Search results for 'Catherine Lange' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Patrick Amar, Pascal Ballet, Georgia Barlovatz-Meimon, Arndt Benecke, Gilles Bernot, Yves Bouligand, Paul Bourguine, Franck Delaplace, Jean-Marc Delosme, Maurice Demarty, Itzhak Fishov, Jean Fourmentin-Guilbert, Joe Fralick, Jean-Louis Giavitto, Bernard Gleyse, Christophe Godin, Roberto Incitti, François Képès, Catherine Lange, Lois Le Sceller, Corinne Loutellier, Olivier Michel, Franck Molina, Chantal Monnier, René Natowicz, Vic Norris, Nicole Orange, Helene Pollard, Derek Raine, Camille Ripoll, Josette Rouviere-Yaniv, Milton Saier, Paul Soler, Pierre Tambourin, Michel Thellier, Philippe Tracqui, Dave Ussery, Jean-Claude Vincent, Jean-Pierre Vannier, Philippa Wiggins & Abdallah Zemirline (2002). Hyperstructures, Genome Analysis and I-Cells. Acta Biotheoretica 50 (4).score: 240.0
    New concepts may prove necessary to profit from the avalanche of sequence data on the genome, transcriptome, proteome and interactome and to relate this information to cell physiology. Here, we focus on the concept of large activity-based structures, or hyperstructures, in which a variety of types of molecules are brought together to perform a function. We review the evidence for the existence of hyperstructures responsible for the initiation of DNA replication, the sequestration of newly replicated origins of replication, cell division (...)
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  2. Marc Lange (2005). Reply to Ellis and to Handfield on Essentialism, Laws, and Counterfactuals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (4):581 – 588.score: 60.0
    In Lange 2004a, I argued that 'scientific essentialism' [Ellis 2001 cannot account for the characteristic relation between laws and counterfactuals without undergoing considerable ad hoc tinkering. In recent papers, Brian Ellis 2005 and Toby Handfield 2005 have defended essentialism against my charge. Here I argue that Ellis's and Handfield's replies fail. Even in ordinary counterfactual reasoning, the 'closest possible world' where the electron's electric charge is 5% greater may have less overlap with the actual world in its fundamental natural (...)
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  3. Jim Woodward, Barry Loewer, John Carroll & Marc Lange (2011). Counterfactuals All the Way Down? Metascience 20 (1):27-52.score: 60.0
    Counterfactuals all the way down? Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11016-010-9437-9 Authors Jim Woodward, History and Philosophy of Science, 1017 Cathedral of Learning, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260, USA Barry Loewer, Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 08901, USA John W. Carroll, Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC 27695-8103, USA Marc Lange, Department of Philosophy, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, CB#3125—Caldwell Hall, Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3125, USA Journal Metascience (...)
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  4. Marc Lange (2004). A Note on Scientific Essentialism, Laws of Nature, and Counterfactual Conditionals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (2):227 – 241.score: 30.0
    Scientific essentialism aims to account for the natural laws' special capacity to support counterfactuals. I argue that scientific essentialism can do so only by resorting to devices that are just as ad hoc as those that essentialists accuse Humean regularity theories of employing. I conclude by offering an account of the laws' distinctive relation to counterfactuals that portrays laws as contingent but nevertheless distinct from accidents by virtue of possessing a genuine variety of necessity.
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  5. Marc Lange (1999). Why Are the Laws of Nature so Important to Science? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):625-652.score: 30.0
    Why should science be so interested in discovering whether p is a law over and above whether p is true? The answer may involve the laws' relation to counterfactuals: p is a law iff p would still have obtained under any counterfactual supposition that is consistent with the laws. But unless we already understand why science is especially concerned with the laws, we cannot explain why science is especially interested in what would have happened under those counterfactual suppositions consistent with (...)
