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Profile: John H Campbell (University of California, Los Angeles)
  1. John Campbell (1993). A Simple View of Colour. In John J. Haldane & C. Wright (eds.), Reality: Representation and Projection. OUP 257-268.
    Physics tells us what is objectively there. It has no place for the colours of things. So colours are not objectively there. Hence, if there is such a thing at all, colour is mind-dependent. This argument forms the background to disputes over whether common sense makes a mistake about colours. It is assumed that..
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  2. John Campbell (2002). The Ownership of Thoughts. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (1):35-39.
  3.  37
    John Campbell (2015). L. A. Paul's Transformative Experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3):787-793.
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  4.  16
    John Campbell & Quassim Cassam (2014). Berkeley's Puzzle: What Does Experience Teach Us? OUP Oxford.
    Sensory experience seems to be the basis of our knowledge of mind-independent things. The puzzle is to understand how that can be: how does our sensory experience enable us to conceive of them as mind-independent? This book is a debate between two rival approaches to understanding the relationship between concepts and sensory experience.
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  5. John Campbell (2011). Tyler Burge: Origins of Objectivity. Journal of Philosophy 108 (5).
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  6.  79
    John Campbell (2010). Control Variables and Mental Causation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (1):15-30.
    I introduce the notion of a ‘control variable’ which gives us a way of seeing how mental causation could be an unproblematic case of causation in general, rather than being some sui generis form of causation. Psychological variables may be the control variables for a system for which there are no physical control variables, even in a deterministic physical world. That explains how there can be psychological causation without physical causation, even in a deterministic physical world.
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  7. John Campbell (2002). Berkeley's Puzzle. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. MIT Press
    But say you,surely there is nothing easier than to imagine trees,for instance,in a park, or books existing in a closet, and nobody by to perceive them. I answer, you may so, there is no dif?culty in it:but what is all this,I beseech you,more than framing in your mind certain ideas which you call books and trees, and at the same time omitting to frame the idea of anyone that may perceive them? But do you not yourself perceive or think of (...)
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  8.  16
    Brendan A. Maher, A. W. Young, Philip Gerrans, John Campbell, Kai Vogeley, Valerie Gray Hardcastle, Owen Flanagan, Robert L. Woolfolk, Barry Smith & Joëlle Proust (1999). Cognitive Theories of Mental Illness. The Monist 82 (4).
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  9.  96
    John Campbell (1992). British Academy: One-Day Conference on the Philosophy of Mind. Mind 101:404.
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  10. John Campbell (2011). Consciousness and Reference. In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. OUP Oxford
  11. John Campbell (2005). Transparency Vs. Revelation in Color Perception. Philosophical Topics 33 (1):105-115.
    What knowledge of the colors does perception of the colors provide? My first aim in this essay is to characterize the way in which color experience seems to provide knowledge of colors. This in turn tells us something about what it takes for there to be colors. Color experience provides knowledge of the aspect of the world that is being acted on when we, or some external force, act on the color of an object and thus make a difference to (...)
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  12. John Campbell (2006). Manipulating Colour: Pounding an Almond. In T. S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. OUP 31--48.
    It seems a compelling idea that experience of colour plays some role in our having concepts of the various colours, but in trying to explain the role experience plays the first thing we have to describe is what sort of colour experience matters here. I will argue that the kind of experience that matters is conscious attention to the colours of objects as an aspect of them on which direct intervention is selectively possible. As I will explain this idea, it (...)
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  13.  39
    John L. Campbell (1998). Institutional Analysis and the Role of Ideas in Political Economy. Theory and Society 27 (3):377-409.
  14. John Campbell (1997). Sense, Reference and Selective Attention. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 71 (71):55-98.
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1997), 55-74, with a reply by Michael Martin.
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  15. John Bigelow, John Campbell & Robert Pargetter (1990). Death and Well-Being. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 71 (2):119-40.
  16. John Campbell (2006). An Interventionist Approach to Causation in Psychology. In Alison Gopnik & Larry J. Schulz (eds.), Causal Learning: Psychology, Philosophy and Computation. OUP 58--66.
  17.  85
    John Campbell (2013). Susanna Siegel's the Contents of Visual Experience. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):819-826.
  18. John Campbell (2008). Sensorimotor Knowledge and Naïve Realism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):666-673.
  19.  38
    John Campbell (2011). Visual Attention and the Epistemic Role of Consciousness. In Christopher Mole, Declan Smithies & Wayne Wu (eds.), Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays. Oxford University Press 323.
  20.  75
    John Campbell (1987). Is Sense Transparent? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 88:273-292.
