Search results for 'Candrakirti' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Eviatar Shulman (2010). The Commitments of a Madhyamaka Trickster: Innovation in Candrakīrti's Prasanna-Padā. [REVIEW] Journal of Indian Philosophy 38 (4):379-417.score: 18.0
    This paper challenges the notion that there is a complete continuity between the thought of Nāgārjuna and the thought of Candrakīrti. It is shown that there is strong reason to doubt Candrakīrti’s gloss of Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā (MMK) 2.1, and that Candrakīrti’s peculiar reading of this verse causes him to alter the context of the discussion in the four cases in which Nāgārjuna quotes MMK 2.1 later in the text—MMK 3.3, 7.14, 10.13 and 16.7. The innovation produced by Candrakīrti is next contrasted (...)
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  2. Anne MacDonald (2011). Who is That Masked Man? Candrakīrti's Opponent in Prasannapadā I 55.11–58.13. Journal of Indian Philosophy 39 (6):677-694.score: 18.0
    The paper aims to determine the identity of an unnamed opponent in a passage of the first chapter of the Prasannapadā whose school affiliation eluded traditional Tibetan scholars and is disputed by modern scholars. The individual(s) in question, whose fundamental ontological views are made evident in the passage’s opening objection as presented by Candrakīrti, has/have alternatively been identified as the Mādhyamika Bhāviveka, as representatives of the Naiyāyika school and, following Stcherbatsky, as Dignāga and/or later members of his epistemological-logical tradition. Although (...)
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  3. Sonam Thakchoe (2012). Candrakīrti’s Theory of Perception: A Case for Non-Foundationalist Epistemology in Madhyamaka. Acta Orientalia Vilnensia 11 (1):93-125.score: 12.0
    Some argue that Candrakīrti is committed to rejecting all theories of perception in virtue of the rejection of the foundationalisms of the Nyāya and the Pramāṇika. Others argue that Candrakīrti endorses the Nyāya theory of perception. In this paper, I will propose an alternative non-foundationalist theory of perception for Candrakīriti. I will show that Candrakrti’s works provide us sufficient evidence to defend a typical Prāsagika’s account of perception that, I argue, complements his core non-foundationalist ontology.
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  4. James Duerlinger (2008). Candrakīrti on the Theories of Persons of the Sāṃmitīyas and Āryasāṃmitīyas. Philosophy East and West 58 (4):pp. 446-469.score: 12.0
    Here it is argued, with the help of Tsongkhapa's interpretation of Candrakīrti's theory of persons, and on the basis of the character of Vasubandhu's encounter with the Pudgalavādins in the "Refutation of the Theory of Self," that in his Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya . Candrakīrti most likely identifies the theory of persons he attributes to the Sāṃmitīyas with the theory of persons Vasubandhu presents in the "Refutation," and the theory of persons he attributes to the Āryasāṃmitīyas with the Pudgalavādins' theory of persons, to (...)
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  5. Dan Arnold (2001). How to Do Things with Candrakirti: A Comparative Study in Anti-Skepticism. Philosophy East and West 51 (2):247-279.score: 12.0
    Two strikingly similar critiques of epistemological foundationalism are examined: J. L. Austin's critique of A. J. Ayer in the former's "Sense and Sensibilia," and part of Candrakīrti's critique of Dignāga in the first chapter of the "Prasannapadā." With respect to Austin, it is argued that his writings on epistemology in fact relate quite closely to his better-known philosophy of speech acts, and that the appeal to ordinary language is part of a transcendental argument against the possibility of radical skepticism. It (...)
