Search results for 'Centered Worlds' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Shen-yi Liao (2012). What Are Centered Worlds? Philosophical Quarterly 62 (247):294-316.score: 90.0
    David Lewis argues that centered worlds give us a way to capture de se, or self-locating, contents in philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. In recent years, centered worlds have also gained other uses in areas ranging widely from metaphysics to ethics. In this paper, I raise a problem for centered worlds and discuss the costs and benefits of different solutions. My investigation into the nature of centered worlds brings out potentially (...)
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  2. Shen-yi Liao (2014). Collective De Se Thoughts and Centered Worlds. Ratio 27 (1):17-31.score: 90.0
    Two lines of investigation into the nature of mental content have proceeded in parallel until now. The first looks at thoughts that are attributable to collectives, such as bands' beliefs and teams' desires. So far, philosophers who have written on collective belief, collective intentionality, etc. have primarily focused on third-personal attributions of thoughts to collectives. The second looks at de se, or self-locating, thoughts, such as beliefs and desires that are essentially about oneself. So far, philosophers who have written on (...)
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  3. Dilip Ninan (2012). Counterfactual Attitudes and Multi-Centered Worlds. Semantics and Pragmatics 5 (5):1-57.score: 60.0
    Counterfactual attitudes like imagining, dreaming, and wishing create a problem for the standard formal semantic theory of de re attitude ascriptions. I show how the problem can be avoided if we represent an agent's attitudinal possibilities using "multi-centered worlds", possible worlds with multiple distinguished individuals, each of which represents an individual with whom the agent is acquainted. I then present a compositional semantics for de re ascriptions according to which singular terms are "assignment-sensitive" expressions and attitude verbs (...)
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  4. Berit Brogaard (2010). Centered Worlds and the Content of Perception: Short Version. In David Sosa (ed.), Philosophical Books (Analytic Philosophy).score: 58.0
    0. Relativistic Content In standard semantics, propositional content, whether it be the content of utterances or mental states, has a truth-value relative only to a possible world. For example, the content of my utterance of ‘Jim is sitting now’ is true just in case Jim is sitting at the time of utterance in the actual world, and the content of my belief that Alice will give a talk tomorrow is true just in case Alice will give a talk on the (...)
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  5. Stephan Torre (2010). Centered Assertion. Philosophical Studies 150 (1):97-114.score: 54.0
    I suggest a way of extending Stalnaker’s account of assertion to allow for centered content. In formulating his account, Stalnaker takes the content of assertion to be uncentered propositions: entities that are evaluated for truth at a possible world. I argue that the content of assertion is sometimes centered: the content is evaluated for truth at something within a possible world. I consider Andy Egan’s proposal for extending Stalnaker’s account to allow for assertions with centered content. I (...)
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  6. Dilip Ninan (2009). Persistence and the First-Person Perspective. Philosophical Review 118 (4):425--464.score: 45.0
    When one considers one's own persistence over time from the first-person perspective, it seems as if facts about one's persistence are "further facts," over and above facts about physical and psychological continuity. But the idea that facts about one's persistence are further facts is objectionable on independent theoretical grounds: it conflicts with physicalism and requires us to posit hidden facts about our persistence. This essay shows how to resolve this conflict using the idea that imagining from the first-person point of (...)
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  7. Berit Brogaard (2010). Strong Representationalism and Centered Content. Philosophical Studies 151 (3):373 - 392.score: 42.0
    I argue that strong representationalism, the view that for a perceptual experience to have a certain phenomenal character just is for it to have a certain representational content (perhaps represented in the right sort of way), encounters two problems: the dual looks problem and the duplication problem. The dual looks problem is this: strong representationalism predicts that how things phenomenally look to the subject reflects the content of the experience. But some objects phenomenally look to both have and not have (...)
