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Caroline T. Arruda [7]Caroline Arruda [1]
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Profile: Caroline T. Arruda (University of Texas at El Paso)
  1.  41
    Caroline T. Arruda & Daniel J. Povinelli (forthcoming). Chimps as Secret Agents. Synthese:1-30.
    We provide an account of chimpanzee-specific agency within the context of philosophy of action. We do so by showing that chimpanzees are capable of what we call reason-directed action, even though they may be incapable of more full-blown action, which we call reason-considered action. Although chimpanzee agency does not possess all the features of typical adult human agency, chimpanzee agency is evolutionarily responsive to their environment and overlaps considerably with our own. As such, it is an evolved set of capacities (...)
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  2.  6
    Caroline T. Arruda (forthcoming). The Varieties of Moral Improvement, Or Why Metaethical Constructivism Must Explain Moral Progress. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-22.
    Among the available metaethical views, it would seem that moral realism—in particular moral naturalism—must explain the possibility of moral progress. We see this in the oft-used argument from disagreement against various moral realist views. My suggestion in this paper is that, surprisingly, metaethical constructivism has at least as pressing a need to explain moral progress. I take moral progress to be, minimally, the opportunity to access and to act in light of moral facts of the matter, whether they are mind-independent (...)
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  3.  12
    Caroline Arruda (forthcoming). Review Essay: Chant, Sara Rachel, Frank Hindriks and Gerhard Preyer, Editors. From Individual to Collective Intentionality: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Pp. 240. [REVIEW] Philosophy of the Social Sciences:0048393116632685.
    I summarize and evaluate the aims of the collection From Individual to Collective Intentionality: New Essays edited by Sara Rachel Chant, Frank Hindriks and Gerhard Preyer in the context of the on-going debate about collective intentionality and group agency. I then consider the individual essays contained therein, both from the perspective of how they advance the collection’s goals and the coherence of their individual arguments.
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  4.  13
    Caroline T. Arruda (2016). What We Can Intend: Recognition and Collective Intentionality. Southern Journal of Philosophy 54 (1):5-26.
    The concept of recognition has played a role in two debates. In political philosophy, it is part of a communitarian response to liberal theories of distributive justice. It describes what it means to respect others’ right to self-determination. In ethics, Stephen Darwall argues that it comprises our judgment that we owe others moral consideration. I present a competing account of recognition on the grounds that most accounts answer the question of why others deserve recognition without answering the question of what (...)
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  5.  36
    Caroline T. Arruda (2014). Review: Margaret Gilbert, Joint Commitment: How We Make the Social World. [REVIEW] Ethics 125 (1):258-262.
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  6.  9
    Caroline T. Arruda (2015). Shared Intention and Reasons for Action. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (6):596-623.
    Most theories of intentional action agree that if acting for a reason is a necessary condition for the action in question to be an intentional action, the reason need not genuinely justify it. The same should hold for shared intentional action, toward which philosophers of action have recently turned their attention. I argue that some of the necessary conditions proposed for shared intention turn out to require that we deny this claim. They entail that shared intention is possible only if (...)
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  7.  33
    Caroline T. Arruda (2006). Limitations on the Political. Radical Philosophy Review 9 (2):201-206.
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  8. Caroline T. Arruda (forthcoming). What Kind of Theory is the Humean Theory of Motivation? Ratio.
    I consider an underappreciated problem for proponents of the Humean theory of motivation (HTM). Namely, it is unclear whether is it to be understood as a largely psychological or largely metaphysical theory. I show that the psychological interpretation of HTM will need to be modified in order to be a tenable view and, as it will turn out, the modifications required render it virtually philosophically empty. I then argue that the largely metaphysical interpretation is the only a plausible interpretation of (...)
     
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