Search results for 'Causal argument' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Steven L. Reynolds, Ryan Takenaga & Luminosity Argument (2002). James M. Joyce/Levi on Causal Decision Theory and the Possibility of Predicting One's Own Actions 69–102. Philosophical Studies 110 (295).score: 360.0
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  2. Markus E. Schlosser (2014). The Luck Argument Against Event-Causal Libertarianism: It is Here to Stay. Philosophical Studies 167 (2):375-385.score: 192.0
    The luck argument raises a serious challenge for libertarianism about free will. In broad outline, if an action is undetermined, then it appears to be a matter of luck whether or not one performs it. And if it is a matter of luck whether or not one performs an action, then it seems that the action is not performed with free will. This argument is most effective against event-causal accounts of libertarianism. Recently, Franklin (Philosophical Studies 156:199–230, 2011) (...)
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  3. Jessica M. Wilson (2010). The Causal Argument Against Component Forces. Dialectica 63 (4):525-554.score: 192.0
    Do component forces exist in conjoined circumstances? Cartwright (1980) says no; Creary (1981) says yes. I'm inclined towards Cartwright's side in this matter, but find several problems with her argumentation. My primary aim here is to present a better, distinctly causal, argument against component forces: very roughly, I argue that the joint posit of component and resultant forces in conjoined circumstances gives rise to a threat of causal overdetermination, avoidance of which best proceeds via eliminativism about component (...)
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  4. Michael Roche (2014). Causal Overdetermination and Kim's Exclusion Argument. Philosophia 42 (3):809-826.score: 192.0
    Jaegwon Kim’s influential exclusion argument attempts to demonstrate the inconsistency of nonreductive materialism in the philosophy of mind. Kim’s argument begins by showing that the three main theses of nonreductive materialism, plus two additional considerations, lead to a specific and (by now) familiar picture of mental causation. The exclusion argument can succeed only if, as Kim claims, this picture is not one of genuine causal overdetermination. Accordingly, one can resist Kim’s conclusion by denying this claim, maintaining (...)
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  5. Robert C. Bishop (2006). The Hidden Premise in the Causal Argument for Physicalism. Analysis 66 (289):44-52.score: 180.0
    The causal argument for physicalism is anayzed and it's key premise--the causal closure of physics--is found wanting. Therefore, a hidden premise must be added to the argument to gain its conclusion, but the hidden premise is indistinguishable from the conclusion of the causal argument. Therefore, it begs the question on physicalism.
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  6. Michael Sollberger (2007). The Causal Argument Against Disjunctivism. Facta Philosophica 9 (1):245-267.score: 180.0
    In this paper, I will ask whether naïve realists have the conceptual resources for meeting the challenge stemming from the causal argument. As I interpret it, naïve realism is committed to disjunctivism. Therefore, I first set out in detail how one has to formulate the causal argument against the background of disjunctivism. This discussion is above all supposed to work out the key assumptions at stake in the causal argument. I will then go on (...)
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  7. Howard Robinson (2005). Reply to Nathan: How to Reconstruct the Causal Argument. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 20 (36):7-10.score: 180.0
    Nicholas Nathan tries to resist the current version of the causal argument for sense-data in two ways. First he suggests that, on what he considers to be the correct reconstruction of the argument, it equivocates on the sense of proximate cause. Second, he defends a form of disjunctivism, by claiming that there might be an extra mechanism involved in producing veridical hallucination that is not present in perception. I argue that Nathan’s reconstruction of the argument is (...)
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  8. David Davies (2011). Assessing Robinson's “Revised Causal Argument” for Sense-Data. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (2):209-224.score: 180.0
    Howard Robinson’s “revised causal argument” for the sense-datum theory of perception combines elements from two other arguments, the “original” causal argument and the argument from hallucination. Mark Johnston, however, has argued that, once the nature of the object of hallucinatory experience is properly addressed, the errors in hallucination-based arguments for conjunctivist views of perception like the sense-datum theory become apparent. I outline Robinson’s views and then consider the implications of Johnston’s challenge for the revised (...) argument. (shrink)
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  9. Jesper Kallestrup (2006). The Causal Exclusion Argument. Philosophical Studies 131 (2):459-85.score: 156.0
    Jaegwon Kim’s causal exclusion argument says that if all physical effects have sufficient physical causes, and no physical effects are caused twice over by distinct physical and mental causes, there cannot be any irreducible mental causes. In addition, Kim has argued that the nonreductive physicalist must give up completeness, and embrace the possibility of downward causation. This paper argues first that this extra argument relies on a principle of property individuation, which the nonreductive physicalist need not accept, (...)
