Search results for 'Causal Explanation' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. A. Pragmatic Concept of Causal Explanation (1984). Kazem sadegh-Zadeh. In Lennart Nordenfelt & B. I. B. Lindahl (eds.), Health, Disease, and Causal Explanations in Medicine. Reidel 201.
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  2. Iulian D. Toader (2015). Against Harmony: Infinite Idealizations and Causal Explanation. In Romanian Studies in Philosophy of Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, Vol. 313, 291-301.
    This paper discusses the idea that some of the causal factors that are responsible for the production of a natural phenomenon are explanatorily irrelevant and, thus, may be omitted or distorted. It argues against Craig Callender’s suggestion that the standard explanation of phase transitions in statistical mechanics may be considered a causal explanation, in Michael Strevens’ sense, as a distortion that can nevertheless successfully represent causal relations.
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  3. James Woodward (2003). Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation. Oxford University Press.
    Woodward's long awaited book is an attempt to construct a comprehensive account of causation explanation that applies to a wide variety of causal and explanatory claims in different areas of science and everyday life. The book engages some of the relevant literature from other disciplines, as Woodward weaves together examples, counterexamples, criticisms, defenses, objections, and replies into a convincing defense of the core of his theory, which is that we can analyze causation by appeal to the notion (...)
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  4.  63
    Robert Northcott (2012). Genetic Traits and Causal Explanation. In Kathryn Plaisance & Thomas Reydon (eds.), Philosophy of Behavioral Biology. Springer 65-82.
    I use a contrastive theory of causal explanation to analyze the notion of a genetic trait. The resulting definition is relational, an implication of which is that no trait is genetic always and everywhere. Rather, every trait may be either genetic or non-genetic, depending on explanatory context. I also outline some other advantages of connecting the debate to the wider causation literature, including how that yields us an account of the distinction between genetic traits and genetic dispositions.
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  5.  71
    Erik Weber, Jeroen Van Bouwel & Robrecht Vanderbeeken (2005). Forms of Causal Explanation. Foundations of Science 10 (4):437-454.
    In the literature on scientific explanation two types of pluralism are very common. The first concerns the distinction between explanations of singular facts and explanations of laws: there is a consensus that they have a different structure. The second concerns the distinction between causal explanations and uni.cation explanations: most people agree that both are useful and that their structure is different. In this article we argue for pluralism within the area of causal explanations: we claim that the (...)
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  6.  21
    Gerben Meynen & Jacco Verburgt (2009). Psychopathology and Causal Explanation in Practice. A Critical Note on Heidegger's Zollikon Seminars. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 12 (1):57-66.
    From 1959 until 1969, Heidegger lectured to psychiatrists and psychiatry students at the University of Zurich Psychiatric Clinic and in Zollikon. The transcriptions of these lectures were published as the Zollikon Seminars. In these seminars Heidegger is highly critical of psychoanalysis, because of its causal and objectifying approach to the human being. In general, Heidegger considers it an objectification or even an elimination of the human being to approach a patient from a causal perspective. In our view Heidegger (...)
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  7.  45
    Elizabeth Valentine (1988). Teleological Explanations and Their Relation to Causal Explanation in Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 1 (1):61-68.
    The relation of teleological to causal explanations in psychology is examined. Nagel's claim that they are logically equivalent is rejected. Two arguments for their non-equivalence are considered: (i) the impossibility of specifying initial conditions in the case of teleological explanations and (ii) the claim that different kinds of logic are involved. The view that causal explanations provide only necessary conditions whereas teleological explanations provide sufficient conditions is rejected: causal explanations can provide sufficient conditions, typically being unable to (...)
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  8.  48
    Eugen Zeleňák (2009). On Explanatory Relata in Singular Causal Explanation. Theoria 75 (3):179-195.
    Explanation is usually taken to be a relation between certain entities. The aim of this paper is to discuss what entities are suitable as explanatory relata of singular causal explanations, i.e., explanations concerning singular causality relating particular events or other appropriate entities. I outline three different positions. The purely causal approach stipulates that the same entities that are related in the singular causal relation are also linked by the explanatory relation. This position, however, has a problem (...)
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    Francesca Pongiglione (2012). The Key Role of Causal Explanation in the Climate Change Issue. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 27 (2):175-188.
