Online research in philosophy

O problema da causação descendente é um ponto central na formulação do fisicalismo não-redutivo e na compreensão da emergência de propriedades. Duas interpretações possíveis da causação descendente, nas quais a contribuição do pensamento aristotélico é importante, são examinadas. Os requisitos do programa de matematização da natureza na mecanica clássica, que levaram ao abandono de três dos modos causais aristotélicos, nao parecem igualmente importantes nas ciencias especiais. Isto sugere que a contribuição de Aristóteles pode ser, de certa maneira, retomada. Uma definição (...) de propriedade emergente é apresentada, sendo a causação descendente interprerada de acordo com os modos causais formal e funcional.The problem of downward causation is a key subject in the formulation of nonreductive physicalism as well as in the understanding of property emergence. Two possible interpretations of downward causation, to which Aristotelian thought is relevant, are examined. In the mathematical understanding of nature in classical mechanics, the principle of causality should meet requirements that entailed the rejection of three among the four Aristotelian causal modes. Those requirements do not seem equally important in the special sciences and one may suggest, then, that Aristotle’s contribution may be taken into account. A definition of an emergent property is proposed, in which downward causation is interpreted according to the formal and functional causal modes. (shrink)

Bibliographical Note Abstract Explaining things - introductory remarks General attitudes and the standard view Requirements for a definition Life as the natural selection of replicators Life as an autopoietic system Life as a semiotic phenomenon Downward causation Implicitly well-defined general objects Emergence as explanatory strategy: the observer reappears Concluding remarks Acknowledgements Notes References Bibliographical note: Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Princeton History of Science Workshop on "Growing Explanations", Princeton University, February 15, 1997; and at the meeting (...) in the International Society for the History, Philosophy and Social Studies of Biology (ISHPSSB) in Seattle, USA, July 16-21, 1997. Different parts were published in a modified form as 1) Emmeche (1997): "Autopoietic systems, replicators, and the search for a meaningful biologic definition of life", Ultimate Reality and Meaning 20 (4): 244-264 [the original title was: "Is the definition of life important?"], and 2) Emmeche (1998): "Defining life as a semiotic phenomenon", Cybernetics & Human Knowing 5 (1): 3-17. The present web version below contains the complete argument of both articles. A further thoroughly rewritten version, accessible also for non-specialists, was made in collaboration with Charbel Niño El-Hani, and translated by him into Portuguese as a contribution to a book (this version can be found at www.nbi.dk/~emmeche/coPubl/99.DefVida.CE.EH.html). (shrink)

When is conceptual change so significant that we should talk about a new theory, not a new version of the same theory? We address this problem here, starting from Gould’s discussion of the individuation of the Darwinian theory. He locates his position between two extremes: ‘minimalist’—a theory should be individuated merely by its insertion in a historical lineage—and ‘maximalist’—exhaustive lists of necessary and sufficient conditions are required for individuation. He imputes the minimalist position to Hull and attempts a reductio : (...) this position leads us to give the same ‘name’ to contradictory theories. Gould’s ‘structuralist’ position requires both ‘conceptual continuity’ and descent for individuation. Hull’s attempt to assimilate into his general selectionist framework Kuhn’s notion of ‘exemplar’ and the ‘semantic’ view of the structure of scientific theories can be used to counter Gould’s reductio , and also to integrate structuralist and population thinking about conceptual change. (shrink)

Any description of the emergence and evolution of different types of meaning processes (semiosis, sensu C.S.Peirce) in living systems must be supported by a theoretical framework which makes it possible to understand the nature and dynamics of such processes. Here we propose that the emergence of semiosis of different kinds can be understood as resulting from fundamental interactions in a triadically-organized hierarchical process. To grasp these interactions, we develop a model grounded on Stanley Salthe's hierarchical structuralism. This model can be (...) applied to establish, in a general sense, a set of theoretical constraints for explaining the instantiation of different kinds of meaning processes (iconic, indexical, symbolic) in semiotic systems. We use it to model a semiotic process in the immune system, namely, B-cell activation, in order to offer insights into the heuristic role it can play in the development of explanations for specific semiotic processes. (shrink)

