36 found
Order:
See also:
Profile: Carlos Moya
  1. Carlos J. Moya (2007). Moral Responsibility Without Alternative Possibilities? Journal of Philosophy 104 (9):475-486.
  2.  12
    Carlos J. Moya (2011). On the Very Idea of a Robust Alternative. Critica 43 (128):3 - 26.
    According to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), an agent is morally responsible for an action of hers only if she could have done otherwise. The notion of a robust alternative plays a prominent role in recent attacks on PAP based on so-called Frankfurt cases. In this paper I defend the truth of PAP for blameworthy actions against Frankfurt cases recently proposed by Derk Pereboom and David Widerker. My defence rests on some intuitively plausible principles that yield a new understanding (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  3.  8
    Carlos J. Moya (forthcoming). Frankfurtian Reflections: A Critical Discussion of Robert Lockie’s “Three Recent Frankfurt Cases”. Philosophia:1-21.
    In a recent article, Robert Lockie brings about a critical examination of three Frankfurtstyle cases designed by David Widerker and Derk Pereboom. His conclusion is that these cases do not refute either the Principle of Alternative Possibilities or some cognate leeway principle for moral responsibility. Though I take the conclusion to be true, I contend that Lockie's arguments do not succeed in showing it. I concentrate on Pereboom's Tax Evasion 2. After presenting Pereboom's example and analyzing its structure, I distinguish (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4.  40
    Carlos J. Moya (1996). Naturalism and Normativity. Theoria 11 (3):239-240.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5.  11
    Carlos J. Moya (2004). La Nau Del Coneixement. Theoria 19 (3):357-359.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6.  8
    Carlos J. Moya, Alvarez. 2010. Kinds of Reasons. An Essay in the Philosophy of Action.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7.  11
    Carlos J. Moya (2006). Moran on Self-Knowledge, Agency and Responsibility (Richard Moran: Autoconocimiento, Agencia y Responsabilidad). Critica 38 (114):3 - 20.
    In this paper I deal with Richard Moran's account of self-knowledge in his book Authority and Estrangement. After presenting the main lines of his account, I contend that, in spite of its novelty and interest, it may have some shortcomings. Concerning beliefs formed through deliberation, the account would seem to face problems of circularity or regress. And it looks also wanting concerning beliefs not formed in this way. I go on to suggest a diagnosis of these problems, according to which (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  8.  26
    Carlos J. Moya (2011). Kinds of Reasons. An Essay in the Philosophy of Action - by Maria Alvarez. [REVIEW] Theoria 26 (2):245-247.
  9.  12
    Carlos J. Moya (2009). Alternativas, responsabilidad Y respuesta a razones. Ideas Y Valores 58 (141):45-65.
    El objetivo del presente trabajo es defender el Principio de posibilidades alternativas (ppa) frente a dos recientes supuestos contraejemplos a éste, inspirados en el que diseñó, hace ya cuarenta años, Harry Frankfurt. Las tres primeras secciones resumen el estado de la cuestión. A partir de la cuar..
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10.  22
    Carlos J. Moya (1998). Boghossian's Reduction of Compatibilism. Philosophical Issues 9:243-251.
  11.  11
    Carlos J. Moya (2009). Alternatives, Responsibility, and Reasons-Responsiveness. Ideas Y Valores 58 (141):45-65.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12.  6
    Carlos J. Moya (1997). Libertad, responsabilidad y razones morales. Isegoría 17:59-71.
    Sila elección está causada por factores ajenos a la voluntad del agente, la libertad y la responsabilidad moral parecen perder su base. Pero si la elección carece de causas, se convierte en un acto irracional y, con ello, irresponsable. La salida de este dilema consiste en advertir la importancia de las razones morales en la deliberación práctica. De acuerdo con la tesis central del presente trabajo, la sensibilidad hacia las razones morales es una condición necesaria de la libertad y la (...)
    Translate
      Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  13.  30
    Carlos J. Moya (1997). Was Descartes an Individualist? A Critical Discussion of W. Ferraiolo's" Individualism and Descartes". Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 16 (2):77-85.
  14.  22
    Carlos J. Moya (1998). Justificación, Causalidad Y Acción Intencional (Justification, Causality and Intentional Action). Theoria 13 (2):349-365.
    Tanto las teorías causales como las teorías no causales de la acción consideran la relación de justificación entre razones y acción como una relación no causal, de caracter puramente lógico o conceptual. Según las teodas causales, la acción intencional ha de satisfacer, independientemente de la condicion de justificación, una condición adicional de causalidad. En este artículo se sostiene, en cambio, que el concepto de justificación es ya causal, de modo que no es necesario exigir un requisito causal independiente para entender (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15.  22
    Carlos J. Moya (2000). A Proposal About Intentional Action. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 9:55-63.
    In this paper, I want to defend the proposal that one has to be a realist about the existence and causal efficacy of reasons if one wants to have rationally justified actions. On this basis, I will propose to understand intentional action in terms of justification alone, not in terms of justification plus causation. I shall argue that an action is intentional, under a certain description, if, and only if, it is justified, under that description, by the agent’s reasons. The (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16.  31
    Carlos J. Moya & Stefaan E. Cuypers (2009). Introduction: Responsibility for Action and Belief. Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):81 – 86.