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  8. T. Stephenson (2010). Control in Centred Worlds. Journal of Semantics 27 (4):409-436.score: 40.0
    This paper extends the framework of Lasersohn (2005) to give an updated semantic approach to control. On the view proposed here, all clausal constituents express (have as their semantic intensions) sets of centred worlds. In control constructions, the subject of the lower clause (‘PRO’) is identified with the ‘centre’ of a centred world. This view allows for a uniform semantic analysis of clauses, including those with and without null subjects, and for propositional attitude predicates.
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  9. Wolfgang Schwarz (2012). Changing Minds in a Changing World. Philosophical Studies 159 (2):219-239.score: 36.0
    I defend a general rule for updating beliefs that takes into account both the impact of new evidence and changes in the subject’s location. The rule combines standard conditioning with a shifting operation that moves the center of each doxastic possibility forward to the next point where information arrives. I show that well-known arguments for conditioning lead to this combination when centered information is taken into account. I also discuss how my proposal relates to other recent proposals, what results (...)
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  10. Lauge Baungaard Rasmussen (2013). Cultural Visions of Technology. AI and Society 28 (2):177-188.score: 36.0
    The essential premise of the human-centered technology paradigm was clearly formulated by Howard Rosenbrock in the 1970s: technology should enrich rather than impoverish people’s work and life conditions. The increasing influence of technology in modern societies has been seen by some as offering great promise for the future, but by others as creating the electronic surveillance and/or manipulation of human genes, minds and beliefs. This paper approaches technological worlds as cultural visions in order to discuss and reflect the (...)
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  11. Jason Turner (2010). Fitting Attitudes de Dicto and de Se. Noûs 44 (1):1-9.score: 33.0
    The Property Theory of attitudes holds that the contents of mental states --- especially de se states --- are properties. The "nonexistence problem" for the Property Theory holds that the theory gives the wrong consequences as to which worlds "fit" which mental states: which worlds satisfy desires, make beliefs true, and so on. If I desire to not exist, since there is no world where I have the property of not existing, my desire is satisfied in no (...). In this paper I argue that the problem can be solved with a suitable account of how properties as mental states fit worlds. The solution relies on a distinction between to kinds of property-instantiation at worlds inspired by Fine's distinction between "inner" and "outer" truth. (shrink)
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  12. Adam Elga (2000). Self-Locating Belief and the Sleeping Beauty Problem. Analysis 60 (2):143–147.score: 31.0
    In addition to being uncertain about what the world is like, one can also be uncertain about one’s own spatial or temporal location in the world. My aim is to pose a problem arising from the interaction between these two sorts of uncertainty, solve the problem, and draw two lessons from the solution.
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  13. Andy Egan (2006). Secondary Qualities and Self-Location. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):97-119.score: 31.0
    Colors aren't as real as shapes. Shapes are full?fledged qualities of things in themselves, independent of how they're perceived and by whom. Colors aren't. Colors are merely qualities of things as they are for us, and the colors of things depend on who is perceiving them. When we take the fully objective view of the world, things keep their shapes, but the colors fall away, revealed as the mere artifacts of our own subjective, parochial perspective on the world that they (...)
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  14. David Lewis (1979). Attitudes de Dicto and de Se. Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.score: 30.0
    t f I hear the patter of little feet around the house, I expect Bruce. What I expect is a cat, a particular cat. If I heard such a patter in another house, I might expect a cat but no particular cat. What I expect then seems to be a Meinongian incomplete cat. I expect winter, expect stormy weather, expect to shovel snow, expect fatigue — a season, a phenomenon, an activity, a state. I expect that someday mankind will inhabit (...)
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  15. David Lewis (1983). Individuation by Acquaintance and by Stipulation. Philosophical Review 92 (1):3-32.score: 30.0
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  16. Robert C. Stalnaker (1981). Indexical Belief. Synthese 49 (1):129-151.score: 30.0
  17. Andy Egan (2009). Billboards, Bombs and Shotgun Weddings. Synthese 166 (2):251 - 279.score: 30.0
    It's a presupposition of a very common way of thinking about contextsensitivity in language that the semantic contribution made by a bit of context-sensitive vocabulary is sensitive only to features of the speaker's situation at the time of utterance. I argue that this is false, and that we need a theory of context-dependence that allows for content to depend not just on the features of the utterance's origin, but also on features of its destination. There are cases in which a (...)
