (Tat Tvam Asi) -- Gauapda (c.7th century) : no bondage, no liberation -- Aakara (c.7th-8th century) : there is (...) no apprehender different from this apprehension to apprehend it -- Modern and contemporary masters -- Ramana Maharshi (1879-1950) : who am I? -- H.W.L Poonja (1910-1997) : you have to do nothing to be who you are! -- Gangaji (b. 1942) : you are that! -- Advaita Vedanta summary : nothing ever happens -- Zen Buddhism : philosophical foundations and deconstructive strategies -- Sources of the tradition -- The Lakvatra Sutra and the Vajracchedik Prajñpramit Sutra all things ... are not independent of each other and not two -- Ngrjuna (c.113-213) : Sasra is Nirva -- Eihei Dgen (1200-1253) : if I am already enlightened, why must I practice -- Contemporary masters -- Ekai Korematsu (b. 1948) : return to the spine -- Hgen Yamahata (b. 1935) : why not now -- Zen Buddhism summary : neither being nor non-being is to be taken hold of -- Deconstructive techniques and dynamics of experiential undoing -- Deconstructive techniques common to both traditions -- The teacher-student dynamic -- Key deconstructive techniques -- Unfindability analysis -- Bringing everything back to the here and now -- Paradoxical problems -- Negation -- Dynamics of experiential undoing -- Non-dual experiential space -- Experiential mapping : practitioners in the space -- Experiential undoing in Advaita Vedanta -- Experiential undoing in Zen Buddhism -- Conclusion: Deconstruction of reified awareness. (shrink)

When is clinical research ethical? The difficulty in answering this question lies in the dual nature of research on human subjects, which yields two somewhat conflicting sets of obligations. On the one hand, there is the traditional view of science that includes the idea of an obligation to learn about the world. On the other hand, there is the obligation of care on the part of researchers towards individual participants in the research ...

We explore a relation we call anticipation between formulas, where A anticipates B (according to some logic) just in case B is a consequence (according to that logic, presumed to support some distinguished implicational connective ) of the formula AB. We are especially interested in the case in which the logic is intuitionistic (propositional) logic and are much concerned with an extension of that logic with a new connective, written as a, governed by rules which guarantee that for any formula (...) B, aB is the (logically) strongest formula anticipating B. The investigation of this new logic, which we call ILa, will confront us on several occasions with some of the finer points in the theory of rules and with issues in the philosophy of logic arising from the proposed explication of the existence of a connective (with prescribed logical behaviour) in terms of the conservative extension of a favoured logic by the addition of such a connective. Other points of interest include the provision of a Kripke semantics with respect to which ILa is demonstrably sound, deployed to establish certain unprovability results as well as to forge connections with C. Rauszer's logic of dual intuitionistic negation and dual intuitionistic implication, and the isolation of two relations (between formulas), head-implication and head-linkage, which, though trivial in the setting of classical logic, are of considerable significance in the intuitionistic context. (shrink)

What role does language play during attention allocation in perceiving and remembering events? We recorded adults‟ eye movements as they studied animated motion events for a later recognition task. We compared native speakers of two languages that use different means of expressing motion (Greek and English). In Experiment 1, eye movements revealed that, when event encoding was made difficult by requiring a concurrent task that did not involve language (tapping), participants spent extra time studying what their language treats as the (...) details of the event. This „linguistic encoding‟ effect was eliminated both when event encoding was made easier (no concurrent task) and when the concurrent task required the use of language (counting aloud). In Experiment 2, under conditions of a delayed concurrent task of counting aloud, participants used language covertly just prior to engaging in the additional task. Together, the results indicate that language can be optionally recruited for encoding events, especially under conditions of high cognitive load. Yet, these effects are malleable and flexible and do not appear to shape core biases in event perception and memory. (shrink)

There are three accounts of divine providence: the Thomistic-Augustinian account, the Molinist account, and the open theist account. Of the three, the Thomistic account has received relatively little attention in recent years, largely because it is been understood to be a form of theological compatibilism or soft determinism, and compatibilism has been subject to powerful objections, most notably those of van Inwagen. In fact, it is possible for a Thomistic account to be robustly incompatibilist and indeterministic, much more so than (...) its Molinist rival. By combining recent developments in the metaphysics of causation with the fertile suggestions of Oxford theologian Austin Farrer, I develop a Thomistic account of providence and freedom that respects the reality of human freedom and provides an adequate foundation for a free will theodicy. (shrink)

