6 found
Sort by:
Disambiguations:
Carsten Heidemann [4]C. Heidemann [2]
  1. Carsten Heidemann (2013). Facets of 'Ought' in Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law. Jurisprudence 4 (2):246-262.
    Any correct assessment of Hans Kelsen's conception of Ought must take into account, first, that Kelsen's theory evolved over some 60 years which saw several major changes of its fundamentals; and second, that the Pure Theory must basically be understood as a meta-theory of institutionalised legal science. With these provisos, Kelsen's explanation of the Ought oscillates between two extremes: at one extreme, the legal Ought is just a formal semantic marker delimiting the realm of the law; at the other, the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Carsten Heidemann (2007). Noch einmal: Stanley L. Paulson und Kelsens urteilstheoretischer Normbegriff. Archiv Fuer Rechts-Und Sozialphilosphie 93 (3):345-362.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Carsten Heidemann (2005). Die reine Rechtslehre im Lichte des kritischen Rationalismus. Ratio Juris 18 (1):124-127.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. C. Heidemann (2000). The Creation of Normative Facts. Law and Philosophy 19 (2):263-281.
    In Kelsen's formalist and reductionist theory of law, the concepts of `authority' and `competence' may be explained exclusively in terms of those norms on which the validity of other legal norms or of legal acts is dependent. Kelsen describes the nature of these norms in different ways; at least three different conceptions can be distinguished. A rational reconstruction of the most plausible of these conceptions will understand sentences expressing such `norms of competence' either to state truth conditions for normative sentences (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. C. Heidemann (1999). Review Article. Norms, Facts, and Judgments. A Reply to S. L. Paulson. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 19 (2):345-350.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Carsten Heidemann (1999). On Some Difficulties Concerning John Searle's Notion of an'Institutional Fact'. Analyse and Kritik 21:251-264.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation