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Charles G. Morgan [32]Charles Grady Morgan [2]
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Profile: Charles Morgan (University of Pennsylvania)
  1. Charles Grady Morgan, Francis Jeffry Pelletier, Theo Janssen, Gerard Kok & Lambert Meertens (2002). 25th Anniversary Volume Contents. Linguistics and Philosophy 25:813-829.
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  2. Charles G. Morgan (2000). The Nature of Nonmonotonic Reasoning. Minds and Machines 10 (3):321-360.
    Conclusions reached using common sense reasoning from a set of premises are often subsequently revised when additional premises are added. Because we do not always accept previous conclusions in light of subsequent information, common sense reasoning is said to be nonmonotonic. But in the standard formal systems usually studied by logicians, if a conclusion follows from a set of premises, that same conclusion still follows no matter how the premise set is augmented; that is, the consequence relations of standard logics (...)
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  3. Charles G. Morgan (1999). Conditionals, Comparative Probability, and Triviality: The Conditional of Conditional Probability Cannot Be Represented in the Object Language. Topoi 18 (2):97-116.
    In this paper we examine the thesis that the probability of the conditional is the conditional probability. Previous work by a number of authors has shown that in standard numerical probability theories, the addition of the thesis leads to triviality. We introduce very weak, comparative conditional probability structures and discuss some extremely simple constraints. We show that even in such a minimal context, if one adds the thesis that the probability of a conditional is the conditional probability, then one trivializes (...)
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  4. Charles G. Morgan & Edwin D. Mares (1995). Conditionals, Probability, and Non-Triviality. Journal of Philosophical Logic 24 (5):455-467.
    We show that the implicational fragment of intuitionism is the weakest logic with a non-trivial probabilistic semantics which satisfies the thesis that the probabilities of conditionals are conditional probabilities. We also show that several logics between intuitionism and classical logic also admit non-trivial probability functions which satisfy that thesis. On the other hand, we also prove that very weak assumptions concerning negation added to the core probability conditions with the restriction that probabilities of conditionals are conditional probabilities are sufficient to (...)
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  5. Charles G. Morgan (1993). Introduction. Studia Logica 52 (2):iii-iii.
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  6. Charles G. Morgan (1992). Annual Meeting of the Society for Exact Philosophy: Co-Sponsored by the Association for Symbolic Logic, Victoria, British Columbia, Canada, May 23- 26, 1991. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 57 (2):749.
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  7. Charles G. Morgan (1992). Non-Standard Logics for Automated Reasoning, Edited by Smets Philippe, Mamdani Abe, Dubois Didier, and Prade Henri, Academic Press, London Etc. 1988, X+ 334 Pp. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 57 (1):277-281.
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  8. Charles G. Morgan (1992). Review: Philippe Smets, Abe Mamdani, Didier Dubois, Henri Prade, Non-Standard Logics for Automated Reasoning. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 57 (1):277-281.
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  9. Hugues Leblanc & Charles G. Morgan (1984). Probability Functions and Their Assumption Sets — the Binary Case. Synthese 60 (1):91 - 106.
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  10. Charles G. Morgan (1984). Weak Conditional Comparative Probability as a Formal Semantic Theory. Mathematical Logic Quarterly 30 (13‐16):199-212.
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  11. Charles G. Morgan (1983). Probabilistic Semantics for Orthologic and Quantum Logic. Logique Et Analyse 26 (103-104):323-339.
     
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  12. Charles G. Morgan & Hugues Leblanc (1983). Probability Theory, Intuitionism, Semantics and the Dutch Book Argument. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 24 (3):289-304.
  13. Charles G. Morgan (1982). Simple Probabilistic Semantics for Propositional K, T, B, S4, and S. Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (4):443 - 458.
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  14. Charles G. Morgan (1982). There is a Probabilistic Semantics for Every Extension of Classical Sentence Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (4):431 - 442.
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  15. Charles G. Morgan (1979). Local and Global Operators and Many-Valued Modal Logics. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 20 (2):401-411.
  16. Charles G. Morgan (1979). Note on a Strong Liberated Modal Logic and its Relevance to Possible World Skepticism. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 20 (4):718-722.
  17. Charles G. Morgan (1979). Modality, Analogy, and Ideal Experiments According to C. S. Peirce. Synthese 41 (1):65 - 83.