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  6. Sonam Thakchoe (2013). Prāsaṅgika Epistemology: A Reply to Stag Tsang's Charge Against Tsongkhapa's Uses of Pramāṇa in Candrakīrti's Philosophy. [REVIEW] Journal of Indian Philosophy 41 (5):535-561.score: 12.0
    Stag tsang, amongst others, has argued that any use of mundane pramāṇa—authoritative cognition—is incompatible with the Prāsaṅgika system. His criticism of Tsongkhapa’s interpretation of Candrakīrti’s Madhyamaka which insists on the uses of pramāṇa (tha snyad pa’i tshad ma)—authoritative cognition—within the Prāsaṅgika philosophical context is that it is contradictory and untenable. This paper is my defence of Tsongkhapa’s approach to pramāṇa in the Prāsaṅgika philosophy. By showing that Tsongkhapa consistently adopts a non-foundationalist approach in his interpretation of the Prāsaṅgika’s epistemology, and (...)
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  7. Jay L. Garfield & Jan Westerhoff (2011). Acquiring the Notion of a Dependent Designation: A Response to Douglas L. Berger. Philosophy East and West 61 (2):365-367.score: 9.0
    In a recent issue of Philosophy East and West Douglas Berger defends a new reading of Mūlamadhyamakakārikā XXIV : 18, arguing that most contemporary translators mistranslate the important term prajñaptir upādāya, misreading it as a compound indicating "dependent designation" or something of the sort, instead of taking it simply to mean "this notion, once acquired." He attributes this alleged error, pervasive in modern scholarship, to Candrakīrti, who, Berger correctly notes, argues for the interpretation he rejects.Berger's analysis, and the reading of (...)
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  8. Krishna Del Toso (2007). Kārya and Kāraṇa in Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikās. AION 67:137-156.score: 9.0
    In this paper, Nāgārjuna’s philosophical interpretation of the terms kāraṇa and kārya is analysed after having methodologically confined the specific field of interest to the MMK. From the study of all the occurrences of kāraṇa and kārya in the MMK (listed in paragraph 2), it emerges that Nāgārjuna makes use of these two terms to refer to skandhas as causes (kāraṇa) of further skandhas as effects (kārya), hence conveying with this words the idea of, so to speak, subjectivity and (re)birth. (...)
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  9. Jay L. Garfield (2008). Turning a Madhyamaka Trick: Reply to Huntington. [REVIEW] Journal of Indian Philosophy 36 (4):507-527.score: 9.0
    Huntington (2007); argues that recent commentators (Robinson, 1957; Hayes, 1994; Tillemans, 1999; Garfield and Priest, 2002) err in attributing to Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti a commitment to rationality and to the use of argument, and that these commentators do violence to the Madhyamaka project by using rational reconstruction in their interpretation of Nāgārjuna’s and Candrakīrti’s texts. Huntington argues instead that mādhyamikas reject reasoning, distrust logic and do not offer arguments. He also argues that interpreters ought to recuse themselves from argument (...)
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  10. William L. Ames (1982). The Notion of Svabhāva in the Thought of Candrakīrti. Journal of Indian Philosophy 10 (2):161-177.score: 9.0
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  11. R. A. F. Thurman (1980). Philosophical Nonegocentrism in Wittgenstein and Candrakīrti in Their Treatment of the Private Language Problem. Philosophy East and West 30 (3):321-337.score: 9.0
  12. Peter G. Fenner (1983). Candrakīrti's Refutation of Buddhist Idealism. Philosophy East and West 33 (3):251-261.score: 9.0
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  13. James Duerlinger (1984). Candrakīrti's Denial of the Self. Philosophy East and West 34 (3):261-272.score: 9.0
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  14. Robert F. Olson (1974). Candrakīrti's Critique of Vijñānavāda. Philosophy East and West 24 (4):405-411.score: 9.0
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  15. James Duerlinger (2008). Candrakirti on the Theories of Persons of the Sammitiyas and Aryasammitiyas. Philosophy East and West 58 (4):446.score: 9.0
     
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  16. F. J. Hoffman (1983). Mervyn Sprung, in Collaboration with T. R. V. Murti and U. S. Vyas. Lucid Exposition of the Middle Way: The Essential Chapters From the Prasannapadā of Candrakīrti. Pp. 283. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979.) £7.50. [REVIEW] Religious Studies 19 (1):119.score: 9.0
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  17. M. P. Marathe (1980). Nagarjuna and Candrakirti on Sunyata. Indian Philosophical Quarterly 7:531-540.score: 9.0
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  18. D. Prithipaul (1982). Candrakïrti, Lucid Exposition of the Middle Way Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 2 (6):268-270.score: 9.0
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  19. Mattia Salvini (2011). Upādāyaprajñaptiḥ and the Meaning of Absolutives: Grammar and Syntax in the Interpretation of Madhyamaka. [REVIEW] Journal of Indian Philosophy 39 (3):229-244.score: 9.0
    The article discusses the relevance of the syntactical implications of the absolutive ending (lyabanta) in interpreting the Madhyamaka term upādāyaprajñapti, and hence Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 18.24. The views of both Sanskrit and Pāli classical grammarians are taken into account, and a comparison is made between some contemporary English translations of MMK 18.24 as against Candrakīrti’s commentary. The conclusion suggests that Candrakīrti is grammatically accurate and perceptive, that he may have been aware of the tradition of Candragomin’s grammar, and that the structural analogy (...)
