We propose an analysis of the notion of model as crucially related to the notion of point of view. A model in this sense would always suggest a certain way of looking at a real system, a certain way of thinking about it and a certain way of acting upon it. We focus on System Dynamics as a paradigmatic case with respect to many of the features and problems we can find in the field of modelling and simulation. We analyse (...) in detail some of those features. All of them would be present in many other cases of construction and use of models. Furthermore, they would support the thesis that a model can be fruitfully understood as offering a point of view capable of improving our own points of view over a certain system. The point of view offered by the model could include both non-conceptual and conceptual contents, it would have a complex structure and behaviour, and it would have direct consequences on the decisions made by the subjects adopting that point of view. (shrink)
`Houto') and XYZ (or whatever) in an alternative world (call it `Ekeino') being different stuffs. Of course the example is not by itself that important, since many other cases could be invented. Still, in the same way as that famous example has served to buttress Putnam's dictum about meaning not being in the head, the example's weakness detract plausibility from that sort of considerations. Now in fact there are such weaknesses. If the aquatic stuff in Houto is quite similar to (...) the one in Ekeino, they are linked by the same causal chains to any other things and events in their respective worlds. Then their different composition may be held to be immaterial for individuation (in fact that point has been made by some authors). That stuff may be thought to be composed by molecules of 2O in Houto and by molecules (or parts) of XYZ in Ekeino. (shrink)
This paper is about perception and its objects. My aim is to suggest a new way to articulate some of the central ideas of direct realism. Sections 1 and 2 offer from different perspectives a panoramic view of the main problems and options in the philosophy of perception. Section 3 introduces the notion of “camouflage” as an interesting and promising alternative in order to explain the nature of the intentional objects of perception. Finally, section 4 makes use of this new (...) notion in the analysis of the relationships between the intentionality of perception, the intentionality of thought, and the intentionality of language. (shrink)
Disjunctivism in philosophy of perception maintains that whereas veridical perceptions are relational states involving objects of the external world, illusions and hallucinations are non-relational states of the subjects. Veridical and non veridical perceptions could be subjectively indistinguishable, but this fact would not be able to support fundamental psychological explanations. Disjunctivism has to face some important problems. The aim of this paper is to explore a peculiar elaboration of disjunctivism able to face them. Our proposal intends to be substantive, offering a (...) counterfactual explanation of the differences between veridicaland non veridical perceptions. We will arrive to an a posteriori disjunctivism for some relevant types of perceptual experiences. The a posteriori character of our position will be consequent with the external nature of the intentional objects of veridical perceptions. But our disjunctivism will be concerned only with types of perceptual experiences. That way, it could make room for many sorts of internalist psychological explanations in the context of a general disjunctivist approach. (shrink)
We propose an analysis of the notion of model as crucially related to the notion of point of view. A model in this sense would always suggest a certain way of looking at a real system, a certain way of thinking about it and a certain way of acting upon it. We focus on System Dynamics as a paradigmatic case with respect to many of the features and problems we can find in the field of modelling and simulation. We analyse (...) in detail some of those features. All of them would be present in many other cases of construction and use of models. Furthermore, they would support the thesis that a model can be fruitfully understood as offering a point of view capable of improving our own points of view over a certain system. The point of view offered by the model could include both non-conceptual and conceptual contents, it would have a complex structure and behaviour, and it would have direct consequences on the decisions made by the subjects adopting that point of view. (shrink)
Manuel Liz (2001). New Physical Properties. In Tian Yu Cao (ed.), The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 10: Philosophy of Science. Philosophy Doc Ctr.score: 30.0
Discussions on physicalism, reduction, special sciences, the layered image of reality, multiple realizability, emergence, downward causation, and so forth, typically make the ontological presupposition that there is no room for new properties in the physical world. It is my purpose in this paper to explore the alternative hypothesis that there can be—and in fact are—new physical properties. In the first section, I will propose a brief analysis of the notions of property, physical property, and new physical property. In the second (...) section, I will present four general situations in which it would be plausible to speak of the existence of new physical properties. All of that will be used to evaluate the content and scope of the hypothesis of physical novelty. Finally, in the third section, I will examine certain very interesting and promising consequences of such a physical novelty in relation to some of the topics above mentioned. (shrink)
The aim of this paper is to focus on the phenomenon of selective attention as pointing out important psychological cases where it is arguable that we can have practical reasons without the capacity to carry out any relevant inference. Selective attention also would serve to show the possibility to have very basic demonstrative references to particular perceptual items without the possession of any concept. I will argue that if we assume 1) that believing can be taken as a kind of (...) action and 2) that demonstrative references to particular empirical items in that so basic sense have an important epistemological role in all of our knowledge, then our conclusions would have a very large application. There would be reasons without inferences not only for acting but also for believing, anddemonstrative reference without concepts would be an uneliminable component of our knowledge. (shrink)
In this paper, we analyze a way of valuing positively something which rarely has been taking into account in the literature: to value positively something because it could be valued positively by someone else. The main features of that way of valuing something are really very suggesting. Here, we would not have instrumental valuations, nor valuations directly sensitive to intrinsic values either. However, there would be cases in which valuations made in that way would make us able to detect things (...) that can be valued in an inconditional way. When we imagine or conceive what could be value positively, our motivational structures face us with something that is valued without evaluative conditions and, therefore, with something that is a good candidate to have an intrinsic value. (shrink)
The main starting point of many of the contributions collected into the book is the kind of Twin Earth considerations, along with meaning individualism. Is Putnam's claim about water in this world and a stuff in an alternative world being different materials?. Is meaning in the head? One seems allowed to be skeptical about the starting point of the debate between such as emphasize broad content and those who think that the basic semantic entities are narrow contents, which would fail (...) to be world-dependent or world-oriented. The kind of motivations prompting the essays collected into the book are likely to be regarded as in need of a deeper elucidation by such as have been more or less influenced by Quine. Pettit & McDowell's collection of essays is one of the books most scholars interested in the confines of philosophy of language and philosophy of mind will find worth reading. (shrink)
On December 9, 1999, VA Linux issued shares to the public and left over $900 million on the table for investors. In the prospectus, the investment banker Credit Suisse First Boston (CSFB) stated it would receive a 7% gross spread as its compensation for underwriting the shares. Yet the SEC alleges some investors paid enormous commissions to CSFB in the form of a kick-back immediately after obtaining the IPO shares. Hence, CSFB had an economic interest in the IPO and there (...) was not a full distribution of shares. This apparent violation of NASD Rule 2110 raises questions as to the credibility of the financial markets. (shrink)
We present three arguments regarding the limits to rationality, prediction, and control in economics, based on Morgenstern's analysis of the Holmes-Moriarty problem. The first uses a standard metamathematical theorem on computability to indicate logical limits to forecasting the future. The second provides possible nonconvergence for Bayesian forecasting in infinite dimensional space. The third shows the impossibility of a computer perfectly forecasting an economy with agents knowing its forecasting program. Thus, economic order is partly the product of something other than calculative (...) rationality. The joint presentation of these existing results should introduce the reader to implications of these concepts for certain shared concerns of Keynes and Hayek. (shrink)
