Search results for 'Causal Explanation' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. A. Pragmatic Concept of Causal Explanation (1984). Kazem sadegh-Zadeh. In Lennart Nordenfelt & B. I. B. Lindahl (eds.), Health, Disease, and Causal Explanations in Medicine. Reidel. 201.score: 190.0
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  2. Erik Weber, Jeroen Van Bouwel & Robrecht Vanderbeeken (2005). Forms of Causal Explanation. Foundations of Science 10 (4):437-454.score: 90.0
    In the literature on scientific explanation two types of pluralism are very common. The first concerns the distinction between explanations of singular facts and explanations of laws: there is a consensus that they have a different structure. The second concerns the distinction between causal explanations and uni.cation explanations: most people agree that both are useful and that their structure is different. In this article we argue for pluralism within the area of causal explanations: we claim that the (...)
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  3. Gerben Meynen & Jacco Verburgt (2009). Psychopathology and Causal Explanation in Practice. A Critical Note on Heidegger's Zollikon Seminars. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 12 (1):57-66.score: 90.0
    From 1959 until 1969, Heidegger lectured to psychiatrists and psychiatry students at the University of Zurich Psychiatric Clinic and in Zollikon. The transcriptions of these lectures were published as the Zollikon Seminars. In these seminars Heidegger is highly critical of psychoanalysis, because of its causal and objectifying approach to the human being. In general, Heidegger considers it an objectification or even an elimination of the human being to approach a patient from a causal perspective. In our view Heidegger (...)
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  4. Elizabeth Valentine (1988). Teleological Explanations and Their Relation to Causal Explanation in Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 1 (1):61-68.score: 88.0
    The relation of teleological to causal explanations in psychology is examined. Nagel's claim that they are logically equivalent is rejected. Two arguments for their non-equivalence are considered: (i) the impossibility of specifying initial conditions in the case of teleological explanations and (ii) the claim that different kinds of logic are involved. The view that causal explanations provide only necessary conditions whereas teleological explanations provide sufficient conditions is rejected: causal explanations can provide sufficient conditions, typically being unable to (...)
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  5. Alexander Reutlinger (forthcoming). Why Is There Universal Macro-Behavior? Renormalization Group Explanation As Non-Causal Explanation. Philosophy of Science.score: 88.0
    Renormalization group (RG) methods are an established strategy to explain how it is possible that microscopically different systems exhibit virtually the same macro behavior when undergoing phase-transitions. I argue – in agreement with Robert Batterman – that RG explanations are non-causal explanations. However, Batterman misidentifies the reason why RG explanations are non-causal: it is not the case that an explanation is non- causal if it ignores causal details. I propose an alternative argument, according to which (...)
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  6. Eugen Zeleňák (2009). On Explanatory Relata in Singular Causal Explanation. Theoria 75 (3):179-195.score: 82.0
    Explanation is usually taken to be a relation between certain entities. The aim of this paper is to discuss what entities are suitable as explanatory relata of singular causal explanations, i.e., explanations concerning singular causality relating particular events or other appropriate entities. I outline three different positions. The purely causal approach stipulates that the same entities that are related in the singular causal relation are also linked by the explanatory relation. This position, however, has a problem (...)
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  7. Garrett Pendergraft (2011). In Defense of a Causal Requirement on Explanation. In Phyllis McKay Illari Federica Russo (ed.), Causality in the Sciences. Oxford University Press. 470.score: 79.0
    Causalists about explanation claim that to explain an event is to provide information about the causal history of that event. Some causalists also endorse a proportionality claim, namely that one explanation is better than another insofar as it provides a greater amount of causal information. In this chapter I consider various challenges to these causalist claims. There is a common and influential formulation of the causalist requirement – the ‘Causal Process Requirement’ – that does appear (...)
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  8. Francesca Pongiglione (2012). The Key Role of Causal Explanation in the Climate Change Issue. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 27 (2):175-188.score: 78.0
    In the context of climate change, the adoption of pro-environment behaviour is favoured by the understanding of causal passages within climate science. The understanding of the causes of climate change is necessary in order to be able to take mitigation actions (the subject needs to be aware of its role as a causalagent). Conversely, the understanding of the consequences of climate change is essential for rationally managing the risks, especially in cases where adaptation is needed rather than simple mitigation. (...)
