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  1. C. S. I. Jenkins & Masashi Kasaki (forthcoming). The Traditional Conception of the a Priori. Synthese:1-22.
    In this paper, we explore the traditional conception of a prioricity as epistemic independence of evidence from sense experience. We investigate the fortunes of the traditional conception in the light of recent challenges by Timothy Williamson. We contend that Williamson’s arguments can be resisted in various ways. En route, we argue that Williamson’s views are not as distant from tradition (in particular, from Kant) as they might seem at first glance.
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  2. C. S. I. Jenkins (2014). Merely Verbal Disputes. Erkenntnis 79 (1):11-30.
    Philosophers readily talk about merely verbal disputes, usually without much or any explicit reflection on what these are, and a good deal of methodological significance is attached to discovering whether a dispute is merely verbal or not. Currently, metaphilosophical advances are being made towards a clearer understanding of what exactly it takes for something to be a merely verbal dispute. This paper engages with this growing literature, pointing out some problems with existing approaches, and develops a new proposal which builds (...)
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  3. C. S. I. Jenkins (2013). A Priori. In Albert Casullo & Joshua C. Thurow (eds.), The a Priori in Philosophy. Oup Oxford. 274.
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  4. C. S. I. Jenkins (2013). Justification Magnets. Philosophical Studies 164 (1):93-111.
    David Lewis is associated with the controversial thesis that some properties are more eligible than others to be the referents of our predicates solely in virtue of those properties’ being more natural; independently, that is, of anything to do with our patterns of usage of the relevant predicates. On such a view, the natural properties act as ‘reference magnets’. In this paper I explore (though I do not endorse) a related thesis in epistemology: that some propositions are ‘justification magnets’. According (...)
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  5. C. S. I. Jenkins (2011). Reflective Knowledge and Epistemic Circularity. Philosophical Papers 40 (3):305-325.
    Abstract This paper examines the kind of epistemic circularity which, according to Ernest Sosa, is unavoidably entailed whenever one has what he calls ?reflective? knowledge (that is, knowledge that p such that the knower reflectively endorses the reliability of the epistemic sources by which she came to her belief that p). I begin by describing the relevant kind of circularity and its role in Sosa's epistemology, en route presenting and resisting Sosa's arguments that this kind of circularity is not vicious. (...)
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