Search results for 'Causal argument' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Order:
  1. Ulrike Hahn, Frank Zenker & Roland Bluhm (forthcoming). Causal Argument. In Michael R. Waldmann (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Causal Reasoning. Oxford University Press
    In this chapter, we outline the range of argument forms involving causation that can be found in everyday discourse. We also survey empirical work concerned with the generation and evaluation of such arguments. This survey makes clear that there is presently no unified body of research concerned with causal argument. We highlight the benefits of a unified treatment both for those interested in causal cognition and those interested in argumentation, and identify the key challenges that must (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. Markus E. Schlosser (2014). The Luck Argument Against Event-Causal Libertarianism: It is Here to Stay. Philosophical Studies 167 (2):375-385.
    The luck argument raises a serious challenge for libertarianism about free will. In broad outline, if an action is undetermined, then it appears to be a matter of luck whether or not one performs it. And if it is a matter of luck whether or not one performs an action, then it seems that the action is not performed with free will. This argument is most effective against event-causal accounts of libertarianism. Recently, Franklin (Philosophical Studies 156:199–230, 2011) (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  3. Jessica M. Wilson (2009). The Causal Argument Against Component Forces. Dialectica 63 (4):525-554.
    Do component forces exist in conjoined circumstances? Cartwright (1980) says no; Creary (1981) says yes. I'm inclined towards Cartwright's side in this matter, but find several problems with her argumentation. My primary aim here is to present a better, distinctly causal, argument against component forces: very roughly, I argue that the joint posit of component and resultant forces in conjoined circumstances gives rise to a threat of causal overdetermination, avoidance of which best proceeds via eliminativism about component (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  4. Michael Roche (2014). Causal Overdetermination and Kim's Exclusion Argument. Philosophia 42 (3):809-826.
    Jaegwon Kim’s influential exclusion argument attempts to demonstrate the inconsistency of nonreductive materialism in the philosophy of mind. Kim’s argument begins by showing that the three main theses of nonreductive materialism, plus two additional considerations, lead to a specific and familiar picture of mental causation. The exclusion argument can succeed only if, as Kim claims, this picture is not one of genuine causal overdetermination. Accordingly, one can resist Kim’s conclusion by denying this claim, maintaining instead that (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5.  28
    Bruce R. Reichenbach (1975). The Cosmological Argument and the Causal Principle. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (3):185 - 190.
    I reply to Houston Craighead, who presents two arguments against my version of the cosmological argument. First, he argues that my arguments in defense of the causal principle in terms of the existence being accidental to an essence is fallacious because it begs the question. I respond that the objection itself is circular, and that it invokes the questionable contention that what is conceivable is possible. Against my contention that the causal principle might be intuitively known, I (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  6. Michael Sollberger (2007). The Causal Argument Against Disjunctivism. Facta Philosophica 9 (1):245-267.
    In this paper, I will ask whether naïve realists have the conceptual resources for meeting the challenge stemming from the causal argument. As I interpret it, naïve realism is committed to disjunctivism. Therefore, I first set out in detail how one has to formulate the causal argument against the background of disjunctivism. This discussion is above all supposed to work out the key assumptions at stake in the causal argument. I will then go on (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. Robert C. Bishop (2006). The Hidden Premise in the Causal Argument for Physicalism. Analysis 66 (289):44-52.
    The causal argument for physicalism is anayzed and it's key premise--the causal closure of physics--is found wanting. Therefore, a hidden premise must be added to the argument to gain its conclusion, but the hidden premise is indistinguishable from the conclusion of the causal argument. Therefore, it begs the question on physicalism.
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  8.  25
    David Davies (2011). Assessing Robinson's “Revised Causal Argument” for Sense-Data. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (2):209-224.
    Howard Robinson’s “revised causal argument” for the sense-datum theory of perception combines elements from two other arguments, the “original” causal argument and the argument from hallucination. Mark Johnston, however, has argued that, once the nature of the object of hallucinatory experience is properly addressed, the errors in hallucination-based arguments for conjunctivist views of perception like the sense-datum theory become apparent. I outline Robinson’s views and then consider the implications of Johnston’s challenge for the revised (...) argument. (shrink)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9.  59
    Howard Robinson (2005). Reply to Nathan: How to Reconstruct the Causal Argument. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 20 (36):7-10.