    In the context of climate change, the adoption of pro-environment behaviour is favoured by the understanding of causal passages within climate science. The understanding of the causes of climate change is necessary in order to be able to take mitigation actions (the subject needs to be aware of its role as a causalagent). Conversely, the understanding of the consequences of climate change is essential for rationally managing the risks, especially in cases where adaptation is needed rather than simple mitigation. (...)
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  10.  33
    Alexander Reutlinger (forthcoming). Is There A Monist Theory of Causal and Non-Causal Explanations? The Counterfactual Theory of Scientific Explanation. Philosophy of Science.
    The goal of this paper is to develop a counterfactual theory of explanation. The CTE provides a monist framework for causal and non-causal explanations, according to which both causal and non-causal explanations are explanatory by virtue of revealing counterfactual dependencies between the explanandum and the explanans. I argue that the CTE is applicable to two paradigmatic examples of non-causal explanations: Euler’s explanation and renormalization group explanations of universality.
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  11. Reinaldo Elugardo (2001). Brain States, Causal Explanation, and the Attitudes. In Explaining Beliefs: Lynne Rudder Baker and Her Critics. Stanford: CSLI Publications
  12.  95
    Garrett Pendergraft (2011). In Defense of a Causal Requirement on Explanation. In Phyllis McKay Illari Federica Russo (ed.), Causality in the Sciences. Oxford University Press 470.
    Causalists about explanation claim that to explain an event is to provide information about the causal history of that event. Some causalists also endorse a proportionality claim, namely that one explanation is better than another insofar as it provides a greater amount of causal information. In this chapter I consider various challenges to these causalist claims. There is a common and influential formulation of the causalist requirement – the ‘Causal Process Requirement’ – that (...)
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  13.  45
    Wesley Salmon (1984). Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World. Princeton University Press.
    The philosophical theory of scientific explanation proposed here involves a radically new treatment of causality that accords with the pervasively statistical character of contemporary science. Wesley C. Salmon describes three fundamental conceptions of scientific explanation--the epistemic, modal, and ontic. He argues that the prevailing view is untenable and that the modal conception is scientifically out-dated. Significantly revising aspects of his earlier work, he defends a causal/mechanical theory that is a version of the ontic conception. Professor (...)
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  14. Holly Andersen (2012). The Case for Regularity in Mechanistic Causal Explanation. Synthese 189 (3):415-432.
    How regular do mechanisms need to be, in order to count as mechanisms? This paper addresses two arguments for dropping the requirement of regularity from the definition of a mechanism, one motivated by examples from the sciences and the other motivated by metaphysical considerations regarding causation. I defend a broadened regularity requirement on mechanisms that takes the form of a taxonomy of kinds of regularity that mechanisms may exhibit. This taxonomy allows precise explication of the degree and location of regular (...)
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  15.  26
    Clark Glymour (1998). Learning Causes: Psychological Explanations of Causal Explanation. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 8 (1):39-60.
    I argue that psychologists interested in human causal judgment should understand and adopt a representation of causal mechanisms by directed graphs that encode conditional independence (screening off) relations. I illustrate the benefits of that representation, now widely used in computer science and increasingly in statistics, by (i) showing that a dispute in psychology between ‘mechanist’ and ‘associationist’ psychological theories of causation rests on a false and confused dichotomy; (ii) showing that a recent, much-cited experiment, purporting to show that (...)
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  16.  43
    Elizabeth Irvine (2015). Models, Robustness, and Non-Causal Explanation: A Foray Into Cognitive Science and Biology. Synthese 192 (12):3943-3959.
    This paper is aimed at identifying how a model’s explanatory power is constructed and identified, particularly in the practice of template-based modeling (Humphreys, Philos Sci 69:1–11, 2002; Extending ourselves: computational science, empiricism, and scientific method, 2004), and what kinds of explanations models constructed in this way can provide. In particular, this paper offers an account of non-causal structural explanation that forms an alternative to causal–mechanical accounts of model explanation that are currently popular in philosophy of biology (...)
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  17.  76
    George Botterill (2010). Two Kinds of Causal Explanation. Theoria 76 (4):287-313.
    To give a causal explanation is to give information about causal history. But a vast amount of causal history lies behind anything that happens, far too much to be included in any intelligible explanation. This is the Problem of Limitation for explanatory information. To cope with this problem, explanations must select for what is relevant to and adequate for answering particular inquiries. In the present paper this idea is used in order to distinguish two kinds (...)
