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Profile: Carolyn Price
  1.  24
    Carolyn S. Price (2001). Functions in Mind: A Theory of Intentional Content. Oxford University Press.
    In this adventurous contribution to the project of combining philosophy and biology to understand the mind, Carolyn Price investigates what it means to say that mental states--like thoughts, wishes, and perceptual experiences--are about things in the natural world. Her insight into this deep philosophical problem offers a novel teleological account of intentional content, grounded in and shaped by a carefully constructed theory of functions. Along the way she defends her view from recent objections to teleological theories and indicates how it (...)
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  2.  25
    Carolyn S. Price (2006). Fearing Fluffy: The Content of an Emotional Appraisal. In Graham F. Macdonald & David Papineau (eds.), Teleosemantics. Oxford University Press
    What is the difference between an emotional appraisal and a dispassionate judgement? It has been suggested that emotional appraisals are states of a special kind that play a distinctive role in our psychology; it has also been suggested that emotional appraisals have a distinctive kind of content. In this paper, I explore the links between the function and content of an emotional appraisal, making use of a teleosemantic account of intentional content that I have developed elsewhere.
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    Carolyn S. Price (1998). Determinate Functions. Noûs 32 (1):54-75.
  4.  25
    Carolyn S. Price (1998). Function, Perception and Normal Causal Chains. Philosophical Studies 89 (1):31-51.
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    Carolyn S. Price (2000). General-Purpose Content. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 14 (2):123-133.
    In this paper, I consider the objection, raised by Radu Bogdan, that a teleological theory of content is unable to ascribe content to a general-purpose, doxastic system. I begin by giving some attention to the notion of general-purpose representation, and suggest that this notion can best be understood as what I term "interest-independent" representation. I then outline Bogdan's objection in what I take to be its simplest form. I attempt to counter the objection by explaining how a teleologist might ascribe (...)
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