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  6. Marc Lange (2005). Laws and Their Stability. Synthese 144 (3):415Ð432.score: 30.0
    Many philosophers have believed that the laws of nature differ from the accidental truths in their invariance under counterfactual perturbations. Roughly speaking, the laws would still have held had q been the case, for any q that is consistent with the laws. (Trivially, no accident would still have held under every such counterfactual supposition.) The main problem with this slogan (even if it is true) is that it uses the laws themselves to delimit qs range. I present a means of (...)
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  7. Marc Lange (2006). How to Account for the Relation Between Chancy Facts and Deterministic Laws. Mind 115 (460):917--946.score: 30.0
    Suppose that unobtanium-346 is a rare radioactive isotope. Consider: (1) Every Un346 atom, at its creation, decays within 7 microseconds (µs). (50%) Every Un346 atom, at its creation, has a 50% chance of decaying within 7µs. (1) and (50%) can be true together, but (1) and (50%) cannot together be laws of nature. Indeed, (50%)'s mere (non-vacuous) truth logically precludes (1)'s lawhood. A satisfactory analysis of chance and lawhood should nicely account for this relation. I shall argue first that David (...)
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  8. Marc Lange (1996). Laws of Nature, Cosmic Coincidences and Scientific Realism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):614 – 638.score: 30.0
  9. Marc Lange (1999). Laws, Counterfactuals, Stability, and Degrees of Lawhood. Philosophy of Science 66 (2):243-267.score: 30.0
    I identify the special sort of stability (invariance, resilience, etc.) that distinguishes laws from accidental truths. Although an accident can have a certain invariance under counterfactual suppositions, there is no continuum between laws and accidents here; a law's invariance is different in kind, not in degree, from an accident's. (In particular, a law's range of invariance is not "broader"--at least in the most straightforward sense.) The stability distinctive of the laws is used to explicate what it would mean for there (...)
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  10. Marc Lange (1995). Are There Natural Laws Concerning Particular Biological Species? Journal of Philosophy 92 (8):430-451.score: 30.0
  11. Marc Lange (2005). A Counterfactual Analysis of the Concepts of Logical Truth and Necessity. Philosophical Studies 125 (3):277 - 303.score: 30.0
    This paper analyzes the logical truths as (very roughly) those truths that would still have been true under a certain range of counterfactual perturbations.What’s nice is that the relevant range is characterized without relying (overtly, at least) upon the notion of logical truth. This approach suggests a conception of necessity that explains what the different varieties of necessity (logical, physical, etc.) have in common, in virtue of which they are all varieties of necessity. However, this approach places the counterfactual conditionals (...)
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  12. Marc Lange (1993). Lawlikeness. Noûs 27 (1):1-21.score: 30.0
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  13. Marc Lange (1999). Calibration and the Epistemological Role of Bayesian Conditionalization. Journal of Philosophy 96 (6):294-324.score: 30.0
  14. Marc Lange (1996). Life, "Artificial Life," and Scientific Explanation. Philosophy of Science 63 (2):225-244.score: 30.0
    Recently, biologists and computer scientists who advocate the "strong thesis of artificial life" have argued that the distinction between life and nonlife is important and that certain computer software entities could be alive in the same sense as biological entities. These arguments have been challenged by Sober (1991). I address some of the questions about the rational reconstruction of biology that are suggested by these arguments: What is the relation between life and the "signs of life"? What work (if any) (...)
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  15. Marc Lange (2001). The Most Famous Equation. Journal of Philosophy 98 (5):219-238.score: 30.0
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  16. John F. Lange (1966). R. M. Hare's Reformulation of the Open Question. Mind 75 (298):244-247.score: 30.0
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  17. Marc Lange (2004). Bayesianism and Unification: A Reply to Wayne Myrvold. Philosophy of Science 71 (2):205-215.score: 30.0
    Myrvold (2003) has proposed an attractive Bayesian account of why theories that unify phenomena tend to derive greater epistemic support from those phenomena than do theories that fail to unify them. It is argued, however, that "unification" in Myrvold's sense is both too easy and too difficult for theories to achieve. Myrvold's account fails to capture what it is that makes unification sometimes count in a theory's favor.