    Nicholas Nathan tries to resist the current version of the causal argument for sense-data in two ways. First he suggests that, on what he considers to be the correct reconstruction of the argument, it equivocates on the sense of proximate cause. Second, he defends a form of disjunctivism, by claiming that there might be an extra mechanism involved in producing veridical hallucination that is not present in perception. I argue that Nathan’s reconstruction of the argument is (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. Jesper Kallestrup (2006). The Causal Exclusion Argument. Philosophical Studies 131 (2):459-85.
    Jaegwon Kim’s causal exclusion argument says that if all physical effects have sufficient physical causes, and no physical effects are caused twice over by distinct physical and mental causes, there cannot be any irreducible mental causes. In addition, Kim has argued that the nonreductive physicalist must give up completeness, and embrace the possibility of downward causation. This paper argues first that this extra argument relies on a principle of property individuation, which the nonreductive physicalist need not accept, (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   13 citations  
  11. Jonas Jervell Indregard (forthcoming). Kant's Causal Power Argument Against Empirical Affection. Kantian Review.
    A well-known trilemma faces the interpretation of Kant’s theory of affection, namely whether the objects that affect us are empirical, noumenal, or both. I argue that according to Kant, the things that affect us and cause representations in us are not empirical objects. I articulate what I call the Causal Power Argument, according to which empirical objects cannot affect us because they do not have the right kind of power to cause representations. All the causal powers that (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12.  57
    Markus Eronen (2012). Pluralistic Physicalism and the Causal Exclusion Argument. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (2):219-232.
    There is a growing consensus among philosophers of science that scientific endeavors of understanding the human mind or the brain exhibit explanatory pluralism. Relatedly, several philosophers have in recent years defended an interventionist approach to causation that leads to a kind of causal pluralism. In this paper, I explore the consequences of these recent developments in philosophy of science for some of the central debates in philosophy of mind. First, I argue that if we adopt explanatory pluralism and the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  13. Daniel von Wachter (2006). Why the Argument From Causal Closure Against the Existence of Immaterial Things is Bad. In H. J. Koskinen, R. Vilkko & S. Philström (eds.), Science - A Challenge to Philosophy? Peter Lang
    Some argue for materialism claiming that a physical event cannot have a non-physical cause, or by claiming the 'Principle of Causal Closure' to be true. This I call a 'Sweeping Naturalistic Argument'. This article argues against this. It describes what it would be for a material event to have an immaterial cause.
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14. Todd Buras (2009). An Argument Against Causal Theories of Mental Content. American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (2):117-129.
    Some mental states are about themselves. Nothing is a cause of itself. So some mental states are not about their causes; they are about things distinct from their causes. If this argument is sound, it spells trouble for causal theories of mental content—the precise sort of trouble depending on the precise sort of causal theory. This paper shows that the argument is sound (§§1-3), and then spells out the trouble (§4).
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  15.  29
    Robert C. Bishop (2012). Excluding the Causal Exclusion Argument Against Non-Redirective Physicalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (5-6):57-74.
    A much discussed argument in the philosophy of mind against non-reductive physicalism leads to the conclusion that all genuine causes involved in mental phenomena must be reductive physical causes. The latter ostensibly exclude any other causes from having genuine effects in human thought and behaviour. Jaegwon Kim has been the chief exponent of this line of argument, calling it variously the causal exclusion argument or the supervenience argument against non-reductive physicalism. I will analyse this (...) and show that some of its key assumptions are unwarranted. Two assumptions on which I will particularly focus are the causal closure of the physical and the prohibition against causal overdetermination when multiple sufficient causes are involved in some effect. The upshot will be that rather than lower-level physical causes always excluding or pre-empting possible mental causes, context plays a key role in determining what kinds of causation are at work in human behaviour and how those causes cooperate. (shrink)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16.  99
    Bob Brecher (1976). Descartes' Causal Argument for the Existence of God. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7 (3):418 - 432.
