Search results for 'Categorical properties' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Robert Schroer (2012). Two Challenges That Categorical Properties Pose to Physicalism. Ratio 25 (2):195-206.
    What are physical objects like when they are considered independently of their causal interactions? Many think that the answer to this question involves categorical propertiesproperties that make contributions to their bearers that are independent of any causal interactions those objects may enter into. In this paper, I examine two challenges that this solution poses to Physicalism. The first challenge is that, given that they are distinct from any of the scientifically described causal powers that they happen (...)
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  2. Brian Ellis (2010). Causal Powers and Categorical Properties. In Anna Marmodoro (ed.), The Metaphysics of Powers: Their Grounding and Their Manifestations. Routledge
    The aim of this paper is to argue that there are categorical properties as well as causal powers, and that the world would not exist as we know it without them. For categorical properties are needed to define the powers—to locate them, and to specify their laws of action. These categorical properties, I shall argue, are not dispositional. For their identities do not depend on what they dispose their bearers to do. (...)
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  3.  93
    James Franklin (1986). Are Dispositions Reducible to Categorical Properties? Philosophical Quarterly 36 (142):62-64.
    Dispostions, such as solubility, cannont be reduced to categorical properties, such as molecular structure, without some element of dipositionaity remaining. Democritus did not reduce all properties to the geometry of atoms - he had to retain the rigidity of the atoms, that is, their disposition not to change shape when a force is applied. So dispositions-not-to, like rigidity, cannot be eliminated. Neither can dispositions-to, like solubility.
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  4.  32
    Brendan O'Sullivan (2012). Absent Qualia and Categorical Properties. Erkenntnis 76 (3):353-371.
    Qualia have proved difficult to integrate into a broadly physicalistic worldview. In this paper, I argue that despite popular wisdom in the philosophy of mind, qualia’s intrinsicality is not sufficient for their non-reducibility. Second, I diagnose why philosophers mistakenly focused on intrinsicality. I then proceed to argue that qualia are categorical and end with some reflections on how the conceptual territory looks when we keep our focus on categoricity.
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  5.  88
    Brian Ellis (2005). Universals, the Essential Problem and Categorical Properties. Ratio 18 (4):462–472.
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  6.  34
    Jerrold Levinson (1988). A Note on Categorical Properties and Contingent Identity. Journal of Philosophy 85 (12):718-722.
    Stephen Yablo has attempted recently to revive the notion of contingent identity, identifying this with a relation of L coincidence between objects that are "distinct by nature but the same in the circumstances" (296). Yablo argues convincingly for the need of essentialist metaphysics to recognize some relation of this sort, a relation of "intimate identity-like connections between things" (296) if it is to acknowledge properly the intuitive difference between (i) the nonidentity of a bust B and a hunk of wax (...)
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  7.  45
    Sharon R. Ford (2012). The Categorical-Dispositional Distinction. In Alexander Bird, Brian Ellis & Howard Sankey (eds.), Properties, Powers and Structures: Issues in the Metaphysics of Realism. Routledge
    This paper largely engages with Brian Ellis’s description of categorical dimensions as put forward in his paper in this volume. The New Essentialism advocated by Ellis posits the ontologically-robust existence of both dispositional and categorical properties. I have argued that the distinction that Ellis draws between the two is unpersuasive, and that the causal role of categorical dimensions—what they do—is inseparable from what they are. This observation is reinforced by the fact that absolute physical quantities permit (...)
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  8.  7
    George Voutsadakis (2003). Categorical Abstract Algebraic Logic Metalogical Properties. Studia Logica 74 (3):369 - 398.
    Metalogical properties that have traditionally been studied in the deductive system context (see, e.g., [21]) and transferred later to the institution context [33], are here formulated in the -institution context. Preservation under deductive equivalence of -institutions is investigated. If a property is known to hold in all algebraic -institutions and is preserved under deductive equivalence, then it follows that it holds in all algebraizable -institutions in the sense of [36].
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  9.  33
    Robert Schroer (2013). Can a Single Property Be Both Dispositional and Categorical? The “Partial Consideration Strategy”, Partially Considered. Metaphysica 14 (1):63-77.
    One controversial position in the debate over dispositional and categorical properties maintains that our concepts of these properties are the result of partially considering unitary properties that are both dispositional and categorical. As one of its defenders (Heil 2005, p. 351) admits, this position is typically met with “incredulous stares”. In this paper, I examine whether such a reaction is warranted. This thesis about properties is an instance of what I call “the Partial Consideration (...)
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  10. George Voutsadakis (2006). Categorical Abstract Algebraic Logic: Full Models, Frege Systems and Metalogical Properties. Reports on Mathematical Logic.
     
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  11. Sharon R. Ford (2010). What Fundamental Properties Suffice to Account for the Manifest World? Powerful Structure. Dissertation, University of Queensland
    This Thesis engages with contemporary philosophical controversies about the nature of dispositional properties or powers and the relationship they have to their non-dispositional counterparts. The focus concerns fundamentality. In particular, I seek to answer the question, ‘What fundamental properties suffice to account for the manifest world?’ The answer I defend is that fundamental categorical properties need not be invoked in order to derive a viable explanation for the manifest world. My stance is a field-theoretic view (...)
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  12. Ullin T. Place (1996). Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or Both. In Tim Crane (ed.), Dispositions: A Debate. New York: Routledge 105--125.
     
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  13. Jw Rosenthal & A. S. H. Cj (1986). AHLBRANDT, G. And ZIEGLER, M., Quasi Finitely Axiomatiz-Able Totally Categorical Theories ASH, CJ and ROSENTHAL, JW, Intersections of Algebraically Closed Fields BAUDISCH, A., On Elementary Properties of Free Lie Algebras. [REVIEW] Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 30:321.
     
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  14.  37
    Matthew Tugby (2013). Categoricalism, Dispositionalism, and the Epistemology of Properties. Synthese 191 (6):1-16.
    Notoriously, the dispositional view of natural properties is thought to face a number of regress problems, one of which points to an epistemological worry. In this paper, I argue that the rival categorical view is also susceptible to the same kind of regress problem. This problem can be overcome, most plausibly, with the development of a structuralist epistemology. After identifying problems faced by alternative solutions, I sketch the main features of this structuralist epistemological approach, referring to graph-theoretic modelling (...)
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  15.  94
    Randolph Clarke (2010). Opposing Powers. Philosophical Studies 149 (2):153 - 160.
    A disposition mask is something that prevents a disposition from manifesting despite the occurrence of that disposition’s characteristic stimulus, and without eliminating that disposition. Several authors have maintained that masks must be things extrinsic to the objects that have the masked dispositions. Here it is argued that this is not so; masks can be intrinsic to the objects whose dispositions they mask. If that is correct, then a recent attempt to distinguish dispositional properties from so-called categorical properties (...)
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  16. Sharon R. Ford (2011). Deriving the Manifestly Qualitative World From a Pure-Power Base: Light-Like Networks. Philosophia Scientiae 15 (3):155-175.
    Seeking to derive the manifestly qualitative world of objects and entities without recourse to fundamental categoricity or qualitativity, I offer an account of how higher-order categorical properties and objects may emerge from a pure-power base. I explore the possibility of ‘fields’ whose fluctuations are force-carrying entities, differentiated with respect to a micro-topology of curled-up spatial dimensions. Since the spacetime paths of gauge bosons have zero ‘spacetime interval’ and no time-like extension, I argue that according them the status of (...)
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  17.  37
    Simone Gozzano (2012). L'essenzialismo scientifico e il mentale. Rivista di Filosofia 103 (2):201-226.
    The major objection for including mental properties, and laws, within the domain of scientific essentialism concerns phenomenal properties, and such an objection is often raised via the intuition that zombies are conceivable. However, if these properties can be individuated in terms of roles and establish nomological relations, zombies are not possible because they would be nomologically identical to us but property different, an independence that essentialism denies. If there are not nomological relations, the essentialist denies that there (...)
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  18. Robert Schroer (2010). How Far Can the Physical Sciences Reach? American Philosophical Quarterlly 47 (3):253-266.
    : It is widely thought that dispositional properties depend upon categorical properties; specifying the nature of this dependency, however, has proven a difficult task. The dependency of dispositional properties upon categorical properties also presents a challenge to the thesis of Physicalism: If the physical sciences only tell us about the dispositional properties of the objects they study and if dispositional properties depend upon categorical properties, then it appears that there will (...)