This paper discusses how to define logics as deductive limits of sequences of other logics. The case of da Costa's hierarchy of increasingly weaker paraconsistent calculi, known as $ \mathcal {C}$n, 1 $ \leq$ n $ \leq$ $ \omega$, is carefully studied. The calculus $ \mathcal {C}$$\scriptstyle \omega$, in particular, constitutes no more than a lower deductive bound to this hierarchy and differs considerably from its companions. A long standing problem in the literature (open for more than 35 years) is (...) to define the deductive limit to this hierarchy, that is, its greatest lower deductive bound. The calculus $ \mathcal {C}$min, stronger than $ \mathcal {C}$$\scriptstyle \omega$, is first presented as a step toward this limit. As an alternative to the bivaluation semantics of $ \mathcal {C}$min presented thereupon, possible-translations semantics are then introduced and suggested as the standard technique both to give this calculus a more reasonable semantics and to derive some interesting properties about it. Possible-translations semantics are then used to provide both a semantics and a decision procedure for $ \mathcal {C}$Lim, the real deductive limit of da Costa's hierarchy. Possible-translations semantics also make it possible to characterize a precise sense of duality: as an example, $ \mathcal {D}$min is proposed as the dual to $ \mathcal {C}$min. (shrink)

This paper is dedicated to Newton da Costa, who,among his many achievements, was the first toaim at dualising intuitionism in order to produce paraconsistent logics,the C-systems. This paper similarly dualises intuitionism to aparaconsistent logic, but the dual is a different logic, namely closed setlogic. We study the interaction between the properties of topologicalspaces, particularly separation properties, and logical theories on thosespaces. The paper begins with a brief survey of what is known about therelation between topology and modal logic, intuitionist logic (...) and paraconsistentlogic in respect of the incompleteness and inconsistency of theories.Necessary and sufficient conditions which relate the T 1-property to theproperties of logical theories, are obtained. The result is then extendedto Hausdorff and Normal spaces. In the final section these methods areused to vary the modelling conditions for identity. (shrink)

Two constructions for adding an involution operator to residuated ordered monoids are investigated. One preserves integrality and the mingle axiom x 2x but fails to preserve the contraction property xx 2. The other has the opposite preservation properties. Both constructions preserve commutativity as well as existent nonempty meets and joins and self-dual order properties. Used in conjunction with either construction, a result of R.T. Brady can be seen to show that the equational theory of commutative distributive residuated lattices (without involution) (...) is decidable, settling a question implicitly posed by P. Jipsen and C. Tsinakis. The corresponding logical result is the (theorem-) decidability of the negation-free axioms and rules of the logic RW, formulated with fusion and the Ackermann constant t. This completes a result of S. Giambrone whose proof relied on the absence of t. (shrink)

Sibling socialisation of moral orientation was investigated in 40 dual-parent families with two children, aged 2 and 4 years. Of particular interest were: (a) the prevalence of use of care and justice moral orientations by the children during real-life dilemmas with siblings, (b) the ability of the children to combine both care and justice orientations in resolving the dilemmas, and (c) the presence of sex differences in the use of the two orientations. Data consisted of transcripts of sibling interactions during (...) sibling property disputes. Children's verbal statements to each other were coded for justice and care orientations. Siblings preferred the use of justice orientation when justifying the manner in which disputes should be resolved, a preference that increased with the age of the sibling. Care and justice were at times combined by individual children within disputes, again a finding that increased with the age of the sibling. No sex difference in the use of the two moral orientations was found; both girls and boys preferred justice over care. The implications of these findings for future research are discussed. (shrink)

Under many circumstances, children and adult rats reorient themselves through a process which operates only on information about the shape of the environment (e.g., Cheng, 1986; Hermer & Spelke, 1996). In contrast, human adults relocate themselves more flexibly, by conjoining geometric and nongeometric information to specify their position (Hermer & Spelke, 1994). The present experiments used a dual-task method to investigate the processes that underlie the flexible conjunction of information. In Experiment 1, subjects reoriented themselves flexibly when they performed no (...) secondary task, but they reoriented themselves like children and adult rats when they engaged in verbal shadowing of continuous speech. In Experiment 2, subjects who engaged in nonverbal shadowing of a continuous rhythm reoriented like nonshadowing subjects, suggesting that the interference effect in Experiment 1 did not stem from general limits on working memory or attention but from processes more specific to language. In further experiments, verbally shadowing subjects detected and remembered both nongeometric information (Experiment 3) and geometric information (Experiments 1, 2, and 4), but they failed to conjoin the two types of information to specify the positions of objects (Experiment 4). Together. (shrink)