: In this paper, we intend to discuss if and in what sense semiosis (meaning process, cf. C. S. Peirce) can be regarded as an "emergent" process in semiotic systems. It is not our problem here to answer when or how semiosis emerged in nature. As a prerequisite for the very formulation of these problems, we are rather interested in discussing the conditions which should be fulfilled for semiosis to be characterized as an emergent process. The first step in this (...) work is to summarize a systematic analysis of the variety of emergence theories and concepts, elaborated by Achim Stephan. Along the summary of this analysis, we pose fundamental questions that have to be answered in order to ascribe a precise meaning to the term "emergence" in the context of an understanding of semiosis. After discussing a model for explaining emergence based on Salthe's hierarchical structuralism, which considers three levels at a time in a semiotic system, we present some tentative answers to those questions. (shrink)

We present here a digital scenario to simulate the emergence of self-organized symbol-based communication among artificial creatures inhabiting a virtual world of predatory events. In order to design the environment and creatures, we seek theoretical and empirical constraints from C.S.Peirce Semiotics and an ethological case study of communication among animals. Our results show that the creatures, assuming the role of sign users and learners, behave collectively as a complex system, where self-organization of communicative interactions plays a major role in the (...) emergence of symbol-based communication. We also strive for a careful use of the theoretical concepts involved, including the concepts of symbol, communication, and emergence, and we use a multi-level model as a basis for the interpretation of inter-level relationships in the semiotic processes we are studying. (shrink)

In this work, we propose a computational approach to the triadic model of Peircean semiosis (meaning processes). We investigate theoretical constraints about the feasibility of simulated semiosis. These constraints, which are basic requirements for the simulation of semiosis, refer to the synthesis of irreducible triadic relations (Sign–Object–Interpretant). We examine the internal organization of the triad S–O–I, that is, the relative position of its elements and how they relate to each other. We also suggest a multi-level approach based on self-organization principles. (...) In this context, semiosis is described as an emergent process. Nevertheless, the term ‘emergence’ is often used in a very informal way in the so called ‘emergent’ computation, without clear explanations and/or definitions. In this paper, we discuss in some detail the meaning of the theoretical terms ‘emergence’ and ‘emergent’, showing how such an analysis can lead to improvements of the algorithm proposed. (shrink)

Este artículo examina eI significado de los términos biológicos “epigénesis” y “preformación” en eI desarrollo imelectual de Kant, así como sus implicaciones epistemológicas. De hecho, las ideas de espontaneidad y sistema, centrales en la teoría kantiana de la mente, encontraron su analogía empírica en la idea de epigénesis de la naturaleza, una noción que Kant utiliza para dar respuesta a la cuestión de la genesis y validez de las represenraciones puras. Para el autor, la idea de epigénesis compendia la revolución (...) copernicana de Kant en la medida en que aquélla ilustra el papel productivo del entendimiento humano en la constitución de la experiencia.This paper explores the meaning of the biological terms “epigenesis” and “preformation” in Kant’s intellectual development, as well as its epistemological implications. In fact, spontaneity and system, two central ideas in Kant’s theory of mind, found their empirical analogy in the idea of epigenesis in nature, a notion that Kant uses to give answer to the question of the genesis and validity of the pure representations. For the author, epigenesis summarizes Kant’s Copernican Revolution in the measure in which that idea illustrates tbe productive role of the human understanding in the constitution of experience. (shrink)

EI desarrollo de su teoría de las leyes como relaciones entre universales condujo a Armstrong a establecer un marco metafísico general mas complejo que el que sus anteriores trabajos presentaban. En este artículo se exponen los aspectos principales de la metafísica de particulares y universales exigida por la identificación original de Armstrong de las leyes con estados de cosas universales. Además, se presentan diversas dificultades que pueden hallarse en su propuesta, y algunas soluciones para las mismas. Los temas principales que (...) se discuten son las leyes con excepciones, las leyes con restriccionesespacio-temporales, las leyes probabilísticas y las leyes no ejemplificadas.The development of his theory of laws as relations between universals led Armstrong to set up a more complex general metaphysical framework than that advanced in his previous works. In this paper I present the main traits of the metaphysics of properties and particulars required by Armstrongsoriginal identification of laws with universal states of affairs. Besides, I advance some serious drawbacks that can be found in his proposal and I also offer some solutions to them. The main subjects to be discussed here will be laws with exceptions, laws with spatio-temporal limitations, probabilistic laws and uninstantiated laws. (shrink)

