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Carl Ginet [78]Carl Allen Ginet [1]
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Profile: Carl Ginet (Cornell University)
  1. Carl Ginet (1990). On Action. Cambridge University Press.
    This book deals with foundational issues in the history of the nature of action, the intentionality of action, the compatibility of freedom of action with determinism, and the explanation of action. Ginet's is a volitional view: that every action has as its core a "simple" mental action. He develops a sophisticated account of the individuation of actions and also propounds a challenging version of the view that freedom of action is incompatible with determinism.
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  2. Carl Ginet (1996). In Defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: Why I Don't Find Frankfurt's Argument Convincing. Philosophical Perspectives 10:403-17.
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  3.  56
    Carl Ginet (1975). Knowledge, Perception, and Memory. D. Reidel Pub. Co..
    INTRODUCTION . What is it to know that something is the case? What am I saying when I say, 'I know that the temperature outside is below freezing' or 'I ...
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  4. Carl Ginet (2001). Deciding to Believe. In Matthias Steup (ed.), Knowledge, Truth and Duty. Oxford University Press 63-76.
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  5.  80
    Carl Ginet (2006). Working with Fischer and Ravizza's Account of Moral Responsibility. Journal of Ethics 10 (3):229-253.
    This paper examines the account of guidance control given in Fischer and Ravizza's book, Responsibility and Control, with the aim of revising it so as to make it a better account of what needs to be added to having alternatives open to yield a specification of the control condition for responsibility that will be acceptable to an adherent of the principle that one is responsible for something only if one could have avoided it.
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  6.  64
    Carl Ginet (2002). Book Review. Living Without Free Will. Derk Pereboom. [REVIEW] Journal of Ethics 6 (3):305-309.
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  7. Carl Ginet (2008). In Defense of a Non-Causal Account of Reasons Explanations. Journal of Ethics 12 (3/4):229 - 237.
    This paper defends my claim in earlier work that certain non-causal conditions are sufficient for the truth of some reasons explanations of actions, against the critique of this claim given by Randolph Clarke in his book, Libertarian Accounts of Free Will.
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  8.  92
    Carl Ginet (1997). Freedom, Responsibility, and Agency. Journal of Ethics 1 (1):85-98.
    This paper first distinguishes three alternative views that adherents to both incompatibilism and PAP may take as to what constitutes an agent''s determining or controlling her action (if it''s not the action''s being deterministically caused by antecedent events): the indeterministic-causation view, the agent-causation view, and "simple indeterminism." The bulk of the paper focusses on the dispute between simple indeterminism - the view that the occurrence of a simple mental event is determined by its subject if it possesses the "actish" phenomenal (...)
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  9. Carl Ginet (2002). Review of Pereboom's Living Without Free Will. [REVIEW] Journal of Ethics 6:305-309.
     
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  10.  29
    Carl Ginet (2004). Trying to Act. In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & David Shier (eds.), Freedom and Determinism. MIT Press
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  11.  58
    Carl Ginet (2000). The Epistemic Requirements for Moral Responsibility. Noûs 34 (s14):267 - 277.
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  12. Carl Ginet (1966). Might We Have No Choice? In Keith Lehrer (ed.), Freedom and Determinisim. Random House 87--104.
  13. William P. Alston, Laurence Bonjour, Carl Ginet, Alvin I. Goldman, John Greco, George I. Mavrodes, Philip L. Quinn, Alessandra Tanesini, Nicholas Wolterstorff & Linda Zagzebski (2005). Perspectives on the Philosophy of William P. Alston. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    One of the most influential analytic philosophers of the late twentieth century, William P. Alston is a leading light in epistemology, philosophy of religion, and the philosophy of language. In this volume, twelve leading philosophers critically discuss the central topics of his work in these areas, including perception, epistemic circularity, justification, the problem of religious diversity, and truth.
     
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  14.  71
    Carl Ginet (2007). An Action Can Be Both Uncaused and Up to the Agent. In Lumer (ed.), Intentionality, Deliberation, and Autonomy. Ashgate 243--255.
  15. Carl Ginet (2005). Infinitism is Not the Answer to the Regress Problem. In Matthias Steup & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell
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  16. Carl Ginet (2010). Self-Evidence. Logos and Episteme 54 (2):325-352.
    ABSTRACT: This paper develops an account of what it is for a proposition to be self- evident to someone, based on the idea that certain propositions are such that to fully understand them is to believe them. It argues that when a proposition p is self-evident to one, one has non-inferential a priori justification for believing that p and, a welcome feature, a justification that does not involve exercising any special sort of intuitive faculty; if, in addition, it is true (...)
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  17. Carl Ginet & David Palmer (2010). On Mele and Robb's Indeterministic Frankfurt-Style Case. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):440-446.
    Alfred Mele and David Robb (1998, 2003) offer what they claim is a counter-example to the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP), the principle that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. In their example, a person makes a decision by his own indeterministic causal process though antecedent circumstances ensure he could not have done otherwise. Specifically, a simultaneously occurring process in him would deterministically cause the decision at the precise time (...)
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  18.  72
    Carl Ginet (1989). Reasons Explanation of Action: An Incompatibilist Account. Philosophical Perspectives 3:17-46.
  19.  27
    Carl Ginet (1985). Contra Reliabilism. The Monist 68 (2):175-187.
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  20.  77
    Carl Ginet (1962). Can the Will Be Caused? Philosophical Review 71 (January):49-55.
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  21.  36
    Carl Ginet (2004). Intentionally Doing and Intentionally Not Doing. Philosophical Topics 32 (1/2):95-110.
  22.  2
    Carl Ginet (forthcoming). Reasons Explanation: Further Defense of a Non-Causal Account. Journal of Ethics:1-10.
    If moral responsibility requires uncaused action, as I believe, and if a reasons explanation of an action must be a causal explanation, as many philosophers of action suppose, then it follows that our responsible actions are ones we do for no reason, which is preposterous. In previous work I have argued against the second premise of this deduction, claiming that the statement that a person did A in order to satisfy their desire D will be true if the person, while (...)
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  23. Carl Ginet (2003). Libertarianism. In Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press 587-612.
     