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  10. Daniel von Wachter (2006). Why the Argument From Causal Closure Against the Existence of Immaterial Things is Bad. In H. J. Koskinen, R. Vilkko & S. Philström (eds.), Science - A Challenge to Philosophy? Peter Lang.score: 156.0
    Some argue for materialism claiming that a physical event cannot have a non-physical cause, or by claiming the 'Principle of Causal Closure' to be true. This I call a 'Sweeping Naturalistic Argument'. This article argues against this. It describes what it would be for a material event to have an immaterial cause.
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  11. Todd Buras (2009). An Argument Against Causal Theories of Mental Content. American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (2):117-129.score: 156.0
    Some mental states are about themselves. Nothing is a cause of itself. So some mental states are not about their causes; they are about things distinct from their causes. If this argument is sound, it spells trouble for causal theories of mental content—the precise sort of trouble depending on the precise sort of causal theory. This paper shows that the argument is sound (§§1-3), and then spells out the trouble (§4).
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  12. Markus Eronen (2012). Pluralistic Physicalism and the Causal Exclusion Argument. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (2):219-232.score: 156.0
    There is a growing consensus among philosophers of science that scientific endeavors of understanding the human mind or the brain exhibit explanatory pluralism. Relatedly, several philosophers have in recent years defended an interventionist approach to causation that leads to a kind of causal pluralism. In this paper, I explore the consequences of these recent developments in philosophy of science for some of the central debates in philosophy of mind. First, I argue that if we adopt explanatory pluralism and the (...)
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  13. Bob Brecher (1976). Descartes' Causal Argument for the Existence of God. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7 (3):418 - 432.score: 150.0
  14. Douglas Ehring (2002). The Causal Argument Against Natural Class Trope Nominalism. Philosophical Studies 107 (2):179 - 190.score: 150.0
    In this paper, I consider an objection to ``natural class''trope nominalism, the view that a trope's nature isdetermined by its membership in a natural class of tropes.The objection is that natural class trope nominalismis inconsistent with causes' being efficacious invirtue of having tropes of a certain type. I arguethat if natural class trope nominalism is combinedwith property counterpart theory, then this objectioncan be rebutted.
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  15. A. C. Ewing, R. I. Aaron & D. MacNabb (1945). Symposium: The Causal Argument for Physical Objects. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 19:32 - 100.score: 150.0
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  16. Christopher Evan Franklin (2014). Event-Causal Libertarianism, Functional Reduction, and the Disappearing Agent Argument. Philosophical Studies 170 (3):413-432.score: 144.0
    Event-causal libertarians maintain that an agent’s freely bringing about a choice is reducible to states and events involving him bringing about the choice. Agent-causal libertarians demur, arguing that free will requires that the agent be irreducibly causally involved. Derk Pereboom and Meghan Griffith have defended agent-causal libertarianism on this score, arguing that since on event-causal libertarianism an agent’s contribution to his choice is exhausted by the causal role of states and events involving him, and since (...)
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  17. Doren A. Recker (1987). Causal Efficacy: The Structure of Darwin's Argument Strategy in the Origin of Species. Philosophy of Science 54 (2):147-175.score: 144.0
    There are several interpretations of the argument structure of Darwin's Origin of Species, representing Covering-Law, Inference-to-the-Best-Explanation, and (more recently) Semantic models. I argue that while all three types of interpretation enjoy some textual support, none succeeds in capturing the overall strategy of the Origin, consistent with Darwin's claim that it is 'one long argument'. I provide detailed criticisms of all three current models, and then offer an alternative interpretation based on the view that there are three main (...) strategies in the Origin, all supporting the 'causal efficacy' of Darwin's theory. This interpretation provides both a more unified treatment of the text, and some important implications concerning the relation between general philosophical models of scientific theory support and specific historical cases. (shrink)
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  18. Roger Stanev (2009). Epidemiologic Causation: Jerome Cornfield’s Argument for a Causal Connection Between Smoking and Lung Cancer. Humana.Mente 9:59-66.score: 144.0
    A central issue confronting both philosophers and practitioners in formulating an analysis of causation is the question of what constitutes evidence for a causal association. From the 1950s onward, the biostatistician Jerome Cornfield put himself at the center of a controversial debate over whether cigarette smoking was a causative factor in the incidence of lung cancer. Despite criticisms from distinguished statisticians such as Fisher, Berkson and Neyman, Cornfield argued that a review of the scientific evidence supported the conclusion of (...)
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  19. Richard Sharvy (1986). Plato's Causal Logic and the Third Man Argument. Noûs 20 (4):507-530.score: 132.0
    (1) anything that fs does so because it participates in the f itself. (2) it is impossible that: a form phi fs because phi participates in phi. (3) the f itself fs. These are inconsistent all right, but (1) is not a doctrine of the theory of forms, and (2) is neither reasonable nor held by plato! but the tma does not involve any of these three. Rather, the tma is aimed at (4) anything that fs does so (a) because (...)
