Search results for 'Causal powers' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Brandon N. Towl (2010). The Individuation of Causal Powers by Events (and Consequences of the Approach). Metaphysica 11 (1):49-61.score: 180.0
    In this paper, I explore the notion of a “causal power”, particularly as it is relevant to a theory of properties whereby properties are individuated by the causal powers they bestow on the objects that instantiate them. I take as my target certain eliminativist positions that argue that certain kinds of properties (or relations) do not exist because they fail to bestow unique causal powers on objects. But the notion of a causal powers (...)
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  2. Ricardo Restrepo (2012). Multiple Realizability and Novel Causal Powers. Abstracta 6 (2):216-230.score: 180.0
    Framed within the dialectic of the causal exclusion argument (Kim 2005), this paper does two things. One, it clarifies some properties of multiple realizability based on its true origin (Turing 1950). And two, it challenges a form of argument Noordhof (1997), Clarke (1999), and Whittle (2007) employ to support the idea that the mental has causal powers not had by its physical realization base (Novel). The paper challenges Novel with ideas derived from multiple realizability, among others.
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  3. Jonas Christensen (forthcoming). Determinable Properties and Overdetermination of Causal Powers. Philosophia:1-17.score: 180.0
    Do determinable properties such as colour, mass, and height exist in addition to their corresponding determinates, being red, having a mass of 1 kilogram, and having a height of 2 metres? Optimists say yes, pessimists say no. Among the latter are Carl Gillett and Bradley Rives who argue that optimism leads to systematic overdetermination of causal powers and hence should be rejected on the grounds that the position is ontologically unparsimonious. In this paper I defend optimism against this (...)
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  4. D. Christensen (1992). Causal Powers and Conceptual Connections. Analysis 52 (3):163-8.score: 136.0
    In "A Modal Argument for Narrow Content" ("Journal of Philosophy", LXXXVIII, 1991, pp 5-26), Jerry Fodor proposes a necessary condition for the distinctness of causal powers. He uses this condition to support psychological individualism. I show that Fodor's argument relies on inconsistent interpretations of his condition on distinct causal powers. Moreover, on no consistent interpretation does Fodor's condition yield the results claimed for it.
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  5. Brandon N. Towl (2010). Spurious Causal Kinds: A Problem for the Causal-Power Conception of Kinds. Philosophia 38 (1):217-223.score: 132.0
    There is an assumption common in the philosophy of mind literature that kinds in our sciences—or causal kinds, at least—are individuated by the causal powers that objects have in virtue of the properties they instantiate. While this assumption might not be problematic by itself, some authors take the assumption to mean that falling under a kind and instantiating a property amount to the same thing. I call this assumption the “Property-Kind Individuation Principle”. A problem with this principle (...)
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  6. Brian Ellis (2010). Causal Powers and Categorical Properties. In Anna Marmodoro (ed.), The Metaphysics of Powers: Their Grounding and Their Manifestations. Routledge.score: 126.0
    The aim of this paper is to argue that there are categorical properties as well as causal powers, and that the world would not exist as we know it without them. For categorical properties are needed to define the powers—to locate them, and to specify their laws of action. These categorical properties, I shall argue, are not dispositional. For their identities do not depend on what they dispose their bearers to do. They are, as Alexander Bird would (...)
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  7. Randolph Clarke (1999). Nonreductive Physicalism and the Causal Powers of the Mental. Erkenntnis 51 (2-3):295-322.score: 124.0
    Nonreductive physicalism is currently one of the most widely held views about the world in general and about the status of the mental in particular. However, the view has recently faced a series of powerful criticisms from, among others, Jaegwon Kim. In several papers, Kim has argued that the nonreductivist's view of the mental is an unstable position, one harboring contradictions that push it either to reductivism or to eliminativism. The problems arise, Kim maintains, when we consider the causal (...)