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  19. Sharon R. Ford (2007). An Analysis of Properties in John Heil’s "From an Ontological Point of View". In G. Romano & Malatesti (eds.), From an Ontological Point of View, Swif Philosophy of Mind Review, Symposium. Swif Philosophy of Mind Review
    In this paper I argue that the requirement for the qualitative is theory-dependent, determined by the fundamental assumptions built into the ontology. John Heil’s qualitative, in its role as individuator of objects and powers, is required only by a theory that posits a world of distinct objects or powers. Does Heil’s ‘deep’ view of the world, such that there is only one powerful object require the qualitative as individuator of objects and powers? The answer depends on whether it is possible (...)
     
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  20.  25
    James Franklin (1988). Reply to Armstrong on Dispositions. Philosophical Quarterly 38 (150):86-87.
    Defends the arguments for the irredicibility of dispositions to categorical properties in "Are dispositions reducible to categorical properties?" (Philosophical Quarterly 36, 1986) against the criticisms of D.M. Armstrong (Philosophical Quarterly 38, 1988).
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  21. J. Franklin (1988). Are Dispositions Ultimate-Reply. Philosophical Quarterly 38 (150):86-87.
    The original article, 'Are dispositions reducible to categorical properties? (Philosophical Quarterly, 36, 1986), argued that dispositions are not so reducible. The present article defends this view against the criticisms of D M Armstrong (Philosophical Quarterly, 38, 1988). Dispositions are distinguished from fully categorical properties like symmetry.
     
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  22. R. Brown, J. F. Glazebrook & I. C. Baianu (2007). A Conceptual Construction of Complexity Levels Theory in Spacetime Categorical Ontology: Non-Abelian Algebraic Topology, Many-Valued Logics and Dynamic Systems. [REVIEW] Axiomathes 17 (3-4):409-493.
    A novel conceptual framework is introduced for the Complexity Levels Theory in a Categorical Ontology of Space and Time. This conceptual and formal construction is intended for ontological studies of Emergent Biosystems, Super-complex Dynamics, Evolution and Human Consciousness. A claim is defended concerning the universal representation of an item’s essence in categorical terms. As an essential example, relational structures of living organisms are well represented by applying the important categorical concept of natural transformations to biomolecular reactions and (...)
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  23.  42
    John H. Taylor (2013). In Defence of Powerful Qualities. Metaphysica 14 (1):93-107.
    The ontology of ‘powerful qualities’ is gaining an increasing amount of attention in the literature on properties. This is the view that the so-called categorical or qualitative properties are identical with ‘dispositional’ properties. The position is associated with C.B. Martin, John Heil, Galen Strawson and Jonathan Jacobs. Robert Schroer ( 2012 ) has recently mounted a number of criticisms against the powerful qualities view as conceived by these main adherents, and has also advanced his own (radically (...)
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  24.  92
    Agustín Vicente (2011). Functions and Emergence: When Functional Properties Have Something to Say. Philosophical Studies 152 (2):293-312.
    In a recent paper, Bird (in: Groff (ed.) Revitalizing causality: Realism about causality in philosophy and social science, 2007 ) has argued that some higher-order properties—which he calls “evolved emergent properties”—can be considered causally efficacious in spite of exclusion arguments. I have previously argued in favour of a similar position. The basic argument is that selection processes do not take physical categorical properties into account. Rather, selection mechanisms are only tuned to what such properties can (...)
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  25.  44
    William A. Bauer (2012). Four Theories of Pure Dispositions. In Alexander Bird, Brian Ellis & Howard Sankey (eds.), Properties, Powers, and Structures: Issues in the Metaphysics of Realism. Routledge 139-162.
    The dispositional properties encountered in everyday experience seem to have causal bases in other properties, e.g., the microstructure of a vase is the causal basis of its fragility. In contrast, the Pure Dispositions Thesis maintains that some dispositions require no causal basis. This thesis faces the Problem of Being: without a causal basis, there appears to be no grounds for the existence of pure dispositions. This paper establishes criteria for evaluating the problem, critically examines four theories of the (...)
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  26.  19
    Andreas Bartels (2013). Why Metrical Properties Are Not Powers. Synthese 190 (12):2001-2013.