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  9. Reinaldo Elugardo (2001). Brain States, Causal Explanation, and the Attitudes. In Explaining Beliefs: Lynne Rudder Baker and Her Critics. Stanford: CSLI Publications.score: 75.0
     
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  10. George Botterill (2010). Two Kinds of Causal Explanation. Theoria 76 (4):287-313.score: 66.0
    To give a causal explanation is to give information about causal history. But a vast amount of causal history lies behind anything that happens, far too much to be included in any intelligible explanation. This is the Problem of Limitation for explanatory information. To cope with this problem, explanations must select for what is relevant to and adequate for answering particular inquiries. In the present paper this idea is used in order to distinguish two kinds (...)
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  11. Clark Glymour (1998). Learning Causes: Psychological Explanations of Causal Explanation. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 8 (1):39-60.score: 66.0
    I argue that psychologists interested in human causal judgment should understand and adopt a representation of causal mechanisms by directed graphs that encode conditional independence (screening off) relations. I illustrate the benefits of that representation, now widely used in computer science and increasingly in statistics, by (i) showing that a dispute in psychology between ‘mechanist’ and ‘associationist’ psychological theories of causation rests on a false and confused dichotomy; (ii) showing that a recent, much-cited experiment, purporting to show that (...)
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  12. Sally Shrapnel (forthcoming). Quantum Causal Explanation: Or, Why Birds Fly South. European Journal for Philosophy of Science:1-15.score: 64.0
    It is widely held that it is difficult, if not impossible, to apply causal theory to the domain of quantum mechanics. However, there are several recent scientific explanations that appeal crucially to quantum processes, and which are most naturally construed as causal explanations. They come from two relatively new fields: quantum biology and quantum technology. We focus on two examples, the explanation for the optical interferometer LIGO and the explanation for the avian magneto-compass. We analyse the (...)
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  13. Holly Andersen (2012). The Case for Regularity in Mechanistic Causal Explanation. Synthese 189 (3):415-432.score: 63.0
    How regular do mechanisms need to be, in order to count as mechanisms? This paper addresses two arguments for dropping the requirement of regularity from the definition of a mechanism, one motivated by examples from the sciences and the other motivated by metaphysical considerations regarding causation. I defend a broadened regularity requirement on mechanisms that takes the form of a taxonomy of kinds of regularity that mechanisms may exhibit. This taxonomy allows precise explication of the degree and location of regular (...)
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  14. James Woodward (2003). Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation. Oxford University Press.score: 63.0
    Woodward's long awaited book is an attempt to construct a comprehensive account of causation explanation that applies to a wide variety of causal and explanatory claims in different areas of science and everyday life. The book engages some of the relevant literature from other disciplines, as Woodward weaves together examples, counterexamples, criticisms, defenses, objections, and replies into a convincing defense of the core of his theory, which is that we can analyze causation by appeal to the notion of (...)
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  15. James R. Griesemer & Michael J. Wade (1988). Laboratory Models, Causal Explanation and Group Selection. Biology and Philosophy 3 (1):67-96.score: 63.0
    We develop an account of laboratory models, which have been central to the group selection controversy. We compare arguments for group selection in nature with Darwin's arguments for natural selection to argue that laboratory models provide important grounds for causal claims about selection. Biologists get information about causes and cause-effect relationships in the laboratory because of the special role their own causal agency plays there. They can also get information about patterns of effects and antecedent conditions in nature. (...)
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  16. Christopher Read Hitchcock (1992). Causal Explanation and Scientific Realism. Erkenntnis 37 (2):151 - 178.score: 60.0
    It is widely believed that many of the competing accounts of scientific explanation have ramifications which are relevant to the scientific realism debate. I claim that the two issues are orthogonal. For definiteness, I consider Cartwright's argument that causal explanations secure belief in theoretical entities. In Section I, van Fraassen's anti-realism is reviewed; I argue that this anti-realism is, prima facie, consistent with a causal account of explanation. Section II reviews Cartwright's arguments. In Section III, it (...)