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  18. Adam Elga (2004). Defeating Dr. Evil with Self-Locating Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):383–396.score: 30.0
    Dr. Evil learns that a duplicate of Dr. Evil has been created. Upon learning this, how seriously should he take the hypothesis that he himself is that duplicate? I answer: very seriously. I defend a principle of indifference for self-locating belief which entails that after Dr. Evil learns that a duplicate has been created, he ought to have exactly the same degree of belief that he is Dr. Evil as that he is the duplicate. More generally, the principle shows that (...)
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  19. Berit Brogaard (2008). In Defence of a Perspectival Semantics for 'Know'. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):439 – 459.score: 30.0
    Relativism offers an ingenious way of accommodating most of our intuitions about 'know': the truth-value of sentences containing 'know' is a function of parameters determined by a context of use and a context of assessment. This sort of double-indexing provides a more adequate account of the linguistic data involving 'know' than does standard contextualism. However, relativism has come under recent attack: it supposedly cannot account for the factivity of 'know', and it entails, counterintuitively, that circumstances of evaluation have features that (...)
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  20. Daniel Nolan (2006). Selfless Desires. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):665–679.score: 30.0
    final version in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2006 73.3: 665-679.
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  21. Ben Blumson (2010). Pictures, Perspective and Possibility. Philosophical Studies 149 (2):135 - 151.score: 24.0
    This paper argues for a possible worlds theory of the content of pictures, with three complications: depictive content is centred, two-dimensional and structured. The paper argues that this theory supports a strong analogy between depictive and other kinds of representation and the platitude that depiction is mediated by resemblance.
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  22. Wlodek Rabinowicz, Letters From Long Ago: On Causal Decision Theory and Centered Chances.score: 21.0
    This paper argues that expected utility theory for actions in chancy environments should be formulated in terms of centered chances. The subjective expected utility of an option A may be seen as a weighted sum of the utilities of A in different possible worlds, with weights being the credences that the agent assigns to these worlds. The utility of A in a given world is then definable as a weighted sum of the values of A’s different possible (...)
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  23. Peter Storkerson (2010). Naturalistic Cognition: A Research Paradigm for Human-Centered Design. Journal of Research Practice 6 (2):Article M12.score: 21.0
    Naturalistic thinking and knowing, the tacit, experiential, and intuitive reasoning of everyday interaction, have long been regarded as inferior to formal reason and labeled primitive, fallible, subjective, superstitious, and in some cases ineffable. But, naturalistic thinking is more rational and definable than it appears. It is also relevant to design. Inquiry into the mechanisms of naturalistic thinking and knowledge can bring its resources into focus and enable designers to create better, human-centered designs for use in real-world settings. This article (...)
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  24. Marie Guillot (2013). The Limits of Selflessness: Semantic Relativism and the Epistemology of de Se Thoughts. Synthese 190 (10):1793-1816.score: 20.0
    It has recently been proposed that the framework of semantic relativism be put to use to describe mental content, as deployed in some of the fundamental operations of the mind. This programme has inspired in particular a novel strategy of accounting for the essential egocentricity of first-personal or de se thoughts in relativist terms, with the advantage of dispensing with a notion of self-representation. This paper is a critical discussion of this strategy. While it is based on a plausible appeal (...)
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  25. Stephen Barker (2011). Can Counterfactuals Really Be About Possible Worlds? Noûs 45 (3):557-576.score: 18.0
    The standard view about counterfactuals is that a counterfactual (A > C) is true if and only if the A-worlds most similar to the actual world @ are C-worlds. I argue that the worlds conception of counterfactuals is wrong. I assume that counterfactuals have non-trivial truth-values under physical determinism. I show that the possible-worlds approach cannot explain many embeddings of the form (P > (Q > R)), which intuitively are perfectly assertable, and which must be true (...)