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  24. Carl Ginet (1992). The Dispositionalist Solution to Wittgenstein's Problem About Understanding a Rule: Answering Kripke's Objection. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 17 (1):53-73.
    The paper explicates a version of dispositionalism and defends it against Kripke's objections (in his "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language") that 1) it leaves out the normative aspect of a rule, 2) it cannot account for the directness of the knowledge one has of what one meant, and 3) regarding rules for computable functions of numbers, a) there are numbers beyond one's capacity to consider and b) there are people who are disposed to make systematic mistakes in computing values (...)
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  25.  70
    Carl Ginet (1983). In Defense of Incompatibilism. Philosophical Studies 44 (November):391-400.
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  26.  33
    Carl Ginet (1980). The Conditional Analysis of Freedom. In P. Van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause: Essays Presented to Richard Taylor. Reidel 171-186.
  27. Carl Ginet (2002). Reasons Explanations of Action: Causalist Versus Noncausalist Accounts. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook on Free Will. Oxford University Press 386-405.
  28.  10
    Carl Ginet (2002). Living Without Free Will by Derk Pereboom. Journal of Ethics 6 (3):305-309.
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  29.  43
    Carl Ginet (1979). Performativity. Linguistics and Philosophy 3 (2):245 - 265.
  30.  42
    Carl Ginet (1988). The Fourth Condition. In D. F. Austin (ed.), Philosophical Analysis. Kluwer 105--117.
  31.  26
    Carl Ginet (1980). Knowing Less by Knowing More. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):151-162.
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  32.  11
    Carl Ginet (2005). Infinitism is Not the Solution to the Regress Problem. In Steup Matthias & Sosa Ernest (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell 140--149.
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  33.  25
    Carl Ginet (1995). Review: Comments on Plantinga's Two-Volume Work on Warrant. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (2):403 - 408.
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  34.  30
    Scott MacDonald, John Martin Fischer, Carl Ginet, Joseph Margolis, Mark Case, Elie Noujain, Robert Kane & Derk Pereboom (2000). Excerpts From John Martin Fischer's Discussion with Members of the Audience. Journal of Ethics 4 (4):408 - 417.
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  35.  40
    Carl Ginet (1970). What Must Be Added to Knowing to Obtain Knowing That One Knows? Synthese 21 (2):163 - 186.
  36.  17
    Carl Ginet (1988). The Fourth Condition. In D. F. Austin (ed.), Philosophical Analysis. Kluwer 105--117.
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  37.  36
    Carl Ginet (1999). Qualia and Private Language. Philosophical Topics 26 (1/2):121-38.
  38.  24
    Carl Ginet (1986). Voluntary Exertion of the Body: A Volitional Account. Theory and Decision 20 (3):223-45.
  39.  23
    Carl Ginet (1988). The Fourth Condition. In D. F. Austin (ed.), Philosophical Analysis. Kluwer 105--117.
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  40.  32
    Carl Ginet (1990). Justification. Journal of Philosophical Research 15:93-107.
    This paper argues that a fact which constitutes part of a subject’s being justified in adopting an action or a belief at a particular time need not be part of what induced the subject to adopt that action or belief but it must be something to which the subject had immediate access. It argues that similar points hold for justification of the involuntary acquisition of a belief and for the justification of continuing a belief (actively or dispositionally.).
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  41.  47
    Carl Ginet & Sydney Shoemaker (eds.) (1983). Knowledge and Mind: Essays Presented to Norman Malcolm. Oxford Univresity Press.
  42. Syndey Shoemaker & Carl Ginet (eds.) (1983). Knowledge and Mind. Oxford University Press.
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  43.  12
    Carl Ginet (1983). Four Difficulties with Dretske's Theory of Knowledge. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):69-70.
    Four difficulties with Dretske's theory of knowledge .
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  44.  5
    Carl Ginet (1985). Plantinga and the Philosophy of Mind. In James Tomberlin & Peter van Ingwagen (eds.), Alvin Plantinga. 199-224.
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  45.  24
    Carl Ginet (2000). The Works of Agency. Philosophical Review 109 (4):632-635.
  46.  31
    Carl Ginet (2005). Comments on Alfred Mele, Motivation and Agency – Discussion. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 123 (3):261 - 272.
  47.  21
    Carl Ginet (1984). Book Review. Actions. Jennifer Hornsby. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 93 (1):120-26.
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  48.  32
    Carl Ginet (2008). Book Review. Teleological Realism. Scott Sehon. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):736–740.
  49.  10
    Carl Ginet (2010). Réplica a Comesaña. Veritas: Revista de Filosofia da PUCRS 55 (2):24-32.
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  50.  18
    Carl Ginet (1992). Causal Theories in Epistemology. In Jonathan Dancy & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Blackwell's A Companion to Epistemology. Blackwell
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