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  18.  40
    James R. Griesemer & Michael J. Wade (1988). Laboratory Models, Causal Explanation and Group Selection. Biology and Philosophy 3 (1):67-96.
    We develop an account of laboratory models, which have been central to the group selection controversy. We compare arguments for group selection in nature with Darwin's arguments for natural selection to argue that laboratory models provide important grounds for causal claims about selection. Biologists get information about causes and cause-effect relationships in the laboratory because of the special role their own causal agency plays there. They can also get information about patterns of effects and antecedent conditions (...)
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  19.  25
    Sally Shrapnel (2014). Quantum Causal Explanation: Or, Why Birds Fly South. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 4 (3):409-423.
    It is widely held that it is difficult, if not impossible, to apply causal theory to the domain of quantum mechanics. However, there are several recent scientific explanations that appeal crucially to quantum processes, and which are most naturally construed as causal explanations. They come from two relatively new fields: quantum biology and quantum technology. We focus on two examples, the explanation for the optical interferometer LIGO and the explanation for the avian magneto-compass. We analyse the (...)
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  20.  19
    Gábor Hofer-Szabó & Péter Vecsernyés (2013). Bell Inequality and Common Causal Explanation in Algebraic Quantum Field Theory. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 44 (4):404-416.
    Bell inequalities, understood as constraints between classical conditional probabilities, can be derived from a set of assumptions representing a common causal explanation of classical correlations. A similar derivation, however, is not known for Bell inequalities in algebraic quantum field theories establishing constraints for the expectation of specific linear combinations of projections in a quantum state. In the paper we address the question as to whether a ‘common causal justification’ of these non-classical Bell inequalities is possible. We will (...)
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  21. Christopher Read Hitchcock (1992). Causal Explanation and Scientific Realism. Erkenntnis 37 (2):151 - 178.
    It is widely believed that many of the competing accounts of scientific explanation have ramifications which are relevant to the scientific realism debate. I claim that the two issues are orthogonal. For definiteness, I consider Cartwright's argument that causal explanations secure belief in theoretical entities. In Section I, van Fraassen's anti-realism is reviewed; I argue that this anti-realism is, prima facie, consistent with a causal account of explanation. Section II reviews Cartwright's arguments. In Section III, it (...)
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  22.  30
    Zhiheng Tang (2015). Absence Causation and a Liberal Theory of Causal Explanation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (4):688-705.
    For the framework of event causation—i.e. the framework according to which causation is a relation between events—absences or omissions pose a problem. Absences, it is generally agreed, are not events; so, under the framework of event causation, they cannot be causally related. But, as a matter of fact, absences are often taken to be causes or effects. The problem of absence causation is thus how to make sense of causation that apparently involves absences as causes or effects. In an influential (...)
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  23. Gábor Hofer-Szabó (2011). Bell(Δ) Inequalities Derived From Separate Common Causal Explanation of Almost Perfect EPR Anticorrelations. Foundations of Physics 41 (8):1398-1413.
    It is a well known fact that a common common causal explanation of the EPR scenario which consists in providing a local, non-conspiratorial common common cause system for a set of EPR correlations is excluded by various Bell inequalities. But what if we replace the assumption of a common common cause system by the requirement that each correlation of the set has a local, non-conspiratorial separate common cause system? In the paper we show that this move does not (...)
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  24.  42
    Denis J. Hilton (1996). Mental Models and Causal Explanation: Judgements of Probable Cause and Explanatory Relevance. Thinking and Reasoning 2 (4):273 – 308.
    Good explanations are not only true or probably true, but are also relevant to a causal question. Current models of causal explanation either only address the question of the truth of an explanation, or do not distinguish the probability of an explanation from its relevance. The tasks of scenario construction and conversational explanation are distinguished, which in turn shows how scenarios can interact with conversational principles to determine the truth and relevance of explanations. The (...)
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  25.  3
    Eric H. Davidson (2016). Genomics, "Discovery Science," Systems Biology, and Causal Explanation: What Really Works? Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 58 (2):165-181.
    In my field, animal developmental biology, and in what could be regarded as its “deep time derivative,” the evolutionary biology of the animal body plan, there exist two kinds of experimentally supported causal explanation. These can be described as “rooted” and “unrooted.” Rooted causal explanation provides logical links to and from the genomic regulatory code, extending right into the genomic sequences that control regulatory gene expression. The genomic regulatory code ultimately determines the developmental process in a (...)
