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  1. Joshua Alexander, Chad Gonnerman & John Waterman (forthcoming). Salience and Epistemic Egocentrism: An Empirical Study. In James Beebe (ed.), Advances in Experimental Epistemology. Continuum.
    Jennifer Nagel (2010) has recently proposed a fascinating account of the decreased tendency to attribute knowledge in conversational contexts in which unrealized possibilities of error have been mentioned. Her account appeals to epistemic egocentrism, or what is sometimes called the curse of knowledge, an egocentric bias to attribute our own mental states to other people (and sometimes our own future and past selves). Our aim in this paper is to investigate the empirical merits of Nagel’s hypothesis about the psychology involved (...)
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  2. Jonathan M. Weinberg, Joshua Alexander, Chad Gonnerman & Shane Reuter (2013). Restrictionism and Reflection: Challenge Deflected, or Simply Redirected? The Monist 95 (2):200-222.
    It has become increasingly popular to respond to experimental philosophy by suggesting that experimental philosophers haven’t been studying the right kind of thing. One version of this kind of response, which we call the reflection defense, involves suggesting both that philosophers are interested only in intuitions that are the product of careful reflection on the details of hypothetical cases and the key concepts involved in those cases, and that these kinds of philosophical intuitions haven’t yet been (and possibly cannot be) (...)
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  3. Chad Gonnerman & Jonathan M. Weinberg (2010). Two Uneliminated Uses for “Concepts”: Hybrids and Guides for Inquiry. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):211-212.
    Machery's case against hybrids rests on a principle that is too strong, even by his own lights. And there are likely important generalizations to be made about hybrids, if they do exist. Moreover, even if there were no important generalizations about concepts themselves, the term picks out an important class of entities and should be retained to help guide inquiry.
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  4. Jonathan M. Weinberg, Chad Gonnerman, Cameron Buckner & Joshua Alexander (2010). Are Philosophers Expert Intuiters? Philosophical Psychology 23 (3):331-355.
    Recent experimental philosophy arguments have raised trouble for philosophers' reliance on armchair intuitions. One popular line of response has been the expertise defense: philosophers are highly-trained experts, whereas the subjects in the experimental philosophy studies have generally been ordinary undergraduates, and so there's no reason to think philosophers will make the same mistakes. But this deploys a substantive empirical claim, that philosophers' training indeed inculcates sufficient protection from such mistakes. We canvass the psychological literature on expertise, which indicates that people (...)
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  5. Chad Gonnerman (2008). Examining the How and Why of Anthropomorphism. Metascience 17 (3):419-423.
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  6. Chad Gonnerman (2008). Reading Conflicted Minds: An Empirical Follow-Up to Knobe and Roedder. Philosophical Psychology 21 (2):193 – 205.
    Recently Joshua Knobe and Erica Roedder found that folk attributions of valuing tend to vary according to the perceived moral goodness of the object of value. This is an interesting finding, but it remains unclear what, precisely, it means. Knobe and Roedder argue that it indicates that the concept MORAL GOODNESS is a feature of the concept VALUING. In this article, I present a study of folk attributions of desires and moral beliefs that undermines this conclusion. I then propose the (...)
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