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C. S. Jenkins [30]C. S. I. Jenkins [5]
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Profile: C.S.I. Jenkins (University of British Columbia, University of Aberdeen)
  1. C. S. Jenkins, The Philosophy of Flirting.
    I attempt to give necessary and sufficient conditions for when an act of flirtation has taken place.
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  2. C. S. I. Jenkins & Masashi Kasaki (forthcoming). The Traditional Conception of the a Priori. Synthese:1-22.
    In this paper, we explore the traditional conception of a prioricity as epistemic independence of evidence from sense experience. We investigate the fortunes of the traditional conception in the light of recent challenges by Timothy Williamson. We contend that Williamson’s arguments can be resisted in various ways. En route, we argue that Williamson’s views are not as distant from tradition (in particular, from Kant) as they might seem at first glance.
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  3. C. S. I. Jenkins (2014). Merely Verbal Disputes. Erkenntnis 79 (1):11-30.
    Philosophers readily talk about merely verbal disputes, usually without much or any explicit reflection on what these are, and a good deal of methodological significance is attached to discovering whether a dispute is merely verbal or not. Currently, metaphilosophical advances are being made towards a clearer understanding of what exactly it takes for something to be a merely verbal dispute. This paper engages with this growing literature, pointing out some problems with existing approaches, and develops a new proposal which builds (...)
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  4. C. S. I. Jenkins (2013). A Priori. In Albert Casullo & Joshua C. Thurow (eds.), The a Priori in Philosophy. Oup Oxford. 274.
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  5. C. S. I. Jenkins (2013). Justification Magnets. Philosophical Studies 164 (1):93-111.
    David Lewis is associated with the controversial thesis that some properties are more eligible than others to be the referents of our predicates solely in virtue of those properties’ being more natural; independently, that is, of anything to do with our patterns of usage of the relevant predicates. On such a view, the natural properties act as ‘reference magnets’. In this paper I explore (though I do not endorse) a related thesis in epistemology: that some propositions are ‘justification magnets’. According (...)
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  6. C. S. Jenkins & Daniel Nolan (2012). Disposition Impossible. Noûs 46 (4):732-753.
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  7. C. S. Jenkins (2011). Is Metaphysical Dependence Irreflexive? The Monist 94 (2):267-276.
  8. C. S. Jenkins (2011). Kripkenstein and the Cleverly Disguised Mules. Analytic Philosophy 52 (2):88-99.
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  9. C. S. I. Jenkins (2011). Reflective Knowledge and Epistemic Circularity. Philosophical Papers 40 (3):305-325.
    Abstract This paper examines the kind of epistemic circularity which, according to Ernest Sosa, is unavoidably entailed whenever one has what he calls ?reflective? knowledge (that is, knowledge that p such that the knower reflectively endorses the reliability of the epistemic sources by which she came to her belief that p). I begin by describing the relevant kind of circularity and its role in Sosa's epistemology, en route presenting and resisting Sosa's arguments that this kind of circularity is not vicious. (...)
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  10. C. S. Jenkins (2010). Concepts, Experience and Modal Knowledge1. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):255-279.
    forthcoming in R. Cameron, B. Hale and A. Hoffmann (ed.s), The Logic, Epistemology and Metaphysics of Modality, Oxford University Press. Presents a concept-grounding account of modal knowledge.
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  11. C. S. Jenkins (2010). Critical Notice of Spandrels of Truth by J.C. Beall. Philosophical Books 51 (4):245-254.
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  12. C. S. Jenkins (2010). Truth in Virtue of Meaning, by Gillian Russell. Mind 119 (473):232-238.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
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  13. C. S. Jenkins (2010). What Is Ontological Realism? Philosophy Compass 5 (10):880-890.
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  14. C. S. Jenkins & Daniel Nolan (2010). Maximising, Satisficing and Context. Noûs 44 (3):451-468.
  15. C. S. Jenkins (2009). The Mystery of the Disappearing Diamond. In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press. 302--319.
    Addresses the question of why we find Fitch's knowability 'paradox' argument surprising.
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  16. C. S. Jenkins (2009). The Nature of Normativity. Analysis 69 (1):156-166.
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  17. C. S. Jenkins (2008). A Priori Knowledge: Debates and Developments. Philosophy Compass 3 (3):436–450.
    forthcoming in Philosophy Compass. This is a paper which aims both to survey the field and do some work at its cutting edge.
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  18. C. S. Jenkins (2008). Boghossian and Epistemic Analyticity. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (1):113-127.
    Boghossian claims that we can acquire a priori knowledge by means of a certain form of argument, our grasp of whose premises relies on the existence of implicit definitions. I discuss an objection to his ‘analytic theory of the a priori’. The worry is that in order to employ this kind of argument we must already know its conclusion. Boghossian has responded to this type of objection in recent work, but I argue that his responses are unconvincing. Along the way, (...)
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  19. C. S. Jenkins (2008). Grounding Concepts: An Empirical Basis for Arithmetical Knowledge. OUP Oxford.
    Grounding Concepts tackles the issue of arithmetical knowledge, developing a new position which respects three intuitions which have appeared impossible to satisfy simultaneously: a priorism, mind-independence realism, and empiricism. -/- Drawing on a wide range of philosophical influences, but avoiding unnecessary technicality, a view is developed whereby arithmetic can be known through the examination of empirically grounded concepts. These are concepts which, owing to their relationship to sensory input, are non-accidentally accurate representations of the mind-independent world. Examination of such concepts (...)