  17.  41
    Douglas Ehring (2002). The Causal Argument Against Natural Class Trope Nominalism. Philosophical Studies 107 (2):179 - 190.
    In this paper, I consider an objection to ``natural class''trope nominalism, the view that a trope's nature isdetermined by its membership in a natural class of tropes.The objection is that natural class trope nominalismis inconsistent with causes' being efficacious invirtue of having tropes of a certain type. I arguethat if natural class trope nominalism is combinedwith property counterpart theory, then this objectioncan be rebutted.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  18.  4
    R. C. Bishop (2006). The Hidden Premiss in the Causal Argument for Physicalism. Analysis 66 (1):44-52.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19.  9
    Annemarie Butler (2009). Hume's Causal Reconstruction of the Perceptual Relativity Argument in Treatise 1.4. Dialogue 48 (1):77.
    ABSTRACT: In Treatise 1.4.4, on behalf of modern philosophers, Hume described a causal argument that shows that our impressions of secondary qualities do not resemble qualities of objects themselves. However, in their respective arguments, Hume’s philosophical predecessors did not argue causally, but appealed to contrary qualities. I argue that Hume’s presentation was not simply a “gratuitous” stylistic difference, but an important correction of his predecessors in light of his own philosophical discoveries. RÉSUMÉ : Dans le Traité 1.4.4, Hume (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  20.  3
    A. C. Ewing, R. I. Aaron & D. MacNabb (1945). Symposium: The Causal Argument for Physical Objects. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 19 (1):32 - 100.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. A. C. Ewing, R. I. Aaron & D. Macnabb (1945). The Causal Argument for Physical Objects. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 19:32-100.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22.  54
    Christopher Evan Franklin (2014). Event-Causal Libertarianism, Functional Reduction, and the Disappearing Agent Argument. Philosophical Studies 170 (3):413-432.
    Event-causal libertarians maintain that an agent’s freely bringing about a choice is reducible to states and events involving him bringing about the choice. Agent-causal libertarians demur, arguing that free will requires that the agent be irreducibly causally involved. Derk Pereboom and Meghan Griffith have defended agent-causal libertarianism on this score, arguing that since on event-causal libertarianism an agent’s contribution to his choice is exhausted by the causal role of states and events involving him, and since (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  23.  55
    Kengo Miyazono & Lisa Bortolotti (2015). The Causal Role Argument Against Doxasticism About Delusions. Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (3):30-50.
    In this paper we consider an argument that is very influential in the philosophical literature, the argument from causal role against the view that delusions are beliefs. The argument has two premises, that many delusions fail to play belief-roles and that playing belief-roles is necessary for a mental state to be a belief. We assess both premises and suggest that they can be resisted.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  24.  33
    Christopher Hitchcock (2012). Theories of Causation and the Causal Exclusion Argument. Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (5-6):5-6.
    There are a wide variety of theories of causation available in the philosophical literature. For the philosopher working in philosophy of mind, who makes use of causal concepts, what is to be made of this embarrassment of riches? By considering a variety of theoretical perspectives, she can discover which principles or assumptions about causation are robust, and which hold only within particular frameworks. In particular, she should be suspicious when the different premises in an argument can only be (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  25.  25
    Doren A. Recker (1987). Causal Efficacy: The Structure of Darwin's Argument Strategy in the Origin of Species. Philosophy of Science 54 (2):147-175.
    There are several interpretations of the argument structure of Darwin's Origin of Species, representing Covering-Law, Inference-to-the-Best-Explanation, and (more recently) Semantic models. I argue that while all three types of interpretation enjoy some textual support, none succeeds in capturing the overall strategy of the Origin, consistent with Darwin's claim that it is 'one long argument'. I provide detailed criticisms of all three current models, and then offer an alternative interpretation based on the view that there are three main (...) strategies in the Origin, all supporting the 'causal efficacy' of Darwin's theory. This interpretation provides both a more unified treatment of the text, and some important implications concerning the relation between general philosophical models of scientific theory support and specific historical cases. (shrink)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  26.  67
    Steven L. Reynolds (2003). The Model Theoretic Argument, Indirect Realism, and the Causal Theory of Reference Objection. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (2):146-154.
