Search results for 'Causal loops' (try it on Scholar)

  1.  99
    U. Meyer (2012). Explaining Causal Loops. Analysis 72 (2):259-264.
    This article argues that the causal loops that occur in some time-travel scenarios and in certain solutions of the theory of relativity are no more mysterious than the infinitely descending causal chains familiar from Newtonian mechanics.
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  2. Bradley Monton (2007). Time Travel Without Causal Loops. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):54-67.
    I argue that time travel can occur without causal loops.
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  3. Richard Hanley (2004). No End in Sight: Causal Loops in Philosophy, Physics and Fiction. Synthese 141 (1):123 - 152.
    There have been many objections to the possibility oftime travel. But all the truly interesting ones concern the possibility of reversecausation. What is objectionable about reverse causation? I diagnose that the trulyinteresting objections are to a further possibility: that of causal loops. I raisedoubts about whether there must be causal loops if reverse causation obtains; but devote themajority of the paper to describing, and dispelling concerns about, various kinds ofcausal loop. In short, I argue that they (...)
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  4.  71
    J. Ismael (2003). Closed Causal Loops and the Bilking Argument. Synthese 136 (3):305 - 320.
    The most potentially powerful objection to the possibility oftime travel stems from the fact that it can, under the right conditions, give rise to closedcausal loops, and closed causal loops can be turned into self-defeating causal chains;folks killing their infant selves, setting out to destroy the world before they were born,and the like. It used to be thought that such chains present paradoxes; the receivedwisdom nowadays is that they give rise to physical anomalies in the form (...)
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  5.  50
    J. Berkovitz (2001). On Chance in Causal Loops. Mind 110 (437):1-23.
    A common line of argument for the impossibility of closed causal loops is that they would involve causal paradoxes. The usual reply is that such loops impose heavy consistency constraints on the nature of causal connections in them; constraints that are overlooked by the impossibility arguments. Hugh Mellor has maintained that arguments for the possibility of causal loops also overlook some constraints, which are related to the chances (single-case, objective probabilities) that causes give (...)
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  6.  40
    Phil Dowe (2001). Causal Loops and the Independence of Causal Facts. Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2001 (3):S89-.
    According to Hugh Mellor in Real Time II (1998, Ch. 12), assuming the logical independence of causal facts and the 'law of large numbers', causal loops are impossible because if they were possible they would produce inconsistent sets of frequencies. I clarify the argument, and argue that it would be preferable to abandon the relevant independence assumption in the case of causal loops.
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  7. Joseph Berkovitz (2002). On Causal Loops in the Quantum Realm. In T. Placek & J. Butterfield (eds.), Non-Locality and Modality. Kluwer 235--257.
  8.  71
    Douglas Ehring (1986). Closed Causal Loops, Single Causes, and Asymmetry. Analysis 46 (1):33 - 35.
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  9.  52
    Susan Weir (1988). Closed Time and Causal Loops: A Defence Against Mellor. Analysis 48 (4):203 - 209.
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  10. Phil Dowe (2001). Causal Loops and the Independence of Causal Facts. Philosophy of Science 68 (S3):S89-S97.
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  11. J. Ismael (2004). Closed Causal Loops and the Bilking Argument. Synthese 136 (3):305-320.
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  12.  12
    Paul Schuurman (2013). Determinism and Causal Feedback Loops in Montesquieu's Explanations for the Military Rise and Fall of Rome. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (3):507-528.
    Montesquieu's Considérations sur les causes de la grandeur des Romains et de leur décadence (1733/1734) is a methodological exercise in causal explanation on the meso-level applied to the subject of the military rise and fall of Rome. Rome is described as a system with contingent initial conditions that have a strong path-determining effect. Contingent and plastic initial configurations become highly determining in their subsequent operation, thanks to self-reinforcing feedback loops. Montesquieu's method seems influenced by the ruthless commitment to (...)
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  13.  43
    Benoni B. Edin (2008). Assigning Biological Functions: Making Sense of Causal Chains. Synthese 161 (2):203 - 218.