    What has the dispositional analysis of properties and laws (e.g. Molnar, Powers, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003; Mumford, Laws in nature, Routledge London, 2004; Bird, Nature’s metaphysics, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2007) to offer to the scientific understanding of physical properties?—The article provides an answer to this question for the case of spacetime points and their metrical properties in General Relativity. The analysis shows that metrical properties are not ‘powers’, i.e. they cannot be understood as producing the (...)
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  27.  64
    Vera Hoffmann-Kolss (2010). The Metaphysics of Extrinsic Properties. Ontos-Verlag.
    This book aims to develop a philosophical theory of extrinsic properties – of properties whose instantiation by an object does not only depend on what the object itself is like, but also on features of its environment. Various accounts of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction are analysed in detail, and it is argued that the most promising approach to defining this distinction is to consider extrinsic properties as a particular type of relational property. Moreover, it is (...)
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  28.  4
    Krzysztof Krupiński (2011). On Relationships Between Algebraic Properties of Groups and Rings in Some Model-Theoretic Contexts. Journal of Symbolic Logic 76 (4):1403-1417.
    We study relationships between certain algebraic properties of groups and rings definable in a first order structure or *-closed in a compact G-space. As a consequence, we obtain a few structural results about ω-categorical rings as well as about small, nm-stable compact G-rings, and we also obtain surprising relationships between some conjectures concerning small profinite groups.
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  29.  49
    Sungho Choi (2005). Do Categorical Ascriptions Entail Counterfactual Conditionals? Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):495–503.
    Stephen Mumford, in his book on dispositions, argues that we can distinguish between dispositional and categorical properties in terms of entailing his 'conditional conditionals', which involve the concept of ideal conditions. I aim at defending Mumford's criterion for distinguishing between dispositional and categorical properties. To be specific, no categorical ascriptions entail Mumford's 'conditional conditionals'.
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  30. Tyler Hildebrand (2014). Can Bare Dispositions Explain Categorical Regularities? Philosophical Studies 167 (3):569-584.
    One of the traditional desiderata for a metaphysical theory of laws of nature is that it be able to explain natural regularities. Some philosophers have postulated governing laws to fill this explanatory role. Recently, however, many have attempted to explain natural regularities without appealing to governing laws. Suppose that some fundamental properties are bare dispositions. In virtue of their dispositional nature, these properties must be (or are likely to be) distributed in regular patterns. Thus it would appear that (...)
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  31. Robert Schroer (2010). Is There More Than One Categorical Property? Philosophical Quarterly 60 (241):831-850.
    I develop a new theory of properties by considering two central arguments in the debate whether properties are dispositional or categorical. The first claims that objects must possess categorical properties in order to be distinct from empty space. The second argument, however, points out several untoward consequences of positing categorical properties. I explore these arguments and argue that despite appearances, their conclusions need not be in conflict with one another. In particular, we can (...)
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  32.  70
    Mauro Dorato, Properties and Dispositions: Some Metaphysical Remarks on Quantum Ontology.
    After some suggestions about how to clarify the confused metaphysical distinctions between dispositional and non-dispositional or categorical properties, I review some of the main interpretations of QM in order to show that – with the relevant exception of Bohm’s minimalist interpretation – quantum ontology is irreducibly dispositional. Such an irreducible character of dispositions must be explained differently in different interpretations, but the reducibility of the contextual properties in the case of Bohmian mechanics is guaranteed by the fact (...)
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  33.  10
    Mauro Dorato, Dispositions, Relational Properties and the Quantum World.
    In this paper I examine the role of dispositional properties in the most frequently discussed interpretations of non-relativistic quantum mechanics. After offering some motivation for this project, I briefly characterize the distinction between non-dispositional and dispositional properties in the context of quantum mechanics by suggesting a necessary condition for dispositionality – namely contextuality – and, consequently, a sufficient condition for non-dispositionality, namely non-contextuality. Having made sure that the distinction is conceptually sound, I then analyze the plausibility of the (...)
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  34.  43
    Chuang Liu (1996). Potential, Propensity, and Categorical Realism. Erkenntnis 45 (1):45 - 68.
