Search results for 'Catherine Lange' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  28
    Patrick Amar, Pascal Ballet, Georgia Barlovatz-Meimon, Arndt Benecke, Gilles Bernot, Yves Bouligand, Paul Bourguine, Franck Delaplace, Jean-Marc Delosme, Maurice Demarty, Itzhak Fishov, Jean Fourmentin-Guilbert, Joe Fralick, Jean-Louis Giavitto, Bernard Gleyse, Christophe Godin, Roberto Incitti, François Képès, Catherine Lange, Lois Le Sceller, Corinne Loutellier, Olivier Michel, Franck Molina, Chantal Monnier, René Natowicz, Vic Norris, Nicole Orange, Helene Pollard, Derek Raine, Camille Ripoll, Josette Rouviere-Yaniv, Milton Saier, Paul Soler, Pierre Tambourin, Michel Thellier, Philippe Tracqui, Dave Ussery, Jean-Claude Vincent, Jean-Pierre Vannier, Philippa Wiggins & Abdallah Zemirline (2002). Hyperstructures, Genome Analysis and I-Cells. Acta Biotheoretica 50 (4):357-373.
    New concepts may prove necessary to profit from the avalanche of sequence data on the genome, transcriptome, proteome and interactome and to relate this information to cell physiology. Here, we focus on the concept of large activity-based structures, or hyperstructures, in which a variety of types of molecules are brought together to perform a function. We review the evidence for the existence of hyperstructures responsible for the initiation of DNA replication, the sequestration of newly replicated origins of replication, cell division (...)
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  2. Joachim Lange, Christian Wolff & Ernst Christoph Manteuffel (1737). Recueil de Nouvelles Pieces Philosophiques Concernant le Different Renouvelle Entre Messieurs Joachim Lange ... Et Chrestien Wolf ... ; Avec des Avis au Lecteur Contenant l'Histoire de Ce Different. [REVIEW] S.N.].
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  3. Marc Lange (2005). Reply to Ellis and to Handfield on Essentialism, Laws, and Counterfactuals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (4):581 – 588.
    In Lange 2004a, I argued that 'scientific essentialism' [Ellis 2001 cannot account for the characteristic relation between laws and counterfactuals without undergoing considerable ad hoc tinkering. In recent papers, Brian Ellis 2005 and Toby Handfield 2005 have defended essentialism against my charge. Here I argue that Ellis's and Handfield's replies fail. Even in ordinary counterfactual reasoning, the 'closest possible world' where the electron's electric charge is 5% greater may have less overlap with the actual world in its fundamental natural (...)
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  4. Jim Woodward, Barry Loewer, John Carroll & Marc Lange (2011). Counterfactuals All the Way Down? Metascience 20 (1):27-52.
    Counterfactuals all the way down? Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11016-010-9437-9 Authors Jim Woodward, History and Philosophy of Science, 1017 Cathedral of Learning, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260, USA Barry Loewer, Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 08901, USA John W. Carroll, Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC 27695-8103, USA Marc Lange, Department of Philosophy, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, CB#3125—Caldwell Hall, Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3125, USA Journal Metascience (...)
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  5.  9
    Karen Lange & Robert I. Soare (2007). Computability of Homogeneous Models. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 48 (1):143-170.
    In the last five years there have been a number of results about the computable content of the prime, saturated, or homogeneous models of a complete decidable theory T in the spirit of Vaught's "Denumerable models of complete theories" combined with computability methods for degrees d ≤ 0′. First we recast older results by Goncharov, Peretyat'kin, and Millar in a more modern framework which we then apply. Then we survey recent results by Lange, "The degree spectra of homogeneous models," (...)
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  6. Marc Lange (2009). Laws and Lawmakers: Science, Metaphysics, and the Laws of Nature. Oxford University Press Usa.
    Laws of nature have long puzzled philosophers. What distinguishes laws from facts about the world that do not rise to the level of laws? How can laws be contingent and nevertheless necessary? In this brief, accessible study, Lange offers provocative and original answers to these questions. He argues that laws are distinguished by their necessity, which is grounded in primitive subjunctive facts. While recognizing that natural necessity is distinct from logical, metaphysical, and mathematical necessity, Lange explains how natural (...)
