Search results for 'Causal closure' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Justin Tiehen (2015). Explaining Causal Closure. Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2405-2425.
    The physical realm is causally closed, according to physicalists like me. But why is it causally closed, what metaphysically explains causal closure? I argue that reductive physicalists are committed to one explanation of causal closure to the exclusion of any independent explanation, and that as a result, they must give up on using a causal argument to attack mind–body dualism. Reductive physicalists should view dualism in much the way that we view the hypothesis that unicorns (...)
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  2. Robert K. Garcia (2014). Closing in on Causal Closure. Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (1-2):96-109.
    I examine the meaning and merits of a premise in the Exclusion Argument, the causal closure principle that all physical effects have physical causes. I do so by addressing two questions. First, if we grant the other premises, exactly what kind of closure principle is required to make the Exclusion Argument valid? Second, what are the merits of the requisite closure principle? Concerning the first, I argue that the Exclusion Argument requires a strong, “stringently pure” version (...)
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  3. Justin Tiehen (2015). Grounding Causal Closure. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3).
    What does it mean to say that mind-body dualism is causally problematic in a way that other mind-body theories, such as the psychophysical type identity theory, are not? After considering and rejecting various proposals, I advance my own, which focuses on what grounds the causal closure of the physical realm. A metametaphysical implication of my proposal is that philosophers working without the notion of grounding in their toolkit are metaphysically impoverished. They cannot do justice to the thought, encountered (...)
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    Justin Tiehen (2015). Grounding Causal Closure. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    What does it mean to say that mind-body dualism is causally problematic in a way that other mind-body theories, such as the psychophysical type identity theory, are not? After considering and rejecting various proposals, I advance my own, which focuses on what grounds the causal closure of the physical realm. A metametaphysical implication of my proposal is that philosophers working without the notion of grounding in their toolkit are metaphysically impoverished. They cannot do justice to the thought, encountered (...)
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  5. Daniel von Wachter (2006). Why the Argument From Causal Closure Against the Existence of Immaterial Things is Bad. In H. J. Koskinen, R. Vilkko & S. Philström (eds.), Science - A Challenge to Philosophy? Peter Lang
    Some argue for materialism claiming that a physical event cannot have a non-physical cause, or by claiming the 'Principle of Causal Closure' to be true. This I call a 'Sweeping Naturalistic Argument'. This article argues against this. It describes what it would be for a material event to have an immaterial cause.
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    Leigh C. Vicens (2014). Physical Causal Closure and Non-Coincidental Mental Causation. Philosophia 42 (1):201-207.
    In his book Personal Agency, E. J. Lowe has argued that a dualist theory of mental causation is consistent with “a fairly strong principle of physical causal closure” and, moreover, that it “has the potential to strengthen our causal explanations of certain physical events.” If Lowe’s reasoning were sound, it would undermine the most common arguments for reductive physicalism or epiphenomenalism of the mental. For it would show not only that a dualist theory of mental causation is (...)
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  7. E. J. Lowe (2000). Causal Closure Principles and Emergentism. Philosophy 75 (294):571-586.
    Causal closure arguments against interactionist dualism are currently popular amongst physicalists. Such an argument appeals to some principles of the causal closure of the physical, together with certain other premises, to conclude that at least some mental events are identical with physical events. However, it is crucial to the success of any such argument that the physical causal closure principle to which it appeals is neither too strong nor too weak by certain standards. In (...)
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    Kevin Morris (2014). Causal Closure, Causal Exclusion, and Supervenience Physicalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (1):72-86.
    This article considers the recent defense of the supervenience approach to physicalism due to Jaegwon Kim. Kim argues that supervenience supports physical causal closure, and that causal closure supports physicalism – indeed, a kind of reductive physicalism – and thus that supervenience suffices for physicalism. After laying out Kim's argument, I ask whether its success would truly vindicate the role of supervenience in defining physicalist positions. I argue that it would not, and that insofar as Kim's (...)
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    Justin Tiehen (2015). Grounding Causal Closure. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    What does it mean to say that mind-body dualism is causally problematic in a way that other mind-body theories, such as the psychophysical type identity theory, are not? After considering and rejecting various proposals, I advance my own, which focuses on what grounds the causal closure of the physical realm. A metametaphysical implication of my proposal is that philosophers working without the notion of grounding in their toolkit are metaphysically impoverished. They cannot do justice to the thought, encountered (...)
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    Justin Tiehen (2015). Grounding Causal Closure. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):n/a-n/a.
    What does it mean to say that mind-body dualism is causally problematic in a way that other mind-body theories, such as the psychophysical type identity theory, are not? After considering and rejecting various proposals, I advance my own, which focuses on what grounds the causal closure of the physical realm. A metametaphysical implication of my proposal is that philosophers working without the notion of grounding in their toolkit are metaphysically impoverished. They cannot do justice to the thought, encountered (...)
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    Justin Tiehen (2015). Grounding Causal Closure. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    What does it mean to say that mind-body dualism is causally problematic in a way that other mind-body theories, such as the psychophysical type identity theory, are not? After considering and rejecting various proposals, I advance my own, which focuses on what grounds the causal closure of the physical realm. A metametaphysical implication of my proposal is that philosophers working without the notion of grounding in their toolkit are metaphysically impoverished. They cannot do justice to the thought, encountered (...)
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    Kile Jones (2008). The Causal Closure of Physics: An Explanation and Critique. World Futures 64 (3):179 – 186.
    Is the physical world causally closed? Can something immaterial have any causal role within physics? This article seeks to answer these questions by explaining the theory of Causal Closure. Causal Closure says that nothing immaterial can have any causal efficacy upon the material world. Physicalists have long held this position and have used it as an argument against Dualism, but does it hold? The hope of this article is that we may better understand the (...)
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    Justin Tiehen (2015). Grounding Causal Closure. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    What does it mean to say that mind-body dualism is causally problematic in a way that other mind-body theories, such as the psychophysical type identity theory, are not? After considering and rejecting various proposals, I advance my own, which focuses on what grounds the causal closure of the physical realm. A metametaphysical implication of my proposal is that philosophers working without the notion of grounding in their toolkit are metaphysically impoverished. They cannot do justice to the thought, encountered (...)
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    Justin Tiehen (2015). Grounding Causal Closure. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    What does it mean to say that mind-body dualism is causally problematic in a way that other mind-body theories, such as the psychophysical type identity theory, are not? After considering and rejecting various proposals, I advance my own, which focuses on what grounds the causal closure of the physical realm. A metametaphysical implication of my proposal is that philosophers working without the notion of grounding in their toolkit are metaphysically impoverished. They cannot do justice to the thought, encountered (...)
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    Justin Tiehen (2015). Grounding Causal Closure. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    What does it mean to say that mind-body dualism is causally problematic in a way that other mind-body theories, such as the psychophysical type identity theory, are not? After considering and rejecting various proposals, I advance my own, which focuses on what grounds the causal closure of the physical realm. A metametaphysical implication of my proposal is that philosophers working without the notion of grounding in their toolkit are metaphysically impoverished. They cannot do justice to the thought, encountered (...)
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    Justin Tiehen (2015). Grounding Causal Closure. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    What does it mean to say that mind-body dualism is causally problematic in a way that other mind-body theories, such as the psychophysical type identity theory, are not? After considering and rejecting various proposals, I advance my own, which focuses on what grounds the causal closure of the physical realm. A metametaphysical implication of my proposal is that philosophers working without the notion of grounding in their toolkit are metaphysically impoverished. They cannot do justice to the thought, encountered (...)
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    Justin Tiehen (2015). Grounding Causal Closure. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    What does it mean to say that mind-body dualism is causally problematic in a way that other mind-body theories, such as the psychophysical type identity theory, are not? After considering and rejecting various proposals, I advance my own, which focuses on what grounds the causal closure of the physical realm. A metametaphysical implication of my proposal is that philosophers working without the notion of grounding in their toolkit are metaphysically impoverished. They cannot do justice to the thought, encountered (...)
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    Justin Tiehen (2015). Grounding Causal Closure. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):n/a-n/a.
    What does it mean to say that mind-body dualism is causally problematic in a way that other mind-body theories, such as the psychophysical type identity theory, are not? After considering and rejecting various proposals, I advance my own, which focuses on what grounds the causal closure of the physical realm. A metametaphysical implication of my proposal is that philosophers working without the notion of grounding in their toolkit are metaphysically impoverished. They cannot do justice to the thought, encountered (...)