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  18. Marc Lange (2002). Okasha on Inductive Scepticism. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (207):226-232.score: 30.0
    In a recent paper replying to the inductive sceptic, Samir Okasha says that the Humean argument for inductive scepticism depends on mistakenly construing inductive reasoning as based on a principle of the uniformity of nature. I dispute Okasha's argument that we are entitled to the background beliefs on which (he says) inductive reasoning depends. Furthermore, I argue that the sorts of theoretically impoverished contexts to which a uniformity-of-nature principle has traditionally been restricted are exactly the contexts relevant to the inductive (...)
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  19. Marc Lange (2004). The Autonomy of Functional Biology: A Reply to Rosenberg. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 19 (1):93-109.score: 30.0
    Rosenberg has recently argued that explanations supplied by (what he calls) functional biology are mere promissory notes for macromolecular adaptive explanations. Rosenberg's arguments currently constitute one of the most substantial challenges to the autonomy, irreducibility, and indispensability of the explanations supplied by functional biology. My responses to Rosenberg's arguments will generate a novel account of the autonomy of functional biology. This account will turn on the relations between counterfactuals, scientific explanations, and natural laws. Crucially, in their treatment of the laws' (...)
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  20. Dirk Hartmann & Rainer Lange (2000). Epistemology Culturalized. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 31 (1):75-107.score: 30.0
    The anti-metaphysical intentions of naturalism can be respected without abandoning the project of a normative epistemology. The central assumptions of naturalism imply that (1.) the distinction between action and behaviour is spurious, and (2.) epistemology cannot continue to be a normative project. Difficulties with the second implication have been adressed by Normative Naturalism, but without violating the naturalistic consensus, it can only appreciate means-end-rationality. However, this does not suffice to justify its own implicit normative pretensions. According to our diagnosis, naturalism (...)
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  21. Marc Lange (1995). Spearman's Principle. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4):503-521.score: 30.0
    Glymour, Scheines, Spirtes, and Kelly argue for ‘Spearman's Principle’: one should (ceteris paribus) favour the theory whose ‘free parameters’ need assume no particular values for the theory to save the ‘constraints’ holding of the phenomena. I argue that the rationale they give for Spearman's Principle fails, but that (contra Cartwright) Spearman's Principle cannot be made to favour either of two theories depending on how they are expressed. I examine how one must motivate the demand for a scientific explanation of a (...)
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  22. John Lange (1966). The Late Papers of C. I. Lewis. Journal of the History of Philosophy 4 (3):235-246.score: 30.0
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  23. Klaus Lange (1979). Albanian Marxism's Notion of Revisionism. Studies in East European Thought 20 (1):61-66.score: 30.0
  24. Scott Edgar (2013). The Limits of Experience and Explanation: F. A. Lange and Ernst Mach on Things in Themselves. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (1):100-121.score: 24.0
    In the middle of the nineteenth century, advances in experimental psychology and the physiology of the sense organs inspired so-called "Back to Kant" Neo-Kantians to articulate robustly psychologistic visions of Kantian epistemology. But their accounts of the thing in itself were fraught with deep tension: they wanted to conceive of things in themselves as the causes of our sensations, while their own accounts of causal inference ruled that claim out. This paper diagnoses the source of that problem in views of (...)
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  25. Nadeem J. Z. Hussain & Lydia Patton, Friedrich Albert Lange. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 24.0
    Friedrich Albert Lange (b. 1828, d. 1875) was a German philosopher, pedagogue, political activist, and journalist. He was one of the originators of neo-Kantianism and an important figure in the founding of the Marburg school of neo-Kantianism. He is also played a significant role in the German labour movement and in the development of social democratic thought. His book, THE HISTORY OF MATERIALISM, was a standard introduction to materialism and the history of philosophy well into the twentieth century.