    I argue that categorical realism, contrary to what most believe today, holds for quantum (and indeed for all) objects and substances. The main argument consists of two steps: (i) the recent experimental verification of the AB effect gives strong empirical evidence for taking quantum potentials as physically real (or substantival), which suggests a change of the data upon which any viable interpretation of quantum theory must rely, and (ii) quantum potentials may be consistently taken as the categorical (...) of quantum objects so that categorical realism can be restored. (shrink)
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  35. Simone Gozzano (2012). Scientific Essentialism and the Mental. Rivista di Filosofia 103 (2):201-226.
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  36. David M. Armstrong (2005). Four Disputes About Properties. Synthese 144 (3):1-12.
    In considering the nature of properties four controversial decisions must be made. (1) Are properties universals or tropes? (2) Are properties attributes of particulars, or are particulars just bundles of properties? (3) Are properties categorical (qualitative) in nature, or are they powers? (4) If a property attaches to a particular, is this predication contingent, or is it necessary? These choices seem to be in a great degree independent of each other. The author indicates his (...)
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  37. John Heil & David Robb (2003). Mental Properties. American Philosophical Quarterly 40 (3):175-196.
    It is becoming increasingly clear that the deepest problems currently exercising philosophers of mind arise from an ill-begotten ontology, in particular, a mistaken ontology of properties. After going through some preliminaries, we identify three doctrines at the heart of this mistaken ontology: (P) For each distinct predicate, “F”, there exists one, and only one, property, F, such that, if “F” is applicable to an object a, then “F” is applicable in virtue of a’s being F. (U) (...) are universals, not particulars. (D) Every property is either categorical or dispositional, but not both. We show how these doctrines influence current philosophical thinking about the mind, suggest and defend an alternative conception of properties, and indicate how this conception provides answers to two puzzles besetting contemporary philosophy of mind: the problem of mental causation and the problem of qualia. (shrink)
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  38.  97
    Sungho Choi (2012). Intrinsic Finks and Dispositional/Categorical Distinction. Noûs 46 (2):289-325.
    The central theme of this paper is the dispositional/categorical distinction that has been one of the top agendas in contemporary metaphysics. I will first develop from my semantic account of dispositions what I think the correct formulation of the dispositional/categorical distinction in terms of counterfactual conditionals. It will be argued that my formulation does not have the shortcomings that have plagued previously proposed ones. Then I will turn my attention to one of its consequences, the thesis that dispositional (...)
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  39. Troy Cross (2012). Goodbye, Humean Supervenience. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 7:129-153.
    Reductionists about dispositions must either say the natural properties are all dispositional or individuate properties hyperintensionally. Lewis stands in as an example of the sort of combination I think is incoherent: properties individuated by modal profile + categoricalism.
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  40. Peter Menzies (forthcoming). Critical Notice of Alexander Bird, Nature's Metaphysics: Laws and Properties. Analysis.
    This book advocates dispositional essentialism, the view that natural properties have dispositional essences.1 So, for example, the essence of the property of being negatively charged is to be disposed to attract positively charged objects. From this fact it follows that it is a law that all negatively charged objects will attract positively 10 charged objects; and indeed that this law is metaphysically necessary. Since the identity of the property of being negatively charged is determined by its being related in (...)
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  41.  3
    Franco Montagna & Sara Ugolini (2015). A Categorical Equivalence for Product Algebras. Studia Logica 103 (2):345-373.
    In this paper we provide a categorical equivalence for the category \ of product algebras, with morphisms the homomorphisms. The equivalence is shown with respect to a category whose objects are triplets consisting of a Boolean algebra B, a cancellative hoop C and a map \ from B × C into C satisfying suitable properties. To every product algebra P, the equivalence associates the triplet consisting of the maximum boolean subalgebra B, the maximum cancellative subhoop C, of P, (...)
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  42.  4
    David M. Evans (2002). ℵ0-Categorical Structures with a Predimension. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 116 (1-3):157-186.
    We give an axiomatic framework for the non-modular simple 0-categorical structures constructed by Hrushovski. This allows us to verify some of their properties in a uniform way, and to show that these properties are preserved by iterations of the construction.
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  43.  15
    George Voutsadakis (2005). Categorical Abstract Algebraic Logic: Models of Π-Institutions. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 46 (4):439-460.
    An important part of the theory of algebraizable sentential logics consists of studying the algebraic semantics of these logics. As developed by Czelakowski, Blok, and Pigozzi and Font and Jansana, among others, it includes studying the properties of logical matrices serving as models of deductive systems and the properties of abstract logics serving as models of sentential logics. The present paper contributes to the development of the categorical theory by abstracting some of these model theoretic aspects and (...)
