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Profile: Carole J. Lee (University of Washington, Seattle)
  1. Carole J. Lee (2013). The Limited Effectiveness of Prestige as an Intervention on the Health of Medical Journal Publications. Episteme 10 (4):387-402.
    Under the traditional system of peer-reviewed publication, the degree of prestige conferred to authors by successful publication is tied to the degree of the intellectual rigor of its peer review process: ambitious scientists do well professionally by doing well epistemically. As a result, we should expect journal editors, in their dual role as epistemic evaluators and prestige-allocators, to have the power to motivate improved author behavior through the tightening of publication requirements. Contrary to this expectation, I will argue that the (...)
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  2. Carole J. Lee, Cassidy R. Sugimoto, Guo Zhang & Blaise Cronin (2013). Bias in Peer Review. Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology 64 (1):2-17.
    Research on bias in peer review examines scholarly communication and funding processes to assess the epistemic and social legitimacy of the mechanisms by which knowledge communities vet and self-regulate their work. Despite vocal concerns, a closer look at the empirical and methodological limitations of research on bias raises questions about the existence and extent of many hypothesized forms of bias. In addition, the notion of bias is predicated on an implicit ideal that, once articulated, raises questions about the normative implications (...)
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  3. Carole J. Lee (2012). A Kuhnian Critique of Psychometric Research on Peer Review. Philosophy of Science 79 (5):859-870.
    Psychometrically oriented researchers construe low inter-rater reliability measures for expert peer reviewers as damning for the practice of peer review. I argue that this perspective overlooks different forms of normatively appropriate disagreement among reviewers. Of special interest are Kuhnian questions about the extent to which variance in reviewer ratings can be accounted for by normatively appropriate disagreements about how to interpret and apply evaluative criteria within disciplines during times of normal science. Until these empirical-cum-philosophical analyses are done, it will remain (...)
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  4. Carole J. Lee & Christian D. Schunn (2011). Social Biases and Solution for Procedural Objectivity. Hypatia 26 (2):352-73.
    An empirically sensitive formulation of the norms of transformative criticism must recognize that even public and shared standards of evaluation can be implemented in ways that unintentionally perpetuate and reproduce forms of social bias that are epistemically detrimental. Helen Longino’s theory can explain and redress such social bias by treating peer evaluations as hypotheses based on data and by requiring a kind of perspectival diversity that bears, not on the content of the community’s knowledge claims, but on the beliefs and (...)
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  5. Carole J. Lee (2010). Reclaiming Davidson's Methodological Rationalism as Galilean Idealization in Psychology. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 40 (1):84-106.
    In his early experimental work with Suppes, Davidson adopted rationality assumptions, not as necessary constraints on interpretation, but as practical conceits in addressing methodological problems faced by experimenters studying decision making under uncertainty. Although the content of their theory has since been undermined, their methodological approach—a Galilean form of methodological rationalism—lives on in contemporary psychological research. This article draws on Max Weber’s verstehen to articulate an account of Galilean methodological rationalism; explains how anomalies faced by Davidson’s early experimental work gave (...)
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  6. Carole J. Lee & Christian D. Schunn, Philosophy Journal Practices and Opportunities for Bias. American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy.
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  7. Carole J. Lee (2008). Applied Cognitive Psychology and the "Strong Replacement" of Epistemology by Normative Psychology. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 38 (1):55-75.
    is normative in the sense that (1) it aims to make recommendations for improving human judgment; (2) it aims to have a practical impact on morally and politically significant human decisions and actions; and (3) it studies normative, rational judgment qua rational judgment. These nonstandard ways of understanding ACP as normative collectively suggest a new interpretation of the strong replacement thesis that does not call for replacing normative epistemic concepts, relations, and inquiries with descriptive, causal ones. Rather, it calls for (...)
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  8. Carole J. Lee (2007). The Representation of Judgment Heuristics and the Generality Problem. Proceedings of the 29th Annual Cognitive Science Society:1211-6.
    In his debates with Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, Gerd Gigerenzer puts forward a stricter standard for the proper representation of judgment heuristics. I argue that Gigerenzer’s stricter standard contributes to naturalized epistemology in two ways. First, Gigerenzer’s standard can be used to winnow away cognitive processes that are inappropriately characterized and should not be used in the epistemic evaluation of belief. Second, Gigerenzer’s critique helps to recast the generality problem in naturalized epistemology and cognitive psychology as the methodological problem (...)
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  9. Carole J. Lee (2006). Gricean Charity: The Gricean Turn in Psychology. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (2):193-218.
    Psychologists' work on conversational pragmatics and judgment suggests a refreshing approach to charitable interpretation and theorizing. This charitable approach—what I call Gricean charity —recognizes the role of conversational assumptions and norms in subject-experimenter communication. In this paper, I outline the methodological lessons Gricean charity gleans from psychologists' work in conversational pragmatics. In particular, Gricean charity imposes specific evidential standards requiring that researchers collect empirical information about (1) the conditions of successful and unsuccessful communication for specific experimental contexts, and (2) the (...)
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