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  1. Stephen H. Kellert, Helen E. Longino & C. Kenneth Waters (forthcoming). Scientific Pluralism. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
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  2. C. Kenneth Waters (forthcoming). Molecules Made Biological. Revue Internationale de Philosophie.
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  3. C. Kenneth Waters (2011). Okasha's Unintended Argument for Toolbox Theorizing. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (1):232-240.
    Okasha claims at the outset of his book "Evolution and the Levels of Selection" (2006) that the Price equation lays bare the fundamentals underlying all selection phenomena. However, the thoroughness of his subsequent analysis of multi-level selection theories leads him to abandon his fundamentalist commitments. At critical points he invokes cost benefit analyses that sometimes favors the Price approach and sometimes the contextual approach, sometimes favors MLS1 and sometimes MLS2. And although he doesn’t acknowledge it, even the Price approach breaks (...)
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  4. C. Kenneth Waters, Beyond Theoretical Reduction and Layer-Cake Antireduction: How DNA Retooled Genetics and Transformed Biological Practice.
    Watson and Crick’s discovery of the structure of DNA led to developments that transformed many biological sciences. But what were the relevant developments and how did they transform biology? Much of the philosophical discussion concerning this question can be organized around two opposing views: theoretical reductionism and layer-cake antireductionism. Theoretical reductionist and their anti-reductionist foes hold two assumptions in common. First, both hold that biological knowledge is structured like a layer cake, with some biological sciences, such as molecular biology cast (...)
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  5. C. Kenneth Waters (2008). How Practical Know‐How Contextualizes Theoretical Knowledge: Exporting Causal Knowledge From Laboratory to Nature. Philosophy of Science 75 (5):707-719.
    Leading philosophical accounts presume that Thomas H. Morgan’s transmission theory can be understood independently of experimental practices. Experimentation is taken to be relevant to confirming, rather than interpreting, the transmission theory. But the construction of Morgan’s theory went hand in hand with the reconstruction of the chief experimental object, the model organism Drosophila melanogaster . This raises an important question: when a theory is constructed to account for phenomena in carefully controlled laboratory settings, what knowledge, if any, indicates the theory’s (...)
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  6. C. Kenneth Waters (2007). Causes That Make a Difference. Journal of Philosophy 104 (11):551-579.
    Biologists studying complex causal systems typically identify some factors as causes and treat other factors as background conditions. For example, when geneticists explain biological phenomena, they often foreground genes and relegate the cellular milieu to the background. But factors in the milieu are as causally necessary as genes for the production of phenotypic traits, even traits at the molecular level such as amino acid sequences. Gene-centered biology has been criticized on the grounds that because there is parity among causes, the (...)
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  7. C. Kenneth Waters (2007). The Nature and Context of Exploratory Experimentation: An Introduction to Three Case Studies of Exploratory Research. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 29 (3):275 - 284.
    My aim in this article is to introduce readers to the topic of exploratory experimentation and briefly explain how the three articles that follow, by Richard Burian, Kevin Elliott, and Maureen O'Malley, advance our understanding of the nature and significance of exploratory research. I suggest that the distinction between exploratory and theory-driven experimentation is multidimensional and that some of the dimensions are continuums. I point out that exploratory experiments are typically theory-informed even if they are not theory-driven. I also distinguish (...)
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  8. Stephen H. Kellert, Helen E. Longino & C. Kenneth Waters (2006). ¸ Itekellersetal:Sp.
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  9. Stephen H. Kellert, Helen E. Longino & C. Kenneth Waters (eds.) (2006). Scientific Pluralism Vol. 19. University of Minnesota Press.
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  10. Stephen H. Kellert, Helen E. Longino & C. Kenneth Waters (2006). The Pluralist Stance. In ¸ Itekellersetal:Sp.
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  11. Michael Dickson, Elisabeth A. Lloyd, C. Kenneth Waters, Matthew Dunn, Jennifer Cianciollo, Costas Mannouris, Richard Bradley & James Mattingly (2005). 1. From the New Editor From the New Editor (P. Iii). Philosophy of Science 72 (2).
     
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  12. C. Kenneth Waters (2005). Why Genic and Multilevel Selection Theories Are Here to Stay. Philosophy of Science 72 (2):311-333.
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  13. C. Kenneth Waters (2004). What Concept Analysis in Philosophy of Science Should Be (and Why Competing Philosophical Analyses of Gene Concepts Cannot Be Tested by Polling Scientists). History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 26 (1):29 - 58.
    What should philosophers of science accomplish when they analyze scientific concepts and interpret scientific knowledge? What is concept analysis if it is not a description of the way scientists actually think? I investigate these questions by using Hans Reichenbach's account of the descriptive, critical, and advisory tasks of philosophy of science to examine Karola Stotz and Paul Griffiths' idea that poll-based methodologies can test philosophical analyses of scientific concepts. Using Reichenbach's account as a point of departure, I argue that philosophy (...)
