Why may not our acts be "the workshop of being, where we catch fact in the making?"1I find it difficult to respond to Peter H. Hare's writings because we come from different universes of discourse and have presumably different intentions. Whereas Peter translates James's writings into traditional philosophical issues as expressed through analytic discourse, I tend to follow James's quirky re-working of these issues to see where they lead and use his own vocabulary rather than translating it into another one. (...) We bring our intellectual backgrounds with us, though, and my way of understanding James—or Dewey or Addams, for that matter—is no more a transparent reading than is his. Although I choose to read and .. (shrink)
Since I think that an inability to recognize and respect the dignity of human beings because of perceived differences is at the center of the most intense disputes that we face in the twenty-first century, we have a particularly pressing duty as philosophers to develop and demonstrate principled beliefs that at the same time value beliefs contrary to one’s own. One of the most troubling developments in the discipline of philosophy over the course of the twentieth century, therefore, was its (...) increasing insulation from cultural, social, and political issues as it sought to emulate the presumed value neutrality of the sciences. As a first step toward a more principled and thoughtful approach to the value of diversity, we need to openly address the divisions in our own ranks as to what constitutes philosophyand how it ought to be carried out, and I use feminist and pragmatist approaches as cases in point. (shrink)
: I argue that the experimental method, like the corporeality of the body and the permeability of skins, links John Dewey and Friedrich Nietzsche. I raise questions about referring to bodies rather than body-minds, emphasizing hypothetical construction and the body rather than mutual responsiveness and situatedness, and whether Nietzsche's elitism is comparable to Dewey's democratic ideal of inclusiveness. With Naomi Zack, I argue for substituting ethnicity for race, and also develop Jane Addams as a model for recognizing and dismantling privilege.
The author argues that the contributions of Jane Addams and the women of theHull House Settlement to pragmatist theory, particularly as formulated by JohnDewey, are largely responsible for its emancipatory emphasis. By recoveringAddams's own pragmatist theory, a version of pragmatist feminism is developedthat speaks to such contemporary feminist issues as the manner of inclusionin society of diverse persons, marginalized by gender, ethnicity, race, andsexual orientation; the strengths and limitations of standpoint theory; and theneed for feminist ethics to embrace the social (...) nature of morality. The model ofsocial democracy that informs the pragmatist shift from a detached theory ofknowing to an engaged theory of understanding differentiates it from both liberalindividualism and communitarianism. Dewey's repeated attacks on theincoherence of the model of classical liberal individualism, for example, areeven more persuasive when seen in the context of the model of the intersubjectiveconstitution of the individual that Addams develops from examining therelation of personal development to social interaction among the women residentsof Hull House. (shrink)
This essay introduces some of the many interests, methodologies, and goals that the philosophical tradition of classical American philosophy, usually referred to as pragmatism, shares with feminist theories. Because pragmatism developed along with the emergence of departments of philosophy in the United States, it also begins recovering the shared history of some of the first women to receive philosophy degrees. It claims that women in and out of the academy influenced pragmatism and shows how contemporary feminist philosophers continue to challenge (...) and appropriate it. (shrink)
Unlike our counterparts in Europe who have rewritten their specific cultural philosophical heritage, American feminists have not yet critically reappropriated our own philosophical tradition of classical American pragmatism. The neglect is especially puzzling, given that both feminism and pragmatism explicitly acknowledge the material or cultural specificity of supposedly abstract theorizing. In this article I suggest some reasons for the neglect, call for the rediscovery of women pragmatists, reflect on a feminine side of pragmatism, and point out some common features. The (...) aim is to encourage the further development of a feminist revisioning of pragmatism and a pragmatist version of feminism. (shrink)