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  17. Gábor Hofer-Szabó (2011). Bell(Δ) Inequalities Derived From Separate Common Causal Explanation of Almost Perfect EPR Anticorrelations. Foundations of Physics 41 (8):1398-1413.score: 60.0
    It is a well known fact that a common common causal explanation of the EPR scenario which consists in providing a local, non-conspiratorial common common cause system for a set of EPR correlations is excluded by various Bell inequalities. But what if we replace the assumption of a common common cause system by the requirement that each correlation of the set has a local, non-conspiratorial separate common cause system? In the paper we show that this move does not (...)
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  18. Denis J. Hilton (1996). Mental Models and Causal Explanation: Judgements of Probable Cause and Explanatory Relevance. Thinking and Reasoning 2 (4):273 – 308.score: 60.0
    Good explanations are not only true or probably true, but are also relevant to a causal question. Current models of causal explanation either only address the question of the truth of an explanation, or do not distinguish the probability of an explanation from its relevance. The tasks of scenario construction and conversational explanation are distinguished, which in turn shows how scenarios can interact with conversational principles to determine the truth and relevance of explanations. The (...)
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  19. Joseph Owens (1998). Psychological Explanation and Causal Deviancy. Synthese 115 (2):143-169.score: 60.0
  20. Richard Healey (1994). Nonseparable Processes and Causal Explanation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 25 (3):337-374.score: 60.0
    If physical reality is nonseparable, as quantum mechanics suggests, then it may contain processes of a quite novel kind. Such nonseparable processes could connect space-like separated events without violating relativity theory or any defensible locality condition. Appeal to nonseparable processes could ground theoretical explanations of such otherwise puzzling phenomena as the two-slit experiment, and EPR- type correlations. We find such phenomena puzzling because they threaten cherished conceptions of how causes operate to produce their effects. But nonseparable processes offer us an (...)
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  21. Robert C. Koons (2004). The Logic of Causal Explanation an Axiomatization. Studia Logica 77 (3):325 - 354.score: 60.0
    Three-valued (strong-Kleene) modal logic provides the foundation for a new approach to formalizing causal explanation as a relation between partial situations. The approach makes fine-grained distinctions between aspects of events, even between aspects that are equivalent in classical logic. The framework can accommodate a variety of ontologies concerning the relata of causal explanation. I argue, however, for a tripartite ontology of objects corresponding to sentential nominals: facts, tropes (or facta or states of affairs), and situations (or (...)
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  22. Angela Potochnik (forthcoming). Causal Patterns and Adequate Explanations. Philosophical Studies:1-20.score: 60.0
    Causal accounts of scientific explanation are currently broadly accepted (though not universally so). My first task in this paper is to show that, even for a causal approach to explanation, significant features of explanatory practice are not determined by settling how causal facts bear on the phenomenon to be explained. I then develop a broadly causal approach to explanation that accounts for the additional features that I argue an explanation should have. This (...)
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  23. Eric Barnes (1995). Truthlikeness, Translation, and Approximate Causal Explanation. Philosophy of Science 62 (2):215-226.score: 60.0
    D. Miller's demonstrations of the language dependence of truthlikeness raise a profound problem for the claim that scientific progress is objective. In two recent papers (Barnes 1990, 1991) I argue that the objectivity of progress may be grounded on the claim that the aim of science is not merely truth but knowledge; progress thus construed is objective in an epistemic sense. In this paper I construct a new solution to Miller's problem grounded on the notion of "approximate causal (...)" which allows for linguistically invariant progress outside an epistemic context. I suggest that the notion of "approximate causal explanation" provides the resources for a more robust theory of progress than that provided by the notion of "approximate truth.". (shrink)
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  24. Dorothy Walsh (1979). Causal Efficacy and Causal Explanation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 40 (2):250-257.score: 60.0
    This paper is an attempt to exhibit the contrast between the primitive notion of causality, simply as efficacy, and the restricted meaning of the expression "causal explanation" as associated with the application of a methodology of causal "inquiry". there can be differences of opinion on whether or not a single general methodology of causal inquiry is appropriate for natural phenomena and for human intentional actions. philosophers who reject a "methodology" of causal explanation for intentional (...)
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  25. D. Lynn Holt (1988). Teleological Explanation: A Species of Causal Explanation. Philosophical Psychology 1 (3):313-325.score: 60.0
    Abstract The thesis that teleological explanations are best understood as causal explanations is defended (contra Valentine). I shift the focus of debate from behavior simpliciter to allegedly rational behavior. Teleological explanation, in the case of rational agents, involves reason?giving; and the reasons agents give for acting must be causative of that action if those agents are to be rational in practice. I argue initially that to abandon the claim that reasons are causes of action is to abandon that (...)