The work on set theory made by A. Tarski in the years 1924-1950 is very interesting, but little know.We develope partial questions in set theory in the moment that A. Tarski intervenes and his contributionsand also influences.The principals aims in this development are:1. The axiom of choice [A.C.] and his equivalents;2. the general continuum hypothesis [G.C.H.] and the A.C.;3. the dual trichotomy principle;4. the inaccessible cardinals and his relation with the A.C. and the G.C.H.;5. the notion of finite set and (...) his relation with the A.C and the G.C.H.;6. the almost disjoint set and their relation with the G.C.H.;and finally,7. the results in Berkeley. (shrink)

Machine generated contents note: Dialectic of Praxis -- I. Philosophy of Subjectivity and -- Historical Materialism 7 -- A. What is the "Toposical Tachiba"? 7 -- B. The Present and Past of Umemoto's Theory of Subjectivity 17 -- C. The Basis and Structure of Degeneration 36 -- II. Confused 'Dialectic of the Subject of Cognition' 48 -- A. Destruction of the Logic of Origo 48 -- 1. Summary of Umemoto's Epistemology 49 -- 2. Umemoto's Defect in Epistemology 56 -- 3. (...) Reversed Hegelianism 60 -- B. Objective Cognition and the Logic of Self-Awareness 68 -- 1. Ontology and Epistemology 68 -- 2. Negation of "Two Circular Structures" 76 -- 3. Objective Cognition and Value Consciousness 82 -- C. Evaporation of Praxiology 89 -- 1. Alienation and Self-Awareness 89 -- 2. Objectivization of Praxis 96 -- 3. Strained Interpretation of Uno's Theory 99 -- 4. Political Economy, Materialist Outlook of History, -- and Praxiology 107 -- 5. A Domain Proper to the Theory of -- Revolutionizing Praxis 116 -- III. Defects in Criticism of Uno's Economics 131 -- A. Problem Awareness 132 -- B. Fall into a "View that the Principles are Lost -- in the Historical Process" 137 -- C. Historicistic Remedy for the Theory of the -- Circulation Form 155 -- 1. Beautification of a Distorting Tendency to -- Emphasize the Circulation Form 156 -- 2. Complementation of the 'Theory of Form -- without the Logic of Substance' 169 -- 3. On the Trans-Historicization of the -- 'Dual Character of Labour' 178 -- IV. Political Economy and -- Materialist Outlook of History 195 -- A. 'Anatomy of Bourgeois Society' and -- 'Anatomy of History' 195 -- B. Consolidation with Reversed Hegelianism 202 -- C. 'Logic of Circularity' and 'Logic of History' 218 -- V, Political Economy and the -- Logic of Revolutionization 231 -- A. Defects in the Understanding of Political Economy 232 -- B. Distortion of 'Labour-Power Commodity' 255 -- 1. On the Dialectic: Commodity Market and the -- Production Process 255 -- 2. Private Property and Capitalist Property 261 -- 3. Negation of the Negation: Sublation of the -- Commoditization of Labour-Power 268 -- C. Capitalist Thingivation and the -- Logic of its Revolutionization 282 -- Afterword 301 -- Supplementary Notes to the English Edition 303 -- Index 309. (shrink)