    A meaningful distinction can be made between functions and mere effects in biological systems without resorting to teleological arguments: (i) biological systems must cope with a multitude of problems or they will cease to exist; (ii) the solutions to these problems invariably depend on circular causal chains (“feedback loops”); and (iii) biological functions are attributes of elements in biological systems that have an effect which, by contributing to the correcting behavior of a feedback control system, assists in solving (...)
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  14. Peter Eldridge-Smith (2007). Paradoxes and Hypodoxes of Time Travel. In Jan Lloyd Jones, Paul Campbell & Peter Wylie (eds.), Art and Time. Australian Scholarly Publishing 172--189.
    I distinguish paradoxes and hypodoxes among the conundrums of time travel. I introduce ‘hypodoxes’ as a term for seemingly consistent conundrums that seem to be related to various paradoxes, as the Truth-teller is related to the Liar. In this article, I briefly compare paradoxes and hypodoxes of time travel with Liar paradoxes and Truth-teller hypodoxes. I also discuss Lewis’ treatment of time travel paradoxes, which I characterise as a Laissez Faire theory of time travel. Time travel paradoxes are impossible according (...)
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  15.  34
    Peter Gärdenfors (1990). An Epistemic Analysis of Explanations and Causal Beliefs. Topoi 9 (2):109-124.
    The analyses of explanation and causal beliefs are heavily dependent on using probability functions as models of epistemic states. There are, however, several aspects of beliefs that are not captured by such a representation and which affect the outcome of the analyses. One dimension that has been neglected in this article is the temporal aspect of the beliefs. The description of a single event naturally involves the time it occurred. Some analyses of causation postulate that the cause must not (...)
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  16.  17
    Igor Hanzel (2012). Causation, Principle of Common Cause and Theoretical Explanation: Wesley C. Salmon and G. W. F. Hegel. [REVIEW] Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 43 (1):29-44.
    The aim of this article is to analyze the main contributions of Wesley C. Salmon to the philosophy of science, that is, his concepts of causation, common cause, and theoretical explanation, and to provide a critique of them. This critique will be based on a comparison of Salmon's concepts with categories developed by Hegel in his Science of Logic, and which can be applied to the issues treated by Salmon by means of the above given three concepts. It is the (...)
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  17.  17
    S. Orestis Palermos (2014). Loops, Constitution and Cognitive Extension. Cognitive Systems Research 27:25-41.
    The ‘causal-constitution’ fallacy, the ‘cognitive bloat’ worry, and the persisting theoretical confusion about the fundamental difference between the hypotheses of embedded (HEMC) and extended (HEC) cognition are three interrelated worries, whose common point—and the problem they accentuate—is the lack of a principled criterion of constitution. Attempting to address the ‘causal-constitution’ fallacy, mathematically oriented philosophers of mind have previously suggested that the presence of non-linear relations between the inner and the outer contributions is sufficient for cognitive extension. The abstract (...)
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  18.  19
    Eric B. Dent (2003). The Interactional Model: An Alternative to the Direct Cause and Effect Construct for Mutually Causal Organizational Phenomena. [REVIEW] Foundations of Science 8 (3):295-314.
    It is time that we in organization sciencesdevelop and implement a new mental model forcause and effect relationships. The dominantmodel in research dates at least to the 1700sand no longer serves the full purposes of thesocial science research problems of the21st century. Traditionally, research is``essentially concerned with two-variableproblems, linear causal trains, one cause andone effect, or with few variables at the most''. However, theliterature is replete with examples ofphenomena in which the traditional cause andeffect construct does not allow for (...)
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  19.  15
    Michael A. E. Dummett (1993). The Seas of Language. Oxford University Press.
    Michael Dummett is a leading contemporary philosopher whose work on the logic and metaphysics of language has had a lasting influence on how these subjects are conceived and discussed. This volume contains some of the most provocative and widely discussed essays published in the last fifteen years, together with a number of unpublished or inaccessible writings. Essays included are: "What is a Theory of Meaning?," "What do I Know When I Know a Language?," "What Does the Appeal to Use Do (...)
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  20. William Grey (1999). Troubles with Time Travel. Philosophy 74 (1):55-70.