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  14. C. Kenneth Waters (2004). What Was Classical Genetics? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 35 (4):783-809.
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  15. C. Kenneth Waters (2003). 5 The Arguments in the Origin of Species. In J. Hodges & Gregory Radick (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Darwin. Cambridge University Press. 116.
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  16. C. Kenneth Waters (1998). Causal Regularities in the Biological World of Contingent Distributions. Biology and Philosophy 13 (1):5-36.
    Former discussions of biological generalizations have focused on the question of whether there are universal laws of biology. These discussions typically analyzed generalizations out of their investigative and explanatory contexts and concluded that whatever biological generalizations are, they are not universal laws. The aim of this paper is to explain what biological generalizations are by shifting attention towards the contexts in which they are drawn. I argue that within the context of any particular biological explanation or investigation, biologists employ two (...)
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  17. C. Kenneth Waters (1994). Genes Made Molecular. Philosophy of Science 61 (2):163-185.
    This paper investigates what molecular biology has done for our understanding of the gene. I base a new account of the gene concept of classical genetics on the classical dogma that gene differences cause phenotypic differences. Although contemporary biologists often think of genes in terms of this concept, molecular biology provides a second way to understand genes. I clarify this second way by articulating a molecular gene concept. This concept unifies our understanding of the molecular basis of a wide variety (...)
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  18. C. Kenneth Waters (1991). Tempered Realism About the Force of Selection. Philosophy of Science 58 (4):553-573.
    Darwinians are realists about the force of selection, but there has been surprisingly little discussion about what form this realism should take. Arguments about the units of selection in general and genic selectionism in particular reveal two realist assumptions: (1) for any selection process, there is a uniquely correct identification of the operative selective forces and the level at which each impinges; and (2) selective forces must satisfy the Pareto-style requirement of probabilistic causation. I argue that both assumptions are false; (...)
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  19. Philip Kitcher, Kim Sterelny & C. Kenneth Waters (1990). The Illusory Riches of Sober's Monism. Journal of Philosophy 87 (3):158-161.
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  20. C. Kenneth Waters (1990). Rosenberg's Rebellion. Biology and Philosophy 5 (2):225-239.
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  21. C. Kenneth Waters (1990). Why the Antireductionist Consensus Won't Survive the Case of Classical Mendelian Genetics. Philosophy of Science Association 1:125-39.
    Philosophers now treat the relationship between classical genetics and molecular biology as a paradigm of nonreduction and this example is playing an increasingly prominent role in debates about the reducibility of theories in other sciences. This paper shows that the anti-reductionist consensus about genetics will not withstand serious scrutiny. In addition to defusing the main anti-reductionist objections, this critical analysis uncovers tell-tale signs of a significant reduction in progress. It also identifies philosophical issues relevant to gaining a better understanding of (...)
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  22. C. Kenneth Waters (1989). Taking Darwin Seriously. Teaching Philosophy 12 (2):179-182.
  23. C. Kenneth Waters (1987). Relevance Logic Brings Hope to Hypothetico-Deductivism. Philosophy of Science 54 (3):453-464.
    Clark Glymour has argued that hypothetico-deductivism, which many take to be an important method of scientific confirmation, is hopeless because it cannot be reconstructed in classical logic. Such reconstructions, as Glymour points out, fail to uphold the condition of relevance between theory and evidence. I argue that the source of the irrelevant confirmations licensed by these reconstructions lies not with hypothetico-deductivism itself, but with the classical logic in which it is typically reconstructed. I present a new reconstruction of hypothetico-deductivism in (...)
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  24. C. Kenneth Waters (1986). Natural Selection Without Survival of the Fittest. Biology and Philosophy 1 (2):207-225.
    Susan Mills and John Beatty proposed a propensity interpretation of fitness (1979) to show that Darwinian explanations are not circular, but they did not address the critics' chief complaint that the principle of the survival of the fittest is either tautological or untestable. I show that the propensity interpretation cannot rescue the principle from the critics' charges. The critics, however, incorrectly assume that there is nothing more to Darwin's theory than the survival of the fittest. While Darwinians all scoff at (...)
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  25. C. Kenneth Waters (1986). Taking Analogical Inference Seriously: Darwin's Argument From Artificial Selection. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986:502 - 513.
    Although historians have carefully examined exactly what role the analogy between artificial and natural selection might have played in Charles Darwin's discovery of natural selection, philosophers have not devoted much attention to the way Darwin employed the analogy to justify his theory. I suggest that philosophers tend to belittle the role that analogies play in the justification of scientific theories because they don't understand the special nature of analogical inference. I present a novel account of analogical argument developed by Julian (...)
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  26. C. Kenneth Waters (1986). Why Chisholm's Analysis of Justification Won't Do. Analysis 46 (3):134 - 137.
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