Search results for 'Catherine Craver-Lemley' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Catherine Craver-Lemley Adam Reeves (2012). Unmasking the Perky Effect: Spatial Extent of Image Interference on Visual Acuity. Frontiers in Psychology 3.score: 132.0
    We have previously argued that visual mental images are not substitutable for visual percepts, because the interfering effects of visual stimuli such as line maskers on visual targets differ markedly in their properties from the interfering effects of visual images (the ‘Perky effect’). Imagery interference occurs over a much wider temporal and spatial extent than masking, and unlike masking, image interference is insensitive to relative orientation. The lack of substitutability is theoretically interesting because the Perky effect can be compared meaningfully (...)
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  2. Martha E. Arterberry, Catherine Craver-Lemley & Adam Reeves (2002). Visual Imagery is Not Always Like Visual Perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):183-184.score: 87.0
    The “Perky effect” is the interference of visual imagery with vision. Studies of this effect show that visual imagery has more than symbolic properties, but these properties differ both spatially (including “pictorially”) and temporally from those of vision. We therefore reject both the literal picture-in-the-head view and the entirely symbolic view.
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  3. Carl F. Craver (2007). Explaining the Brain: Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience. Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press ;.score: 60.0
    Carl Craver investigates what we are doing when we sue neuroscience to explain what's going on in the brain.
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  4. Carl F. Craver (2009). Explaining the Brain. OUP Oxford.score: 60.0
    What distinguishes good explanations in neuroscience from bad? Carl F. Craver constructs and defends standards for evaluating neuroscientific explanations that are grounded in a systematic view of what neuroscientific explanations are: descriptions of multilevel mechanisms. In developing this approach, he draws on a wide range of examples in the history of neuroscience (e.g. Hodgkin and Huxley's model of the action potential and LTP as a putative explanation for different kinds of memory), as well as recent philosophical work on the nature (...)
     
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  5. Peter K. Machamer, Lindley Darden & Carl F. Craver (2000). Thinking About Mechanisms. Philosophy of Science 67 (1):1-25.score: 30.0
    The concept of mechanism is analyzed in terms of entities and activities, organized such that they are productive of regular changes. Examples show how mechanisms work in neurobiology and molecular biology. Thinking in terms of mechanisms provides a new framework for addressing many traditional philosophical issues: causality, laws, explanation, reduction, and scientific change.
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  6. Gualtiero Piccinini & Carl Craver (2011). Integrating Psychology and Neuroscience: Functional Analyses as Mechanism Sketches. [REVIEW] Synthese 183 (3):283-311.score: 30.0
    We sketch a framework for building a unified science of cognition. This unification is achieved by showing how functional analyses of cognitive capacities can be integrated with the multilevel mechanistic explanations of neural systems. The core idea is that functional analyses are sketches of mechanisms , in which some structural aspects of a mechanistic explanation are omitted. Once the missing aspects are filled in, a functional analysis turns into a full-blown mechanistic explanation. By this process, functional analyses are seamlessly integrated (...)
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  7. Carl F. Craver (2006). When Mechanistic Models Explain. Synthese 153 (3):355-376.score: 30.0
    Not all models are explanatory. Some models are data summaries. Some models sketch explanations but leave crucial details unspecified or hidden behind filler terms. Some models are used to conjecture a how-possibly explanation without regard to whether it is a how-actually explanation. I use the Hodgkin and Huxley model of the action potential to illustrate these ways that models can be useful without explaining. I then use the subsequent development of the explanation of the action potential to show what is (...)
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  8. Carl F. Craver & William Bechtel (2007). Top-Down Causation Without Top-Down Causes. Biology and Philosophy 22 (4):547-563.score: 30.0
    We argue that intelligible appeals to interlevel causes (top-down and bottom-up) can be understood, without remainder, as appeals to mechanistically mediated effects. Mechanistically mediated effects are hybrids of causal and constitutive relations, where the causal relations are exclusively intralevel. The idea of causation would have to stretch to the breaking point to accommodate interlevel causes. The notion of a mechanistically mediated effect is preferable because it can do all of the required work without appealing to mysterious interlevel causes. When interlevel (...)