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  18. Charles Grady Morgan & Francis Jeffry Pelletier (1977). Some Notes Concerning Fuzzy Logics. Linguistics and Philosophy 1 (1):79 - 97.
    Fuzzy logics are systems of logic with infinitely many truth values. Such logics have been claimed to have an extremely wide range of applications in linguistics, computer technology, psychology, etc. In this note, we canvass the known results concerning infinitely many valued logics; make some suggestions for alterations of the known systems in order to accommodate what modern devotees of fuzzy logic claim to desire; and we prove some theorems to the effect that there can be no fuzzy logic which (...)
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  19. Charles G. Morgan (1976). A Resolution Principle for a Class of Many-Valued Logics. Logique Et Analyse 19 (74-76):311-339.
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  20. Charles G. Morgan (1976). Tuomela on Deductive Explanation. Journal of Philosophical Logic 5 (4):511 - 525.
    Almost every formal model of explanation thus far proposed has been demonstrated to be faulty. In this paper, a new model, proposed by Raimo Tuomela, is also demonstrated to be faulty. In particular, one condition of the model is shown to be too restrictive, and another condition of the model is shown to be too permissive.
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  21. Charles G. Morgan (1975). Weak Liberated Versions of T and S. Journal of Symbolic Logic 40 (1):25-30.
    The usual semantics for the modal systems T, S4, and S5 assumes that the set of possible worlds contains at least one member. Recently versions of these modal systems have been developed in which this assumption is dropped. The systems discussed here are obtained by slightly weakening the liberated versions of T and S4. The semantics does not assume the existence of possible worlds, and the accessibility relation between worlds is only required to be quasi-reflexive instead of reflexive. Completeness and (...)
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  22. Charles G. Morgan (1974). Book Review:Reason and Prediction Simon Blackburn. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 41 (1):98-.
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  23. Charles G. Morgan (1974). Book Review:Likelihood: An Account of the Statistical Concept of Likelihood and Its Application to Scientific Inference A. W. F. Edwards. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 41 (4):427-.
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  24. Charles G. Morgan (1974). A Theory of Equality for a Class of Many‐Valued Predicate Calculi. Mathematical Logic Quarterly 20 (25‐27):427-432.
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  25. Charles G. Morgan (1974). Liberated Brouwerian Modal Logic. Dialogue 13 (03):505-514.
  26. Charles G. Morgan (1973). Sentential Calculus for Logical Falsehoods. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 14 (3):347-353.
  27. Charles G. Morgan (1973). Truth, Falsehood, and Contingency in First-Order Predicate Calculus. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 14 (4):536-542.
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  28. Charles G. Morgan (1973). Drawing Dichotomies Via Formal Languages. Southern Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):216-227.
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  29. Charles G. Morgan (1973). Omer on Scientific Explanation. Philosophy of Science 40 (1):110-117.
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  30. Charles G. Morgan (1973). Systems of Modal Logic for Impossible Worlds. Inquiry 16 (1-4):280 – 289.
    The intuitive notion behind the usual semantics of most systems of modal logic is that of ?possible worlds?. Loosely speaking, an expression is necessary if and only if it holds in all possible worlds; it is possible if and only if it holds in some possible world. Of course, contradictory expressions turn out to hold in no possible worlds, and logically true expressions turn out to hold in every possible world. A method is presented for transforming standard modal systems into (...)
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  31. Charles G. Morgan (1973). The Psychology of Knowing. Edited by J. R. Royce and W. W. Rozeboom. New York: Gordon and Breach, Science Publishers, Inc., 1972, Pp. Viii, 496. $24.50. [REVIEW] Dialogue 12 (03):544-547.
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  32. Charles G. Morgan (1972). Observation and Theory in Science. By Ernest Nagel, Sylvain Bromberger, and Adolf Grünbaum. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press; Toronto: Copp Clark. 1971, Pp. 134. $7.65. [REVIEW] Dialogue 11 (04):651-655.
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  33. Charles G. Morgan (1972). On Two Proposed Models of Explanation. Philosophy of Science 39 (1):74-81.
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  34. Charles G. Morgan (1970). Kim on Deductive Explanation. Philosophy of Science 37 (3):434-439.
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