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  20. Kevin Vose (2010). Authority in Early Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka. Journal of Indian Philosophy 38 (6):553-582.score: 9.0
    This paper examines the role of pramāṇa in Jayānanda’s commentary to Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatāra. As the only extant Indian commentary on any of Candrakīrti’s works (available only in Tibetan translation), written in the twelfth century when Candrakīrti’s interpretation of Madhyamaka first became widely valued, Jayānanda’s Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā is crucial to our understanding of early Prāsaṅgika thought. In the portions of his text examined here, Jayānanda offers a pointed critique of both svatantra inferences and the broader Buddhist epistemological movement. In developing this critique, (...)
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  21. Jan Westerhoff, Jay Garfield, Tom Tillemans, Graham Priest, Georges Dreyfus, Sonam Thakchoe, Guy Newland, Mark Siderits, Brownwyn Finnigan & Koji Tanaka (2011). Moonshadows. Conventional Truth in Buddhist Philosophy. Oxford University Press.score: 9.0
    The doctrine of the two truths - a conventional truth and an ultimate truth - is central to Buddhist metaphysics and epistemology. The two truths (or two realities), the distinction between them, and the relation between them is understood variously in different Buddhist schools; it is of special importance to the Madhyamaka school. One theory is articulated with particular force by Nagarjuna (2nd ct CE) who famously claims that the two truths are identical to one another and yet distinct. One (...)
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  22. Jan Westerhoff (2007). The Madhyamaka Concept of Svabhāva: Ontological and Cognitive Aspects. Asian Philosophy 17 (1):17 – 45.score: 6.0
    This paper considers the philosophical interpretation of the concept of svabhāva, sometimes translated as 'inherent existence' or 'own-being', in the Madyamaka school of Buddhist philosophy. It is argued that svabhāva must be understood as having two different conceptual dimensions, an ontological and a cognitive one. The ontological dimension of svabhāva shows it to play a particular part in theories investigating the most fundamental constituents of the world. Three different understandings of svabhāva are discussed under this heading: svabhāva understood as essence, (...)
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  23. Jay L. Garfield (2006). The Conventional Status of Reflexive Awareness: What's at Stake in a Tibetan Debate? Philosophy East and West 56 (2):201-228.score: 6.0
    ‘Ju Mipham Rinpoche, (1846-1912) an important figure in the _Ris med_, or non- sectarian movement influential in Tibet in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries, was an unusual scholar in that he was a prominent _Nying ma_ scholar and _rDzog_ _chen_ practitioner with a solid dGe lugs education. He took dGe lugs scholars like Tsong khapa and his followers seriously, appreciated their arguments and positions, but also sometimes took issue with them directly. In his commentary to Candrak¥rti’s _Madhyamakåvatåra, _Mi (...)