  21. John Campbell (2005). Information-Processing, Phenomenal Consciousness and Molyneux's Question. In José Luis Bermúdez (ed.), Thought, Reference, and Experience: Themes From the Philosophy of Gareth Evans. Oxford: Clarendon Press
    Ordinary common sense suggests that we have just one set of shape concepts that we apply indifferently on the bases of sight and touch. Yet we understand the shape concepts, we know what shape properties are, only because we have experience of shapes. And phenomenal experience of shape in vision and phenomenal experience of shape in touch seem to be quite different. So how can the shape concepts we grasp and use on the basis of vision be the same as (...)
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  22.  79
    John Campbell (2006). Does Visual Reference Depend on Sortal Classification? Reply to Clark. Philosophical Studies 127 (2):221-237.
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  23.  45
    John Campbell (2012). Cogito Ergo Sum: Christopher Peacocke and John Campbell: II—Lichtenberg and the Cogito. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (3):361-378.
    Our use of ‘I’, or something like it, is implicated in our self-regarding emotions, in the concern to survive, and so seems basic to ordinary human life. But why does that pattern of use require a referring term? Don't Lichtenberg's formulations show how we could have our ordinary pattern of use here without the first person? I argue that what explains our compulsion to regard the first person as a referring term is our ordinary causal thinking, which requires us to (...)
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  24.  53
    John Campbell (1999). Can Philosophical Accounts of Altruism Accommodate Experimental Data on Helping Behaviour? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (1):26 – 45.
    Philosophers often discuss altruism, how it is to be understood, explained, justified, evaluated, etc. Few refer to any experimental data on helping behaviour. I will argue that some of these data seem at least initially to present a challenge to various philosophical accounts of altruism. Put very broadly, when one looks at various philosophical accounts of altruism in light of various data on helping behaviour, one might wonder whether many philosophical accounts fall prey to the 'fundamental attribution error', overestimating people's (...)
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  25. John Campbell (1996). Molyneux's Question. Philosophical Issues 7:301-318.
    in Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Perception (Philosophical Issues vol. 7) (Atascadero: Ridgeview 1996), 301-318, with replies by Brian Loar and Kirk Ludwig.
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  26.  34
    John Campbell (2008). Sensorimotor Knowledge and Naïve Realism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):666 - 673.
  27. John Campbell (2007). The Metaphysics of Perception. Philosophical Issues 17 (1):1–15.
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  28.  94
    John Campbell (2006). What is the Role of Location in the Sense of a Visual Demonstrative? Reply to Matthen. Philosophical Studies 127 (2):239-254.
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  29.  74
    John Campbell (2005). Joint Attention and Common Knowledge. In Naomi M. Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press 287--297.
    This chapter makes the case for a relational version of an experientialist view of joint attention. On an experientialist view of joint attention, shifting from solitary attention to joint attention involves a shift in the nature of your perceptual experience of the object attended to. A relational analysis of such a view explains the latter shift in terms of the idea that, in joint attention, it is a constituent of your experience that the other person is, with you, jointly attending (...)
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  30. John Campbell (2004). What is It to Know What 'I' Refers To? The Monist 87 (2):206-218.
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  31. John Campbell (2007). What's the Role of Spatial Awareness in Visual Perception of Objects? Mind and Language 22 (5):548–562.
    I set out two theses. The first is Lynn Robertson’s: (a) spatial awareness is a cause of object perception. A natural counterpoint is: (b) spatial awareness is a cause of your ability to make accurate verbal reports about a perceived object. Zenon Pylyshyn has criticized both. I argue that nonetheless, the burden of the evidence supports both (a) and (b). Finally, I argue conscious visual perception of an object has a different causal role to both: (i) non-conscious perception of the (...)
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  32.  33
    John Campbell (2004). The First Person, Embodiment, and the Certainty That One Exists. The Monist 87 (4):475-488.
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  33.  89
    John Campbell (1982). Knowledge and Understanding. Philosophical Quarterly 32 (126):17-34.
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  34. John Campbell, 1. Acquaintance Vs. Knowledge of Truths.
    Suppose your conscious life were surgically excised, but everything else left intact, what would you miss? In this situation you would not have the slightest idea what was going on. You would have no idea what there is in the world around you; what the grounds are of the potentialities and threats are that you are negotiating. Experience of your surroundings provides you with knowledge of what is there: with your initial base of knowledge of what the things are that (...)
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  35.  98
    John Campbell (1997). The Simple View of Colour. In Alex Byrne & David Hilbert (eds.), Readings on Color. MIT Press 177-90.