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  26.  29
    Richard Healey (1994). Nonseparable Processes and Causal Explanation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 25 (3):337-374.
    If physical reality is nonseparable, as quantum mechanics suggests, then it may contain processes of a quite novel kind. Such nonseparable processes could connect space-like separated events without violating relativity theory or any defensible locality condition. Appeal to nonseparable processes could ground theoretical explanations of such otherwise puzzling phenomena as the two-slit experiment, and EPR- type correlations. We find such phenomena puzzling because they threaten cherished conceptions of how causes operate to produce their effects. But nonseparable processes offer us an (...)
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  27.  19
    Rinke Hoekstra & Joost Breuker (2007). Commonsense Causal Explanation in a Legal Domain. Artificial Intelligence and Law 15 (3):281-299.
    In this paper, we present an approach to commonsense causal explanation of stories that can be used for automatically determining the liable party in legal case descriptions. The approach is based on, a core ontology for law that takes a commonsense perspective. Aside from our thesis that in the legal domain many terms still have a strong commonsense flavour, the descriptions of events in legal cases, as e.g. presented at judicial trials, are cast in commonsense (...)
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  28.  71
    Eric Barnes (1995). Truthlikeness, Translation, and Approximate Causal Explanation. Philosophy of Science 62 (2):215-226.
    D. Miller's demonstrations of the language dependence of truthlikeness raise a profound problem for the claim that scientific progress is objective. In two recent papers (Barnes 1990, 1991) I argue that the objectivity of progress may be grounded on the claim that the aim of science is not merely truth but knowledge; progress thus construed is objective in an epistemic sense. In this paper I construct a new solution to Miller's problem grounded on the notion of "approximate causal (...)" which allows for linguistically invariant progress outside an epistemic context. I suggest that the notion of "approximate causal explanation" provides the resources for a more robust theory of progress than that provided by the notion of "approximate truth.". (shrink)
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  29.  16
    Jan Baedke (2013). Causal Explanation Beyond the Gene. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 27 (2):153-174.
    This paper deals with the interrelationship between causal explanation and methodology in a relatively young discipline in biology: epigenetics. Based on cases from molecular and ecological epigenetics, I show that James Woodward’s interventionist account of causation captures essential features about how epigeneticists using highly diverse methods, i.e. laboratory experiments and purely observational studies, think about causal explanation. I argue that interventionism thus qualifies as a useful unifying explanatory approach when it comes to cross-methodological research efforts. It (...)
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  30.  17
    D. Lynn Holt (1988). Teleological Explanation: A Species of Causal Explanation. Philosophical Psychology 1 (3):313-325.
    Abstract The thesis that teleological explanations are best understood as causal explanations is defended (contra Valentine). I shift the focus of debate from behavior simpliciter to allegedly rational behavior. Teleological explanation, in the case of rational agents, involves reason?giving; and the reasons agents give for acting must be causative of that action if those agents are to be rational in practice. I argue initially that to abandon the claim that reasons are causes of action is to abandon that (...)
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  31.  28
    Robert C. Koons (2004). The Logic of Causal Explanation an Axiomatization. Studia Logica 77 (3):325 - 354.
    Three-valued (strong-Kleene) modal logic provides the foundation for a new approach to formalizing causal explanation as a relation between partial situations. The approach makes fine-grained distinctions between aspects of events, even between aspects that are equivalent in classical logic. The framework can accommodate a variety of ontologies concerning the relata of causal explanation. I argue, however, for a tripartite ontology of objects corresponding to sentential nominals: facts, tropes (or facta or states of affairs), and situations (or (...)
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  32.  12
    George Sher (1973). Causal Explanation and the Vocabulary of Action. Mind 82 (325):22-30.
    It seems plausible to suppose that (a) the vocabulary of action is distinct from and irreducible to that of mere movement, And (b) the causal laws of the natural sciences are couched solely in terms of the latter vocabulary. From these two suppositions, The falsehood of determinism has sometimes been said to follow. I argue that whether this does follow depends on our conception of causal explanation; on the interpretation of this concept that seems to me the (...)
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  33.  16
    Dorothy Walsh (1979). Causal Efficacy and Causal Explanation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 40 (2):250-257.