    Talk about time travel is puzzling even if it isn't obviously contradictory. Philosophers however are divided about whether time travel involves empirical paradox or some deeper metaphysical incoherence. It is suggested that time travel requires a Parmenidean four-dimensionalist metaphysical conception of the world in time. The possibility of time travel is addressed (mainly) from within a Parmenidean metaphysical framework, which is accepted by David Lewis in his defence of the coherence of time travel. It is argued that time travel raises (...)
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  21.  74
    Heather Dyke (2005). The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Time Travel. Think 9 (9):43-52.
    This paper examines various philosophical arguments to do with time travel. It argues that time travel has not been shown to be logically impossible. It then considers whether time travel would give rise to improbable strings of coincidences, or closed causal loops. Finally, it considers whether we could ever be justified in believing someone who claimed to be a time traveller, or whether we would always be more justified in believing that the claimant was either deluded or trying (...)
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  22. Bradley Monton (2003). Presentists Can Believe in Closed Timelike Curves. Analysis 63 (3):199–202.
    Presentists believe that only presently existing things exist. In a Newtonian framework of three spatial dimensions, for example, presentists would say that all that exists is a three-dimensional spatial manifold, and the events in that manifold change with time. Eternalists, by contrast, believe that past, present, and future things all exist. In the Newtonian framework, eternalists believe in a four-dimensional space-time manifold, where events are scattered throughout this four-dimensional ‘block universe’. It is often thought that presentism is incompatible with time (...)
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  23.  37
    Michael D. Robinson (2004). Divine Providence, Simple Foreknowledge, and the ‘Metaphysical Principle’. Religious Studies 40 (4):471-483.
    In this essay, I challenge David P. Hunt's defence of the utility of simple foreknowledge for divine providence against the ‘Metaphysical Principle’. This principle asserts that circular causal loops are impossible. Hunt agrees with this principle but maintains that so long as the deity does not use simple foreknowledge in such a way that causal loops unfold, the Metaphysical Principle in not violated. I argue that Hunt's position still allows for the possibility of such causal (...)
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  24.  19
    Chris Dalton (2014). Beyond Description to Pattern. Journal of Critical Realism 13 (2):163-182.
    This paper proposes a limitation to epistemological claims to theory building prevalent in critical realist research. While accepting the basic ontological and epistemological positions of the perspective as developed by Roy Bhaskar, it is argued that application in social science has relied on sociological concepts to explain the underlying generative mechanisms, and that in many cases this has been subject to the effects of an anthropocentric constraint. A novel contribution to critical realist research comes from the work and ideas of (...)
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  25.  15
    Aaron Sloman (1996). Beyond Turing Equivalence. In Peter Millican Andy Clark (ed.), Machines and Thought The Legacy of Alan Turing. Oxford University Press 1--179.
    What is the relation between intelligence and computation? Although the difficulty of defining `intelligence' is widely recognized, many are unaware that it is hard to give a satisfactory definition of `computational' if computation is supposed to provide a non-circular explanation for intelligent abilities. The only well-defined notion of `computation' is what can be generated by a Turing machine or a formally equivalent mechanism. This is not adequate for the key role in explaining the nature of mental processes, because it is (...)
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  26.  3
    Márta Somogyvári (2013). The Costs of Organisational Injustice in the Hungarian Health Care System. Journal of Business Ethics 118 (3):543-560.
    The new Hungarian Labour Code allows informal payments to be accepted, subject only to the prior permission of the employer. In Hungary, the area most affected is Health Care, where informal payments to medical staff are common. The article assesses the practice on ethical terms, focusing on organisational justice. It includes an analysis of distributional injustice, that is, of non-equitable payments to professionals, on the distribution of payments depending on the specialisation and status of the doctor, on his or her (...)
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  27. Iulian D. Toader (2015). Against Harmony: Infinite Idealizations and Causal Explanation. In Iulian D. Toader, Gabriel Sandu & Ilie Pȃrvu (eds.), Romanian Studies in Philosophy of Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, Vol. 313, 291-301.
    This paper discusses the idea that some of the causal factors that are responsible for the production of a natural phenomenon are explanatorily irrelevant and, thus, may be omitted or distorted. It argues against Craig Callender’s suggestion that the standard explanation of phase transitions in statistical mechanics may be considered a causal explanation, in Michael Strevens’ sense, as a distortion that can nevertheless successfully represent causal relations.