This paper is a response to the opening of new lines of research on CSR and SMEs (Thompson & Smith, 1991; Spence, 1999; Moore & Smith, 2006; Spence, 2007). It seeks to explore the business case for CSR in this corporate segment. The paper, which is based on four case studies of medium-sized firms in the automotive sector, took the distinctive approach of trying to understand the nature of CSR-like activities developed not by best-in-class CSR-driven companies but by purely competitiveness-driven (...) firms. The case studies provide explicit evidence that the CSR activities of SMEs and the notion of social capital are interrelated, turning social capital into a powerful instrument to better explain what academic literature has called silent CSR practices . The analysis that follows questions some of the basic tenets that underpin the branch of business ethics that deals with the nature of SMEs' approach to CSR. Four basic concerns, which take the form of propositions for further research, serve as the basis for this analysis: a) A definition of CSR that includes most of the actions taken by all companies in the territory contributes no academic value to the discipline b) Any study of the motivation behind these CSR actions must reflect their essentially pragmatic nature. Actions are linked to social values but also, more importantly, to the nature of the competitive environment c) Business ethics must seek common ground with other more sociological disciplines if it is to explain the reasons behind this type of action d) Any study of this kind of practice requires a dual approach: a) normative when using tools developed by CSR; and b) descriptive and instrumental using the notion of social capital. (shrink)

Many recent experiments have used parallel Implicit Association Test (IAT) and selfreport measures of attitudes. These measures are sometimes strongly correlated. However, many of these studies find apparent dissociations in the form of (a) weak correlations between the two types of measures, (b) separation of their means on scales that should coincide if they assess the same construct, or (c) differing correlations with other variables. Interpretations of these empirical patterns are of three types: single-representation — the two types of measures (...) assess a single attitude, but under the influence of different extra-attitudinal process influences; dual-representation — the two types of measures assess distinct forms of attitudes (e.g., conscious vs. unconscious; implicit vs. explicit); and person vs. culture — a variant of the dualrepresentation view in which self-report measures reflect personal attitudes, whereas IAT measures reflect non-attitudinal cultural or semantic knowledge. Proponents sometimes interpret evidence for single versus dual constructs as evidence for single versus dual structural representations. Behavioral evidence can establish the discriminant validity of implicit and explicit attitude phenomena (dual constructs), but cannot choose among single- vs. dual-representation interpretations because the distinct constructs remain susceptible to interpretation in terms of either one or two representations. Selecting among representational accounts must therefore be based on considerations of explanatory power or parsimony. (shrink)

The work on set theory made by A. Tarski in the years 1924-1950 is very interesting, but little know.We develope partial questions in set theory in the moment that A. Tarski intervenes and his contributionsand also influences.The principals aims in this development are:1. The axiom of choice [A.C.] and his equivalents;2. the general continuum hypothesis [G.C.H.] and the A.C.;3. the dual trichotomy principle;4. the inaccessible cardinals and his relation with the A.C. and the G.C.H.;5. the notion of finite set and (...) his relation with the A.C and the G.C.H.;6. the almost disjoint set and their relation with the G.C.H.;and finally,7. the results in Berkeley. (shrink)

The role of interaction in learning is essential and profound: it must provide the means to solve open problems (those only vaguely specified in advance), but cannot be captured using our familiar formal cognitive tools. This presents an impasse to those confined to present formalisms; but interaction is fundamentally dynamical, not formal, and with its importance thus underlined it invites the development of a distinctively interactivist account of life and mind. This account is provided, from its roots in the interactivist (...) biological constitution of life, through the evolution of the dual internal regulatory capacities expressed as intentionality and intelligence, to its expression in self-directed anticipative learning in persons and in science. (shrink)

Abstract: In Chapter 4 of his "Self-Deception Unmasked" (SDU), Al Mele considers several (attempted) empirical demonstrations of self-deception. These empirical demonstrations work under the conception of what Mele refers to as the 'dual-belief requirement', in which an agent simultaneously holds a belief p and a belief ~p. Toward the end of this chapter, Mele considers the argument of one biologist and anthropologist, Robert Trivers, who describes what he takes to be an evolutionary explanation for coming to form false beliefs. Mele (...) argues briefly that Trivers's account is no more explanatory than a similar one that does not include the dual-belief requirement. I present a case describing Trivers' analysis, show how Mele might reply to it. After briefly explaining Mele's sufficient conditions for entering self-deception from Chapter 3 of SDU, I'll consider what it means to hold the dual-belief. I'll then consider what I take to be a class of cases of self-deception which rely on genetic determinism, which I take to satisfy the dual-belief condition. (shrink)