    This paper is an attempt to exhibit the contrast between the primitive notion of causality, simply as efficacy, and the restricted meaning of the expression "causal explanation" as associated with the application of a methodology of causal "inquiry". there can be differences of opinion on whether or not a single general methodology of causal inquiry is appropriate for natural phenomena and for human intentional actions. philosophers who reject a "methodology" of causal explanation for intentional (...)
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  34.  8
    José Luis Rolleri (2007). La Teoría de la Explicación Causal de Salmon y la Mecánica Cuántica (Salmon's Theory of Causal Explanation and Quantum Mechanics). Critica 39 (116):3 - 35.
    Salmón ha afirmado que su teoría de la explicación causal no es enteramente adecuada para el dominio cuántico debido a ciertas anomalías causales como el dualismo onda/partícula y, especialmente, a las correlaciones estadísticas que surgen de experimentos tipo EPR. En este escrito se analizan las nociones causales de Salmón, en las cuales se basa su teoría probabilista de la explicación, con el fin de delimitar su alcance en ese dominio mostrando que sólo abarca procesos de transición pero no procesos (...)
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  35.  9
    James R. Griesemer (1988). Causal Explanation in Laboratory Ecology: The Case of Competitive Indeterminacy. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:337 - 344.
    This paper characterizes the role of the experimenter in causal explanations of laboratory phenomena. Causal explanation rests on appeals to the experimenter's efficacy as a causal agent. I contrast "demographic" and "genetic" explanations of stochastic outcomes in a set of competition experiments in ecology. The demographic view ascribes causes to the experimenter's agency in setting up the experiment and to events within the experimental set-up. The genetic view ascribes causes to an unrecognized effect of the experimenter's (...)
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  36.  85
    Tuomas K. Pernu (2013). Interactions and Exclusions: Studies on Causal Explanation in Naturalistic Philosophy of Mind. Dissertation, University of Helsinki
    The notion of causal explanation is an essential element of the naturalistic world view. This view is typically interpreted to claim that we are only licensed to postulate entities that make a causal difference , or have causal power . The rest are epiphenomena and hence eliminable from the correct view of reality. The worry that some entities and phenomena that we take for granted mental properties in particular turn out to be epiphenomenal, can be seen (...)
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  37.  31
    Morteza Dehghani, Rumen Iliev & Stefan Kaufmann (2012). Causal Explanation and Fact Mutability in Counterfactual Reasoning. Mind and Language 27 (1):55-85.
    Recent work on the interpretation of counterfactual conditionals has paid much attention to the role of causal independencies. One influential idea from the theory of Causal Bayesian Networks is that counterfactual assumptions are made by intervention on variables, leaving all of their causal non-descendants unaffected. But intervention is not applicable across the board. For instance, backtracking counterfactuals, which involve reasoning from effects to causes, cannot proceed by intervention in the strict sense, for otherwise they would be equivalent (...)
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  38. Derek Bolton (1996). Mind, Meaning, and Mental Disorder: The Nature of Causal Explanation in Psychology and Psychiatry. Oxford University Press.
    Philosophical ideas about the mind, brain, and behavior can seem theoretical and unimportant when placed alongside the urgent questions of mental distress and disorder. However, there is a need to give direction to attempts to answer these questions. On the one hand, a substantial research effort is going into the investigation of brain processes and the development of drug treatments for psychiatric disorders, and on the other, a wide range of psychotherapies is becoming available to adults and children with mental (...)
     
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  39.  24
    Rebecca Schweder (1999). Causal Explanation and Explanatory Selection. Synthese 120 (1):115-124.
    It is observed that in ordinary everyday causal explanations often just one causal factor is mentioned. One causal factor carries the explanatory burden, even if there are several causal factors that are responsible for the event to be explained. This paper deals with the question of how to account for this explanatory selection. I argue for a pragmatic stance towards explanation, that we must attend to the question–answer situation as a whole and the context of (...)
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  40.  10
    Josefa Toribio, Naturalism and Causal Explanation.
    Semantic properties are not commonly held to be part of the basic ontological furniture of the world. Consequently, we confront a problem: how to 'naturalize' semantics so as to reveal these properties in their true ontological colors? Dominant naturalistic theories address semantic properties as properties of some other (more primitive, less problematic) kind. The reductionistic flavor is unmistakable. The following quote from Fodor's Psychosemantics is probably the contemporary locus classicus of this trend. Fodor is commendably unapologetic: "I suppose that sooner (...)