     
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  7. Marc Lange (2009). Laws and Lawmakers: Science, Metaphysics, and the Laws of Nature. Oxford University Press.
    Laws form counterfactually stable sets -- Natural necessity -- Three payoffs of my account -- A world of subjunctives.
     
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  8.  81
    Marc Lange (2000). Natural Laws in Scientific Practice. Oxford University Press.
    It is often presumed that the laws of nature have special significance for scientific reasoning. But the laws' distinctive roles have proven notoriously difficult to identify--leading some philosophers to question if they hold such roles at all. This study offers original accounts of the roles that natural laws play in connection with counterfactual conditionals, inductive projections, and scientific explanations, and of what the laws must be in order for them to be capable of playing these roles. Particular attention is given (...)
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  9. Marc Lange (2002). Who's Afraid of Ceteris-Paribus Laws? Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Them. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 57 (3):281Ð301.
    Ceteris-paribus clauses are nothing to worry about; aceteris-paribus qualifier is not poisonously indeterminate in meaning. Ceteris-paribus laws teach us that a law need not be associated straightforwardly with a regularity in the manner demanded by regularity analyses of law and analyses of laws as relations among universals. This lesson enables us to understand the sense in which the laws of nature would have been no different under various counterfactual suppositions — a feature even of those laws that involve no ceteris-paribus (...)
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  10. Marc Lange (2004). A Note on Scientific Essentialism, Laws of Nature, and Counterfactual Conditionals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (2):227 – 241.
    Scientific essentialism aims to account for the natural laws' special capacity to support counterfactuals. I argue that scientific essentialism can do so only by resorting to devices that are just as ad hoc as those that essentialists accuse Humean regularity theories of employing. I conclude by offering an account of the laws' distinctive relation to counterfactuals that portrays laws as contingent but nevertheless distinct from accidents by virtue of possessing a genuine variety of necessity.
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  11. Marc Lange (1999). Why Are the Laws of Nature so Important to Science? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):625-652.
    Why should science be so interested in discovering whether p is a law over and above whether p is true? The answer may involve the laws' relation to counterfactuals: p is a law iff p would still have obtained under any counterfactual supposition that is consistent with the laws. But unless we already understand why science is especially concerned with the laws, we cannot explain why science is especially interested in what would have happened under those counterfactual suppositions consistent with (...)
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  12. Marc Lange (2005). Laws and Their Stability. Synthese 144 (3):415Ð432.
    Many philosophers have believed that the laws of nature differ from the accidental truths in their invariance under counterfactual perturbations. Roughly speaking, the laws would still have held had q been the case, for any q that is consistent with the laws. (Trivially, no accident would still have held under every such counterfactual supposition.) The main problem with this slogan (even if it is true) is that it uses the laws themselves to delimit qs range. I present a means of (...)
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  13. Marc Lange (2002). Baseball, Pessimistic Inductions and the Turnover Fallacy. Analysis 62 (4):281–285.
    Among the niftiest arguments for scientific anti-realism is the ‘pessimistic induction’ (also sometimes called ‘the disastrous historical meta-induction’). Although various versions of this argument differ in their details (see, for example, Poincare 1952: 160, Putnam 1978: 25, and Laudan 1981), the argument generally begins by recalling the many scientific theories that posit unobservable entities and that at one time or another were widely accepted. The anti-realist then argues that when these old theories were accepted, the evidence for them was quite (...)
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  14. Marc Lange (1999). Laws, Counterfactuals, Stability, and Degrees of Lawhood. Philosophy of Science 66 (2):243-267.
    I identify the special sort of stability (invariance, resilience, etc.) that distinguishes laws from accidental truths. Although an accident can have a certain invariance under counterfactual suppositions, there is no continuum between laws and accidents here; a law's invariance is different in kind, not in degree, from an accident's. (In particular, a law's range of invariance is not "broader"--at least in the most straightforward sense.) The stability distinctive of the laws is used to explicate what it would mean for there (...)
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  15. Marc Lange (2006). How to Account for the Relation Between Chancy Facts and Deterministic Laws. Mind 115 (460):917--946.