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  9. Carl F. Craver (2009). Mechanisms and Natural Kinds. Philosophical Psychology 22 (5):575-594.score: 30.0
    It is common to defend the Homeostatic Property Cluster ( HPC ) view as a third way between conventionalism and essentialism about natural kinds ( Boyd , 1989, 1991, 1997, 1999; Griffiths , 1997, 1999; Keil , 2003; Kornblith , 1993; Wilson , 1999, 2005; Wilson , Barker , & Brigandt , forthcoming ). According to the HPC view, property clusters are not merely conventionally clustered together; the co-occurrence of properties in the cluster is sustained by a similarity generating ( (...)
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  10. David Michael Kaplan & Carl F. Craver (2011). The Explanatory Force of Dynamical and Mathematical Models in Neuroscience: A Mechanistic Perspective. Philosophy of Science 78 (4):601-627.score: 30.0
    We argue that dynamical and mathematical models in systems and cognitive neuro- science explain (rather than redescribe) a phenomenon only if there is a plausible mapping between elements in the model and elements in the mechanism for the phe- nomenon. We demonstrate how this model-to-mechanism-mapping constraint, when satisfied, endows a model with explanatory force with respect to the phenomenon to be explained. Several paradigmatic models including the Haken-Kelso-Bunz model of bimanual coordination and the difference-of-Gaussians model of visual receptive fields are (...)
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  11. Carl F. Craver & Robert A. Wilson (2006). Realization. In P. Thagard (ed.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science. Elsevier.score: 30.0
    For the greater part of the last 50 years, it has been common for philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists to invoke the notion of realization in discussing the relationship between the mind and the brain. In traditional philosophy of mind, mental states are said to be realized, instantiated, or implemented in brain states. Artificial intelligence is sometimes described as the attempt either to model or to actually construct systems that realize some of the same psychological abilities that we and (...)
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  12. Carl F. Craver (2001). Role Functions, Mechanisms, and Hierarchy. Philosophy of Science 68 (1):53-74.score: 30.0
    Many areas of science develop by discovering mechanisms and role functions. Cummins' (1975) analysis of role functions-according to which an item's role function is a capacity of that item that appears in an analytic explanation of the capacity of some containing system-captures one important sense of "function" in the biological sciences and elsewhere. Here I synthesize Cummins' account with recent work on mechanisms and causal/mechanical explanation. The synthesis produces an analysis of specifically mechanistic role functions, one that uses the characteristic (...)
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  13. Carl F. Craver (2008). Physical Law and Mechanistic Explanation in the Hodgkin and Huxley Model of the Action Potential. Philosophy of Science 75 (5):1022-1033.score: 30.0
    Hodgkin and Huxley’s model of the action potential is an apparent dream case of covering‐law explanation in biology. The model includes laws of physics and chemistry that, coupled with details about antecedent and background conditions, can be used to derive features of the action potential. Hodgkin and Huxley insist that their model is not an explanation. This suggests either that subsuming a phenomenon under physical laws is insufficient to explain it or that Hodgkin and Huxley were wrong. I defend Hodgkin (...)
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  14. Carl F. Craver & Sarah K. Robins (2011). No Nonsense Neuro-Law. Neuroethics 4 (3):195-203.score: 30.0
    In Minds, Brains, and Norms, Pardo and Patterson deny that the activities of persons (knowledge, rule-following, interpretation) can be understood exclusively in terms of the brain, and thus conclude that neuroscience is irrelevant to the law, and to the conceptual and philosophical questions that arise in legal contexts. On their view, such appeals to neuroscience are an exercise in nonsense. We agree that understanding persons requires more than understanding brains, but we deny their pessimistic conclusion. Whether neuroscience can be used (...)
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  15. Carl F. Craver (2003). The Making of a Memory Mechanism. Journal of the History of Biology 36 (1):153-95.score: 30.0
    Long-Term Potentiation (LTP) is a kind of synaptic plasticity that many contemporary neuroscientists believe is a component in mechanisms of memory. This essay describes the discovery of LTP and the development of the LTP research program. The story begins in the 1950's with the discovery of synaptic plasticity in the hippocampus (a medial temporal lobe structure now associated with memory), and it ends in 1973 with the publication of three papers sketching the future course of the LTP research program. The (...)
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  16. Carl F. Craver & Anna Alexandrova (2008). No Revolution Necessary: Neural Mechanisms for Economics. Economics and Philosophy 24 (3):381-406.score: 30.0
    We argue that neuroeconomics should be a mechanistic science. We defend this view as preferable both to a revolutionary perspective, according to which classical economics is eliminated in favour of neuroeconomics, and to a classical economic perspective, according to which economics is insulated from facts about psychology and neuroscience. We argue that, like other mechanistic sciences, neuroeconomics will earn its keep to the extent that it either reconfigures how economists think about decision-making or how neuroscientists think about brain mechanisms underlying (...)
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  17. Carl F. Craver (2002). Interlevel Experiments and Multilevel Mechanisms in the Neuroscience of Memory. Philosophy of Science Supplemental Volume 69 (3):S83-S97.score: 30.0
  18. Carl Craver, Why the Hodgkin and Huxely Model Does Not Explain the Action Potential.score: 30.0
    Hodgkin and Huxley’s 1952 model of the action potential is an apparent dream case of covering-law explanation. The model appeals to general laws of physics and chemistry (specifically, Ohm’s law and the Nernst equation), and the laws, coupled with details about antecedent and background conditions, entail many of the significant properties of the action potential. However, Hodgkin and Huxley insist that their model falls short of an explanation. This historical fact suggests either that there is more to explaining the action (...)
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  19. Carl Craver (2007). Constitutive Explanatory Relevance. Journal of Philosophical Research 32:3-20.score: 30.0
    In what sense are the activities and properties of components in a mechanism explanatorily relevant to the behavior of a mechanism as a whole? I articulate this problem, the problem of constitutive relevance, and I show that it must be solved if we are to understand mechanisms and mechanistic explanation. I argue against some putative solutions to the problem of constitutive relevance, and I sketch a positive account according to which relevance is analyzed in terms ofrelationships of mutual manipulability between (...)
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  20. Carl F. Craver (2005). Beyond Reduction: Mechanisms, Multifield Integration and the Unity of Neuroscience. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 36 (2):373-395.score: 30.0
  21. L. U. Catherine (2011). Colonialism as Structural Injustice: Historical Responsibility and Contemporary Redress. Journal of Political Philosophy 19 (3):261-281.score: 30.0
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  22. Carl F. Craver (2004). Dissociable Realization and Kind Splitting. Philosophy of Science 71 (5):960-971.score: 30.0
    It is a common assumption in contemporary cognitive neuroscience that discovering a putative realized kind to be dissociably realized (i.e., to be realized in each instance by two or more distinct realizers) mandates splitting that kind. Here I explore some limits on this inference using two deceptively similar examples: the dissociation of declarative and procedural memory and Ramachandran's argument that the self is an illusion.
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  23. Sarah Robins & Carl Craver (2011). No Nonsense Neuro-Law. Neuroethics 4 (3):195-203.score: 30.0
    In Minds, Brains, and Norms , Pardo and Patterson deny that the activities of persons (knowledge, rule-following, interpretation) can be understood exclusively in terms of the brain, and thus conclude that neuroscience is irrelevant to the law, and to the conceptual and philosophical questions that arise in legal contexts. On their view, such appeals to neuroscience are an exercise in nonsense. We agree that understanding persons requires more than understanding brains, but we deny their pessimistic conclusion. Whether neuroscience can be (...)
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  24. Brandon N. Towl, Jonathan Halvorson & Carl F. Craver (2003). An Elusive Target: A Critical Review of Clark Glymour's the Mind's Arrows. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 16 (1):157 – 164.score: 30.0
    The mind's arrows , by Clark Glymour, combines several of the author's previous essays on causal inference. Glymour deploys causal Bayes nets (CBNs) to provide a descriptive psychological model of human causal inference and a prescriptive model for making inferences in cognitive neuropsychology and the social sciences. Though The mind's arrows is highly original and provocative, its labyrinthine organization and technical style render it inaccessible to the uninitiated. Here we attempt to distill, package and dress some of Glymour's more interesting (...)
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  25. Lindley Darden & Carl Craver (2002). Strategies in the Interfield Discovery of the Mechanism of Protein Synthesis. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 33 (1):1-28.score: 30.0
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  26. Carl F. Craver & Lindley Darden (2001). Discovering Mechanisms in Neurobiology: The Case of Spatial Memory. In P.K. Machamer, Rick Grush & Peter McLaughlin (eds.), Theory and Method in Neuroscience. Pittsburgh: University of Pitt Press. 112--137.score: 30.0
  27. L. Welch Catherine, E. Welch Denice & Lisa Hewerdine (2008). Gender and Export Behaviour: Evidence From Women-Owned Enterprises. Journal of Business Ethics 83 (1).score: 30.0
    This article draws on the results of a qualitative, exploratory study of 20 Australian women business owners to demonstrate how using a ‹gender as social identity’ lens provides new insights into the influence of gender on exporting and entrepreneurial behaviour. Interview data reveal perceptions of gender identity and gender relations varied and influenced the interpretations which women business owners placed on their exporting activities. Women in the study used different terms to describe exporter and entrepreneurial characteristics to those found in (...)
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  28. Carl F. Craver & Lindley Darden (2005). Introduction. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 36 (2):233-244.score: 30.0
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  29. Carl F. Craver & William P. Bechtel, Explaining Top-Down Causation (Away).score: 30.0
     
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  30. Carl F. Craver (2005). Functions and Mechanisms in Contemporary Neuroscience. In Pierre Poirier, Luc Faucher, Eric Racine & E. Ennan (eds.), Des Neurones A La Conscience: Neurophilosophie Et Philosophie Des Neurosciences. Bruxelles: De Boeck Universite.score: 30.0
     
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  31. R. Skipper Jr, C. Allen, R. A. Ankeny, C. F. Craver, L. Darden, G. Mikkelson & R. Richardson (eds.) (forthcoming). Philosophy and the Life Sciences: A Reader. MIT Press.score: 30.0
  32. James Lindemann Nelson (2014). Odd Complaints and Doubtful Conditions: Norms of Hypochondria in Jane Austen and Catherine Belling. Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 11 (2):193-200.score: 24.0
    In her final fragmentary novel Sanditon, Jane Austen develops a theme that pervades her work from her juvenilia onward: illness, and in particular, illness imagined, invented, or self-inflicted. While the “invention of odd complaints” is characteristically a token of folly or weakness throughout her writing, in this last work imagined illness is also both a symbol and a cause of how selves and societies degenerate. In the shifting world of Sanditon, hypochondria is the lubricant for a society bent on turning (...)
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  33. Arnon Levy (2009). Explaining What? Review of Explaining the Brain: Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience by Carl F. Craver. Biology and Philosophy 24 (1).score: 18.0
    Carl Craver’s recent book offers an account of the explanatory and theoretical structure of neuroscience. It depicts it as centered around the idea of achieving mechanistic understanding, i.e., obtaining knowledge of how a set of underlying components interacts to produce a given function of the brain. Its core account of mechanistic explanation and relevance is causal-manipulationist in spirit, and offers substantial insight into casual explanation in brain science and the associated notion of levels of explanation. However, the focus on mechanistic (...)
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  34. Jim Bogen (2008). The Hodgkin‐Huxley Equations and the Concrete Model: Comments on Craver, Schaffner, and Weber. Philosophy of Science 75 (5):1034-1046.score: 18.0
    I claim that the Hodgkin‐Huxley (HH) current equations owe a great deal of their importance to their role in bringing results from experiments on squid giant action preparations to bear on the study of the action potential in other neurons in other in vitro and in vivo environments. I consider ideas from Weber and Craver about the role of Coulomb’s and other fundamental equations in explaining the action potential and in HH’s development of their equations. Also, I offer an embellishment (...)
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  35. Lisabeth During (2000). Catherine Malabou and the Currency of Hegelianism. Hypatia 15 (4):190-195.score: 18.0
    : Catherine Malabou is a professor of philosophy at Paris-Nanterre. A collaborator and student of Jacques Derrida, her work shares some of his interest in rigorous protocols of reading, and a willingness to attend to the undercurrents of over-read and "too familiar" texts. But, as she points out, this orientation was shared by Hegel himself. Arguing against Heidegger, Kojève, and other critics of Hegel, the book in which this Introduction appears puts Hegel back on the map of the present.
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  36. Stuart Glennan, Carl F. Craver and Lindley Darden: In Search of Mechanisms: Discoveries Across the Life Sciences.score: 18.0
    Carl Craver and Lindley Darden are two of the foremost proponents of a recent approach to the philosophy of biology that is often called the New Mechanism. In this book they seek to make available to a broader readership insights gained from more than two decades of work on the nature of mechanisms and how they are described and discovered. The book is not primarily aimed at specialists working on the New Mechanism, but rather targets scientists, students and teachers who (...)
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  37. Anna Antonopoulos (1991). Writing the Mystic Body: Sexuality and Textuality in the Écriture-Féminine of Saint Catherine of Genoa. Hypatia 6 (3):185 - 207.score: 18.0
    This paper looks to evolve a discourse about the body in medieval women's mystical experience via an understanding of the life and work of Saint Catherine of Genoa as écriture-féminine. Drawing upon Catherine's resolution of binarism through the articulation of sexuality and textuality, I argue that the female mystic's experience of the body as site of struggle helps move beyond analysis of a binary experience to a politics of speaking the body directly.
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  38. Iulia Iuga (2010). Catherine Clement, Julia Kristeva, Femeia si Sacrul/ The Woman and the Sacred. Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies 2 (6):198-200.score: 18.0
    Catherine Clement, Julia Kristeva, Femeia si Sacrul Editura Albatros, Bucureoti, 2001., 244 pg.
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  39. Sophie Dulucq (1997). Catherine COQUERY-VIDROVITCH, Les Africaines. Histoire des femmes d'Afrique noire du XIXe au XXe siècle, Paris, Desjonquères, 1994, 291 p. [REVIEW] Clio 2:25-25.score: 18.0
    Parue en 1994, l'impressionnante synthèse de Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch sur les femmes dans les sociétés africaines contemporaines est un livre pionnier dans l'historiographie française. S'appuyant sur une considérable bibliographie (notamment en anglais) et sur ses propres recherches, l'auteur dresse le bilan des connaissances accumulées depuis deux décennies et s'attache à établir une cartographie des incertitudes et des lacunes qui demeurent. « Ce qu'il importe de comprendre, c'es..
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  40. Agnès Fine (2002). Catherine ALES et Cécile BARRAUD (dir.), Sexe relatif ou sexe absolu ?, Paris, Éditions de la Maison des sciences de l'homme, 2001, 431 p. [REVIEW] Clio 2:32-32.score: 18.0
    Le titre au premier abord énigmatique de cet ouvrage collectif d'anthropologie et le caractère très technique et parfois difficile de son contenu risquent de décourager les lecteurs non spécialistes. Aussi me paraît-il important d'en résumer la problématique tant elle paraît importante pour qui s'intéresse à la question du caractère universel de la différence des sexes et de la subordination des femmes. La lecture de l'introduction générale de Catherine Alès qui présente les différente..
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  41. Catherine E. Barton (2000). Richard M. Lerner Catherine E. Barton. In Walter J. Perrig & Alexander Grob (eds.), Control of Human Behavior, Mental Processes, and Consciousness: Essays in Honor of the 60th Birthday of August Flammer. Erlbaum. 420.score: 18.0
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  42. D. Catherine Brown (1997). Jean Gerson D. Catherine Brown. In Jill Kraye (ed.), Cambridge Translations of Renaissance Philosophical Texts. Cambridge University Press. 3.score: 18.0
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  43. André Ferreira de Araújo (2013). AUDARD, Catherine. Cidadania e democracia deliberativa. Porto Alegre: EDIPUCRS, 2006. Cadernos Do Pet Filosofia 4 (8):90-96.score: 18.0
    Esta resenha versa sobre a obra Cidadania e Democracia Deliberativa de Catherine Audard que se refere à uma articulação rawlsiana entre uma teoria da justiça e as teses centrais do seu liberalismo político sobre o pluralismo razoável, democracia deliberativa, cidadania participativa, razão pública, direito dos povos e multiculturalismo.
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  44. Catherine Z. Elgin (1998). Catherine Z. Elgin. In Alcoff Linda (ed.), Epistemology: The Big Questions. Blackwell. 26.score: 18.0
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  45. Catherine Goldstein (2000). Documents-Essay Review: On Catherine Goldsteins Book, Un Theoreme de Fermat Et Ses Lecteurs. Revue d'Histoire des Sciences 53 (2):295.score: 18.0
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  46. Jacques Maître (1995). Sainte Catherine de sienne : patronne des anorexiques ? Clio 2:6-6.score: 18.0
    À partir du XIIIe siècle, le tableau clinique de l'anorexie mentale se présente sous la forme de l'anorexie mystique. L'exemple retenu est Catherine de Sienne († 1380). Une approche de psychanalyse socio-historique permet de situer sa démarche par rapport à ses conflits intrapsychiques et aux processus idéologiques de son époque. L'anorexie mystique apparaît comme liée à l'histoire personnelle de chacune dans sa constellation familiale comme à l'essor de la mystique affective féminine. On la trouve souvent marquée par une révolte (...)
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  47. Cyril Olivier (2003). Jean-Yves LE NAOUR, Catherine VALENTI, Histoire de l'avortement (XIXe-XXe siècle), Paris, Le Seuil, coll. « L'univers historique »), 2003, 394 p. [REVIEW] Clio 2:27-27.score: 18.0
    Jean-Yves Le Naour et Catherine Valenti proposent un ouvrage ambitieux par son propos : faire une histoire de l'avortement depuis le milieu du XIXe jusqu'à la fin du XXe siècle. Entreprise ambitieuse mais nécessaire, une telle synthèse étant inédite en France. L'idée force du livre tient donc dans sa longue durée : un siècle et demi durant lequel la question de l'avortement fut au centre de débats tant politiques, que juridiques, économiques et sociaux. Le problème est pris à bras (...)
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  48. Alice Crary (2009). Dumb Beasts and Dead Philosophers: Humanity and the Humane in Ancient Philosophy and Literature – by Catherine Osborne. Philosophical Investigations 32 (2):191-197.score: 15.0
  49. Valerie Gray Hardcastle (2008). Review of Carl F. Craver, Explaining the Brain: Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (1).score: 15.0
  50. Pete Mandik (2009). Review of Catherine Malabou, What Should We Do with Our Brain?. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (4).score: 15.0
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