    Abstract: Hilary Putnam has reformulated his model-theoretic argument as an argument against indirect realism in the philosophy of perception. This new argument is reviewed and defended. Putnam’s new focus on philosophical theories of perception (instead of metaphysical realism) makes better sense of his previous responses to the objection from the causal theory of reference. It is argued that the model-theoretic argument can also be construed as an argument that holders of a causal theory (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27.  24
    Roger Stanev (2009). Epidemiologic Causation: Jerome Cornfield’s Argument for a Causal Connection Between Smoking and Lung Cancer. Humana.Mente 9:59-66.
    A central issue confronting both philosophers and practitioners in formulating an analysis of causation is the question of what constitutes evidence for a causal association. From the 1950s onward, the biostatistician Jerome Cornfield put himself at the center of a controversial debate over whether cigarette smoking was a causative factor in the incidence of lung cancer. Despite criticisms from distinguished statisticians such as Fisher, Berkson and Neyman, Cornfield argued that a review of the scientific evidence supported the conclusion of (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28.  61
    Graham Oppy (2010). The Shape of Causal Reality: A Naturalistic Adaptation of O’Connor’s Cosmological Argument. Philosophia Christi 12 (2):281-288.
    This paper is a companion to an article that I published in *Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion*. The OSPR discusses the third chapter of Tim O'Connor's *Theism and Ultimate Explanation. This paper discusses a range of other issues that are not picked up in the OSPR discussion.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29. Sven Walter (2008). The Supervenience Argument, Overdetermination, and Causal Drainage: Assessing Kim's Master Argument. Philosophical Psychology 21 (5):673 – 696.
    This paper examines Jaegwon Kim's Supervenience Argument (SA) against nonreductive physicalism, concentrating on Kim's response to two of the most important objections against the SA: First, the Overdetermination Argument, according to which Kim has no convincing argument against the possibility that mental causation might be a case of genuine or systematic overdetermination; second, the Generalization Argument, according to which the SA would entail that causation at any level gives way to causation at the next lower level, (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  30. Scott R. Sehon (2000). An Argument Against the Causal Theory of Action Explanation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):67-85.
    It is widely held that belief explanations of action are a species of causal explanation. This paper argues against the causal construal of action explanation. It first defends the claim that unless beliefs are brain states, beliefs cannot causally explain behavior. Second, the paper argues against the view that beliefs are brain states. It follows from these claims that beliefs do not causally explain behavior. An alternative account is then proposed, according to which action explanation is teleological rather (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  31.  75
    J. Ismael (2003). Closed Causal Loops and the Bilking Argument. Synthese 136 (3):305 - 320.
    The most potentially powerful objection to the possibility oftime travel stems from the fact that it can, under the right conditions, give rise to closedcausal loops, and closed causal loops can be turned into self-defeating causal chains;folks killing their infant selves, setting out to destroy the world before they were born,and the like. It used to be thought that such chains present paradoxes; the receivedwisdom nowadays is that they give rise to physical anomalies in the form of inexplicably (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  32.  19
    Richard Sharvy (1986). Plato's Causal Logic and the Third Man Argument. Noûs 20 (4):507-530.
    (1) anything that fs does so because it participates in the f itself. (2) it is impossible that: a form phi fs because phi participates in phi. (3) the f itself fs. These are inconsistent all right, but (1) is not a doctrine of the theory of forms, and (2) is neither reasonable nor held by plato! but the tma does not involve any of these three. Rather, the tma is aimed at (4) anything that fs does so (a) because (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  33. James M. Humber (1974). Causal Necessity and the Ontological Argument: JAMES M. HUMBER. Religious Studies 10 (3):291-300.