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  28. Jonathan Phillips & Alex Shaw (2014). Manipulating Morality: Third‐Party Intentions Alter Moral Judgments by Changing Causal Reasoning. Cognitive Science 38 (8):1320-1347.
    The present studies investigate how the intentions of third parties influence judgments of moral responsibility for other agents who commit immoral acts. Using cases in which an agent acts under some situational constraint brought about by a third party, we ask whether the agent is blamed less for the immoral act when the third party intended for that act to occur. Study 1 demonstrates that third-party intentions do influence judgments of blame. Study 2 finds that third-party intentions only influence moral (...)
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  29. Ulrike Hahn, Frank Zenker & Roland Bluhm (forthcoming). Causal Argument. In Michael R. Waldmann (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Causal Reasoning. Oxford University Press
    In this chapter, we outline the range of argument forms involving causation that can be found in everyday discourse. We also survey empirical work concerned with the generation and evaluation of such arguments. This survey makes clear that there is presently no unified body of research concerned with causal argument. We highlight the benefits of a unified treatment both for those interested in causal cognition and those interested in argumentation, and identify the key challenges that must be met (...)
     
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  30.  33
    Adam Bales (forthcoming). The Pauper’s Problem: Chance, Foreknowledge and Causal Decision Theory. Philosophical Studies (6):1-20.
    In a letter to Wlodek Rabinowicz, David Lewis introduced a decision scenario that he described as “much more problematic for decision theory than the Newcomb Problems”. This scenario, which involves an agent with foreknowledge of the outcome of some chance process, has received little subsequent attention. However, in one of the small number of discussions of such cases, Huw Price's Causation, Chance and the Rational Significance of Supernatural Evidence it has been argued that cases of this sort pose serious problems (...)
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  31.  82
    Holly Andersen (forthcoming). Complements, Not Competitors: Causal and Mathematical Explanations. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    A finer-grained delineation of a given explanandum reveals a nexus of closely related causal and non- causal explanations, complementing one another in ways that yield further explanatory traction on the phenomenon in question. By taking a narrower construal of what counts as a causal explanation, a new class of distinctively mathematical explanations pops into focus; Lange’s characterization of distinctively mathematical explanations can be extended to cover these. This new class of distinctively mathematical explanations is illustrated with the (...)
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  32. Caleb Cohoe (2013). There Must Be A First: Why Thomas Aquinas Rejects Infinite, Essentially Ordered, Causal Series. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (5):838 - 856.
    Several of Thomas Aquinas's proofs for the existence of God rely on the claim that causal series cannot proceed in infinitum. I argue that Aquinas has good reason to hold this claim given his conception of causation. Because he holds that effects are ontologically dependent on their causes, he holds that the relevant causal series are wholly derivative: the later members of such series serve as causes only insofar as they have been caused by and are effects (...)
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  33.  17
    Finnur Dellsén (forthcoming). There May Yet Be Non-Causal Explanations. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie:1-8.
    There are many putative counterexamples to the view that all scientific explanations are causal explanations. Using a new theory of what it is to be a causal explanation, Bradford Skow has recently argued that several of the putative counterexamples fail to be non-causal. This paper defends some of the counterexamples by showing how Skow’s argument relies on an overly permissive theory of causal explanations.
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  34.  16
    Matt Farr, Review of Mathias Frisch's Causal Reasoning in Physics. [REVIEW]
    Review of 'Causal Reasoning in Physics' by Mathias Frisch for British Journal for Philosophy of Science.
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  35.  43
    Alexander Reutlinger (forthcoming). Is There A Monist Theory of Causal and Non-Causal Explanations? The Counterfactual Theory of Scientific Explanation. Philosophy of Science.
    The goal of this paper is to develop a counterfactual theory of explanation. The CTE provides a monist framework for causal and non-causal explanations, according to which both causal and non-causal explanations are explanatory by virtue of revealing counterfactual dependencies between the explanandum and the explanans. I argue that the CTE is applicable to two paradigmatic examples of non-causal explanations: Euler’s explanation and renormalization group explanations of universality.