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    Justin Tiehen (2015). Grounding Causal Closure. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    What does it mean to say that mind-body dualism is causally problematic in a way that other mind-body theories, such as the psychophysical type identity theory, are not? After considering and rejecting various proposals, I advance my own, which focuses on what grounds the causal closure of the physical realm. A metametaphysical implication of my proposal is that philosophers working without the notion of grounding in their toolkit are metaphysically impoverished. They cannot do justice to the thought, encountered (...)
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    Justin Tiehen (2015). Grounding Causal Closure. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    What does it mean to say that mind-body dualism is causally problematic in a way that other mind-body theories, such as the psychophysical type identity theory, are not? After considering and rejecting various proposals, I advance my own, which focuses on what grounds the causal closure of the physical realm. A metametaphysical implication of my proposal is that philosophers working without the notion of grounding in their toolkit are metaphysically impoverished. They cannot do justice to the thought, encountered (...)
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    Justin Tiehen (2015). Grounding Causal Closure. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    What does it mean to say that mind-body dualism is causally problematic in a way that other mind-body theories, such as the psychophysical type identity theory, are not? After considering and rejecting various proposals, I advance my own, which focuses on what grounds the causal closure of the physical realm. A metametaphysical implication of my proposal is that philosophers working without the notion of grounding in their toolkit are metaphysically impoverished. They cannot do justice to the thought, encountered (...)
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    Justin Tiehen (2015). Grounding Causal Closure. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    What does it mean to say that mind-body dualism is causally problematic in a way that other mind-body theories, such as the psychophysical type identity theory, are not? After considering and rejecting various proposals, I advance my own, which focuses on what grounds the causal closure of the physical realm. A metametaphysical implication of my proposal is that philosophers working without the notion of grounding in their toolkit are metaphysically impoverished. They cannot do justice to the thought, encountered (...)
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    Justin Tiehen (2015). Grounding Causal Closure. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):n/a-n/a.
    What does it mean to say that mind-body dualism is causally problematic in a way that other mind-body theories, such as the psychophysical type identity theory, are not? After considering and rejecting various proposals, I advance my own, which focuses on what grounds the causal closure of the physical realm. A metametaphysical implication of my proposal is that philosophers working without the notion of grounding in their toolkit are metaphysically impoverished. They cannot do justice to the thought, encountered (...)
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    Justin Tiehen (2015). Grounding Causal Closure. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    What does it mean to say that mind-body dualism is causally problematic in a way that other mind-body theories, such as the psychophysical type identity theory, are not? After considering and rejecting various proposals, I advance my own, which focuses on what grounds the causal closure of the physical realm. A metametaphysical implication of my proposal is that philosophers working without the notion of grounding in their toolkit are metaphysically impoverished. They cannot do justice to the thought, encountered (...)
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    Agustín Vicente (2001). El Principio Del Cierre Causal Del Mundo Físico (The Priniciple of the Causal Closure of the Physical World). Critica 33 (99):3 - 17.
    Cabe argumentar en favor del fisicismo a partir de consideraciones metodológicas o epistémicas, o desde un punto de vista ontológico. En los últimos años se ha venido presentando un potente argumento ontológico que hace un uso esencial de lo que se ha dado en llamar el "principio del cierre causal del mundo físico". En este artículo examino si es posible que sea la propia física quien fundamente este principio. Propongo que, con la ayuda de las contemporáneas teorías reductivas de (...)
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  26.  46
    Barbara Montero (2003). Varieties of Causal Closure. In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic 173-187.
  27. E. J. Lowe (2003). Physical Causal Closure and the Invisibility of Mental Causation. In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic 137-154.
     
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  28.  26
    Sophie Gibb (2015). The Causal Closure Principle. Philosophical Quarterly 65 (261):626-647.
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  29. David Papineau (2009). The Causal Closure of the Physical and Naturalism. In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. OUP Oxford
     
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  30.  78
    Micah Sparacio (2002). Mental Realism: Rejecting the Causal Closure Thesis and Expanding Our Physical Ontology. Pcid 2 (3-8).
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  31.  32
    Daniel von Wachter (2006). Why the Argument From Causal Closure Against the Existence of Immaterial Things is Bad. In H. J. Koskinen, R. Vilkko & S. PhilströM. (eds.), Science - a Challenge to Philosophy? Peter Lang 113-124.
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  32.  1
    Daniel von Wachter, Why the Argument From Causal Closure Against the Existence of Immaterial Things is Bad.