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  44.  4
    George Voutsadakis (2006). Categorical Abstract Algebraic Logic: More on Protoalgebraicity. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 47 (4):487-514.
    Protoalgebraic logics are characterized by the monotonicity of the Leibniz operator on their theory lattices and are at the lower end of the Leibniz hierarchy of abstract algebraic logic. They have been shown to be the most primitive among those logics with a strong enough algebraic character to be amenable to algebraic study techniques. Protoalgebraic π-institutions were introduced recently as an analog of protoalgebraic sentential logics with the goal of extending the Leibniz hierarchy from the sentential framework to the π-institution (...)
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  45.  2
    George Voutsadakis (2015). Categorical Abstract Algebraic Logic: Truth-Equational $Pi$-Institutions. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 56 (2):351-378.
    Finitely algebraizable deductive systems were introduced by Blok and Pigozzi to capture the essential properties of those deductive systems that are very tightly connected to quasivarieties of universal algebras. They include the equivalential logics of Czelakowski. Based on Blok and Pigozzi’s work, Herrmann defined algebraizable deductive systems. These are the equivalential deductive systems that are also truth-equational, in the sense that the truth predicate of the class of their reduced matrix models is explicitly definable by some set of unary (...)
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  46.  2
    Dion Coumans (2012). Generalising Canonical Extension to the Categorical Setting. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 163 (12):1940-1961.
    Canonical extension has proven to be a powerful tool in algebraic study of propositional logics. In this paper we describe a generalisation of the theory of canonical extension to the setting of first order logic. We define a notion of canonical extension for coherent categories. These are the categorical analogues of distributive lattices and they provide categorical semantics for coherent logic, the fragment of first order logic in the connectives ∧, ∨, 0, 1 and ∃. We describe a (...)
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  47. Alexander Bird, B. D. Ellis & Howard Sankey (eds.) (2012). Properties, Powers, and Structures: Issues in the Metaphysics of Realism. Routledge.
    While the phrase "metaphysics of science" has been used from time to time, it has only recently begun to denote a specific research area where metaphysics meets philosophy of science—and the sciences themselves. The essays in this volume demonstrate that metaphysics of science is an innovative field of research in its own right. The principal areas covered are: (1) The modal metaphysics of properties: What is the essential nature of natural properties? Are all properties essentially categorical? (...)
     
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  48.  33
    Vera Hoffmann-Kolss (2015). On a Sufficient Condition for Hyperintensionality. Philosophical Quarterly 65 (260):336-354.
    Let an X/Y distinction be a distinction between kinds of properties, such as the distinctions between qualitative and non-qualitative, intrinsic and extrinsic, perfectly natural and less-than-perfectly natural or dispositional and categorical properties. An X/Y distinction is hyperintensional iff there are cointensional properties P and Q, such that P is an X-property, whereas Q is a Y-property. Many accounts of metaphysical distinctions among properties presuppose that such distinctions are non-hyperintensional. In this paper, I call this presupposition (...)
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  49.  22
    Travis Dumsday (2015). Why Pan-Dispositionalism is Incompatible with Metaphysical Naturalism. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 78 (1):107-122.
    Pan-dispositionalism is one of the major theories in current analytic metaphysics concerning dispositional properties and how they relate to categorical properties. According to pan-dispositionalists, all fundamental properties are dispositional in nature, such that any supposed categorical properties are either unreal or reducible in some way to the dispositional. I argue that if pan-dispositionalism is true then metaphysical naturalism is false. To the extent that one finds pan-dispositionalism a plausible theory, one ought to question the (...)
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  50. George Voutsadakis (2005). Categorical Abstract Algebraic Logic: Gentzen Π ‐Institutions and the Deduction‐Detachment Property. Mathematical Logic Quarterly 51 (6):570-578.
    Given a π -institution I , a hierarchy of π -institutions I is constructed, for n ≥ 1. We call I the n-th order counterpart of I . The second-order counterpart of a deductive π -institution is a Gentzen π -institution, i.e. a π -institution associated with a structural Gentzen system in a canonical way. So, by analogy, the second order counterpart I of I is also called the “Gentzenization” of I . In the main result of the paper, it (...)
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