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  26. Rinke Hoekstra & Joost Breuker (2007). Commonsense Causal Explanation in a Legal Domain. Artificial Intelligence and Law 15 (3):281-299.score: 60.0
    In this paper, we present an approach to commonsense causal explanation of stories that can be used for automatically determining the liable party in legal case descriptions. The approach is based on , a core ontology for law that takes a commonsense perspective. Aside from our thesis that in the legal domain many terms still have a strong commonsense flavour, the descriptions of events in legal cases, as e.g. presented at judicial trials, are cast in commonsense terms as (...)
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  27. George Sher (1973). Causal Explanation and the Vocabulary of Action. Mind 82 (325):22-30.score: 60.0
    It seems plausible to suppose that (a) the vocabulary of action is distinct from and irreducible to that of mere movement, And (b) the causal laws of the natural sciences are couched solely in terms of the latter vocabulary. From these two suppositions, The falsehood of determinism has sometimes been said to follow. I argue that whether this does follow depends on our conception of causal explanation; on the interpretation of this concept that seems to me the (...)
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  28. James R. Griesemer (1988). Causal Explanation in Laboratory Ecology: The Case of Competitive Indeterminacy. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:337 - 344.score: 60.0
    This paper characterizes the role of the experimenter in causal explanations of laboratory phenomena. Causal explanation rests on appeals to the experimenter's efficacy as a causal agent. I contrast "demographic" and "genetic" explanations of stochastic outcomes in a set of competition experiments in ecology. The demographic view ascribes causes to the experimenter's agency in setting up the experiment and to events within the experimental set-up. The genetic view ascribes causes to an unrecognized effect of the experimenter's (...)
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  29. José Luis Rolleri (2007). La Teoría de la Explicación Causal de Salmon y la Mecánica Cuántica (Salmon's Theory of Causal Explanation and Quantum Mechanics). Crítica 39 (116):3 - 35.score: 60.0
    Salmón ha afirmado que su teoría de la explicación causal no es enteramente adecuada para el dominio cuántico debido a ciertas anomalías causales como el dualismo onda/partícula y, especialmente, a las correlaciones estadísticas que surgen de experimentos tipo EPR. En este escrito se analizan las nociones causales de Salmón, en las cuales se basa su teoría probabilista de la explicación, con el fin de delimitar su alcance en ese dominio mostrando que sólo abarca procesos de transición pero no procesos (...)
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  30. Jan Baedke (2013). Causal Explanation Beyond the Gene. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 27 (2):153-174.score: 60.0
    This paper deals with the interrelationship between causal explanation and methodology in a relatively young discipline in biology: epigenetics. Based on cases from molecular and ecological epigenetics, I show that James Woodward’s interventionist account of causation captures essential features about how epigeneticists using highly diverse methods, i.e. laboratory experiments and purely observational studies, think about causal explanation. I argue that interventionism thus qualifies as a useful unifying explanatory approach when it comes to cross-methodological research efforts. It (...)
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  31. Rebecca Schweder (1999). Causal Explanation and Explanatory Selection. Synthese 120 (1):115-124.score: 58.0
    It is observed that in ordinary everyday causal explanations often just one causal factor is mentioned. One causal factor carries the explanatory burden, even if there are several causal factors that are responsible for the event to be explained. This paper deals with the question of how to account for this explanatory selection. I argue for a pragmatic stance towards explanation, that we must attend to the question–answer situation as a whole and the context of (...)
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  32. Josefa Toribio, Naturalism and Causal Explanation.score: 58.0
    Semantic properties are not commonly held to be part of the basic ontological furniture of the world. Consequently, we confront a problem: how to 'naturalize' semantics so as to reveal these properties in their true ontological colors? Dominant naturalistic theories address semantic properties as properties of some other (more primitive, less problematic) kind. The reductionistic flavor is unmistakable. The following quote from Fodor's Psychosemantics is probably the contemporary locus classicus of this trend. Fodor is commendably unapologetic: "I suppose that sooner (...)