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  24. Jonardon Ganeri (2004). An Irrealist Theory of Self. Harvard Review of Philosophy 12 (1):61-80.score: 6.0
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  25. James B. Apple (2013). An Early Tibetan Commentary on Atiśa's Satyadvayāvatāra. [REVIEW] Journal of Indian Philosophy 41 (3):263-329.score: 6.0
    Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna (982–1054 c.e.), more commonly known under his honorific title of Atiśa, is a renowned figure in Tibetan Buddhist cultural memory. He is famous for coming to Tibet and revitalizing Buddhism there during the early eleventh century. Of the many works that Atiśa composed, translated, and brought to Tibet one of the most well-known was his “Entry to the Two Realities” (Satyadvayāvatāra). Recent scholarship has provided translations and Tibetan editions of this work, including Lindtner’s English translation (1981) and Ejima’s Japanese (...)
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  26. James B. Apple (2013). An Early Tibetan Commentary on Atiśa's Satyadvayāvatāra: Diplomatic Edition with Introduction and Notes. [REVIEW] Journal of Indian Philosophy 41 (5):501-533.score: 6.0
    An earlier article (Apple, J Indian Philos 41(3): 263–329, 2013) identified for the first time a brief Tibetan commentary to Atiśa Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna’s (982–1054 c.e.) well-known “Entry to the Two Realities” (Satyadvayāvatāra) and provided an annotated translation of the work. This article provides an annotated diplomatic edition of the Tibetan commentary. The manuscript of the commentary is a facsimile reprint located in the recently published “Collected Works of the Bka’-gdams-pas” (bka’ gdams gsung ’bum). The early Tibetan commentary to Atiśa’s Satyadvayāvatāra provides (...)
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  27. Mattia Salvini (forthcoming). Dependent Arising, Non-Arising, and the Mind: MMK1 and the Abhidharma. Journal of Indian Philosophy:1-27.score: 6.0
    The first Chapter of Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā offers a critique of causation that includes the Abhidharmic category of the ‘four conditions’. Following the South-Asian commentarial tradition, this article discusses the precise relationship between Madhyamaka philosophy and its fundamental Abhidharmic background. What comes to light is a more precise assessment of Madhyamaka ideas about viable conventions, understood as the process of dependent arising. Since this is primarily in the sense of conceptual dependence, it involves sentiency as a necessary causal element, and the (...)
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  28. Bronwyn Finnigan (2010-11). Buddhist Meta-Ethics. Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 33 (1-2):267-297.score: 3.0
    In this paper I argue for the importance of pursuing Buddhist Meta-Ethics. Most contemporary studies of the nature of Buddhist Ethics proceed in isolation from the highly sophisticated epistemological theories developed within the Buddhist tradition. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that an intimate relationship holds between ethics and epistemology in Buddhism. To show this, I focus on Damien Keown's influential virtue ethical theorisation of Buddhist Ethics and demonstrate the conflicts that arise when it is brought into dialogue (...)
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  29. Jay Garfield (2010). Taking Conventional Truth Seriously: Authority Regarding Deceptive Reality. Philosophy East and West 60 (3):341 - 354.score: 3.0
    Mädhyamika philosophers in India and Tibet distinguish between two truths: the conventional and the ultimate. It is difficult, however, to say in what sense conventional truth is indeed a truth, as opposed to falsehood. Indeed, many passages in prominent texts suggest that it is entirely false. It is explained here in the sense in which, for Candrakïrti and Tsong khapa, conventional truth is truth.
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  30. Adrian Kuzminski (2007). Pyrrhonism and the Mādhyamaka. Philosophy East and West 57 (4):482-511.score: 3.0
    : The question of possible Indian influence on Pyrrhonist skepticism was raised long ago by Diogenes Laertius in his biography of Pyrrho. Diogenes tells us that Pyrrho adopted his "most noble philosophy" as a result of his contacts with Indian sages when he accompanied Alexander the Great on his expedition in the fourth century B.C.E. Most modern Western scholars have downplayed Diogenes’ claim as unsubstantiated, but the striking parallels to be found in subsequent ancient Pyrrhonist and Mādhyamaka texts suggest its (...)