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  8. Jonathan D. Jacobs (2007). Causal Powers: A Neo-Aristotelian Metaphysic. Dissertation, Indiana Universityscore: 120.0
    Causal powers, say, an electron’s power to repel other electrons, are had in virtue of having properties. Electrons repel other electrons because they are negatively charged. One’s views about causal powers are shaped by—and shape—one’s views concerning properties, causation, laws of nature and modality. It is no surprise, then, that views about the nature of causal powers are generally embedded into larger, more systematic, metaphysical pictures of the world. This dissertation is an exploration of (...)
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  9. Ned Block (2003). Do Causal Powers Drain Away. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):133-150.score: 120.0
    In this note, I will discuss one issue concerning the main argument of Mind in a Physical World (Kim, 1998), the Causal Exclusion Argument. The issue is whether it is a consequence of the Causal Exclusion Argument that all macro level causation (that is, causation above the level of fundamental physics) is an illusion, with all of the apparent causal powers of mental and other macro properties draining into the bottom level of physics. I will argue (...)
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  10. Eric Watkins (2004). Kant's Model of Causality: Causal Powers, Laws, and Kant's Reply to Hume. Journal of the History of Philosophy 42 (4):449-488.score: 120.0
    : This paper argues that Kant's model of causality cannot consist in one temporally determinate event causing another, as Hume had thought, since such a model is inconsistent with mutual interaction, to which Kant is committed in the Third Analogy. Rather causality occurs when one substance actively exercises its causal powers according to the unchanging grounds that constitute its nature so as to determine a change of state of another substance. Because this model invokes unchanging grounds, one can (...)
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  11. Jessica M. Wilson (2002). Causal Powers, Forces, and Superdupervenience. Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):53-77.score: 120.0
    Horgan (1993) proposed that "superdupervenience" - supervenience preserving physicalistic acceptability - is a matter of robust explanation. I argued against him (1999) that (as nearly all physicalist and emergentist accounts reflect) superdupervenience is a matter of Condition on Causal Powers (CCP): every causal power bestowed by the supervenient property is identical with a causal power bestowed by its base property. Here I show that CCP is, as it stands, unsatisfactory,for on the usual understandings of causal (...)
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  12. Frank Hofmann (2007). Causal Powers, Realization, and Mental Causation. Erkenntnis 67 (2):173 - 182.score: 120.0
    Sydney Shoemaker has attempted to save mental causation by a new account of realization. As Brian McLaughlin argues convincingly, the account has to face two major problems. First, realization does not guarantee entailment. So even if mental properties are realized by physical properties, they need not be entailed by them. This is the first, rather general metaphysical problem. A second problem, which relates more directly to mental causation is that Shoemaker must appeal to some kind of proportionality as a constraint (...)
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  13. Eric Hiddleston (2005). Causal Powers. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (1):27-59.score: 120.0
    Nancy Cartwright offers an account of causal powers, and argues that it explains some important general features of scientific method. Patricia Cheng argues that this theory is superior as a psychological theory of learning to standard models of conditioning. I extend and develop the theory, and argue that it provides the best explanation of a number of problem cases for philosophical theories of causation, including preemption, overdetermination and puzzles about transitivity. Hitchcock and Halpern & Pearl on ‘actual causes’ (...)
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  14. Robert A. Wilson (1992). Individualism, Causal Powers, and Explanation. Philosophical Studies 68 (2):103-39.score: 120.0
    This paper examines a recent, influential argument for individualism in psychology defended by Jerry Fodor and others, what I call the argument from causal powers. I argue that this argument equivocates on the crucial notion of "causal powers", and that this equivocation constitutes a deep problem for arguments of this type. Relational and individualistic taxonomies are incompatible, and it does not seem in general to be possible to factor the former into the latter. The distinction between (...)
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  15. Sean Crawford (2003). Relational Properties, Causal Powers and Psychological Laws. Acta Analytica 18 (30-31):193-216.score: 120.0
    This paper argues that Twin Earth twins belong to the same psychological natural kind, but that the reason for this is not that the causal powers of mental states supervene on local neural structure. Fodor’s argument for this latter thesis is criticized and found to rest on a confusion between it and the claim that Putnamian and Burgean type relational psychological properties do not affect the causal powers of the mental states that have them. While it (...)