La perspectiva historiográfica ofrecida por la teoría de las consecuencias involuntarias puede ser reconceptualizada en una concepción del mercado que explique su funcionamiento como una continua interrelación entre individuos que desconocen las consecuencias colectivas de los cursos de acción que emprenden.Asimismo, podrían distinguirse dos versiones de dicha teoria; de un lado, Ia versión débil, que se correspondería con el concepto de mercado de Hayek, y, deI otro, Ia versión fuerte. EI objetivo de este artículo es proponer el concepto al que (...) hemos denominado el principio de ignorancia, que seria una concepción acerca deI desenvolvimiento deI mercado acorde con los rasgos propios de Ia versión fuerte de Ia teoría de las consecuencias involuntarias.The historiographical perspective of the theory of unintended consequences can be reconceptualized into a conception of the market which explains its operation as a continuous interaction among individuals that do not know the collective consequences of their behaviours.Also, two versions of this theory might be distinguished, the weak version, which corresponds to Hayek’s concept of market, and the strong version. The aim of this paper is to propose the concept that we have termed as ignorance principIe, which is a conception of the operation of the market that fits to the characteristics of the strong version of the theory of unintended consequences. (shrink)

The controversy over the notion of emergence has recently re-emerged But a rigorous debate concerning how it might be explained or defined is often lacking Emergence is discussed here under two strict conditions (l) emergents can be predictable from the knowledge about a system's parts, (ll) emergents can be regarded as dependent on, and deternuned by, the system's micro-structure O'Connor's definmon of an emergent property is taken as a starting-point for a new definmon, incorporating Emmeche and colleagues' analysis of dounward (...) causation and Baas' treatment of emergence It is not necessary to assume that this defintaon might provide the solution to the problem of emergence Rather, theoretical pluralism regarding different pragmatically-workable notions of emergence is welcome The reality of emergents is discussed here from the standpoint of Dennet's mild realism. (shrink)

La perspectiva historiográfica ofrecida por la teoría de las consecuencias involuntarias puede ser reconceptualizada en una concepción del mercado que explique su funcionamiento como una continua interrelación entre individuos que desconocen las consecuencias colectivas de los cursos de acción que emprenden.Asimismo, podrían distinguirse dos versiones de dicha teoria; de un lado, Ia versión débil, que se correspondería con el concepto de mercado de Hayek, y, deI otro, Ia versión fuerte. EI objetivo de este artículo es proponer el concepto al que (...) hemos denominado el principio de ignorancia, que seria una concepción acerca deI desenvolvimiento deI mercado acorde con los rasgos propios de Ia versión fuerte de Ia teoría de las consecuencias involuntarias.The historiographical perspective of the theory of unintended consequences can be reconceptualized into a conception of the market which explains its operation as a continuous interaction among individuals that do not know the collective consequences of their behaviours.Also, two versions of this theory might be distinguished, the weak version, which corresponds to Hayek’s concept of market, and the strong version. The aim of this paper is to propose the concept that we have termed as ignorance principIe, which is a conception of the operation of the market that fits to the characteristics of the strong version of the theory of unintended consequences. (shrink)

In this article I propose a new explanation of the relationship between Russell and ther first Wittgenstein. There are five main novelties in my interpretation; (i) the use of all relevant unpublished manuscripts of Russell; (ii) the discovery of the first apparition of the “multiple theory of judgment” in a purely logical and unpublished context; (iii) the role of the Bradleian objection against relations in the evolution of the nation of form in both Russell and Wittgenstein; (iv) a general point (...) of view to obtain a common explanation of all the criticisms of Wittgenstein against Russell and of the abandonment to Theory of Knowledge; and (v) the first account of the contribution of Whitehead to the progressive Russellian evolution from atomism to holism. (shrink)

Pragmatics is the theory of conversation; more specifically, pragmatics is the discipline that studies linguistic rationality. This concept has to be interpreted as the instrumental coherence betweencommunicative goals and means. Therefore, pragmatics is essentially about the relations of relevance between utterances and contexts, understanding these as sets of beliefs held by the speaker and eventually shared by the hearer, and not as the set of objective features surrounding communicative interaction.