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  26. Scott Edgar (forthcoming). The Physiology of the Sense Organs and Early Neo-Kantian Conceptions of Objectivity: Helmholtz, Lange, Liebmann. In Flavia Padovani, Alan Richardson & Jonathan Y. Tsou (eds.), Objectivity in Science: Approaches to Historical Epistemology. Boston Studies in Philosophy and History of Science. Springer.score: 24.0
    The physiologist Johannes Müller’s doctrine of specific nerve energies had a decisive influence on neo-Kantian conceptions of the objectivity of knowledge in the 1850s - 1870s. In the first half of the nineteenth century, Müller amassed a body of experimental evidence to support his doctrine, according to which the character of our sensations is determined by the structures of our own sensory nerves, and not by the external objects that cause the sensations. Neo-Kantians such as Hermann von Helmholtz, F.A. (...), and Otto Liebmann took Müller’s doctrine to have far-reaching consequences for their epistemologies. Over the course of the 1850s - 1870s, these three neo-Kantians, each in his own way, argued that reflection on Müller’s doctrine ruled out a certain conception of the objectivity of knowledge. It ruled out the view that knowledge is objective in virtue of affording us information about objects in a mind-independent external world. -/- This paper traces how Helmholtz, Lange, and Liebmann developed their arguments for this view, and how each developed his own alternative conception of objectivity, according to which objectivity has nothing to do with a mind-independent world. Finally, the paper concludes by considering why these arguments modelled on Müller’s doctrine would have been so powerful against rival post-Hegelian conceptions of objectivity, especially those of scientific materialists like Ludwig Büchner. (shrink)
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  27. James Lindemann Nelson (2014). Odd Complaints and Doubtful Conditions: Norms of Hypochondria in Jane Austen and Catherine Belling. Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 11 (2):193-200.score: 24.0
    In her final fragmentary novel Sanditon, Jane Austen develops a theme that pervades her work from her juvenilia onward: illness, and in particular, illness imagined, invented, or self-inflicted. While the “invention of odd complaints” is characteristically a token of folly or weakness throughout her writing, in this last work imagined illness is also both a symbol and a cause of how selves and societies degenerate. In the shifting world of Sanditon, hypochondria is the lubricant for a society bent on turning (...)
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  28. Cornelius L. Golightly (1953). The James-Lange Theory: A Logical Post-Mortem. Philosophy of Science 20 (October):286-299.score: 21.0
  29. Marc Lange (2008). Could the Laws of Nature Change? Philosophy of Science 75 (1):69-92.score: 20.0
    After reviewing several failed arguments that laws cannot change, I use the laws' special relation to counterfactuals to show how temporary laws would have to differ from eternal but time-dependent laws. Then I argue that temporary laws are impossible and that neither Lewis's nor Armstrong's analyses of law nicely accounts for the laws' immutability. *Received September 2006; revised September 2007. ‡Many thanks to John Roberts and John Carroll for valuable comments on earlier drafts, as well as to several anonymous referees (...)
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  30. Marc Lange (2002). Who's Afraid of Ceteris-Paribus Laws? Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Them. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 57 (3):281Ð301.score: 20.0
    Ceteris-paribus clauses are nothing to worry about; aceteris-paribus qualifier is not poisonously indeterminate in meaning. Ceteris-paribus laws teach us that a law need not be associated straightforwardly with a regularity in the manner demanded by regularity analyses of law and analyses of laws as relations among universals. This lesson enables us to understand the sense in which the laws of nature would have been no different under various counterfactual suppositions — a feature even of those laws that involve no ceteris-paribus (...)
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  31. Marc Lange (1996). Inductive Confirmation, Counterfactual Conditionals, and Laws of Nature. Philosophical Studies 85 (1):1-36.score: 20.0
  32. Marc Lange (1993). Natural Laws and the Problem of Provisos. Erkenntnis 38 (2):233Ð248.score: 20.0
    Hempel and Giere contend that the existence of provisos poses grave difficulties for any regularity account of physical law. However, Hempel and Giere rely upon a mistaken conception of the way in which statements acquire their content. By correcting this mistake, I remove the problem Hempel and Giere identify but reveal a different problem that provisos pose for a regularity account — indeed, for any account of physical law according to which the state of affairs described by a law-statement presupposes (...)