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  16. Keith Butler (1996). Content, Causal Powers, and Context. Philosophy of Science 63 (1):105-14.score: 120.0
    Owens (1993) argues that one cannot accept the anti-individualistic conclusions of arguments inspired by Twin Earth thought experiments and still maintain that folk psychological states causally explain behavior. Saidel (1994) has argued that Owens' argument illegitimately individuates the contents of folk psychological states widely and causal powers narrowly. He suggests that causal powers may well be wide, and that the conditions that militate in favor of wide content also militate in favor of wide causal (...); mutatis mutandis for narrow content and narrow causal powers. I argue that these suggestions are in error, and hence that Saidel's criticism is ineffective. Owens' original point is therefore likely to stand. (shrink)
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  17. Eric Saidel (1994). Content and Causal Powers. Philosophy of Science 61 (4):658-65.score: 120.0
    Owens (1993) argues that a tension exists between our commonsense view of mental states and the scientific view that psychological explanations not contradict supervenience. He suggests that one cannot accept the anti-individualistic conclusions of Twin-Earth thought experiments and continue to use folk psychological states to explain behavior. I argue that his conclusions are based on individuating content widely and causal powers narrowly, and that such individuation violates consistency assumptions about the terms of his discussion. Thus, I argue, the (...)
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  18. Amit Ron (2010). The Hermeneutics of the Causal Powers of Meaningful Objects. Journal of Critical Realism 9 (2):155-171.score: 120.0
    Much of the interest of critical realists in the hermeneutic character of social inquiry has been shaped by debates with critics. Critical realists insist that the meaningful character of societies does not exclude the possibility of treating them as objects that have causal powers and that these objects are more than the sum-total of their meanings. In what follows, I want to go beyond this debate. Working within critical realist ontology, the question I want to ask is what (...)
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  19. Max Kistler & Bruno Gnassounou (eds.) (2007). Dispositions and Causal Powers. Ashgate.score: 120.0
    This collection of essays, by leading international researchers, examines the case for realism with respect to dispositions and causal powers in both ...
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  20. Rom Harré (2007). Extended Semantic Field of Dispositions and the Grounding Role of Causal Powers. In Gnassounou Bruno & Kistler Max (eds.), Dispositions and Causal Powers. Ashgate. 67--80.score: 120.0
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  21. Sharon R. Ford (2012). Objects, Discreteness, and Pure Power Theories: George Molnar’s Critique of Sydney Shoemaker’s Causal Theory of Properties. [REVIEW] Metaphysica 13 (2):195-215.score: 114.0
    Sydney Shoemaker’s causal theory of properties is an important starting place for some contemporary metaphysical perspectives concerning the nature of properties. In this paper, I discuss the causal and intrinsic criteria that Shoemaker stipulates for the identity of genuine properties and relations, and address George Molnar’s criticism that holding both criteria presents an unbridgeable hypothesis in the causal theory of properties. The causal criterion requires that properties and relations contribute to the causal powers of (...)
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  22. Sharon Ford (2012). Objects, Discreteness, and Pure Power Theories: George Molnar’s Critique of Sydney Shoemaker’s Causal Theory of Properties. [REVIEW] Metaphysica 13 (2):195-215.score: 114.0
    Sydney Shoemaker’s causal theory of properties is an important starting place for some contemporary metaphysical perspectives concerning the nature of properties. In this paper, I discuss the causal and intrinsic criteria that Shoemaker stipulates for the identity of genuine properties and relations, and address George Molnar’s criticism that holding both criteria presents an unbridgeable hypothesis in the causal theory of properties. The causal criterion requires that properties and relations contribute to the causal powers of (...)
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  23. Tobias Hansson Wahlberg (forthcoming). Elder-Vass on the Causal Power of Social Structures. Philosophy of the Social Sciences:0048393113500213.score: 100.0
    In this review essay, I examine the central tenets of sociologist Dave Elder-Vass’s recent contribution to social ontology, as put forth in his book The Causal Power of Social Structures: Emergence, Structure and Agency. Elder-Vass takes issue with ontological individualists and maintains that social structures exist and have causal powers in their own right. I argue that he fails to establish his main theses: he shows neither that social structures have causal powers “in their own (...)