Prigogine afirma que, en presencia de alta inestabilidad (caos), los estados puntuales y las trayectorias lineales en el espacio de las fases se convierten en una falsa idealización. En el presente trabajo se sostiene que: (i) los argumentos de Prigogine en favor de tal tesis no son concluyentes, y (ii) hay buenas razones para retener la postulacion de estados puntuales y trayectorias lineales, en tanto conceptos teóricos legítimos en mecánica estadística.Prigogine asserts that the existence of radical instability (chaos) makes the (...) postulation of pointlike states and linelike trajectories in phase space a false idealization. In this paper we argue that (i) Prigogine’s arguments for this claim are not conclusive, and (ii) there are good reasons for retain the positing of pointlike states and linelike trajectories as a legitimate theoretical posit in statistical mechanics. (shrink)

There are two kinds of philosophical problems in the theory of partial truth: semantical and methodological problems. The semantics of partial truth must be clarified by some standard system of multivaluedlogic. Fuzzy set theory should be applied to solve some methodological problems.

This paper analyses the ancient atomism from a modern point of view. It focuses its attention on the essential properties of clasical atoms. First, it considers the principles of the atomist ontology and the concept of void. Then, it studies the concept of atom and its fundamental properties: shape, size, weight, and motion. It discusses three significant problems of the clasical atomism: i) the theoretical character to the atoms and their resemblances and differences with respect to the macroscopical bodies; ii) (...) the atomist explanation and its limits; and iii) the visual representation of the atoms. Finally, it outlines some reasons which indicate a radical change and the very dissolution of the classical concept of particle in the field of the contemporary physical science. (shrink)

Nuestro sistema musical de referencia está basado en la division de la octava en doce partes, doce semitonos, iguales. Aunque adecuada tal configuración a la práctica musical, conlleva en el plano teórico una serie de problemas, como que, a excepción de la propia octava, no haya ni una sola consonancia natural (justa) o que la razon deI semitono sea 12√2. Tal temperamento igual no se impone definitivamente hasta mediados deI s. XVIII, pero ya a finales deI s. XVI se llega (...) a su formulación y determinación exactas, bien que no de forma matemática. En este esfuerzo merece especial atenciónla figura deI teórico musical español Francisco Salinas.Our tonal system of reference is based· on division of the octave into twelve equal parts, twelve semitones. Although this configuration is suitable for practical musical purposes, it poses some problems for music theory. For example, apart from the octave itself, there is not one natural (just) consonance. Also, the semitone ratio results to be 12√2. This equal temperament was not definitively imposed until the middle of the 18th Century, but by the end of the 16th Century its precise formulation and calculation, although not in its mathematical form, had been completed. The spanish humanist and music theorist Francisco Salinas was one of the key figures responsible for this task. (shrink)

Dentro dei ámbito de estudio da la ciancia, recientemente ha surgido con fuerza un nuevo enfoque, la sociología dei conocimiento científico (SSK). Desde su aparición a mediados de la dacada de los setenta, la SSK ha tomado formas diversas. Entre éstas y la filosofía de la ciencia ha existido una continua disputa. Ultimamente, sin embargo, la SSK se ha ido transformando en una “sociologfa de la practica cientrfica”. A partir de este cambio, ambas disciplinas -la filosofía de la ciencia y (...) a SSK- están encontrando puntos en común de influencia, diálogo y estudio. Mi propósito es mostrar la trayectoria de la SSK y analizar esos puntos de contacto.Within the field of science studies, recently a new approach has taken a strong hold -the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK). Ever since its appearance in the mid-seventies, within SSK there have been diverse tendencies. Between these and the philosophy of science there has been a perpetual confrontation. Lately, SSK appears to be undergoing a metamorphosis, transforming into a sociology of scientific practice. What is interesting about this case is that both disciplines -philosophy of science and SSK- are finding a common point of confluence, dialogue and study. My aim is to trace the trajectory of SSK and to analyze these points of contact. (shrink)