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  20. Robert D. Hughes (1975). Descartes' Ontological Argument as Not Identical to the Causal Arguments. New Scholasticism 49 (4):473-485.score: 130.0
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  21. Sven Walter (2008). The Supervenience Argument, Overdetermination, and Causal Drainage: Assessing Kim's Master Argument. Philosophical Psychology 21 (5):673 – 696.score: 126.0
    This paper examines Jaegwon Kim's Supervenience Argument (SA) against nonreductive physicalism, concentrating on Kim's response to two of the most important objections against the SA: First, the Overdetermination Argument, according to which Kim has no convincing argument against the possibility that mental causation might be a case of genuine or systematic overdetermination; second, the Generalization Argument, according to which the SA would entail that causation at any level gives way to causation at the next lower level, (...)
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  22. J. Ismael (2003). Closed Causal Loops and the Bilking Argument. Synthese 136 (3):305 - 320.score: 126.0
    The most potentially powerful objection to the possibility oftime travel stems from the fact that it can, under the right conditions, give rise to closedcausal loops, and closed causal loops can be turned into self-defeating causal chains;folks killing their infant selves, setting out to destroy the world before they were born,and the like. It used to be thought that such chains present paradoxes; the receivedwisdom nowadays is that they give rise to physical anomalies in the form of inexplicably (...)
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  23. Scott R. Sehon (2000). An Argument Against the Causal Theory of Action Explanation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):67-85.score: 120.0
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  24. Ted A. Warfield (2000). Causal Determinism and Human Freedom Are Incompatible: A New Argument for Incompatibilism. Philosopical Perspectives 14 (s14):167-180.score: 120.0
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  25. Steven L. Reynolds (2003). The Model Theoretic Argument, Indirect Realism, and the Causal Theory of Reference Objection. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (2):146-154.score: 120.0
  26. Øistein Schmidt Galaaen, The Disturbing Matter of Downward Causation: A Study of the Exclusion Argument and its Causal-Explanatory Presuppositions.score: 120.0
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  27. Ryan Wasserman, John Hawthorne & Mark Scala (2004). Recombination, Causal Constraints, and Humean Supervenience: An Argument for Temporal Parts? In Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Volume 1. Oup Oxford.score: 120.0
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  28. Bruce R. Reichenbach (1975). The Cosmological Argument and the Causal Principle. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (3):185 - 190.score: 120.0
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  29. Richard Sharvy (1987). Erratum: Plato's Causal Logic and the Third Man Argument. Noûs 21 (3):455 -.score: 120.0
  30. Daniel von Wachter (2006). Why the Argument From Causal Closure Against the Existence of Immaterial Things is Bad. In H. J. Koskinen, R. Vilkko & S. PhilströM. (eds.), Science - a Challenge to Philosophy? Peter Lang. 113-124.score: 120.0
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  31. Christopher Hitchcock (2012). Theories of Causation and the Causal Exclusion Argument. Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (5-6):5-6.score: 120.0
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  32. Barry Miller (1982). Necessarily Terminating Causal Series and the Contingency Argument. Mind 91 (362):201-215.score: 120.0
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  33. Robert C. Bishop (2012). Excluding the Causal Exclusion Argument Against Non-Redirective Physicalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (5-6):57-74.score: 120.0
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  34. Annemarie Butler (2009). Hume's Causal Reconstruction of the Perceptual Relativity Argument in Treatise 1.4. Dialogue 48 (01):77-.score: 120.0
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  35. Matthew Stuart Piper (2012). You Can't Eat Causal Cake with an Abstract Fork: An Argument Against Computational Theories of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (11-12):154-90.score: 120.0
    Two of the most important concepts in contemporary philosophy of mind are computation and consciousness. This paper explores whether there is a strong relationship between these concepts in the following sense: is a computational theory of consciousness possible? That is, is the right kind of computation sufficient for the instantiation of consciousness. In this paper, I argue that the abstract nature of computational processes precludes computations from instantiating the concrete properties constitutive of consciousness. If this is correct, then not only (...)
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  36. Jimmy Alfonso Licon (2012). Another Argument for Animalism: The Argument From Causal Powers. Prolegomena 11 (2):169-180.score: 120.0
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  37. Alice Gb ter Meulen (2008). Agency, Argument Structure, and Causal Inference. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (6):728-729.score: 120.0
    Logically, weighting is transitive, but similarity is not, so clustering cannot be either. Entailments must help a child to review attribute lists more efficiently. Children's understanding of exceptions to generic claims precedes their ability to articulate explanations. So agency, as enabling constraint, may show coherent covariation with attributes, as mere extensional, observable effect of intensional entailments.
