This paper explores the relationship between Fukuyama’s account of history and Derrida’s theory of hauntology. Initially, I use Derrida’s idea of hauntology tocritique Fukuyama’s account of an end of history. I argue that Derrida’s idea of a hauntology is a valuable theoretical tool for theorising about politics, sinceDerrida shows that the death of a particular social/political system (e.g. Communism) does not entail the death/devaluing of the thinker(s) who inspired that system, since critics of the contemporary social and political order may (...) have something valuable to offer contemporary political thought. However, I do notendorse the view that history cannot reach an end point just because there are specters waiting to return. Instead, I argue that it is possible to bridge theapparent dualistic binary between Derrida’s hauntology and Fukuyama’s end of history, since the specter is something which must be recognised and realised atthe end of history. (shrink)
Introduction -- Methodology : an approach to philosophical analysis -- Fukuyama I : the concept of a history with universal direction and end point -- Fukuyama II : why does history end in liberal democracy? -- Postmodern perspectives on the flow of time -- Questioning the universality of human nature -- The myth of the individual : how "I" is constructed and gives an account of itself -- A theory of a history which ends in liberal democracy through a reading (...) of Fukuyama and postmodernism. (shrink)
This paper suggests an alternative reading of Practice in Christianity to Merold Westphal’s interpretation of the text as defining what he calls “religiousness C.” Attending closely to the rhetorical construction of Practice, and situating it in the context of Kierkegaard’s intensive reading of Luther late in his life, I argue that this text extends the Postscript’s meditation on inwardness and writing to one of the central theological constructs of Lutheranism, the distinction between law and gospel. On my reading, Practice both (...) defends the primacy of faith and grace within Christianity, and refuses their commodification into directly communicable results. At the end of this paper, I consider Kierkegaard’s seeming retraction, in 1855, of two rhetorical features of Practice that my reading emphasizes. Iconclude that this gesture in fact intensifies Kierkegaard’s appropriation of the law/gospel paradigm, and speaks to the impossibility of any direct, comprehensive, and final account of authentic Christian life. (shrink)
In the current study we compared academic locus of control (ALoC) and perceived quality of academic life (PQAL) across three groups of university students: those without disabilities, those with attention deficit disorder or learning disabilities (ADD-LD), and those with other disabilities. Results showed no significant differences in ALoC scores, with each group reporting an internal ALoC. However, students with other disabilities (e.g., sensory, motor, chronic health, and/or mental health) reported significantly lower satisfaction with their overall quality of academic life than (...) students without disabilities. Applied implications are discussed along with recommendations for further research. (shrink)
Saul Kripke, in a series of classic writings of the 1960s and 1970s, changed the face of metaphysics and philosophy of language. Christopher Hughes offers a careful exposition and critical analysis of Kripke's central ideas about names, necessity, and identity. He clears up some common misunderstandings of Kripke's views on rigid designation, causality and reference, and the necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori. Through his engagement with Kripke's ideas Hughes makes a significant contribution to ongoing debates on, inter alia, (...) the semantics of natural kind terms, the nature of natural kinds, the essentiality of origin and constitution, the relative merits of 'identitarian' and counterpart-theoretic accounts of modality, and the identity or otherwise of mental types and tokens with physical types and tokens. No specialist knowledge in either the philosophy of language or metaphysics is presupposed; Hughes's book will be valuable for anyone working on the ideas which Kripke made famous in the philosophy world. (shrink)
Recent philosophical criticisms of individual rights and the postmodern deconstruction of the sovereign subject raise serious questions for the defense of universal human rights. This paper critically examines Paul Ricoeur's effort to reconstruct a viable notion of the human subject as the bearer of human rights. Ricoeur's analysis of the narrative structure of human experiences and action takes account of the recent philosophical criticisms of sovereign subjectivity; it avoids both the fiction of the atomistic individual of liberal political philosophy and (...) the fragility of a completely relativized and decentered subject. By extending Ricoeur's work on narrative identity and by developing a humanism based on the ethical primacy of the other-than-self, this paper aims to provide new insights into the complexity of implementing and defending universal human rights. Key Words: deconstruction human rights narrative Ricoeur subject subjectivity. (shrink)
At several points in his writings, Levinas is implicitly critical of Hobbes's view that the political order is required to restrict violent conflict and competition and make morality possible. This paper makes Levinas's criticisms explicit by comparing Hobbes's descriptions of human nature and human relations with Levinas's radically different descriptions of the ethical relation of responsibility and the consequent kinship of the human community. I use insights from Levinas to argue that ethics cannot be reduced to politics and that the (...) primacy of the ethical relation provides a more adequate description of human relations and justice in the human community. (shrink)
Suppose there are possible worlds in which God exists but Anselm does not. Then (I argue) there are possible worlds in which Anselm does not exist, but God cannot even entertain the thought that he does not. In such worlds Anselm does not exist, but God does not know that. This, I argue, is incompatible with (a straightforward construal of) the doctrine of God's essential omniscience. Considerations involving negative existentials also call into question a certain picture of creation, on which (...) God chooses which particular (possible) individuals to create. They suggest that there is an element of brute contingency about which individuals exist. (shrink)
David Hunt has recently developed a new strategy, called the “dispositional omniscience scenario,” or (OOS), which is designed to defeat theological fatalism by showing the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human (libertarian) free agency. But I argue that Hunt fails to establish his compatibility claim because (DOS) is based on a defective analysis of dispositional belief that is too weak to sustain any divine foreknowledge of future free actions.
Locke thought that it was impossible for there to be two things of the same kind in the same place at the same time. I offer (what looks to me like) a counterexample to that principle, involving two ships in the same place at the same time. I then consider two ways of explaining away, and one way of denying, the apparent counterexample of Locke's principle, and I argue that none is successful. I conclude that, although the case under discussion (...) does not refute Locke's principle, it constitutes a serious challenge to it. (shrink)
The learning society has been advocated as an answer to current economic, political and social problems by a wide coalition of interests, including politicians, employers and educators. Here we critically analyse the concept as a myth; that is, as an idea which may or may not have validity, but which many people believe in. For the purpose of this analysis, the learning society is set alongside four other myths upon which it builds: those of productivity, change, lifelong education and the (...) learning organisation. It is argued that the United Kingdom cannot currently be considered to be a learning society, nor is it likely to become one in the foreseeable future. But the idea of the learning society retains an important role as a myth, in drawing together and channelling energies in directions sought by policy-makers. (shrink)
A new reduction class is presented for the satisfiability problem for well-formed formulas of the first-order predicate calculus. The members of this class are closed prenex formulas of the form ∀ x∀ yC. The matrix C is in conjunctive normal form and has no disjuncts with more than three literals, in fact all but one conjunct is unary. Furthermore C contains but one predicate symbol, that being unary, and one function symbol which symbol is binary.
A constructive proof is given which shows that every nonrecursive r.e. many-one degree is represented by the family of decision problems for partial implicational propositional calculi whose well-formed formulas contain at most two distinct variable symbols.
In this paper we investigate some families of decision problems associated with a restricted class of Post canonical forms, specifically, those defined over one-letter alphabets whose productions have single premises and contain only one variable. For brevity sake, we call any such form an RPCF (Restricted Post Canonical Form). Constructive proofs are given which show, for any prescribed nonrecursive r.e. many-one degree of unsolvability D, the existence of an RPCF whose word problem is of degree D and an RPCF with (...) axiom whose decision problem is also of degree D. Finally, we show that both of these results are best possible in that they do not hold for one-one degrees. (shrink)