    Physics tells us what is objectively there. It has no place for the colours of things. So colours are not objectively there. Hence, if there is such a thing at all, colour is mind-dependent. This argument forms the background to disputes over whether common sense makes a mistake about colours. It is assumed that..
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  36. John Campbell, An Interventionist Approach to Causation in Psychology by John Campbell.
    My project in this paper is to extend the interventionist analysis of causation to give an account of causation in psychology. Many aspects of empirical investigation into psychological causation fit straightforwardly into the interventionist framework. I address three problems. First, the problem of explaining what it is for a causal relation to be properly psychological rather than merely biological. Second, the problem of rational causation: how it is that reasons can be causes. Finally, I look at the implications of an (...)
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  37. John Campbell, Philosophical Lecture.
    Ir IS winmx HELD that the capacity for spatial thought depends upon the ability to refer to physical things. The argument is that the identification of places depends upon the identification of things; places in themselves are all very much alike and can be distinguished only by their spatial relations to things. So one could not so much as think about places unless one could think about things (Strawson, 1959). It has to be acknowledged that our identifications of places are (...)
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  38.  52
    John Campbell (2011). Origins of Objectivity. Journal of Philosophy 108 (5):269-285.
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  39. John Campbell (2011). Relational Vs Kantian Responses to Berkeley's Puzzle. In Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Perception, Causation, and Objectivity. Oxford University Press
     
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  40. John Campbell (2005). Precis of Reference and Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 126 (1):103-114.
  41.  84
    John Campbell (1993). The Role of Physical Objects in Spatial Thinking. In Naomi M. Eilan, R. McCarthy & M. W. Brewer (eds.), Problems in the Philosophy and Psychology of Spatial Representation. Blackwell
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  42.  18
    John Campbell (2001). Memory Demonstratives. In Christoph Hoerl & Teresa McCormark (eds.), Time and Memory. Oxford University Press 177--194.
  43.  23
    John L. Campbell, Paul Thomas, Neil Gross, Maureen Katz & Jonathon R. Zatlin (1998). Book Reviews. Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation. Neera Chandhoke, State and Civil Society. Explorations in Political Theory. Kevin Anderson, Lenin, Hegel and Western Marxism. A Critical Study. Stephen Turner, The Social Theory of Practices: Tradition, Tacit Knowledge, and Presuppositions. Joel Whitebook, Perversion and Utopia: A Study in Psychoanalysis and Critical Theory. John C. Torpey, Intellectuals, Socialism, and Dissent. The East German Opposition and its Legacy. [REVIEW] Theory and Society 27 (1):103-146.
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  44.  66
    John Campbell (1996). Shape Properties, Experience of Shape and Shape Concepts. Philosophical Issues 7:351-363.
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  45.  64
    John Campbell (1986). Conceptual Structure. In C. Travis (ed.), Meaning and Interpretation. Blackwell
    in Charles Travis (ed.), Meaning and Interpretation (Oxford and New York: Blackwell 1986), 159-174.
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  46. John Angus Campbell & Stephen C. Meyer (eds.) (2003). Darwinism, Design, and Public Education. Michigan State University Press.
  47. John Campbell (2010). Demonstrative Reference, the Relational View of Experience, and the Proximality Principle. In Robin Jeshion (ed.), New Essays on Singular Thought. OUP Oxford
     
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  48.  98
    John Campbell (2005). Molyneux's Question and Cognitive Impenetrability. In Athanassios Raftopoulos (ed.), Cognitive Penetrabiity of Perception: Attention, Strategies and Bottom-Up Constraints. New York: Nova Science
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  49.  15
    John Angus Campbell (1994). Of Orchids, Insects, and Natural Theology: Timing, Tactics, and Cultural Critique in Darwin's Post-?Origin? Strategy. [REVIEW] Argumentation 8 (1):63-80.
    This essay examines the relation of Darwin's orchids book to a central persuasive flaw in theOrigin: Its inability to give variation sufficient “presence” to break the hold of “design” in the mind of the reader. Darwin characterized the orchids book as “a flank movement on the enemy”; this essay identifies the “enemy” as Paley's natural theology and the “flank” as thetopoi, maxims, and habits of perception that led Darwin's colleagues and contemporaries to see design in nature. Moreover, this essay examines (...)
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  50. John Campbell (2008). Comment: Psychological Causation Without Physical Causation. In Kenneth S. Kendler & Josef Parnas (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry: Explanation, Phenomenology, and Nosology. Johns Hopkins University Press 184--195.
     
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