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  24. Graham Macdonald (2007). Emergence and Causal Powers. Erkenntnis 67 (2):239 - 253.score: 96.0
    This paper argues that the non-reductive monist need not be concerned about the ‘problem’ of mental causation; one can accept both the irreducibility of mental properties to physical properties and the causal closure of the physical. More precisely, it is argued that instances of mental properties can be causally efficacious, and that there is no special barrier to seeing mental properties whose instances are causally efficacious as being causally relevant to the effects they help to bring about. It is (...)
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  25. Sophie C. Gibb (2014). The Causal Criterion of Property Identity and the Subtraction of Powers. Erkenntnis 79 (1):127-146.score: 96.0
    According to one popular criterion of property identity, where X and Y are properties, X is identical with Y if and only if X and Y bestow the same conditional powers on their bearers. In this paper, I argue that this causal criterion of property identity is unsatisfactory, because it fails to provide a sufficient condition for the identification of properties. My argument for this claim is based on the observation that the summing of properties does not entail (...)
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  26. Stephen Barker (2013). The Emperor's New Metaphysics of Powers. Mind (487):fzt082.score: 90.0
    This paper argues that the new metaphysics of powers, also known as dispositional essentialism or causal structuralism, is an illusory metaphysics. I argue for this in the following way. I begin by distinguishing three fundamental ways of seeing how facts of physical modality — facts about physical necessitation and possibility, causation, disposition, and chance — are grounded in the world. The first way, call it the first degree, is that the actual world or all worlds, in their entirety, (...)
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  27. Stephen Mumford & Rani Lill Anjum (2011). Spoils to the Vector - How to Model Causes If You Are a Realist About Powers. The Monist 94 (1):54-80.score: 90.0
    A standard way of representing causation is with neuron diagrams. This has become popular since the influential work of David Lewis. But it should not be assumed that such representations are metaphysically neutral and amenable to any theory of causation. On the contrary, this way of representing causation already makes several Humean assumptions about what causation is, and which suit Lewis’s programme of Humean Supervenience. An alternative of a vector diagram is better suited for a powers ontology. Causation should (...)
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  28. Toby Handfield (2010). Dispositions, Manifestations, and Causal Structure. In Anna Marmodoro (ed.), The Metaphysics of Powers: Their Grounding and Their Manifestations. Routledge.score: 90.0
    This paper examines the idea that there might be natural kinds of causal processes, with characteristic diachronic structure, in much the same way that various chemical elements form natural kinds, with characteristic synchronic structure. This claim -- if compatible with empirical science -- has the potential to shed light on a metaphysics of essentially dispositional properties, championed by writers such as Bird and Ellis.
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  29. Tuomas E. Tahko (2009). Against the Vagueness Argument. Philosophia 37 (2):335-340.score: 90.0
    In this paper I offer a counterexample to the so called vagueness argument against restricted composition. This will be done in the lines of a recent suggestion by Trenton Merricks, namely by challenging the claim that there cannot be a sharp cut-off point in a composition sequence. It will be suggested that causal powers which emerge when composition occurs can serve as an indicator of such sharp cut-off points. The main example will be the case of a heap. (...)
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  30. Ted A. Warfield (1999). Searle's Causal Powers. Analysis 59 (1):29-32.score: 90.0
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  31. Gabriel Segal (2004). Reference, Causal Powers, Externalist Intuitions, and Unicorns. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter. 329.score: 90.0
    In this chapter, I will compare and contrast singular concepts with what I call.
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  32. Kevin Morris (2013). On Two Arguments for Subset Inheritance. Philosophical Studies 163 (1):197-211.score: 90.0
    A physicalist holds, in part, that what properties are instantiated depends on what physical properties are instantiated; a physicalist thinks that mental properties, for example, are instantiated in virtue of the instantiation of physical “realizer” properties. One issue that arises in this context concerns the relationship between the “causal powers” of instances of physical properties and instances of dependent properties, properties that are instantiated in virtue of the instantiation of physical properties. After explaining the significance of this issue, (...)
