In this essay I argue that Mozi's philosophy is anything but utilitarianism by way of analysing four ethical theories. Utilitarianism is an ethics in which the moral subject is an atomic individual human being, and its concern is how to fulfill the interests of the individual self and the social majority. Confucian ethics is centered on the notion of the family and its basic question is that of priority in the relationship between the small self and the enlarged or collective (...) self. Opposite to these two moral theories is Mozi's ethics: The interests that Mozi is primarily concerned with are not the interests of my individual self or my collective self, but the interests of the other. The fulfillment of the material needs of the other is my moral obligation. The arguments are centered on the three basic concepts, "the I," "the we," and "the other." The significance of Mozi's thought in modemrn or postmodern context lies in its striking resemblance to the philosophy of a contemporary western philosopher, Levinas. In both Mozi and Levinas, there is a suspension of utilitarianism. (shrink)

This essay attempts to provide an alternative approach to the philosophy of religion through a new interpretation of Daoist philosophy in light of Husserl’s phenomenology. I argue that Lao-Zhuang’s wu-wei should be understood as a reduction of our existential and conceptual beliefs about the reality of this world. In Lao-Zhuang, wu-wei is related to the theme of decentering of the subject. In order to be a true self, we have to make space at the core of our being for Dao (...) to appear. The authentic selfhood is constituted in its correctrelation to Dao. In Daoist philosophy of religion, the center of gravity in the relation between Dao and the world (or worlds) is shifted from this world to Dao, and the problematic in the philosophy of religion is displaced from a truth-oriented issue to a receptivity issue. (shrink)

This paper addresses the question why the issue of reason and evidence as the central concern in the mainstream contemporary philosophy of religion has to be displaced by the issue of suspension according to Lao-Zhuang and the Augustine of Hippo. For both Lao-Zhuang and Augustine, in making room for the Other to appear at the core of the self’s being, it shows that there is an inseparable relationship of the self to the Other. In suspending its own understanding, admitting its (...) own ignorance in humility, the subject is not in sheer darkness, but can follow a new light not generated from itself; in suspending its own will, the subject is not paralyzed, but follows the will of the Other. The selfhood of the subject is constituted in its relation to the Other. (shrink)

Abstract: This paper examines two fundamental claims by Michel Henry on his philosophy’s relationship with classical phenomenology (Husserl and Heidegger) and Christianity. It shows in what way Henry’s phenomenology is the radicalization and absolutization of classical phenomenology: pure phenomenological truth is the identification of appearing and what appears rather than the separation of the two. According to Henry, his notions of life and truth is fully in accordance with Christianity’s Revelation of God. In the last part, the paper challenges Henry’s (...) claim that his phenomenology is a Christian philosophy from a Kierkegaardian point of view and argues that Henry’s phenomenology is, as a matter of fact, a philosophy without Christ. Contrary to a popular viewpoint that Michel Henry is a Christian thinker of our age, I would argue that Henry’s concept of God and Christ is essentially a scholarly philosophical invention. If Henry’s philosophy is an absolute and ultimate form of phenomenology, then it is reasonable to draw a conclusion that Christ as the Truth of Christianity is outside the boundary of phenomenology. (shrink)

In the dissertation I have presented a historical, comparative, and systematic study on the issue of the relation between aesthetic subjects and ethical subjects by focusing on the philosophers Lao-zi, Zhuang-zi, Mencius, Tu Wei-ming, Heidegger, Derrida, Foucault, and Levinas. By "aesthetic" I mean "amoral" in the Kierkegaardian sense, and by "ethical" I mean care and compassion for others in the Levinasian sense. The dissertation is correspondingly divided into two parts: "Part : Aesthetic Subjects," and "Part : Ethical Subjects." In Part (...) I, I argue that in Lao-zi and Zhuang-zi there is a tranquil poetic-religious-aesthetic subject, in Heidegger a heroic-existential-aesthetic subject and a poetic-aesthetic subject , and in Confucianism a metaphysical-moral-aesthetic subject. In Part II, one can see that in Derrida there is an ethical-religious subject, in Foucault, an ethical-political subject, and in Levinas, a pious religious-ethical subject. ;By investigating, interpreting and comparing three kinds of ethics, metaphysical moral theory, originary ethics, and postmodern ethics, I try to provide an answer to the question asked by contemporary philosophers "Who comes after the subject?" The subject, as I understand it, means the subject of representation, the metaphysical subject. This subject is essentially aesthetic. The end of the subject is my starting point. The central theme of my present study is that an ethical subject is possible only on the condition that it is first a situated subject. However, this does not mean that a situated subject is necessarily an ethical one. After the death of the subject there are at least two possibilities of being a situated subject, the aesthetic one and the ethical one: for example, the Nietzschean subject in early Derrida and the Levinasian subject in later Derrida respectively. ;My conclusion is that if the subject in "Who comes after the subject?" is a knowing subject, then in postmodern ethics, the subjectivity of the subject is constituted in its ethical responsibilities. (shrink)

In this essay I offer an interpretative reading of the first chapter in the two canonical works, the Zhuang-zi and the Lao-zi, and argue that there is an inner connection between the first chapters of the two books. My presupposition is that what Zhuang-zi has argued in "Xiao Yao You" is the theme of the relativity of the position of the human world, which is in accord with the mystery of Dao presented at the beginning of the Lao-zi. Therefore, there (...) are two opposite directions running in the Daoist philosophy in Lao-zi and Zhuang-zi: the first one is from this world (worlds) to Dao; the second one is from Dao to the worlds. While the first emphasizes the relativity of the point of views of the worldly beings, the second shows the mystery of Dao. This can be seen as a hermeneutical circle. (shrink)