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  36. Markus E. Schlosser (2014). The Luck Argument Against Event-Causal Libertarianism: It is Here to Stay. Philosophical Studies 167 (2):375-385.
    The luck argument raises a serious challenge for libertarianism about free will. In broad outline, if an action is undetermined, then it appears to be a matter of luck whether or not one performs it. And if it is a matter of luck whether or not one performs an action, then it seems that the action is not performed with free will. This argument is most effective against event-causal accounts of libertarianism. Recently, Franklin (Philosophical Studies 156:199–230, 2011) has defended (...)
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  37.  13
    Alexander Gebharter & Gerhard Schurz (forthcoming). A Modeling Approach for Mechanisms Featuring Causal Cycles. Philosophy of Science.
    Mechanisms play an important role in many sciences when it comes to questions concerning explanation, prediction, and control. Answering such questions in a quantitative way requires a formal represention of mechanisms. Gebharter (2014) suggests to represent mechanisms by means of one or more causal arrows of an acyclic causal net. In this paper we show how this approach can be extended in such a way that it can also be fruitfully applied to mechanisms featuring causal feedback.
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  38. James M. Joyce (2012). Regret and Instability in Causal Decision Theory. Synthese 187 (1):123-145.
    Andy Egan has recently produced a set of alleged counterexamples to causal decision theory in which agents are forced to decide among causally unratifiable options, thereby making choices they know they will regret. I show that, far from being counterexamples, CDT gets Egan's cases exactly right. Egan thinks otherwise because he has misapplied CDT by requiring agents to make binding choices before they have processed all available information about the causal consequences of their acts. I elucidate (...)
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  39. Robert K. Garcia (2014). Closing in on Causal Closure. Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (1-2):96-109.
    I examine the meaning and merits of a premise in the Exclusion Argument, the causal closure principle that all physical effects have physical causes. I do so by addressing two questions. First, if we grant the other premises, exactly what kind of closure principle is required to make the Exclusion Argument valid? Second, what are the merits of the requisite closure principle? Concerning the first, I argue that the Exclusion Argument requires a strong, “stringently pure” version of closure. The (...)
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  40. Neil McDonnell (2015). The Deviance in Deviant Causal Chains. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):162-170.
    Causal theories of action, perception and knowledge are each beset by problems of so-called ‘deviant’ causal chains. For each such theory, counterexamples are formed using odd or co-incidental causal chains to establish that the theory is committed to unpalatable claims about some intentional action, about a case of veridical perception or about the acquisition of genuine knowledge. In this paper I will argue that three well-known examples of a deviant causal chain have something in common: they (...)
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  41.  51
    Wesley Salmon (1984). Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World. Princeton University Press.
    The philosophical theory of scientific explanation proposed here involves a radically new treatment of causality that accords with the pervasively statistical character of contemporary science. Wesley C. Salmon describes three fundamental conceptions of scientific explanation--the epistemic, modal, and ontic. He argues that the prevailing view is untenable and that the modal conception is scientifically out-dated. Significantly revising aspects of his earlier work, he defends a causal/mechanical theory that is a version of the ontic conception. Professor Salmon's theory furnishes a (...)
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  42. James Woodward (2003). Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation. Oxford University Press.
    Woodward's long awaited book is an attempt to construct a comprehensive account of causation explanation that applies to a wide variety of causal and explanatory claims in different areas of science and everyday life. The book engages some of the relevant literature from other disciplines, as Woodward weaves together examples, counterexamples, criticisms, defenses, objections, and replies into a convincing defense of the core of his theory, which is that we can analyze causation by appeal to the notion of manipulation.
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  43.  12
    Mark Pexton (2016). There Are Non‐Causal Explanations of Particular Events. Metaphilosophy 47 (2):264-282.
    A defence of non-causal explanations of events is presented in cases where explanation is understood as modal explanation. In such cases the source of modal information is crucial. All explanations implicitly use contrast classes, and relative to a particular contrast we can privilege some difference makers over others. Thinking about changes in these privileged “actual” difference makers is then the source of modal information for any given explanandum. If an actual difference maker is non-causal, then we have a (...)