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  33. Jennifer McKitrick (2008). Review of Max Kistler, Bruno Gnassounou (Eds.), Dispositions and Causal Powers. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (7).score: 90.0
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  34. Brian Ellis (1999). Causal Powers and Laws of Nature. In Howard Sankey (ed.), Causation and Laws of Nature. Kluwer. 19--34.score: 90.0
  35. Dave Elder-Vass (2005). Emergence and the Realist Account of Cause. Journal of Critical Realism 4 (2):315-338.score: 90.0
    This paper aims to improve critical realism's understanding of emergence by discussing, first, what emergence is and how it works; second, the need for a compositional account of emergence; and third, the implications of emergence for causation. It goes on to argue that the theory of emergence leads to the recognition of certain hitherto neglected similarities between real causal powers and actual causation. (edited).
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  36. Charles R. Varela Androm Harré (1996). Conflicting Varieties of Realism: Causal Powers and the Problems of Social Structure. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 26 (3):313–325.score: 90.0
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  37. Patricia Hanna (1985). Causal Powers and Cognition. Mind 94 (373):53-63.score: 90.0
    Argues that Searle is confused, and underestimates computers. Weak.
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  38. Brian Chance (2013). Causal Powers, Hume's Early German Critics, and Kant's Response to Hume. Kant-Studien 104 (2):213-236.score: 90.0
    Eric Watkins has argued on philosophical, textual, and historical grounds that Kant’s account of causation in the first Critique should not be read as an attempt to refute Hume’s account of causation. In this paper, I challenge the arguments for Watkins’ claim. Specifically, I argue (1) that Kant’s philosophical commitments, even on Watkins’ reading, are not obvious obstacles to refuting Hume, (2) that textual evidence from the “Disciple of Pure Reason” suggests Kant conceived of his account of causation as such (...)
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  39. David Papineau (1977). Causal Powers By R. Harré and E. Madden Basil Blackwell, 1975, Viii + 191 Pp., £4.75. [REVIEW] Philosophy 52 (199):113-.score: 90.0
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  40. Jimmy Alfonso Licon (2012). Another Argument for Animalism: The Argument From Causal Powers. Prolegomena: Časopis Za Filozofiju 11 (2):169-180.score: 90.0
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  41. B. W. A. (1976). Causal Powers. A Theory of Natural Necessity. Review of Metaphysics 29 (4):735-736.score: 90.0
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  42. Antony Flew (1976). Natural Necessities and Causal Powers. Hume Studies 2 (2):86-94.score: 90.0
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  43. Are Liberty & Equality Compatible (2012). To Introduce Some Rather Ad Hoc Constraints on the Vectorial Representation of Causal Powers (Egp 38). The Authors Adopt the Vectorial Representation Because It is 'Suited to Dis-Play Many of the Features of a Dispositional Theory of Causation'(P. 20), and is Thus 'Amenable to a Dispositionalist Ontology'(P. 46). In Particular, They. [REVIEW] Mind 121:484.score: 90.0
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  44. John R. Searle (1990). The Causal Powers of the Brain: The Necessity of Sufficiency. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (1):164.score: 90.0
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  45. Henry B. Veatch (1976). Causal Powers. New Scholasticism 50 (4):537-541.score: 90.0
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  46. Edward Pols (1976). Causal Powers. International Philosophical Quarterly 16 (3):369-377.score: 90.0
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  47. J. M. Whitmer (1983). Intentionality, Artificial Intelligence, and the Causal Powers of the Brain. Auslegung 10:194-210.score: 90.0
     
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  48. R. S. Woolhouse (1976). Causal Powers. Philosophical Books 17 (2):84-87.score: 90.0
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  49. D. E. B. Pollard (1975). Causal Powers. Philosophical Studies 24:315-316.score: 90.0
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  50. Charles R. Varela & Rom Harré (1996). Conflicting Varieties of Realism: Causal Powers and the Problems of Social Structure. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 26 (3):313-325.score: 90.0
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