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  33. V. Reppert (2001). Causal Closure, Mechanism, and Rational Inference. Philosophia Christi 3 (2):473-83.
     
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  34. Agustín Vicente (2006). On the Causal Completeness of Physics. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 20 (2):149 – 171.
    According to an increasing number of authors, the best, if not the only, argument in favour of physicalism is the so-called 'overdetermination argument'. This argument, if sound, establishes that all the entities that enter into causal interactions with the physical world are physical. One key premise in the overdetermination argument is the principle of the causal closure of the physical world, said to be supported by contemporary physics. In this paper, I examine various ways in which physics (...)
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  35. Uwe Meixner (2009). Three Indications for the Existence of God in Causal Metaphysics. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 66 (1):33 - 46.
    With the emergence of modern physics a conflict became apparent between the Principle of Sufficient Cause and the Principle of Physical Causal Closure. Though these principles are not logically incompatible, they could no longer be considered to be both true; one of them had to be false. The present paper makes use of this seldom noticed conflict to argue on the basis of considerations of comparative rationality for the truth of causal statements that have at least some (...)
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  36.  32
    Robert C. Bishop (2012). Excluding the Causal Exclusion Argument Against Non-Redirective Physicalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (5-6):57-74.
    A much discussed argument in the philosophy of mind against non-reductive physicalism leads to the conclusion that all genuine causes involved in mental phenomena must be reductive physical causes. The latter ostensibly exclude any other causes from having genuine effects in human thought and behaviour. Jaegwon Kim has been the chief exponent of this line of argument, calling it variously the causal exclusion argument or the supervenience argument against non-reductive physicalism. I will analyse this argument and show that some (...)
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  37.  15
    Matteo Mossio (2013). Closure, Causal. In W. Dubitzky O. Wolkenhauer & K. Cho H. Yokota (eds.), Encyclopedia of Systems Biology. Springer 415-418.
    Entry of the Encyclopedia of Systems Biology.
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  38.  63
    Brad Weslake (forthcoming). Difference-Making, Closure and Exclusion. In Helen Beebee, Christopher Hitchcock & Huw Price (eds.), Making a Difference. Oxford University Press
    Consider the following causal exclusion principle: For all distinct properties F and F* such that F* supervenes on F, F and F* do not both cause a property G. Peter Menzies and Christian List have proven that it follows from a natural conception of causation as difference-making that this exclusion principle is not generally true. Rather, it turns out that whether the principle is true is a contingent matter. In addition, they have shown that in a wide range of (...)
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  39.  58
    Tuomas K. Pernu (2013). The Principle of Causal Exclusion Does Not Make Sense. Philosophical Forum 44 (1):89-95.
    The principle of causal exclusion is based on two distinct causal notions: causal sufficiency and causation simpliciter. The principle suggests that the former has the power to exclude the latter. But that is problematic since it would amount to claiming that sufficient causes alone can take the roles of causes simpliciter. Moreover, the principle also assumes that events can sometimes have both sufficient causes and causes simpliciter. This assumption is in conflict with the first part of the (...)
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  40.  53
    Ralph D. Ellis (2014). Enactivism and the New Teleology: Reconciling the Warring Camps. Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (2):173-198.
    Enactivism has the potential to provide a sense of teleology in purpose-directed action, but without violating the principles of efficient causation. Action can be distinguished from mere reaction by virtue of the fact that some systems are self-organizing. Self-organization in the brain is reflected in neural plasticity, and also in the primacy of motivational processes that initiate the release of neurotransmitters necessary for mental and conscious functions, and which guide selective attention processes. But in order to flesh out the enactivist (...)
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  41. Simon Prosser (2012). Emergent Causation. Philosophical Studies 159 (1):21-39.
    Downward causation is commonly held to create problems for ontologically emergent properties. In this paper I describe two novel examples of ontologically emergent properties and show how they avoid two main problems of downward causation, the causal exclusion problem and the causal closure problem. One example involves an object whose colour does not logically supervene on the colours of its atomic parts. The other example is inspired by quantum entanglement cases but avoids controversies regarding quantum mechanics. These (...)
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  42.  23
    Andrew Melnyk (2003). Some Evidence for Physicalism. In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic 155-172.
    This paper presents an irreducibly inductive argument for physicalism based on the causal closure of the physical (for which it argues), and defends it against various detractors.