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  33. D. Benjamin Barros (2013). Negative Causation in Causal and Mechanistic Explanation. Synthese 190 (3):449-469.score: 57.0
    Instances of negative causation—preventions, omissions, and the like—have long created philosophical worries. In this paper, I argue that concerns about negative causation can be addressed in the context of causal explanation generally, and mechanistic explanation specifically. The gravest concern about negative causation is that it exacerbates the problem of causal promiscuity—that is, the problem that arises when a particular account of causation identifies too many causes for a particular effect. In the explanatory context, the problem of (...)
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  34. Morteza Dehghani, Rumen Iliev & Stefan Kaufmann (2012). Causal Explanation and Fact Mutability in Counterfactual Reasoning. Mind and Language 27 (1):55-85.score: 57.0
    Recent work on the interpretation of counterfactual conditionals has paid much attention to the role of causal independencies. One influential idea from the theory of Causal Bayesian Networks is that counterfactual assumptions are made by intervention on variables, leaving all of their causal non-descendants unaffected. But intervention is not applicable across the board. For instance, backtracking counterfactuals, which involve reasoning from effects to causes, cannot proceed by intervention in the strict sense, for otherwise they would be equivalent (...)
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  35. Derek Bolton (1996). Mind, Meaning, and Mental Disorder: The Nature of Causal Explanation in Psychology and Psychiatry. Oxford University Press.score: 57.0
    Philosophical ideas about the mind, brain, and behavior can seem theoretical and unimportant when placed alongside the urgent questions of mental distress and disorder. However, there is a need to give direction to attempts to answer these questions. On the one hand, a substantial research effort is going into the investigation of brain processes and the development of drug treatments for psychiatric disorders, and on the other, a wide range of psychotherapies is becoming available to adults and children with mental (...)
     
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  36. Angela Potochnik (2011). Explanation and Understanding. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (1):29-38.score: 54.0
    Michael Strevens offers an account of causal explanation according to which explanatory practice is shaped by counterbalanced commitments to representing causal influence and abstracting away from overly specific details. In this paper, I challenge a key feature of that account. I argue that what Strevens calls explanatory frameworks figure prominently in explanatory practice because they actually improve explanations. This suggestion is simple but has far-reaching implications. It affects the status of explanations that cite multiply realizable properties; changes (...)
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  37. Carl Ginet (2008). In Defense of a Non-Causal Account of Reasons Explanations. Journal of Ethics 12 (3/4):229 - 237.score: 54.0
    This paper defends my claim in earlier work that certain non-causal conditions are sufficient for the truth of some reasons explanations of actions, against the critique of this claim given by Randolph Clarke in his book, Libertarian Accounts of Free Will.
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  38. J. Marto & J. R. Croca (2002). Non-Local Interferometry: A Causal Explanation by Means of Local Wavelet Analysis. [REVIEW] Foundations of Physics 32 (7):1091-1109.score: 54.0
    In the following we consider the possibility of interpretating recent non-local interferometric experiments according to the De Broglie causal model. With the help of a simplified mathematical model based on wavelet analysis it is indeed possible to explain it in a causal way. Furthermore we show the distinctions between the two formalisms and discuss some experimental conditions that may make these differences evident.
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  39. L. R. Franklin-Hall (forthcoming). High-Level Explanation and the Interventionist's 'Variables Problem'. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.score: 54.0
    The interventionist account of causal explanation, in the version presented by Jim Woodward (2003), has been recently claimed capable of buttressing the widely felt—though poorly understood—hunch that high-level, relatively abstract explanations, of the sort provided by sciences like biology, psychology and economics, are in some cases explanatorily optimal. It is the aim of this paper to show that this is mistaken. Due to a lack of effective constraints on the causal variables at the heart of the interventionist (...)
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  40. L. R. Franklin-Hall (forthcoming). Explaining Causal Selection with Explanatory Causal Economy: Biology and Beyond. In P.-A. Braillard & C. Malaterre (eds.), Explanation in Biology: An Enquiry into the Diversity of Explanatory Patterns in the Life Sciences. Springer.score: 54.0
    Among the factors necessary for the occurrence of some event, which of these are selectively highlighted in its explanation and labeled as causes — and which are explanatorily omitted, or relegated to the status of background conditions? Following J. S. Mill, most have thought that only a pragmatic answer to this question was possible. In this paper I suggest we understand this ‘causal selection problem’ in causal-explanatory terms, and propose that explanatory trade-offs between abstraction and stability can (...)