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  38. James M. Humber (1974). Causal Necessity and the Ontological Argument. Religious Studies 10 (3):291 - 300.score: 120.0
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  39. James M. Humber (1970). Descartes' Ontological Argument as Non-Causal. New Scholasticism 44 (3):449-459.score: 120.0
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  40. Alice G. B. ter Meulen (2008). Agency, Argument Structure, and Causal Inference. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (6):728-729.score: 120.0
  41. E. Carlson (2005). Causal Determinism and Human Freedom Are Incompatible: A New Argument for Incompatibilism (Vol 14, Pg 167, 2000). Philosophia 32 (1-4):443-448.score: 120.0
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  42. Lawrence Nolan & Alan Nelson (2006). To a Reader Voyaging Through the Meditations for the First Time, Descartes' Proofs for the Existence of God Can Seem Daunting, Especially the Argument of Meditation III, with its Appeal to Causal Principles That Seem Arcane, and to Medieval Doctrines About Different Modes of Being and Degrees of Reality. First-Time Readers Are Not Alone in Feeling Bewildered. Many Commentators Have Had the Same Reaction. In an Attempt at Charity, Some of Them Have Tried to Tame the Complexity of Descartes' Discussion by .. [REVIEW] In Stephen Gaukroger (ed.), Blackwell Guide to Descartes’ Meditations. Wiley-Blackwell. 2--104.score: 120.0
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  43. Warren Schrader, A Unity of Consciousness Argument Against Causal Emergence.score: 120.0
     
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  44. B. Sharvy (1986). Plato's Causal Logic and the Third Man Argument. Noûs 20 (4):507-530.score: 120.0
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  45. Sven Walter (2006). Causal Exclusion as an Argument Against Non-Reductive Physicalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):67-83.score: 120.0
     
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  46. Robert K. Garcia (2014). Closing in on Causal Closure. Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (1-2):96-109.score: 102.0
    I examine the meaning and merits of a premise in the Exclusion Argument, the causal closure principle that all physical effects have physical causes. I do so by addressing two questions. First, if we grant the other premises, exactly what kind of closure principle is required to make the Exclusion Argument valid? Second, what are the merits of the requisite closure principle? Concerning the first, I argue that the Exclusion Argument requires a strong, “stringently pure” version (...)
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  47. David Yates (2009). Emergence, Downwards Causation and the Completeness of Physics. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):110 - 131.score: 90.0
    The 'completeness of physics' is the key premise in the causal argument for physicalism. Standard formulations of it fail to rule out emergent downwards causation. I argue that it must do this if it is tare in a valid causal argument for physicalism. Drawing on the notion of conferring causal power, I formulate a suitable principle, 'strong completeness'. I investigate the metaphysical implications of distinguishing this principle from emergent downwards causation, and I argue that categoricalist (...)
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  48. Neal Judisch (2008). Why 'Non-Mental' Won't Work: On Hempel's Dilemma and the Characterization of the 'Physical'. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 140 (3):299 - 318.score: 90.0
    Recent discussions of physicalism have focused on the question how the physical ought to be characterized. Many have argued that any characterization of the physical should include the stipulation that the physical is non-mental, and others have claimed that a systematic substitution of ‘non-mental’ for ‘physical’ is all that is needed for philosophical purposes. I argue here that both claims are incorrect: substituting ‘non-mental’ for ‘physical’ in the causal argument for physicalism does not deliver the physicalist conclusion, and (...)
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  49. Michael Sollberger (2012). Causation in Perception: A Challenge to Naïve Realism. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (4):581-595.score: 90.0
    Defending a form of naïve realism about visual experiences is quite popular these days. Those naïve realists who I will be concerned with in this paper make a central claim about the subjective aspects of perceptual experiences. They argue that how it is with the perceiver subjectively when she sees worldly objects is literally determined by those objects. This way of thinking leads them to endorse a form of disjunctivism, according to which the fundamental psychological nature of seeings and hallucinations (...)
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  50. G. Ramsey (2013). Organisms, Traits, and Population Subdivisions: Two Arguments Against the Causal Conception of Fitness? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (3):589-608.score: 84.0
    A major debate in the philosophy of biology centers on the question of how we should understand the causal structure of natural selection. This debate is polarized into the causal and statistical positions. The main arguments from the statistical side are that a causal construal of the theory of natural selection's central concept, fitness, either (i) leads to inaccurate predictions about population dynamics, or (ii) leads to an incoherent set of causal commitments. In this essay, I (...)
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