    The ontological argument appears in a multiplicity of forms. Over the past ten or twelve years, however, the philosophical community seems to have been concerned principally with those versions of the proof which claim that God is a necessary being. In contemporary literature, Professors Malcolm and Hartshorne have been the chief advocates of this view, both men holding that God must be conceived as a necessary being and that, as a result, his existence is able to be demonstrated a (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. Ted A. Warfield (2000). Causal Determinism and Human Freedom Are Incompatible: A New Argument for Incompatibilism. Philosophical Perspectives 14 (s14):167-180.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   18 citations  
  35. Ryan Wasserman, John Hawthorne & Mark Scala (2004). Recombination, Causal Constraints, and Humean Supervenience: An Argument for Temporal Parts? In Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics. OUP Oxford
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  36. Richard Sharvy (1987). Erratum: Plato's Causal Logic and the Third Man Argument. Noûs 21 (3):455 -.
  37. Sven Walter (2006). Causal Exclusion as an Argument Against Non-Reductive Physicalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):67-83.
  38. Øistein Schmidt Galaaen, The Disturbing Matter of Downward Causation: A Study of the Exclusion Argument and its Causal-Explanatory Presuppositions.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39.  10
    Jimmy Alfonso Licon (2012). Another Argument for Animalism: The Argument From Causal Powers. Prolegomena 11 (2):169-180.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  40.  21
    Matthew Stuart Piper (2012). You Can't Eat Causal Cake with an Abstract Fork: An Argument Against Computational Theories of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (11-12):154-90.
    Two of the most important concepts in contemporary philosophy of mind are computation and consciousness. This paper explores whether there is a strong relationship between these concepts in the following sense: is a computational theory of consciousness possible? That is, is the right kind of computation sufficient for the instantiation of consciousness. In this paper, I argue that the abstract nature of computational processes precludes computations from instantiating the concrete properties constitutive of consciousness. If this is correct, then not only (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41.  30
    Daniel von Wachter (2006). Why the Argument From Causal Closure Against the Existence of Immaterial Things is Bad. In H. J. Koskinen, R. Vilkko & S. PhilströM. (eds.), Science - a Challenge to Philosophy? Peter Lang 113-124.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42. Lawrence Nolan & Alan Nelson (2006). To a Reader Voyaging Through the Meditations for the First Time, Descartes' Proofs for the Existence of God Can Seem Daunting, Especially the Argument of Meditation III, with its Appeal to Causal Principles That Seem Arcane, and to Medieval Doctrines About Different Modes of Being and Degrees of Reality. First-Time Readers Are Not Alone in Feeling Bewildered. Many Commentators Have Had the Same Reaction. In an Attempt at Charity, Some of Them Have Tried to Tame the Complexity of Descartes' Discussion by .. [REVIEW] In Stephen Gaukroger (ed.), Blackwell Guide to Descartes’ Meditations. Wiley-Blackwell 2--104.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43.  10
    Alice Gb ter Meulen (2008). Agency, Argument Structure, and Causal Inference. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (6):728-729.
    Logically, weighting is transitive, but similarity is not, so clustering cannot be either. Entailments must help a child to review attribute lists more efficiently. Children's understanding of exceptions to generic claims precedes their ability to articulate explanations. So agency, as enabling constraint, may show coherent covariation with attributes, as mere extensional, observable effect of intensional entailments.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44.  8
    Robert D. Hughes (1975). Descartes' Ontological Argument as Not Identical to the Causal Arguments. New Scholasticism 49 (4):473-485.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  45.  18
    Barry Miller (1982). Necessarily Terminating Causal Series and the Contingency Argument. Mind 91 (362):201-215.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46. Ted A. Warfield (2000). Causal Determinism and Human Freedom Are Incompatible: A New Argument for Incompatibilism. Noûs 34 (s14):167-180.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  47.  10
    James M. Humber (1970). Descartes' Ontological Argument as Non-Causal. New Scholasticism 44 (3):449-459.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48.  3
    James M. Humber (1974). Causal Necessity and the Ontological Argument. Religious Studies 10 (3):291 - 300.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49.  2
    Alice G. B. ter Meulen (2008). Agency, Argument Structure, and Causal Inference. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (6):728-729.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50. E. Carlson (2005). Causal Determinism and Human Freedom Are Incompatible: A New Argument for Incompatibilism (Vol 14, Pg 167, 2000). Philosophia 32 (1-4):443-448.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 1000