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  20. C. S. Jenkins (2008). Romeo, René, and the Reasons Why: What Explanation Is. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1part1):61-84.
  21. C. S. Jenkins (2008). Modal Knowledge, Counterfactual Knowledge and the Role of Experience. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):693-701.
    In recent work Timothy Williamson argues that the epistemology of metaphysical modality is a special case of the epistemology of counterfactuals. I argue that Williamson has not provided an adequate argument for this controversial claim, and that it is not obvious how what he says should be supplemented in order to derive such an argument. But I suggest that an important moral of his discussion survives this point. The moral is that experience could play an epistemic role which is more (...)
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  22. C. S. Jenkins (2008). The Importance of Being Designated: A Comment on Caret and Cotnoir. Analysis 68 (299):244–247.
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  23. C. S. Jenkins & Daniel Nolan (2008). Backwards Explanation. Philosophical Studies 140 (1):103 - 115.
    We discuss explanation of an earlier event by a later event, and argue that prima facie cases of backwards event explanation are ubiquitous. Some examples: (1) I am tidying my flat because my brother is coming to visit tomorrow. (2) The scarlet pimpernels are closing because it is about to rain. (3) The volcano is smoking because it is going to erupt soon. We then look at various ways people might attempt to explain away these prima facie cases by arguing (...)
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  24. C. S. Jenkins & Daniel Nolan (2008). Liar-Like Paradox and Object Language Features. American Philosophical Quarterly 45 (1):67 - 73.
    forthcoming in American Philosophical Quarterly. We argue that it would seem to be a mistake to blame Liar-like paradox on certain features of the object language, since the effect can be created with very minimal object languages that contain none of the usual suspects (truth-like predicates, reference to their own truth-bearers, negation, etc.).
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  25. C. S. Jenkins (2007). Anti-Realism and Epistemic Accessibility. Philosophical Studies 132 (3):525 - 551.
    I argue that Fitch’s ‘paradox of knowability’ presents no special problem for the epistemic anti-realist who believes that reality is epistemically accessible to us. For the claim which is the target of the argument (If p then it is possible to know p) is not a commitment of anti-realism. The epistemic anti-realist’s commitment is (or should be) to the recognizability of the states of affairs which render true propositions true, not to the knowability of the propositions themselves. A formal apparatus (...)
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  26. C. S. Jenkins (2007). Entitlement and Rationality. Synthese 157 (1):25 - 45.
    This paper takes the form of a critical discussion of Crispin Wright’s notion of entitlement of cognitive project. I examine various strategies for defending the claim that entitlement can make acceptance of a proposition epistemically rational, including one which appeals to epistemic consequentialism. Ultimately, I argue, none of these strategies is successful, but the attempt to isolate points of disagreement with Wright issues in some positive proposals as to how an epistemic consequentialist should characterize epistemic rationality.
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  27. C. S. Jenkins (2007). Epistemic Norms and Natural Facts. American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (3):259 - 272.
    in American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (3), July 2007, pp. 259-72. Argues that epistemically normative claims are made true by the same facts as, but do not mean the same as, certain natural-sounding claims.
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  28. C. S. Jenkins (2007). True, False, Paranormal and Designated: A Reply to Beall. Analysis 67 (1):80–83.
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  29. C. S. Jenkins (2006). Review: The Knowability Paradox. [REVIEW] Mind 115 (460):1141-1147.
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  30. C. S. Jenkins (2006). Knowledge and Explanation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (2):137-163.
    I propose a necessary and sufficient condition on knowledge in terms of explanation.
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  31. C. S. Jenkins (2006). Lewis and Blackburn on Quasi-Realism and Fictionalism. Analysis 66 (4):315–319.
    Lewis has argued that quasi-realism is fictionalism. Blackburn denies this, offering reasons which rely on a descriptive reading of quasi-realism. This note offers a different, more general argument against Lewis's claim, available to prescriptive as well as descriptive quasi-realists.
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  32. C. S. Jenkins (2005). Knowledge of Arithmetic. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (4):727-747.
    The goal of the research programme I describe in this article is a realist epistemology for arithmetic which respects arithmetic's special epistemic status (the status usually described as a prioricity) yet accommodates naturalistic concerns by remaining fundamentally empiricist. I argue that the central claims which would allow us to develop such an epistemology are (i) that arithmetical truths are known through an examination of our arithmetical concepts; (ii) that (at least our basic) arithmetical concepts are accurate mental representations of elements (...)
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  33. C. S. Jenkins (2005). Realism and Independence. American Philosophical Quarterly 42 (3):199 - 209.
    I argue that mind-independence realism should be characterised in terms of what I call 'essential', rather than 'modal', independence from our mental lives. I explore the connections between the two kinds of independence, and argue that characterizations in terms of essence respect more intuitions about what realism is, harmonize better with standard characterizations of anti-realism, and avert the threat of subversion from Blackburn's quasi-realist.
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  34. C. S. Jenkins (2005). Sleeping Beauty: A Wake-Up Call. Philosophia Mathematica 13 (2):194-201.
    This note concerns a puzzle about probability which has recently caught the attention of a number of philosophers. According to the current philosophical consensus, the solution to the puzzle reveals that one can acquire new information, sufficient to change one's credences in certain events, just by having a certain experience, even though one knew all along that one would have an experience which felt exactly like this. I argue that the philosophical consensus is mistaken.
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