    Suppose that unobtanium-346 is a rare radioactive isotope. Consider: (1) Every Un346 atom, at its creation, decays within 7 microseconds (µs). (50%) Every Un346 atom, at its creation, has a 50% chance of decaying within 7µs. (1) and (50%) can be true together, but (1) and (50%) cannot together be laws of nature. Indeed, (50%)'s mere (non-vacuous) truth logically precludes (1)'s lawhood. A satisfactory analysis of chance and lawhood should nicely account for this relation. I shall argue first that David (...)
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  16. Marc Lange (2001). The Most Famous Equation. Journal of Philosophy 98 (5):219-238.
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  17. Marc Lange (1993). Natural Laws and the Problem of Provisos. Erkenntnis 38 (2):233Ð248.
    Hempel and Giere contend that the existence of provisos poses grave difficulties for any regularity account of physical law. However, Hempel and Giere rely upon a mistaken conception of the way in which statements acquire their content. By correcting this mistake, I remove the problem Hempel and Giere identify but reveal a different problem that provisos pose for a regularity account — indeed, for any account of physical law according to which the state of affairs described by a law-statement presupposes (...)
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  18.  66
    Marc Lange (2009). Why Proofs by Mathematical Induction Are Generally Not Explanatory. Analysis 69 (2):203-211.
    Philosophers who regard some mathematical proofs as explaining why theorems hold, and others as merely proving that they do hold, disagree sharply about the explanatory value of proofs by mathematical induction. I offer an argument that aims to resolve this conflict of intuitions without making any controversial presuppositions about what mathematical explanations would be.
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  19. Marc Lange (2000). Is Jeffrey Conditionalization Defective by Virtue of Being Non-Commutative? Remarks on the Sameness of Sensory Experiences. Synthese 123 (3):393 - 403.
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  20. Marc Lange (2008). Could the Laws of Nature Change? Philosophy of Science 75 (1):69-92.
    After reviewing several failed arguments that laws cannot change, I use the laws' special relation to counterfactuals to show how temporary laws would have to differ from eternal but time-dependent laws. Then I argue that temporary laws are impossible and that neither Lewis's nor Armstrong's analyses of law nicely accounts for the laws' immutability. *Received September 2006; revised September 2007. ‡Many thanks to John Roberts and John Carroll for valuable comments on earlier drafts, as well as to several anonymous referees (...)
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  21.  58
    Marc Lange (1999). Calibration and the Epistemological Role of Bayesian Conditionalization. Journal of Philosophy 96 (6):294-324.
  22. Marc Lange (1996). Life, "Artificial Life," and Scientific Explanation. Philosophy of Science 63 (2):225-244.
    Recently, biologists and computer scientists who advocate the "strong thesis of artificial life" have argued that the distinction between life and nonlife is important and that certain computer software entities could be alive in the same sense as biological entities. These arguments have been challenged by Sober (1991). I address some of the questions about the rational reconstruction of biology that are suggested by these arguments: What is the relation between life and the "signs of life"? What work (if any) (...)
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  23. Marc Lange (2009). Why Do the Laws Explain Why? In Toby Handfield (ed.), Dispositions and Causes. Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press ;
     
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  24. Marc Lange (2006). Do Chances Receive Equal Treatment Under the Laws? Or: Must Chances Be Probabilities? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (2):383-403.
    I offer an argument regarding chances that appears to yield a dilemma: either the chances at time t must be determined by the natural laws and the history through t of instantiations of categorical properties, or the function ch(•) assigning chances need not satisfy the axioms of probability. The dilemma's first horn might seem like a remnant of determinism. On the other hand, this horn might be inspired by our best scientific theories. In addition, it is entailed by the familiar (...)
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  25.  38
    Marc Lange (2005). How Can Instantaneous Velocity Fulfill its Causal Role? Philosophical Review 114 (4):433-468.
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  26. Friedrich Albert Lange (1879). The History of Materialism. New York,Arno Press.
    First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
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  27.  31
    Marc Lange (2004). The Autonomy of Functional Biology: A Reply to Rosenberg. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 19 (1):93-109.
