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  1. Carolina Sartorio, Chapter 26: Causation and Ethics.
    My main aim is to examine the extent to which an appeal to the concept of cause contributes to elucidating moral notions or to increasing the plausibility of moral views. Something that makes this task interestingly complex is the fact that the notion of causation itself is controversial and difficult to pin down. As a result, in some cases the success of its use in moral theory hinges on how certain debates about causation are resolved. I will point to examples (...)
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  2. Carolina Sartorio, Failing to Do the Impossible.
    A billionaire tells you: “That chair is in my way; I don’t feel like moving it myself, but if you push it out of my way I’ll give you a hundred dollars.” You decide you don’t want the billionaire’s money and you’d actually prefer that the chair stay in the billionaire’s way, so you graciously turn down the offer and go home. As it turns out, the billionaire is also a stingy old miser; he was never willing to let go (...)
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  3. Carolina Sartorio, The Prince of Wales Problem for Counterfactual Theories of Causation.
    In 1992, as part of a larger charitable campaign, the Prince of Wales (Prince Charles, Queen Elizabeth’s older son and heir) launched a line of organic food products called “Prince’s Duchy Originals”.1 The first product that went on sale was an oat cookie: “the oaten biscuit.” Since then the oaten biscuit has been joined by hundreds of other products and Duchy Originals has become one of the leading organic food brands in the UK. Presumably, the Prince of Wales is very (...)
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  4. Carolina Sartorio (forthcoming). Vihvelin on Frankfurt-Style Cases and the Actual-Sequence View. Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-14.
    This is a critical discussion of Vihvelin’s recent book Causes, Laws, and Free Will. I discuss Vihvelin’s ideas on Frankfurt-style cases and the actual-sequence view of freedom that is inspired by them.
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  5. Juan Comesaña & Carolina Sartorio (2014). Difference‐Making in Epistemology. Noûs 48 (2):368-387.
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  6. Carolina Sartorio (2012). Causation and Freedom. Journal of Philosophy 109 (11):629-651.
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  7. Carolina Sartorio (2012). Resultant Luck. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):63-86.
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  8. Carolina Sartorio (2012). Two Wrongs Do Not Make a Right: Responsibility and Overdetermination. Legal Theory 18 (4):473-490.
    In this paper I critically examine Michael Moore's views about responsibility in overdetermination cases. Moore argues for an asymmetrical view concerning actions and omissions: whereas our actions can make us responsible in overdetermination cases, our omissions cannot. Moore argues for this view on the basis of a causal claim: actions can be causes but omissions cannot. I suggest that we should reject Moore's views about responsibility and overdetermination. I argue, in particular, that our omissions (just like our actions) can make (...)
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  9. Carolina Sartorio (2010). Comments on Clarke's 'Intentional Omissions's. In J. Aguilar & A. Buckareff (eds.), Causing Human Action: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action. Bradford. 157--160.
     
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  10. Carolina Sartorio (2009). Causation and Ethics. In Helen Beebee, Christopher Hitchcock & Peter Menzies (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Causation. Oup Oxford.
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  11. Carolina Sartorio (2009). Omissions and Causalism. Noûs 43 (3):513-530.
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  12. Carolina Sartorio (2008). Moral Inertia. Philosophical Studies 140 (1):117 - 133.
    I argue that, according to ordinary morality, there is moral inertia, that is, moral pressure to fail to intervene in certain circumstances. Moral inertia is manifested in scenarios with a particular causal structure: deflection scenarios, where a threatening or benefiting process is diverted from a group of people to another. I explain why the deflection structure is essential for moral inertia to be manifested. I argue that there are two different manifestations of moral inertia: strict prohibitions on interventions, and constraints (...)
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  13. Carolina Sartorio (2007). Causation and Responsibility. Philosophy Compass 2 (5):749–765.
    In this article I examine the relation between causation and moral responsibility. I distinguish four possible views about that relation. One is the standard view: the view that an agent's moral responsibility for an outcome requires, and is grounded in, the agent's causal responsibility for it. I discuss several challenges to the standard view, which motivate the three remaining views. The final view – the view I argue for – is that causation is the vehicle of transmission of moral responsibility. (...)
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  14. Carolina Sartorio (2006). Disjunctive Causes. Journal of Philosophy 103 (10):521-538.
    There is an initial presumption against disjunctive causes. First of all, for some people causation is a relation between events. But, arguably, there are no disjunctive events, since events are particulars and thus they have spatiotemporal locations, while it is unclear what the spatiotemporal location of a disjunctive event could be.1 More importantly, even if one believes that entities like facts can enter in causal relations, and even if there are disjunctive facts, it is still hard to see how disjunctive (...)
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  15. Carolina Sartorio (2006). Failures to Act and Failures of Additivity. Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):373–385.
    On the face of it, causal responsibility seems to be “additive” in the following sense: if I cause some effects, then it seems that I also cause the sum (aggregate, conjunction, etc.) of those effects. Let’s call the claim that causation behaves in this way, Additivity.
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  16. Carolina Sartorio (2006). On Causing Something to Happen in a Certain Way Without Causing It to Happen. Philosophical Studies 129 (1):119 - 136.
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  17. Carolina Sartorio (2005). A New Asymmetry Between Actions and Omissions. Noûs 39 (3):460–482.
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  18. Carolina Sartorio (2005). Causes as Difference-Makers. Philosophical Studies 123 (1-2):71 - 96.
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  19. Carolina Sartorio (2004). How to Be Responsible for Something Without Causing It. Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):315–336.
    What is the relationship between moral responsibility and causation? Plainly, we are not morally responsible for everything that we cause. For we cause a multitude of things, including things that we couldn't possibly foresee we would cause and with respect to which we cannot be assessed morally. Thus, it is clear that causing something does not entail being morally responsible for it. But, does the converse entailment hold? Does moral responsibility require causation? Intuitively, it does: intuitively, we can only be (...)
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