  17.  23
    Carlos J. Moya (1998). Reason and Causation in Davidson's Theory of Action Explanation. Critica 30 (89):29 - 43.
    En la concepcion de Davidson, las explicaciones de la accion en terminos de razones incluyen dos aspectos o condiciones independientes entre si: una condicion de racionalidad o justificacion racional y una condicion causal. La satisfaccion de la primera depende de relaciones logicas apropiadas entre las descripciones de la razon y de la accion. La segunda exige unicamente la existencia de un vinculo causal entre razon y accion. Es esta independencia entre las dos condiciones la que, en nuestra opinion, genera en (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18.  10
    Carlos J. Moya (2011). Razones Causadas: Nuevas Perspectivas. In David Pérez Chico, Rodríguez Suárez & Luisa Paz (eds.), Explicar y Comprender. Plaza y Valdés 231--255.
    No categories
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19.  10
    Carlos J. Moya (2004). Creencia, Significado y Escepticismo. Ideas Y Valores 125:23-47.
    Davidson’s antisceptical considerations, like Putnam’s, are transcendentalin character: they start from facts that the sceptic has to accept, and areintended to show that those facts would not be such if the scepticalhypotheses were true. It is doubtful that these considerations are finallysuccessfu..
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20.  7
    Carlos J. Moya (2005). La naturalización de la responsabilidad moral. In Tobies Grimaltós & Julián Pacho (eds.), La Naturalización de la Filosofía: Problemas y Límites. Editorial Pre-Textos 59.
    No categories
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21.  7
    Carlos J. Moya (2001). Sentimientos y teoría de la acción. Isegoría 25:19-40.
    En el presente trabajo sostenemos que la concepción de la intencionalidad en la teoría de la acción más ampliamente aceptada en la actualidad hace difícil una comprensión adecuada del papel de las emociones en la génesis e interpretación de la acción. La asimilación de las emociones a actitudes intencionales descuida lo que cabría llamar su contenido emocional y pasa por alto importantes diferencias entre su contenido intencional y el de las actitudes intencionales paradigmáticas, como creencias, deseos e intenciones. Sugerimos, sobre (...)
    Translate
      Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22.  20
    Tobies Grimaltos & Carlos J. Moya (2009). Content, Meaning and Truth. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (2):299 – 305.
  23.  5
    Carlos J. Moya (1996). The Regress-Problem: A Reply to Vermazen. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 77 (2).
    This paper is intended to meet some objections that Vermazen has raised about the treatment of the regress-problem in the author's book on the philosophy of action. This problem is shown to involve a skeptical claim about the very existence of actions as distinct from happenings. It is argued, against Vermazen's contention, that only one version of the problem is at work in that book and that, while Danto's basic actions, McCann's volitions and O'Shaughnessy's and Hornsby's tryings do not solve, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24.  2
    Carlos J. Moya (2011). Kinds of Reasons. An Essay in the Philosophy of Action. [REVIEW] Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 26 (2):245-247.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25.  2
    Carlos J. Moya (1994). Las emociones y la naturalización de la intencionalidad. Logos: Anales Del Seminario de Metafísica 28:227.
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26.  11
    Carlos J. Moya & Tobies Grimaltos (2000). Memory and Justification: Hookway and Fumerton on Scepticism. Noûs 34 (s1):386 - 394.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27.  3
    Carlos J. Moya & T. Grimaltos (2000). Memoria y justificación: Hookway y Fumerton sobre el escepticismo. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 19 (3):203-210.
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28.  3
    Jennifer Hornsby, Carl Ginet, Kathleen Lennon & Carlos J. Moya (1991). On Action.Explaining Human Action.The Philosophy of Action: An Introduction. Philosophical Quarterly 41 (165):498.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29. Josep E. Corbí & Carlos J. Moya (1997). Ensayos Sobre Libertad y Necesidad. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
    No categories
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. Tobies Grimaltos & Carlos J. Moya (1997). Belief, Content, and Cause. In European Review of Philosophy, Vol. 2: Cognitive Dynamics. Stanford: CSLI
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31. Tobies Grimaltos & Carlos J. Moya (1997). European Review of Philosophy, Vol. 2: Cognitive Dynamics. Stanford: CSLI.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32. Carlos J. Moya (2003). Externalism, Inclusion, and Knowledge of Content. In Maria J. Frapolli & E. Romero (eds.), Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind. Csli 773-800.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33. Carlos J. Moya & Tobies Grimaltos (2000). Memory and Justification: Hookway and Fumerton on Scepticism. Philosophical Issues 10 (1):386-394.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. Carlos J. Moya (2007). Moral Responsibility Without Alternative Possibilities? Journal of Philosophy 104 (9):475-486.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35. Carlos J. Moya (1996). Presentación. Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 16 (60/61):5.
    No categories
    Translate
      Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36. Carlos J. Moya (2005). Vértigo y equilibrio: los senderos del escepticismo. Daimon: Revista de Filosofia 36:85-96.
    No categories
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography