88 found
Order:
See also:
Profile: Catherine Elgin (Harvard University)
  1. Catherine Elgin (2009). Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   13 citations  
  2.  26
    Catherine Elgin (1996). Considered Judgment. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
    The book contains a unique epistemological position that deserves serious consideration by specialists in the subject."--Bruce Aune, University of Massachusetts.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   35 citations  
  3. Catherine Z. Elgin (2004). True Enough. Philosophical Issues 14 (1):113–131.
    Truth is standardly considered a requirement on epistemic acceptability. But science and philosophy deploy models, idealizations and thought experiments that prescind from truth to achieve other cognitive ends. I argue that such felicitous falsehoods function as cognitively useful fictions. They are cognitively useful because they exemplify and afford epistemic access to features they share with the relevant facts. They are falsehoods in that they diverge from the facts. Nonetheless, they are true enough to serve their epistemic purposes. Theories that contain (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   25 citations  
  4. Catherine Elgin (2007). Understanding and the Facts. Philosophical Studies 132 (1):33 - 42.
    If understanding is factive, the propositions that express an understanding are true. I argue that a factive conception of understanding is unduly restrictive. It neither reflects our practices in ascribing understanding nor does justice to contemporary science. For science uses idealizations and models that do not mirror the facts. Strictly speaking, they are false. By appeal to exemplification, I devise a more generous, flexible conception of understanding that accommodates science, reflects our practices, and shows a sufficient but not slavish sensitivity (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   16 citations  
  5.  5
    Catherine Z. Elgin (forthcoming). Nominalism, Realism and Objectivity. Synthese:1-16.
    I argue that constructive nominalism is preferable to scientific realism. Rather than reflecting without distortion the way the mind-independent world is, theories refract. They provide an understanding of the world as modulated by a particular theory. Truth is defined within a theoretical framework rather than outside of it. This does not undermine objectivity, for an assertion contains a reference to the framework in terms of which its truth is claimed.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6.  28
    Catherine Elgin (2009). ``Is Understanding Factive?". In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press 322--30.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  7. Catherine Elgin (2006). From Knowledge to Understanding. In Stephen Cade Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology Futures. Oxford University Press 199--215.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  8.  25
    Catherine Elgin (2005). Non-Foundationalist Epistemology: Holism, Coherence, and Tenability. In Steup Matthias & Sosa Ernest (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell 156--67.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  9. Catherine Z. Elgin (2001). The Legacy of Nelson Goodman. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):679-690.
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. Catherine Z. Elgin (2010). Keeping Things in Perspective. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 150 (3):439 - 447.
    Scientific realism holds that scientific representations are utterly objective. They describe the way the world is, independent of any point of view. In Scientific Representation, van Fraassen argues otherwise. If science is to afford an understanding of nature, it must be grounded in evidence. Since evidence is perspectivai, science cannot vindicate its claims using only utterly objective representations. For science to do its epistemic job, it must involve perspectivai representations. I explicate this argument and show its power.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  11.  50
    Catherine Z. Elgin (2008). Trustworthiness. Philosophical Papers 37 (3):371-387.
    I argue that trustworthiness is an epistemic desideratum. It does not reduce to justified or reliable true belief, but figures in the reason why justified or reliable true beliefs are often valuable. Such beliefs can be precarious. If a belief's being justified requires that the evidence be just as we take it to be, then if we are off even by a little, the belief is unwarranted. Similarly for reliability. Although it satisfies the definition of knowledge, such a belief is (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  12.  56
    Nelson Goodman & Catherine Z. Elgin (1986). Interpretation and Identity: Can the Work Survive the World? Critical Inquiry 12 (3):564-575.
    Predictions concerning the end of the world have proven less reliable than your broker’s recommendations or your fondest hopes. Whether you await the end fearfully or eagerly, you may rest assured that it will never come—not because the world is everlasting but because it has already ended, if indeed it ever began. But we need not mourn, for the world is indeed well lost, and with it the stultifying stereotypes of absolutism: the absurd notions of science as the effort to (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. Catherine Z. Elgin (2010). Persistent Disagreement. In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. OUP Oxford
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  14.  38
    Catherine Z. Elgin (2002). Art in the Advancement of Understanding. American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (1):1 - 12.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  15.  98
    Catherine Z. Elgin (2002). Take It From Me: The Epistemological Status of Testimony. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):291-308.
    Testimony consists in imparting information without supplying evidence or argument to back one's claims. To what extent does testimony convey epistemic warrant? C. J. A. Coady argues, on Davidsonian grounds, that (1) most testimony is true, hence (2) most testimony supplies warrant sufficient for knowledge. I appeal to Grice's maxims to undermine Coady's argument and to show that the matter is more complicated and context-sensitive than is standardly recognized. Informative exchanges take place within networks of shared, tacit assumptions that affect (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  16.  1
    Catherine Z. Elgin (2000). Considered Judgement. Mind 109 (434):334-337.
    Philosophy long sought to set knowledge on a firm foundation, through derivation of indubitable truths by infallible rules. For want of such truths and rules, the enterprise foundered. Nevertheless, foundationalism's heirs continue their forbears' quest, seeking security against epistemic misfortune, while their detractors typically espouse unbridled coherentism or facile relativism. Maintaining that neither stance is tenable, Catherine Elgin devises a via media between the absolute and the arbitrary, reconceiving the nature, goals, and methods of epistemology. In Considered Judgment, she argues (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  17. Catherine Z. Elgin (1993). Understanding: Art and Science. Synthese 95 (1):196-208.
    The arts and the sciences perform many of the same cognitive functions, both serving to advance understanding. This paper explores some of the ways exemplification operates in the two fields. Both scientific experiments and works of art highlight, underscore, display, or convey some of their own features. They thereby focus attention on them, and make them available for examination and projection. Thus, the Michelson-Morley experiment exemplifies the constancy of the speed of light. Jackson Pollock'sNumber One exemplifies the viscosity of paint. (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  18.  83
    Catherine Z. Elgin (1995). Unnatural Science. Journal of Philosophy 92 (6):289-302.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  19.  20
    Catherine Z. Elgin (1997). Between the Absolute and the Arbitrary. Cornell University Press.
    In Between the Absolute and the Arbitrary, Catherine Z. Elgin maps a constructivist alternative to the standard Anglo-American conception of philosophy's ...
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  20. Catherine Elgin (2009). Exemplification, Idealization, and Scientific Understanding. In Mauricio Suárez (ed.), Fictions in Science: Philosophical Essays on Modeling and Idealization. Routledge 4--77.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  21.  69
    Catherine Z. Elgin (1988). The Epistemic Efficacy of Stupidity. Synthese 74 (3):297 - 311.
    I show that it follows from both externalist and internalist theories that stupid people may be in a better position to know than smart ones. This untoward consequence results from taking our epistemic goal to be accepting as many truths as possible and rejecting as many falsehoods as possible, combined with a recognition that the standard for acceptability cannot be set too high, else scepticism will prevail. After showing how causal, reliabilist, and coherentist theories devalue intelligence, I suggest that knowledge, (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  22.  34
    Catherine Z. Elgin (2014). Fiction as Thought Experiment. Perspectives on Science 22 (2):221-241.
    Jonathan Bennett (1974) maintains that Huckleberry Finn’s deliberations about whether to return Jim to slavery afford insight into the tension between sympathy and moral judgment; Miranda Fricker (2007) argues that the trial scene in To Kill a Mockingbird affords insight into the nature of testimonial injustice. Neither claims merely that the works prompt an attentive reader to think something new or to change her mind. Rather, they consider the reader cognitively better off for her encounters with the novels. Nor is (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23.  73
    Catherine Z. Elgin (2002). Creation as Reconfiguration: Art in the Advancement of Science. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 16 (1):13 – 25.
    Cognitive advancement is not always a matter of acquiring new information. It often consists in reconfiguration--in reorganizing a domain so that hitherto overlooked or underemphasized features, patterns, opportunities, and resources come to light. Several modes of reconfiguration prominent in the arts--metaphor, fiction, exemplification, and perspective--play important roles in science as well. They do not perform the same roles as literal, descriptive, perspectiveless scientific truths. But to understand how science advances understanding, we need to appreciate the ineliminable cognitive contributions of non-literal, (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  24.  32
    Catherine Z. Elgin (1999). Education and the Advancement of Understanding. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 3:131-140.
    Understanding, as I construe it, is holistic. It is a matter of how commitments mesh to form a mutually supportive, independently supported system of thought. It is advanced by bootstrapping. We start with what we think we know and build from there. This makes education continuous with what goes on at the cutting edge of inquiry. Methods, standards, categories and stances are as important as facts. So something like E. D. Hirsch’s list of facts every fourth grader should know is (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  25.  76
    Catherine Z. Elgin (2000). Reorienting Aesthetics, Reconceiving Cognition. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 58 (3):219-225.
  26.  45
    Catherine Z. Elgin (2009). Construction and Cognition. Theoria 24 (2):135-146.
    The Structure of Appearance presents a phenomenalist system, constructing enduring visible objects out of qualia. Nevertheless Goodman does not espouse phenomenalism. This is not because he considers his system inadequate. Although details remain to be filled in, he considers his system viable. And he believes his constructional methods could readily yield extensions to other sensory realms. Why isn’t Goodman a phenomenalist? This paper suggests an answer that illuminates Goodman’s views about the nature and functions of constructional systems, the prospects of (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27.  11
    Catherine Z. Elgin (2008). Philosophical Papers 27 (2008), 371-387. Trustworthiness. Philosophical Papers 27:371-387.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28.  6
    James W. McAllister, Lars Bergström, James Robert Brown, Martin Carrier, Nancy Cartwright, Jiwei Ci, David Davies, Catherine Elgin, Márta Fehér & Michel Ghins (2010). First Page Preview. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (4).
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  29.  32
    Catherine Z. Elgin (2012). Making Manifest: The Role of Exemplification in the Sciences and the Arts. Principia 15 (3):399-413.
    Exemplification is the relation of an example to whatever it is an example of. Goodman maintains that exemplification is a symptom of the aesthetic: although not a necessary condition, it is an indicator that symbol is functioning aesthetically. I argue that exemplification is as important in science as it is in art. It is the vehicle by which experiments make aspects of nature manifest. I suggest that the difference between exemplars in the arts and the sciences lies in the way (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. Catherine Z. Elgin (1999). Epistemology's Ends, Pedagogy's Prospects'. Facta Philosophica 1:39-54.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  31.  70
    Catherine Z. Elgin (2000). Interpretation and Understanding. Erkenntnis 52 (2):175-183.
    To understand a term or other symbol, I argue that it is generally neither necessary nor sufficient to assign it a unique determinate reference. Independent of and prior to investigation, it is frequently indeterminate not only whether a sentence is true, but also what its truth conditions are. Nelson Goodman's discussions of likeness of meaning are deployed to explain how this can be so.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32.  18
    Catherine Z. Elgin (1997). The Power of Parsimony. Philosophia Scientiae 2 (1):89-104.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33.  1
    Catherine Z. Elgin (1984). With Reference to Reference. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 42 (4):448-451.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  34.  67
    Catherine Z. Elgin (2004). Denying a Dualism: Goodman's Repudiation of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 28 (1):226–238.
  35.  36
    Catherine Elgin (1996). The Relativity of Fact and the Objectivity of Value. The Harvard Review of Philosophy 6 (1):4-15.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36.  26
    Catherine Z. Elgin (2012). Begging to Differ. The Philosophers' Magazine 59 (59):77-82.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37.  20
    Catherine Z. Elgin (2011). "The Legacy of" Two Dogmas". American Philosophical Quarterly 48 (3):267.
    W. V. Quine is famous, or perhaps infamous, for his repudiation of the analytic/synthetic distinction and kindred dualisms—the necessary/contingent dichotomy and the a priori/a posteriori dichotomy. As these dualisms have come back into vogue in recent years, it might seem that the denial of the dualisms is no part of Quine's enduring legacy. Such a conclusion is unwarranted—not only because the dualisms are deeply problematic, but because "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" haunts even those who want to retain them. "Two Dogmas" (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38.  19
    Catherine Z. Elgin (2005). Review: Williams on Truthfulness. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):343 - 352.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  39.  8
    Catherine Z. Elgin (1991). What Goodman Leaves Out. Journal of Aesthetic Education 25 (1):89-95.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40.  10
    Catherine Z. Elgin (1993). Scheffler's Symbols. Synthese 94 (1):3 - 12.
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  41.  16
    Catherine Z. Elgin (2005). Word Giving, Word Taking. In David Wood & José Medina (eds.), Truth: Engagements Across Philosophical Traditions. Blackwell Pub. 271--287.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42.  15
    Catherine Z. Elgin (2002). Take It From Me. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):291-308.
    Testimony consists in imparting information without supplying evidence or argument to back one’s claims. To what extent does testimony convey epistemic warrant? C. J. A. Coady argues, on Davidsonian grounds, that (1) most testimony is true, hence (2) most testimony supplies warrant sufficient for knowledge. I appeal to Grice’s maxims to undermine Coady’s argument and to show that the matter is more complicated and context-sensitive than is standardly recognized. Informative exchanges take place within networks of shared, tacit assumptions that affect (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  43.  34
    Catherine Z. Elgin (2010). Review of Henk W. De Regt, Sabina Leonelli, Kai Eigner (Eds.), Scientific Understanding: Philosophical Perspectives. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (1).
    No categories
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44.  24
    Catherine Z. Elgin (1985). Translucent Belief. Journal of Philosophy 82 (2):74-91.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  45.  42
    Catherine Z. Elgin & Israel Scheffler (1987). Mainsprings of Metaphor. Journal of Philosophy 84 (6):331-335.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46. Catherine Z. Elgin (2010). 13 Skepticism Aside. In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O.’Rourke & Harry S. Silverstein (eds.), Knowledge and Skepticism. MIT Press 309.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47.  44
    Catherine Z. Elgin & Nelson Goodman (1987). Changing the Subject. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 46:219-223.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48.  22
    David Miller, Catherine Z. Elgin, Jonathan E. Adler & Douglas N. Walton (1980). Critical Notice. Synthese 43 (3):125 – 140.
    No categories
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  49.  11
    Catherine Z. Elgin (forthcoming). Sign, Symbol, and System. Journal of Aesthetic Education.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50.  40
    Catherine Z. Elgin (2000). Worldmaker: Nelson Goodman 1906–1998. [REVIEW] Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 31 (1):1-18.
1 — 50 / 88