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  44. Jesper Kallestrup (2006). The Causal Exclusion Argument. Philosophical Studies 131 (2):459-85.
    Jaegwon Kim’s causal exclusion argument says that if all physical effects have sufficient physical causes, and no physical effects are caused twice over by distinct physical and mental causes, there cannot be any irreducible mental causes. In addition, Kim has argued that the nonreductive physicalist must give up completeness, and embrace the possibility of downward causation. This paper argues first that this extra argument relies on a principle of property individuation, which the nonreductive physicalist need not accept, and second (...)
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  45.  65
    Robert Northcott (2012). Genetic Traits and Causal Explanation. In Kathryn Plaisance & Thomas Reydon (eds.), Philosophy of Behavioral Biology. Springer 65-82.
    I use a contrastive theory of causal explanation to analyze the notion of a genetic trait. The resulting definition is relational, an implication of which is that no trait is genetic always and everywhere. Rather, every trait may be either genetic or non-genetic, depending on explanatory context. I also outline some other advantages of connecting the debate to the wider causation literature, including how that yields us an account of the distinction between genetic traits and genetic dispositions.
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  46. David Wiens (2013). Demands of Justice, Feasible Alternatives, and the Need for Causal Analysis. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (2):325-338.
    Many political philosophers hold the Feasible Alternatives Principle (FAP): justice demands that we implement some reform of international institutions P only if P is feasible and P improves upon the status quo from the standpoint of justice. The FAP implies that any argument for a moral requirement to implement P must incorporate claims whose content pertains to the causal processes that explain the current state of affairs. Yet, philosophers routinely neglect the need to attend to actual causal processes. (...)
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  47.  26
    Ahmet Ekici & Sule Onsel (2013). How Ethical Behavior of Firms is Influenced by the Legal and Political Environments: A Bayesian Causal Map Analysis Based on Stages of Development. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 115 (2):271-290.
    Even though potential impacts of political and legal environments of business on ethical behavior of firms (EBOF) have been conceptually recognized, not much evidence (i.e., empirical work) has been produced to clarify their role. In this paper, using Bayesian causal maps (BCMs) methodology, relationships between legal and political environments of business and EBOF are investigated. The unique design of our study allows us to analyze these relationships based on the stages of development in 92 countries around the world. The (...)
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  48. Geert Keil (2007). What Do Deviant Causal Chains Deviate From? In Christoph Lumer & Sandro Nannini (eds.), Intention, Deliberation and Autonomy. Ashgate 69-90.
    The problem of <span class='Hi'>deviant</span> causal chains is endemic to any theory of action that makes definitional or explanatory use of a causal connection between an agent’s beliefs and pro-attitudes and his bodily movements. Other causal theories of intentional phenomena are similarly plagued. The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, to defend Davidson’s defeatism. In his treatment of <span class='Hi'>deviant</span> causal chains, Davidson makes use of the clause “in the right way” to rule out (...) waywardness, but he regards any attempt at specifying ‘right’ sorts of causal histories as hopeless and even harmful. To my mind, Davidson’s defeatism contains a valuable insight, so I shall try to explain the reasons for it. Second, I shall try to answer a question that has often been ignored or passed over in the literature; namely the question of what it is that <span class='Hi'>deviant</span> causal chains deviate from. (shrink)
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  49. Agustín Vicente (2006). On the Causal Completeness of Physics. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 20 (2):149 – 171.
    According to an increasing number of authors, the best, if not the only, argument in favour of physicalism is the so-called 'overdetermination argument'. This argument, if sound, establishes that all the entities that enter into causal interactions with the physical world are physical. One key premise in the overdetermination argument is the principle of the causal closure of the physical world, said to be supported by contemporary physics. In this paper, I examine various ways in which physics may (...)
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  50.  97
    Justin Tiehen (2015). Explaining Causal Closure. Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2405-2425.
    The physical realm is causally closed, according to physicalists like me. But why is it causally closed, what metaphysically explains causal closure? I argue that reductive physicalists are committed to one explanation of causal closure to the exclusion of any independent explanation, and that as a result, they must give up on using a causal argument to attack mind–body dualism. Reductive physicalists should view dualism in much the way that we view the hypothesis that unicorns exist, or (...)
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