Behind a succinct account about Euler and his connection with the philosophy, on show forth his arguments for to prove the effective existence of the absolute space in the Mechanica sive motus scientia (1736) and in the Reflexions sur l’espace et le temps (1748). These works constitute the Euler’s first approximation in defence of the doctrine of space held by Newton, and against: the Metaphysicians(Leibniz, Berkeley). This paper point at the possible ascendancy about Kant, especially in Von de m ersten (...) Grunde des Unterschiedes der Gegenden im Raume (1768). (shrink)

Toda decisión racional a la vez que se apoya en la información proporcionada por los datos,sirve para incrementar el contenido informativo de los mismos. El sistema de normas constituye el dato fundemental en el proceso de toma de decisiones jurídicas. Le coherencia de tal sistema no es un supuesto a acepter, sino que debe ser controlada y mejorada a través de estrategias que incluyen el aprovechamiento de los medios automatizados y de le critica recionel del lenguaje jurídico.

Firstly we consider the new results about enzymatic capabilities in the RNA. In this framework we analyse the sequence-folding duality as a precursor of the genotype/phenotype duality. We discuss then which are the evolutive potentialities and limitations for a system with the absence and the presence of a nucleic acid to proteins translator code. We study the arise of the code in the living systems as a form of deep interlooking between the logic of the machinery and its hardware, discussing (...) some problems that abstract modelization of this process implies. Finaly we propose to redefine the informational vocabulary usually employed in Molecular Biology. (shrink)

En el debate entre contextualistas y anticontextualistas, señala Recanati, los últimos aventajan a los primeros por un argumento atribuible a Grice. Este argumento tiene corno premisa el Principio del Paralelismo que, según Recanati, convierte al argumento en circular y a la posición anticontextualista en injustificada. Si bien considero este argumento anticontextualista inadecuado, demostraré que no es atribuible a Grice. Grice no puede admitir el Principio del Paralelismo si se tiene en cuenta la explicación que elabora para ciertos ejemplos y su (...) teoria de las implicaturas. Grice, según esa explicación y algunas de sus propuestas, se muestra como un contextualista. (shrink)

Dentro dei ámbito de estudio da la ciancia, recientemente ha surgido con fuerza un nuevo enfoque, la sociología dei conocimiento científico (SSK). Desde su aparición a mediados de la dacada de los setenta, la SSK ha tomado formas diversas. Entre éstas y la filosofía de la ciencia ha existido una continua disputa. Ultimamente, sin embargo, la SSK se ha ido transformando en una “sociologfa de la practica cientrfica”. A partir de este cambio, ambas disciplinas -la filosofía de la ciencia y (...) a SSK- están encontrando puntos en común de influencia, diálogo y estudio. Mi propósito es mostrar la trayectoria de la SSK y analizar esos puntos de contacto.Within the field of science studies, recently a new approach has taken a strong hold -the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK). Ever since its appearance in the mid-seventies, within SSK there have been diverse tendencies. Between these and the philosophy of science there has been a perpetual confrontation. Lately, SSK appears to be undergoing a metamorphosis, transforming into a sociology of scientific practice. What is interesting about this case is that both disciplines -philosophy of science and SSK- are finding a common point of confluence, dialogue and study. My aim is to trace the trajectory of SSK and to analyze these points of contact. (shrink)

The “Centro de Estudios Cientificos” (CEC) of San Sebastian was established to palliate the absence of universitary studies in the Basque Country, in base of an idea suggested by J. Rey Pastor. It began itsactivities in 1932 and ended in 1936, because of Spanish Civil War. It was supported by the “Sociedad de Estudios Vascos” and sponsored by the “Diputación Foral de Gipuzkoa” and the San Sebastian Council. In this paper, we describe and comment the different aspects relatives to the (...) CEC such as constitution, statutes, members, sections, courses, teachers, students, ... , and scientific journals supported by the CEC. (shrink)