    Rosenberg has recently argued that explanations supplied by (what he calls) functional biology are mere promissory notes for macromolecular adaptive explanations. Rosenberg's arguments currently constitute one of the most substantial challenges to the autonomy, irreducibility, and indispensability of the explanations supplied by functional biology. My responses to Rosenberg's arguments will generate a novel account of the autonomy of functional biology. This account will turn on the relations between counterfactuals, scientific explanations, and natural laws. Crucially, in their treatment of the laws' (...)
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  28. Marc Lange (2005). A Counterfactual Analysis of the Concepts of Logical Truth and Necessity. Philosophical Studies 125 (3):277 - 303.
    This paper analyzes the logical truths as (very roughly) those truths that would still have been true under a certain range of counterfactual perturbations.What’s nice is that the relevant range is characterized without relying (overtly, at least) upon the notion of logical truth. This approach suggests a conception of necessity that explains what the different varieties of necessity (logical, physical, etc.) have in common, in virtue of which they are all varieties of necessity. However, this approach places the counterfactual conditionals (...)
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  29.  65
    Marc Lange (1993). Lawlikeness. Noûs 27 (1):1-21.
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  30.  24
    Marc Lange (2001). The Apparent Superiority of Prediction to Accommodation as a Side Effect: A Reply to Maher. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (3):575-588.
    has offered a lovely example to motivate the intuition that a successful prediction has a kind of confirmatory significance that an accommodation lacks. This paper scrutinizes Maher's example. It argues that once the example is tweaked, the intuitive difference there between prediction and accommodation disappears. This suggests that the apparent superiority of prediction to accommodation is actually a side effect of an important difference between the hypotheses that tend to arise in each case.
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  31. Marc Lange (1996). Inductive Confirmation, Counterfactual Conditionals, and Laws of Nature. Philosophical Studies 85 (1):1-36.
  32.  80
    Marc Lange (1995). Are There Natural Laws Concerning Particular Biological Species? Journal of Philosophy 92 (8):430-451.
  33. Marc Lange (1996). Laws of Nature, Cosmic Coincidences and Scientific Realism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):614 – 638.
  34.  65
    Marc Lange (2009). Must the Fundamental Laws of Physics Be Complete? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):312-345.
    The beauty of electricity, or of any other force, is not that the power is mysterious and unexpected, touching every sense at unawares in turn, but that it is under law... Michael Faraday, Wheatstone's Electric Telegraph's Relation to Science (being an argument in favour of the full recognition of Science as a branch of Education), 1854.
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  35.  31
    Marc Lange (2004). Review Essay on Dynamics of Reason by Michael Friedman. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):702–712.
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  36.  52
    Marc Lange (2008). Why Contingent Facts Cannot Necessities Make. Analysis 68 (298):120–128.
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  37.  21
    R. Lange, M. A. Thalbourne, J. Houran & L. Storm (2000). The Revised Transliminality Scale: Reliability and Validity Data From a Rasch Top-Down Purification Procedure. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (4):591-617.
    The concept of transliminality (''a hypothesized tendency for psychological material to cross thresholds into or out of consciousness'') was anticipated by William James (1902/1982), but it was only recently given an empirical definition by Thalbourne in terms of a 29-item Transliminality Scale. This article presents the 17-item Revised Transliminality Scale (or RTS) that corrects age and gender biases, is unidimensional by a Rasch criterion, and has a reliability of .82. The scale defines a probabilistic hierarchy of items that address magical (...)
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  38.  32
    Marc Lange (2004). Would "Direct Realism" Resolve the Classical Problem of Induction? Noûs 38 (2):197–232.
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  39.  56
    Marc Lange (2000). Salience, Supervenience, and Layer Cakes in Sellars's Scientific Realism, McDowell's Moral Realism, and the Philosophy of Mind. Philosophical Studies 101 (2-3):213-251.
  40.  32
    Marc Lange (2004). Bayesianism and Unification: A Reply to Wayne Myrvold. Philosophy of Science 71 (2):205-215.
    Myrvold (2003) has proposed an attractive Bayesian account of why theories that unify phenomena tend to derive greater epistemic support from those phenomena than do theories that fail to unify them. It is argued, however, that "unification" in Myrvold's sense is both too easy and too difficult for theories to achieve. Myrvold's account fails to capture what it is that makes unification sometimes count in a theory's favor.