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  26. Phillip Bricker (2006). David Lewis: On the Plurality of Worlds. In John Shand (ed.), Central Works of Philosophy, Vol. 5: The Twentieth Century: Quine and After. Acumen Publishing.score: 18.0
    David Lewis's book 'On the Plurality of Worlds' mounts an extended defense of the thesis of modal realism, that the world we inhabit the entire cosmos of which we are a part is but one of a vast plurality of worlds, or cosmoi, all causally and spatiotemporally isolated from one another. The purpose of this article is to provide an accessible summary of the main positions and arguments in Lewis's book.
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  27. Jens Christian Bjerring (2013). Impossible Worlds and Logical Omniscience: An Impossibility Result. Synthese 190 (13):2505-2524.score: 18.0
    In this paper, I investigate whether we can use a world-involving framework to model the epistemic states of non-ideal agents. The standard possible-world framework falters in this respect because of a commitment to logical omniscience. A familiar attempt to overcome this problem centers around the use of impossible worlds where the truths of logic can be false. As we shall see, if we admit impossible worlds where “anything goes” in modal space, it is easy to model extremely non-ideal (...)
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  28. Mark Jago (2013). Impossible Worlds. Noûs 47 (3).score: 18.0
    Impossible worlds are representations of impossible things and impossible happenings. They earn their keep in a semantic or metaphysical theory if they do the right theoretical work for us. As it happens, a worlds-based account provides the best philosophical story about semantic content, knowledge and belief states, cognitive significance and cognitive information, and informative deductive reasoning. A worlds-based story may also provide the best semantics for counterfactuals. But to function well, all these accounts need use of impossible (...)
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  29. Mark Jago (2012). Constructing Worlds. Synthese 189 (1):59-74.score: 18.0
    You and I can differ in what we say, or believe, even though the things we say, or believe, are logically equivalent. Discussing what is said, or believed, requires notions of content which are finer-grained than sets of (metaphysically or logically) possible worlds. In this paper, I develop the approach to fine-grained content in terms of a space of possible and impossible worlds. I give a method for constructing ersatz worlds based on theory of substantial facts. I (...)
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  30. David K. Lewis (1986/2001). On the Plurality of Worlds. Blackwell Publishers.score: 18.0
    This book is a defense of modal realism; the thesis that our world is but one of a plurality of worlds, and that the individuals that inhabit our world are only ...
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  31. Shan Gao, An Exceptionally Simple Argument Against the Many-Worlds Interpretation.score: 18.0
    It is shown that the superposed wave function of a measuring device, in each branch of which there is a definite measurement result, does not correspond to many mutually unobservable but equally real worlds, as the superposed wave function can be observed in our world by protective measurement.
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  32. Mark Jago (forthcoming). Are Impossible Worlds Trivial? In Vit Puncochar & Petr Svarny (eds.), The Logica Yearbook 2012. College Publications.score: 18.0
    Theories of content are at the centre of philosophical semantics. The most successful general theory of content takes contents to be sets of possible worlds. But such contents are very coarse-grained, for they cannot distinguish between logically equivalent contents. They draw intensional but not hyperintensional distinctions. This is often remedied by including impossible as well as possible worlds in the theory of content. Yet it is often claimed that impossible worlds are metaphysically obscure; and it is sometimes (...)
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  33. Phillip Bricker (2006). Absolute Actuality and the Plurality of Worlds. Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):41–76.score: 18.0
    According to David Lewis, a realist about possible worlds must hold that actuality is relative: the worlds are ontologically all on a par; the actual and the merely possible differ, not absolutely, but in how they relate to us. Call this 'Lewisian realism'. The alternative, 'Leibnizian realism', holds that actuality is an absolute property that marks a distinction in ontological status. Lewis presents two arguments against Leibnizian realism. First, he argues that the Leibnizian realist cannot account for the (...)