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  31. D. S. Duckworth (2010). Mipam's Middle Way Through Yogācāra and Prāsaṅgika. Journal of Indian Philosophy 38 (4):431-439.score: 3.0
    In Tibet, the negative dialectics of Madhyamaka are typically identified with Candrakīrti’s interpretation of Nāgārjuna, and systematic epistemology is associated with Dharmakīrti. These two figures are also held to be authoritative commentators on a univocal doctrine of Buddhism. Despite Candrakīrti’s explicit criticism of Buddhist epistemologists in his Prasannapadā, Buddhists in Tibet have integrated the theories of Candrakīrti and Dharmakīrti in unique ways. Within this integration, there is a tension between the epistemological system-building on the one hand, and “deconstructive” negative dialectics (...)
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  32. Douglas L. Berger (2010). Acquiring Emptiness: Interpreting Nāgārjuna's Mmk 24:18. Philosophy East and West 60 (1):pp. 40-64.score: 3.0
    A pivotal focus of exegesis of Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārïkā (MMK) for the past half century has been the attempt to decipher the text's philosophy of language, and determine how this best aids us in characterizing Madhyamaka thought as a whole. In this vein, MMK 24:18 has been judged of particular weight insofar as it purportedly insists that the concepts pratītyasamutpāda (conditioned co-arising) and śūnyatā (emptiness), both indispensable to Buddhist praxis, are themselves only "nominal" or "conventional," that is, they are merely labels (...)
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  33. Dan Arnold (2012). The Deceptive Simplicity of Nāgārjuna's Arguments Against Motion: Another Look at Mūlamadhyamakakārikā Chapter 2. [REVIEW] Journal of Indian Philosophy 40 (5):553-591.score: 3.0
    This article – which includes a complete translation of Mūlamadhyamakakārikā chapter 2 together with Candrakīrti’s commentary thereon – argues that notwithstanding the many different and often arcane interpretations that have been offered of Nāgārjuna’s arguments against motion, there is really just one straightforward kind of argument on offer in this vexed chapter. It is further argued that this basic argument can be understood as a philosophically interesting one if it is kept in mind that the argument essentially has to do (...)
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  34. Donald S. Lopez (1988). Do Śrāvakas Understand Emptiness? Journal of Indian Philosophy 16 (1):65-105.score: 3.0
    The present study has attempted to artriculate a central issue of Mahäyäna soteriology through an examination of the writings of two Mädhyamika masters, Bhävaviveka and Candrakïrti. The purpose here has been to demonstrate a further criterion for the retrospective designation of their respective philosophies with the terms “Svātantrika” and “Prasangika” an exhaustive study of the nature of the Hinayäna wisdom according to the Mädhyamika school would entail an analysis of the writings of many other masters, especially those who produced what (...)
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  35. Stephen David Ross (2010). Empty Self. International Studies in Philosophy Monograph Series:233-268.score: 3.0
    Zen-Buddhist nothingness is the nowhere is there something that is I, or conversely: the I that is the nowhere is there something. (Hisamatsu, FN, 25-26; quoted and trans. in Stambaugh, FS, 76)... it is empty of being. That means that it is beyond all measure ....... it is empty without emptiness. That means that it does not cling to itself.... it possesses nothing. That means that it doesn't possess and also cannot be possessed. (Hisamatsu, FN, 31; quoted and trans. in (...)
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  36. Chizuko Yoshimizu (2013). Zhang Thang Sag Pa ʼbyung Gnas Ye Shes, Dbu Ma Tshig Gsal Gyi Ti Ka. Toyo Bunko.score: 3.0
    pt. 1. Folios 1a-26a3 on Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā ad Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 1.1.
     
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