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  33. Marc Lange (2006). Do Chances Receive Equal Treatment Under the Laws? Or: Must Chances Be Probabilities? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (2):383-403.score: 20.0
    I offer an argument regarding chances that appears to yield a dilemma: either the chances at time t must be determined by the natural laws and the history through t of instantiations of categorical properties, or the function ch(•) assigning chances need not satisfy the axioms of probability. The dilemma's first horn might seem like a remnant of determinism. On the other hand, this horn might be inspired by our best scientific theories. In addition, it is entailed by the familiar (...)
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  34. Marc Lange (2002). Baseball, Pessimistic Inductions and the Turnover Fallacy. Analysis 62 (4):281–285.score: 20.0
    Among the niftiest arguments for scientific anti-realism is the ‘pessimistic induction’ (also sometimes called ‘the disastrous historical meta-induction’). Although various versions of this argument differ in their details (see, for example, Poincare 1952: 160, Putnam 1978: 25, and Laudan 1981), the argument generally begins by recalling the many scientific theories that posit unobservable entities and that at one time or another were widely accepted. The anti-realist then argues that when these old theories were accepted, the evidence for them was quite (...)
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  35. Marc Lange (2000). Salience, Supervenience, and Layer Cakes in Sellars's Scientific Realism, McDowell's Moral Realism, and the Philosophy of Mind. Philosophical Studies 101 (2-3):213-251.score: 20.0
  36. Marc Lange (2000). Is Jeffrey Conditionalization Defective by Virtue of Being Non-Commutative? Remarks on the Sameness of Sensory Experiences. Synthese 123 (3):393 - 403.score: 20.0
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  37. Marc Lange (2004). Review Essay on Dynamics of Reason by Michael Friedman. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):702–712.score: 20.0
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  38. Marc Lange (2008). Why Contingent Facts Cannot Necessities Make. Analysis 68 (298):120–128.score: 20.0
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  39. Marc Lange (2004). Would "Direct Realism" Resolve the Classical Problem of Induction? Noûs 38 (2):197–232.score: 20.0
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  40. Marc Lange (2001). The Apparent Superiority of Prediction to Accommodation as a Side Effect: A Reply to Maher. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (3):575-588.score: 20.0
    has offered a lovely example to motivate the intuition that a successful prediction has a kind of confirmatory significance that an accommodation lacks. This paper scrutinizes Maher's example. It argues that once the example is tweaked, the intuitive difference there between prediction and accommodation disappears. This suggests that the apparent superiority of prediction to accommodation is actually a side effect of an important difference between the hypotheses that tend to arise in each case.
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  41. Marc Lange (2005). How Can Instantaneous Velocity Fulfill its Causal Role? Philosophical Review 114 (4):433-468.score: 20.0
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  42. R. Lange, M. A. Thalbourne, J. Houran & L. Storm (2000). The Revised Transliminality Scale: Reliability and Validity Data From a Rasch Top-Down Purification Procedure. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (4):591-617.score: 20.0
    The concept of transliminality (''a hypothesized tendency for psychological material to cross thresholds into or out of consciousness'') was anticipated by William James (1902/1982), but it was only recently given an empirical definition by Thalbourne in terms of a 29-item Transliminality Scale. This article presents the 17-item Revised Transliminality Scale (or RTS) that corrects age and gender biases, is unidimensional by a Rasch criterion, and has a reliability of .82. The scale defines a probabilistic hierarchy of items that address magical (...)