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  34. Thomas Mormann (2014). Set Theory, Topology, and the Possibility of Junky Worlds. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 55 (1): 79 - 90.score: 18.0
    A possible world is a junky world if and only if each thing in it is a proper part. The possibility of junky worlds contradicts the principle of general fusion. Bohn (2009) argues for the possibility of junky worlds, Watson (2010) suggests that Bohn‘s arguments are flawed. This paper shows that the arguments of both authors leave much to be desired. First, relying on the classical results of Cantor, Zermelo, Fraenkel, and von Neumann, this paper proves the possibility (...)
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  35. Clas Weber (2013). Centered Communication. Philosophical Studies 166 (1):205-223.score: 18.0
    According to an attractive account of belief, our beliefs have centered content. According to an attractive account of communication, we utter sentences to express our beliefs and share them with each other. However, the two accounts are in conflict. In this paper I explore the consequences of holding on to the claim that beliefs have centered content. If we do in fact express the centered content of our beliefs, the content of the belief the hearer acquires cannot (...)
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  36. B. Jack Copeland (2002). The Genesis of Possible Worlds Semantics. Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (2):99-137.score: 18.0
    This article traces the development of possible worlds semantics through the work of: Wittgenstein, 1913-1921; Feys, 1924; McKinsey, 1945; Carnap, 1945-1947; McKinsey, Tarski and Jónsson, 1947-1952; von Wright, 1951; Becker, 1952; Prior, 1953-1954; Montague, 1955; Meredith and Prior, 1956; Geach, 1960; Smiley, 1955-1957; Kanger, 1957; Hintikka, 1957; Guillaume, 1958; Binkley, 1958; Bayart, 1958-1959; Drake, 1959-1961; Kripke, 1958-1965.
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  37. Robin Hanson (2003). When Worlds Collide: Quantum Probability From Observer Selection? [REVIEW] Foundations of Physics 33 (7):1129-1150.score: 18.0
    In Everett's many worlds interpretation, quantum measurements are considered to be decoherence events. If so, then inexact decoherence may allow large worlds to mangle the memory of observers in small worlds, creating a cutoff in observable world size. Smaller world are mangled and so not observed. If this cutoff is much closer to the median measure size than to the median world size, the distribution of outcomes seen in unmangled worlds follows the Born rule. Thus deviations (...)
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  38. Louis deRosset (2012). Possible Worlds for Modal Primitivists. Journal of Philosophical Logic (1):1-23.score: 18.0
    Among the most remarkable developments in metaphysics since the 1950’s is the explosion of philosophical interest in possible worlds. This paper proposes an explanation of what possible worlds are, and argues that this proposal, the interpreted models conception, should be attractive to anyone who thinks that modal facts are primitive, and so not to be explained in terms of some non-modal notion of “possible world.” I articulate three constraints on any acceptable primitivist explanation of the nature of possible (...)
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  39. Barak Krakauer (2013). What Are Impossible Worlds? Philosophical Studies 165 (3):989-1007.score: 18.0
    In this paper, I argue for a particular conception of impossible worlds. Possible worlds, as traditionally understood, can be used in the analysis of propositions, the content of belief, the truth of counterfactuals, and so on. Yet possible worlds are not capable of differentiating propositions that are necessarily equivalent, making sense of the beliefs of agents who are not ideally rational, or giving truth values to counterfactuals with necessarily false antecedents. The addition of impossible worlds addresses (...)
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  40. Jeffrey Barrett (2011). Everett's Pure Wave Mechanics and the Notion of Worlds. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (2):277-302.score: 18.0
    Everett (1957a, b, 1973) relative-state formulation of quantum mechanics has often been taken to involve a metaphysical commitment to the existence of many splitting worlds each containing physical copies of observers and the objects they observe. While there was earlier talk of splitting worlds in connection with Everett, this is largely due to DeWitt’s (Phys Today 23:30–35, 1970) popular presentation of the theory. While the thought of splitting worlds or parallel universes has captured the popular imagination, Everett (...)
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  41. Ira Georgia Kiourti (2010). Real Impossible Worlds : The Bounds of Possibility. Dissertation, University of St Andrewsscore: 18.0
    Lewisian Genuine Realism (GR) about possible worlds is often deemed unable to accommodate impossible worlds and reap the benefits that these bestow to rival theories. This thesis explores two alternative extensions of GR into the terrain of impossible worlds. It is divided in six chapters. Chapter I outlines Lewis’ theory, the motivations for impossible worlds, and the central problem that such worlds present for GR: How can GR even understand the notion of an impossible world, (...)