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  43.  3
    Charles Taliaferro (2015). Abstract Objects and Causation: Bringing Causation Back Into Contemporary Platonism. Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 71 (4):769-780.
    Resumo O autor defenderá, por um lado, a existência dos objectos abstractos e, por outro, o seu papel causal, numa ontologia platónica, tal como enquadrada por Roderick Chisholm. Se plausível, a natureza e o papel dos abstracta sob a forma de estados de coisas, oferecem-nos razões para acreditar em uma descrição bem-sucedida e explicativa da intencionalidade humana e animal que não está encerrada no mundo físico. Palavras-chave : causalidade, encerramento causal, fisicalismo, objectos abstractos, platonismo, Roderick ChisholmA defense of (...)
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    Gustavo Fernández Acevedo (2003). ¿Puede un dualismo naturalista resolver el problema de la ineficacia causal de lo mental? Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 28 (2):285-303.
    In this article I defend two theses related to the ontology of the mind and the conception of explanatory levels supposed by evolutionary psychology. First, that the theory of mind adopted by this program can not remove all dualist remnant and present an acceptable picture of mind-body relationship. Second, that the difficulties presented by the ontological hypothesis, in addition to certain plausible theses on the explanatory compatibility, reduce in wide measure the attractiveness of pluralism of levels defended.
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  45. Alyssa Ney (2016). Microphysical Causation and the Case for Physicalism. Analytic Philosophy 57 (1):141-164.
    Physicalism is sometimes portrayed by its critics as a dogma, but there is an empirical argument for the position, one based on the accumulation of diverse microphysical causal explanations in physics, chemistry, and physiology. The canonical statement of this argument was presented in 2001 by David Papineau. The goal of this paper is to demonstrate a tension that arises between this way of understanding the empirical case for physicalism and a view that is becoming practically a received position in (...)
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  46. David Yates (2009). Emergence, Downwards Causation and the Completeness of Physics. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):110 - 131.
    The 'completeness of physics' is the key premise in the causal argument for physicalism. Standard formulations of it fail to rule out emergent downwards causation. I argue that it must do this if it is tare in a valid causal argument for physicalism. Drawing on the notion of conferring causal power, I formulate a suitable principle, 'strong completeness'. I investigate the metaphysical implications of distinguishing this principle from emergent downwards causation, and I argue that categoricalist accounts of (...)
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  47.  8
    Todd Jones (2004). Reduction and Anti-Reduction: Rights and Wrongs. Metaphilosophy 25 (5):614-647.
    Scholars are divided as to whether reduction should be a central strategy for understanding the world. While reductive analysis is the standard mode of explanation in many areas of science and everyday life, many consider reductionism a sign of “intellectual naivete and backwardness.” In this paper I make three points about the proper status of anti-reductionism: First, reduction, is, in fact, a centrally important epistemic strategy. Second, reduction to physics is always possible for all causal properties. Third, there are, (...)
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  48.  70
    Susan L. Feagin (2007). On Noël Carroll on Narrative Closure. Philosophical Studies 135 (1):17 - 25.
    This paper examines various claims by Noël Carroll about narrative closure and its relationship to narrative connections, which are, roughly, causal connections generously conceived to include necessary conditions for sufficient conditions for an effect. I propose supplementing the expanded notion of a cause with Michael Bratman’s notion of a psychological connection to account for the particular role that human agents play in narratives. A novel and a film are used as examples to illustrate how the concept of a (...)
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  49. Henry P. Stapp (2006). Quantum Interactive Dualism, II: The Libet and Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Causal Anomalies. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 65 (1):117-142.
    b>: Replacing faulty nineteenth century physics by its orthodox quantum successor converts the earlier materialist conception of nature to a structure that does not enforce the principle of the causal closure of the physical. The quantum laws possess causal gaps, and these gaps are filled in actual scientific practice by inputs from our streams of consciousness. The form of the quantum laws permits and suggests the existence of an underlying reality that is built not on substances, but (...)
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  50. Robert C. Bishop (2006). The Hidden Premise in the Causal Argument for Physicalism. Analysis 66 (289):44-52.
    The causal argument for physicalism is anayzed and it's key premise--the causal closure of physics--is found wanting. Therefore, a hidden premise must be added to the argument to gain its conclusion, but the hidden premise is indistinguishable from the conclusion of the causal argument. Therefore, it begs the question on physicalism.
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