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  43. Ernst Michael Lange (1998). Wittgenstein—Mind and Will, an Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations by P. M. S. Hacker. Vol. 4, Oxford (Blackwell) 1996, Pp. 737, £90. [REVIEW] Philosophy 73 (3):495-523.score: 20.0
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  44. Alexander Bird (2011). Lange and Laws, Kinds, and Counterfactuals. In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Matthew H. Slater (eds.), Carving Nature at its Joints. MIT Press.score: 18.0
    In this paper I examine and question Marc Lange’s account of laws, and his claim that the law delineating the range of natural kinds of fundamental particle has a lesser grade of necessity that the laws connecting the fundamental properties of those kinds with their derived properties.
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  45. A. Drewery (2011). Laws and Lawmakers: Science, Metaphysics and the Laws of Nature * by Marc Lange. Analysis 71 (3):599-601.score: 18.0
    Marc Lange’s new book on laws offers a restatement and development of the account he proposed in Natural Laws and Scientific Practice (Oxford University Press, 2000), henceforth NLSP, and the new material is helpfully summarized in the preface. Laws and Lawmakers presents the key idea from NLSP in a rather more reader-friendly manner – this idea being roughly that the difference between laws and accidents is that laws, unlike accidents, form a ‘stable’ set, i.e. a logically closed set of (...)
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  46. Christopher Belanger (2010). Marc Lange. Laws and Lawmakers: Science, Metaphysics, and the Laws of Nature. Spontaneous Generations 4 (1):266-269.score: 18.0
    In Laws and Lawmakers: Science, Metaphysics, and the Laws of Nature, Marc Lange has presented an engagingly written, tightly argued, and novel philosophical account of the laws of nature. One of the intuitions behind the notion of a law of nature is, roughly, that of the many regularities we observe in the world there are some which appear to be due to mere happen-stance (“accidental” regularities, in the philosopher’s jargon), while others, which we call “laws,” seem to be possessed (...)
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  47. Heather Demarest (2012). Do Counterfactuals Ground the Laws of Nature? A Critique of Lange. Philosophy of Science 79 (3):333-344.score: 18.0
    Most philosophers of science hold that the laws of nature play an important role in determining which counterfactuals are true. Marc Lange reverses this dependence, arguing that it is the truth of certain counterfactuals that determines which statements are laws. I argue that the context sensitivity of counterfactual sentences makes it impossible for them to determine the laws. Next, I argue that Lange’s view cannot avoid additional counterexamples concerning nested counterfactuals. Finally, I argue that Lange’s counterfacts, posited (...)
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  48. Z. Yudell (2013). Lange's Challenge: Accounting for Meta-Laws. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (2):347-369.score: 18.0
    Lange issues a novel challenge to philosophical accounts of laws of nature. He notes that the laws of nature seem to be themselves governed by laws analogous to the way that the laws govern particular facts. These higher order laws are the meta-laws of nature. He claims that if a philosophical account of laws aims to accurately characterize the laws, it should be able to account for these meta-laws. To generalize this challenge, I introduce the notion of roles played (...)
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  49. Georg Northoff (2008). Are Our Emotional Feelings Relational? A Neurophilosophical Investigation of the James–Lange Theory. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):501-527.score: 18.0
    The James–Lange theory considers emotional feelings as perceptions of physiological body changes. This approach has recently resurfaced and modified in both neuroscientific and philosophical concepts of embodiment of emotional feelings. In addition to the body, the role of the environment in emotional feeling needs to be considered. I here claim that the environment has not merely an indirect and thus instrumental role on emotional feelings via the body and its sensorimotor and vegetative functions. Instead, the environment may have a (...)
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  50. Toby Handfield (2005). Lange on Essentialism, Counterfactuals, and Explanation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):81 – 85.score: 18.0
    Marc Lange objects to scientific essentialists that they can give no better account of the counterfactual invariance of laws than Humeans. While conceding this point succeeds ad hominem against some essentialists, I show that it does not undermine essentialism in general. Moreover, Lange's alternative account of the relation between laws and counterfactuals is - with minor modification - compatible with essentialism.
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