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  41. Rumen Iliev Morteza Dehghani (2012). Causal Explanation and Fact Mutability in Counterfactual Reasoning. Mind and Language 27 (1):55-85.
    Recent work on the interpretation of counterfactual conditionals has paid much attention to the role of causal independencies. One influential idea from the theory of Causal Bayesian Networks is that counterfactual assumptions are made by intervention on variables, leaving all of their causal non‐descendants unaffected. But intervention is not applicable across the board. For instance, backtracking counterfactuals, which involve reasoning from effects to causes, cannot proceed by intervention in the strict sense, for otherwise they would be equivalent (...)
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  42. J. Marto & J. R. Croca (2002). Non-Local Interferometry: A Causal Explanation by Means of Local Wavelet Analysis. [REVIEW] Foundations of Physics 32 (7):1091-1109.
    In the following we consider the possibility of interpretating recent non-local interferometric experiments according to the De Broglie causal model. With the help of a simplified mathematical model based on wavelet analysis it is indeed possible to explain it in a causal way. Furthermore we show the distinctions between the two formalisms and discuss some experimental conditions that may make these differences evident.
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  43.  45
    Joseph Owens (1998). Psychological Explanation and Causal Deviancy. Synthese 115 (2):143-169.
  44.  94
    D. Benjamin Barros (2013). Negative Causation in Causal and Mechanistic Explanation. Synthese 190 (3):449-469.
    Instances of negative causation—preventions, omissions, and the like—have long created philosophical worries. In this paper, I argue that concerns about negative causation can be addressed in the context of causal explanation generally, and mechanistic explanation specifically. The gravest concern about negative causation is that it exacerbates the problem of causal promiscuity—that is, the problem that arises when a particular account of causation identifies too many causes for a particular effect. In the explanatory context, the problem of (...)
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  45.  83
    Alexander Mebius (2014). A Weakened Mechanism Is Still A Mechanism: On the Causal Role of Absences in Mechanistic Explanation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 45 (1):43-48.
    Much contemporary debate on the nature of mechanisms centers on the issue of modulating negative causes. One type of negative causability, which I refer to as “causation by absence,” appears difficult to incorporate into modern accounts of mechanistic explanation. This paper argues that a recent attempt to resolve this problem, proposed by Benjamin Barros, requires improvement as it overlooks the fact that not all absences qualify as sources of mechanism failure. I suggest that there are a number of additional (...)
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  46. David Lewis (1986). Causal Explanation. In Philosophical Papers Vol. Ii. Oxford University Press 214-240.
  47. Jennifer Hornsby (1993). Agency and Causal Explanation. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press
    I. There are two points of view: ___ From the personal point of view, an action is a person's doing something for a reason, and her doing it is found intelligible when we know the reason that led her to it. ___ From the impersonal point of view, an action would be a link in a causal chain that could be viewed without paying any attention to people, the links being understood by reference to the world's causal workings.
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  48. James Woodward (2004). Counterfactuals and Causal Explanation. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 18 (1):41 – 72.
    This article defends the use of interventionist counterfactuals to elucidate causal and explanatory claims against criticisms advanced by James Bogen and Peter Machamer. Against Bogen, I argue that counterfactual claims concerning what would happen under interventions are meaningful and have determinate truth values, even in a deterministic world. I also argue, against both Machamer and Bogen, that we need to appeal to counterfactuals to capture the notions like causal relevance and causal mechanism. Contrary to what both authors (...)
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  49.  24
    Bruce Glymour (2008). Stable Models and Causal Explanation in Evolutionary Biology. Philosophy of Science 75 (5):571-583.
    : Models that fail to satisfy the Markov condition are unstable in the sense that changes in state variable values may cause changes in the values of background variables, and these changes in background lead to predictive error. This sort of error arises exactly from the failure of non-Markovian models to track the set of causal relations upon which the values of response variables depend. The result has implications for discussions of the level of selection: under certain plausible conditions (...)
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  50.  97
    Stathis Psillos (2007). Causal Explanation and Manipulation. In Johannes Persson & Petri Ylikoski (eds.), Rethinking Explanation. Springer 93--107.
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