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  41. Jaakko Kuorikoski (2012). Contrastive Statistical Explanation and Causal Heterogeneity. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (3):435-452.score: 54.0
    Probabilistic phenomena are often perceived as being problematic targets for contrastive explanation. It is usually thought that the possibility of contrastive explanation hinges on whether or not the probabilistic behaviour is irreducibly indeterministic, and that the possible remaining contrastive explananda are token event probabilities or complete probability distributions over such token outcomes. This paper uses the invariance-under-interventions account of contrastive explanation to argue against both ideas. First, the problem of contrastive explanation also arises in cases in (...)
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  42. Rebecca Schweder (2005). A Defense of a Unificationist Theory of Explanation. Foundations of Science 10 (4):421-435.score: 52.0
    This paper defends a unificationist theory of explanation. I first explore the notion of understanding entrenched by the unificationist. Then I present an overview of various kinds of causal statements and explanations. It is claimed that only genuine causal law statements have explanatory power. Finally, I attempt to fit causal explanations into the unificationist theory of explanation. In this way, I try to provide an account of how causal explanations provide understanding of the phenomena (...)
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  43. Erik Allander (1984). Holistic Medicine as a Method of Causal Explanation, Treatment, and Prevention in Clinical Work: Obstacle or Opportunity for Development?. In. In Lennart Nordenfelt & B. I. B. Lindahl (eds.), Health, Disease, and Causal Explanations in Medicine. Reidel. 215--223.score: 52.0
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  44. H. B. Dalrymple (1975). Dispositional and Causal Explanation. Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):115-121.score: 52.0
    It is argued that dispositional explanations are radically incomplete causal explanations that are employed when (1) a description of the stimuli is insufficient to account for the object's response and (2) not enough is known about the object to specify what its specific causal contribution is. ryle's failure to refer to the causal contribution of the organism in his account of dispositions is regarded as a serious weakness.
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  45. Ingmar Pörn (1984). Comments on Sadegh-Zadeh's 'a Pragmatic Concept of Causal Explanation'. In. In Lennart Nordenfelt & B. I. B. Lindahl (eds.), Health, Disease, and Causal Explanations in Medicine. Reidel. 211--212.score: 52.0
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  46. Kazem Sadegh-Zadeh (1984). A Pragmatic Concept of Causal Explanation. In. In Lennart Nordenfelt & B. I. B. Lindahl (eds.), Health, Disease, and Causal Explanations in Medicine. Reidel. 201--209.score: 52.0
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  47. Scott R. Sehon (1997). Deviant Causal Chains and the Irreducibility of Teleological Explanation. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (2):195–213.score: 51.0
    We typically explain human action teleologically, by citing the action's goal or purpose. However, a broad class of naturalistic projects within the philosophy of mind presuppose that teleological explanation is reducible to causal explanation. In this paper I argue that two recently suggested strategies - one suggested by Al Mele and the other proposed by John Bishop and Christopher Peacocke - fail to provide a successful causal analysis of teleological explanation. The persistent troubles encountered by (...)
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  48. Scott R. Sehon (1998). Connectionism and the Causal Theory of Action Explanation. Philosophical Psychology 11 (4):511-532.score: 51.0
    It is widely assumed that common sense psychological explanations of human action are a species of causal explanation. I argue against this construal, drawing on Ramsey et al.'s paper, “Connectionism, eliminativism, and the future of folk psychology”. I argue that if certain connec-tionist models are correct, then mental states cannot be identified with functionally discrete causes of behavior, and I respond to some recent attempts to deny this claim. However, I further contend that our common sense psychological practices (...)
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  49. Michael Rota (2007). Infinite Causal Chains and Explanation. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 81:109-122.score: 51.0
    Many cosmological arguments for the existence of a first cause or a necessary being rely on a premise which denies the possibility of an infinite regress ofsome particular sort. Adequate and satisfying support for this premise, however, is not always provided. In this paper I attempt to address this gap in the literature. After discussing the notion of a causal explanation (section I), I formulate three principles which govern any successful causal explanation (section II). I then (...)
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  50. Robert Wyllie (1980). Causal Explanations in Mental Event Contexts. Philosophical Papers 9 (May):15-31.score: 51.0
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