What is the relation between the perfection that Christians have in Christ, by dint of his substitutionary Atonement for sinners, and the virtues to which we are called as believers? How does the Atonement affect the moral life of Christians and how are we to understand our virtues in the light of what God has done for us in Christ? This paper identifies three interactions between the Atonement and our virtues: the generative aspect, the dual attitude aspect, and the pervasion (...) of Atonement aspect. Each of these aspects suggests a proposal for how moral and spiritual nurture should be pursued in the church. (shrink)

Transitive inference is claimed to be “deductive”. Yet every group/species ever reported apparently uses it. We asked 58 adults to solve five-term transitive tasks, requiring neither training nor premise learning. A computer-based procedure ensured all premises were continually visible. Response accuracy and RT (non-discriminative nRT ) were measured as is typically done. We also measured RT confined to correct responses ( cRT ). Overall, very few typical transitive phenomena emerged. The symbolic distance effect never extended to premise recall and was (...) not at all evident for nRT ; suggesting the use of non-deductive end-anchor strategies. For overall performance, and particularly the critical B ? D inference, our findings indicate that deductive transitive inference is far more intellectually challenging than previously thought. Contrasts of our present findings against previous findings suggest at least two distinct transitive inference modes, with most research and most computational models to date targeting an associative mode rather than their desired deductive mode. This conclusion fits well with the growing number of theories embracing a “dual process” conception of reasoning. Finally, our differing findings for nRT versus cRT suggest that researchers should give closer consideration to matching the RT measure they use to the particular conception of transitive inference they pre-held. (shrink)

The dual-deficit model of visual hallucinations (Collerton et al. target article) is compared with the dual-deficit model of auditory hallucinations (Waters et al., in press). Differences in cognitive mechanisms described may be superficial. Similarities between these models may provide the basis for a general model of complex hallucinations extended across disorders and modalities, involving shared (overlapping) cognitive processes.

We agree with Caplan & Waters that there are problems with the single-resource theory of sentence comprehension. However, we challenge their dual-resource alternative on theoretical and empirical grounds and point to a more coherent solution that abandons the notion of working memory resources.

Transitive inference is claimed to be “deductive”. Yet every group/species ever reported apparently uses it. We asked 58 adults to solve five-term transitive tasks, requiring neither training nor premise learning. A computer-based procedure ensured all premises were continually visible. Response accuracy and RT (non-discriminative nRT ) were measured as is typically done. We also measured RT confined to correct responses ( cRT ). Overall, very few typical transitive phenomena emerged. The symbolic distance effect never extended to premise recall and was (...) not at all evident for nRT ; suggesting the use of non-deductive end-anchor strategies. For overall performance, and particularly the critical B ? D inference, our findings indicate that deductive transitive inference is far more intellectually challenging than previously thought. Contrasts of our present findings against previous findings suggest at least two distinct transitive inference modes, with most research and most computational models to date targeting an associative mode rather than their desired deductive mode. This conclusion fits well with the growing number of theories embracing a “dual process” conception of reasoning. Finally, our differing findings for nRT versus cRT suggest that researchers should give closer consideration to matching the RT measure they use to the particular conception of transitive inference they pre-held. (shrink)

This paper investigates board judgment in response to management led buyouts (MLBs). Board response is suggested to be guided by the business judgment rule and its dual duties of care and loyalty. The duty of loyalty is seen to be evolving into a specification of fair dealing. With this trend, the current interpretation of the business judgment rule emphasizes the role of care and relies on the market to insure fairness. Possible failures in the MLB market which limit its effectiveness (...) in assuring fairness are discussed. Recommendations to counteract these failures are suggested. (shrink)

Introduction : Kierkegaard's life and works -- Pseudonymity and indirect communication -- The human self : truth and subjectivity -- The stages of existence : forms of the aesthetic life -- The ethical life as the quest for selfhood -- Religious existence : religiousness A -- Christian existence : faith and the paradox -- Kierkegaard's dual challenge to the contemporary world.

Level of processing and generation effects were replicated in separate experiments in which recognition memory was tested using either short (500 ms) or long (1500 ms) response deadlines. These effects were similar at each deadline. Moreover, at each deadline these effects were associated with subsequent reports of remembering, not of knowing. And reports of both knowing and remembering increased following the longer deadline. These results imply that knowing does not index an automatic familiarity process, as conceived in some dual-process models (...) of recognition, and that both remembering and knowing increase with the slower, more controlled processing permitted by the longer response time. (shrink)