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  42. Jiri Benovsky (2006). Persistence Through Time and Across Possible Worlds. Ontos Verlag.score: 18.0
    How do ordinary objects persist through time and across possible worlds ? How do they manage to have their temporal and modal properties ? These are the questions adressed in this book which is a "guided tour of theories of persistence". The book is divided in two parts. In the first, the two traditional accounts of persistence through time (endurantism and perdurantism) are combined with presentism and eternalism to yield four different views, and their variants. The resulting views are (...)
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  43. Phillip Bricker (1987). Reducing Possible Worlds to Language. Philosophical Studies 52 (3):331 - 355.score: 18.0
    The most commonly heard proposals for reducing possible worlds to language succumb to a simple cardinality argument: it can be shown that there are more possible worlds than there are linguistic entities provided by the proposal. In this paper, I show how the standard proposals can be generalized in a natural way so as to make better use of the resources available to them, and thereby circumvent the cardinality argument. Once it is seen just what the limitations are (...)
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  44. Diane Proudfoot (2006). Possible Worlds Semantics and Fiction. Journal of Philosophical Logic 35 (1):9 - 40.score: 18.0
    The canonical version of possible worlds semantics for story prefixes is due to David Lewis. This paper reassesses Lewis's theory and draws attention to some novel problems for his account.
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  45. Takashi Yagisawa (2010). Worlds and Individuals, Possible and Otherwise. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
    Modal realism -- Time, space, world -- Existence -- Actuality -- Modal realism and modal tense -- Transworld individuals and their identity -- Existensionalism -- Impossibility -- Proposition and relief -- Fictional worlds -- Epistemology.
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  46. Michael J. Jacobson, Charlotte Taylor, Anne Newstead, Wai Yat Wong, Deborah Richards, Meredith Taylor, Porte John, Kartiko Iwan, Kapur Manu & Hu Chun (2011). Collaborative Virtual Worlds and Productive Failure. In Proceedings of the CSCL (Computer Supported Cognition and Learning) III. University of Hong Kong.score: 18.0
    This paper reports on an ongoing ARC Discovery Project that is conducting design research into learning in collaborative virtual worlds (CVW).The paper will describe three design components of the project: (a) pedagogical design, (b)technical and graphics design, and (c) learning research design. The perspectives of each design team will be discussed and how the three teams worked together to produce the CVW. The development of productive failure learning activities for the CVW will be discussed and there will be an (...)
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  47. Ulrich Meyer (2006). Worlds and Times. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 47 (1):25--37.score: 18.0
    There are many parallels between the role of possible worlds in modal logic and that of times in tense logic. But the similarities only go so far, and it is important to note where the two come apart. This paper argues that even though worlds and times play similar roles in the model theories of modal and tense logic, there is no tense analogue of the possible-worlds analysis of modal operators. An important corollary of this result is (...)
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  48. Phillip Bricker (1996). Isolation and Unification: The Realist Analysis of Possible Worlds. Philosophical Studies 84 (2-3):225 - 238.score: 18.0
    If realism about possible worlds is to succeed in eliminating primitive modality, it must provide an 'analysis' of possible world: nonmodal criteria for demarcating one world from another. This David Lewis has done. Lewis holds, roughly, that worlds are maximal unified regions of logical space. So far, so good. But what Lewis means by 'unification' is too narrow, I think, in two different ways. First, for Lewis, all worlds are (almost) 'globally' unified: at any world, (almost) every (...)
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  49. Graham White (2000). Lewis, Causality, and Possible Worlds. Dialectica 54 (2):133–137.score: 18.0
    We show that, given standard assumptions about classical dynamical systems, Lewis' conception of possible worlds is incompatible with classical physics in that it would imply that all dynamical systems were integrable.
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