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  41.  34
    Marc Lange (2002). Okasha on Inductive Scepticism. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (207):226-232.
    In a recent paper replying to the inductive sceptic, Samir Okasha says that the Humean argument for inductive scepticism depends on mistakenly construing inductive reasoning as based on a principle of the uniformity of nature. I dispute Okasha's argument that we are entitled to the background beliefs on which (he says) inductive reasoning depends. Furthermore, I argue that the sorts of theoretically impoverished contexts to which a uniformity-of-nature principle has traditionally been restricted are exactly the contexts relevant to the inductive (...)
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  42.  23
    Martin Lange (2009). Model Checking for Hybrid Logic. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 18 (4):465-491.
    We consider the model checking problem for Hybrid Logic. Known algorithms so far are global in the sense that they compute, inductively, in every step the set of all worlds of a Kripke structure that satisfy a subformula of the input. Hence, they always exploit the entire structure. Local model checking tries to avoid this by only traversing necessary parts of the input in order to establish or refute the satisfaction relation between a given world and a formula. We present (...)
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  43.  35
    John F. Lange (1966). R. M. Hare's Reformulation of the Open Question. Mind 75 (298):244-247.
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  44.  39
    Marc Lange (ed.) (2007). Philosophy of Science: An Anthology. Blackwell Pub..
    Philosophy of Science: An Anthology assembles some of the finest papers in the philosophy of science since 1945, showcasing enduring classics alongside important and innovative recent work. Introductions by the editor highlight connections between selections, and contextualize the articles Nine sections address topics at the heart of philosophy of science, including realism and the character of scientific theories, scientific explanations and laws of nature, singular casusation, and the metaphysical implications of modern physics Provides an authoritative and accessible overview of the (...)
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  45.  9
    Klaus Lange (1979). Albanian Marxism's Notion of Revisionism. Studies in East European Thought 20 (1):61-66.
  46.  21
    Dirk Hartmann & Rainer Lange (2000). Epistemology Culturalized. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 31 (1):75-107.
    The anti-metaphysical intentions of naturalism can be respected without abandoning the project of a normative epistemology. The central assumptions of naturalism imply that (1.) the distinction between action and behaviour is spurious, and (2.) epistemology cannot continue to be a normative project. Difficulties with the second implication have been adressed by Normative Naturalism, but without violating the naturalistic consensus, it can only appreciate means-end-rationality. However, this does not suffice to justify its own implicit normative pretensions. According to our diagnosis, naturalism (...)
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  47.  18
    John Lange (1966). The Late Papers of C. I. Lewis. Journal of the History of Philosophy 4 (3):235-246.
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  48.  13
    Marc Lange (1995). Spearman's Principle. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4):503-521.
    Glymour, Scheines, Spirtes, and Kelly argue for ‘Spearman's Principle’: one should (ceteris paribus) favour the theory whose ‘free parameters’ need assume no particular values for the theory to save the ‘constraints’ holding of the phenomena. I argue that the rationale they give for Spearman's Principle fails, but that (contra Cartwright) Spearman's Principle cannot be made to favour either of two theories depending on how they are expressed. I examine how one must motivate the demand for a scientific explanation of a (...)
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  49.  16
    Marc Lange (2007). Review of Huw Price, Richard Corry (Eds.), Causation, Physics, and the Constitution of Reality: Russell's Republic Revisited. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (11).
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  50.  12
    Anders Søgaard & Martin Lange (2009). Polyadic Dynamic Logics for Hpsg Parsing. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 18 (2):159-198.
    Head-driven phrase structure grammar (HPSG) is one of the most prominent theories employed in deep parsing of natural language. Many linguistic theories are arguably best formalized in extensions of modal or dynamic logic (Keller, Feature logics, infinitary descriptions and grammar, 1993; Kracht, Linguistics Philos 18:401–458, 1995; Moss and Tiede, In: Blackburn, van Benthem, and Wolther (eds.) Handbook of modal logic, 2006), and HPSG seems to be no exception. Adequate extensions of dynamic logic have not been studied in detail, however; the (...)
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