La Iglesia ha dado por zanjado el caso Galileo en más de una ocasion. No obstante, la polémica ha continuado. Aquí se argumenta que las distintas iniciativas de la Iglesia respecto al caso Galileo -la revision de la condena dei copernicanismo a partir de 1820; la utilización de los documentos dei dossier inquisitorial de Galileo a partir de 1850 y la polémica suscitada; el caso Paschini (1942-1965); y las conclusiones de Juan Pablo II en 1992-1993- ponen de manifiesto la misma (...) actitud de la Iglesia y la persistencia de los intereses básicos de partida, que hacen muy improbable que el “caso de Galileo”, al margen de los problemas genuinamente históricos, pueda cerrarse.Althoght the Catholic Church has setlled “Galileo’s case” several times, the controverse goes on. I argue that Church’s initatives on this matter -the revision of the condenmation of copernicanism from 1820; the use of documents coming from Galileo’s inquisitorial dossier from 1850 on and the controversy raised by this use; Paschini case (1942-1965); and the conclusions drawn by pope John Paul II in 1992-1993- make evident the identical actitude of the Church as well as the persistence of his basic interests, which make very unlikely that Galileo’s case, regardless of genuine historical problems, call be considered as closed. (shrink)

Firstly we consider the new results about enzymatic capabilities in the RNA. In this framework we analyse the sequence-folding duality as a precursor of the genotype/phenotype duality. We discuss then which are the evolutive potentialities and limitations for a system with the absence and the presence of a nucleic acid to proteins translator code. We study the arise of the code in the living systems as a form of deep interlooking between the logic of the machinery and its hardware, discussing (...) some problems that abstract modelization of this process implies. Finaly we propose to redefine the informational vocabulary usually employed in Molecular Biology. (shrink)

En el contexto de este artículo denominaremos mentalismo a la conjunción de dos tesis diferentes: (i) para que las expresiones lingüísticas tengan significado es necesario que haya entidades de carácter mental; (ii) tales entidades mentales son suficientes para fijar el significado de las expresiones correspondientes (es decir, lo determinan). Es característico deI segundo Wittgenstein el rechazo a ambas tesis. Pero son sus argumentos contra (ii), especialmente a partir de las consideraciones sobre seguir una regla, los que han concentrado casi toda (...) la atención. En este trabajo presento el argumento principal de Wittgentein contra (i), diferenciándolo de sus objeciones a (ii).In this article mentalism will be used to denominate the conjunction of two thesis: (i) it is a necessary condition for linguistic expressions having meaning the existence of mental entities; (ii) these mental entities are sufficient to fix the meaning of the corresponding expressions (they determine it). The two thesis are rejected by the later Wittgenstein. Most of the attention, though, has been paid to his arguments against (ii), especially based on discussions of rule-following. In this paper I work out Wittgenstein’s main argument against (i), and I distinguish it from his objections to (ii). (shrink)

A través de los recursos esenciales de la semantica de los mundos posibles se comparan y relacionan, por un lado, la dimensión científica y filosófica, y por otro, la dimensión tecnica y la utópica, utilizándose para ello las relaciones entre composibilidad (o compatibilidad) y existencia, y entre el mundo actual, en el que opera la técnica, y mundos posibles, hacia los que se proyecta la utopía. En esta tarea resulta de interés prestar atención a la problematica clasica acerca de los (...) poliedros posibles e imposibles, en relación con el problema de la afectación, exclusión o ajuste de los “monstruos” de la lógica o de la razón.Through the essential means of the semantics of possible worlds, some dimensions are compared and related: firstly, the scientific and philosophical dimension, and secondly the technical and utopian dimension. For that purpose the relationship between compossibility (or compatibility) and existence are used as well as that between the real world, in which technique works, and possible worlds, towards utopia is oriented. In this task it is interesting to pay attention to the classic issue of possible and impossible polyhedrons, concerning affectation, exclusion or fitting of “monsters” of logic or of reason. (shrink)

Given Kim’s principle of explanatory exclusion (EE), it follows that in addition to the problem of mental causation, dualism faces a problem of mental explanation. However, the plausibility of EE rests upon the acceptance of a further principle concerning the individuation of explanation (EI). The two methods of defending EI—either by combining an internal account of the individuation of explanation with a semantical account of properties or by accepting an external account of the individuation of explanation—are both metaphysically implausible. This (...) is not, however, to reject the problem of mental explanation, for EE can be replaced with a far weaker principle, which does not require the acceptance of EI, but which generates a similar problem for dualism. (shrink)

Without a doubt, Levinas' principal concern in philosophy is how the self meets the Other. His magnum opus, Totality and Infinity, bears the subtitle, An Essay on Exterior- ity. Exteriority refers to a region beyond the horizons of the self, that which "is" beyond transcendental subjectivity. If there are such "beings" as other selves, that is, other subjects, they exist out there in the exterior. But if knowledge is confined to the interior—as Levinas says it must be—then the Other cannot (...) be known. He writes, "There is in knowledge, in the final account, an impossibility of escaping the self; hence sociality cannot have the same structure as knowledge" (EI 60). (shrink)

Consider the Evidence Question: When and under what conditions is proposition P evidence for some agent S? Silins (Philos Perspect 19:375–404, 2005) has recently offered a partial answer to the Evidence Question. In particular, Silins argues for Evidential Internalism (EI), which holds that necessarily, if A and B are internal twins, then A and B have the same evidence. In this paper I consider Silins’s argument, and offer two response on behalf of Evidential Externalism (EE), which is the denial of (...) Evidential Internalism. The first response claims that the allegedly unattractive consequence for EE is not so unattractive. The second response takes the form of a tu quoque, demonstrating that a structurally similar argument can be constructed against EI. The two responses play off one another: objecting to the first puts pressure on one to accept the other. Taken together, the two responses have important ramifications for how we answer the Evidence Question, and how we think about evidence in general. (shrink)

This study explores the impact of both individual ethics (IE) and organizational ethics (OE) on ethical intention (EI). Ethical intention, or the individual’s intention to engage in ethical behavior, is useful as a dependent variable because it relates to behavior which can be an expression of values, but also is influenced by organizational and societal variables. The focus is on EI in international business decision-making, since the international context provides great latitude in making ethical decisions. Results demonstrate that both IE (...) and OE influence EI. Ethical congruence is also discussed as a positive influence. Younger managers are more influenced by OE than older managers. The findings call for creating governance mechanisms to enhance ethical congruence, thereby increasing the likelihood of managers making ethical choices in organizational decision-making. (shrink)

Epistemic Internalism (EI) is the claim that an agent S is justified in believing that p at a time t iff S has either an actual or potential direct awareness of the grounds or properties that confer justification on p at t . In this paper I argue that EI does not provide the proponent of EI with an intuitively clear analysis of epistemic justification. More exactly, after identifying two different versions of EI – a weak version and a strong (...) version – I offer some general considerations for thinking that neither the weak version nor the strong version provides the proponent of EI with a plausible analysis of epistemic justification and conclude, therefore, that EI itself cannot be considered a plausible analysis of epistemic justification. (shrink)

If we follow a traditional reading of Descartes and throw in some of our favorite German philosophers (Kant, Husserl and Heidegger, for instance) we can isolate a doctrinal current that says that the pure intellect has no immediate access to the extra-mental world. This reduction of experience to reason forces the question of the external world’s existence, leading to Heidegger’s assertion that the scandal of philosophy was not that it had yet to furnish a proof for the external world’s existence, (...) as Kant thought, but that the question emerged in the first place. Prior to representing realities, the human being dwells in the world. Knowing is, thus, founded on Being-in-the-world. Once this is remembered, it seems quite extraneous to inquire about the existence of the external world, since it is given as part of the structure of human experience. But, if the question of the external world's existence arises when we reduce experience to rational experience, then we have learned something important about the structures involved in knowing the world. Knowing succeeds by breaking away from Being-in-theworld. As Levinas says, "it is still and always a solitude" (EI 60). Though knowledge might begin as a mode of Being-in-the-world, it succeeds by turning its back on these origins and entering upon another terrain. Thus, Heidegger's recourse to the external world could not be within knowledge. Instead, he grounded it in concern, the primordial way in which the human being dwells in the world. Knowing is but one way in which the human being exhibits this concern. Where Husserl showed the limits of representation to be within the parameters of the transcendental ego, Heidegger pushed the frontiers of the world down to another level, the level of function. On this level, the human being dwells as a worker; things are construed as implements for-the-sake-of something else. These implements refer to other implements in a referential totality guided by "circumspection." The world of function is held together as a totality by an intricate web of references, each pointing to others.. (shrink)