Online research in philosophy

The paper reconstructs Moore's Open Question Argument (OQA) and discusses its rise and fall. There are three basic objections to the OQA: Geach's point, that Moore presupposes that ?good? is a predicative adjective (whereas it is in fact attributive); Lewy's point, that it leads straight to the Paradox of Analysis; and Durrant's point that even if ?good? is not synonymous with any naturalistic predicate, goodness might be synthetically identical with a naturalistic property. As against Geach, I argue that ?good? has (...) both predicative and attributive uses and that in moral contexts it is difficult to give a naturalistic account of the attributive ?good?. To deal with Lewy, I reformulate the OQA. But the bulk of the paper is devoted to Durrant's objection. I argue that the post-Moorean programme of looking for synthetic identities between moral and naturalistic properties is either redundant or impossible. For it can be carried through only if ?good? expresses an empirical concept, in which case it is redundant since naturalism is true. But ?good? does not express an empirical concept (a point proved by the reformulated OQA). Hence synthetic naturalism is impossible. I discuss direct reference as a possible way out for the synthetic naturalist and conclude that it will not work. The OQA may be a bit battered but it works after a fashion. (shrink)

Machine generated contents note: Preface and Acknowledgements * Series Editor's Preface * Notes on the Contributors * A Note on References to Hume and Locke * Introduction; C.Pigden * Expressivism, Motivation Internalism, and Hume; R.Joyce * Is Hume Inconsistent? -- Motivation and Morals; N.Lo * If Not Non-Cognitivism, Then What?; C.Pigden * The Motivation Argument for Non-cognitivism; M.Smith * Experiences of Value; G.Oddie * Hume and the Debate on Motivating Reasons; C.Sandis * Against all Reason: Scepticism about the Instrumental Norm; (...) S.Finlay * Why Internalists about Reasons Should be Humeans about Motivation; K.Hurtig * Humean Sources of Normativity; H.Pauer-Studer * Two Kinds of Normativity; L.Russell * What Kind of Virtue-Theorist is Hume?; C.Swanton * Kinds of Virtue Theorist: A Response to Christine Swanton; A.Baier * Reply to Annette Baier; C.Swanton * Hume on Justice; R.Hursthouse * Consolidated Bibliography * Index Preface and Acknowledgements * Series Editor's Preface * Notes on the Contributors * A Note on References to Hume and Locke * Introduction; C.Pigden * Expressivism, Motivation Internalism, and Hume; R.Joyce * Is Hume Inconsistent? -- Motivation and Morals; N.Lo * If Not Non-Cognitivism, Then What?; C.Pigden * The Motivation Argument for Non-cognitivism; M.Smith * Experiences of Value; G.Oddie * Hume and the Debate on Motivating Reasons; C.Sandis * Against all Reason: Scepticism about the Instrumental Norm; S.Finlay * Why Internalists about Reasons Should be Humeans about Motivation; K.Hurtig * Humean Sources of Normativity; H.Pauer-Studer * Two Kinds of Normativity; L.Russell * What Kind of Virtue-Theorist is Hume?; C.Swanton * Kinds of Virtue Theorist: A Response to Christine Swanton; A.Baier * Reply to Annette Baier; C.Swanton * Hume on Justice; R.Hursthouse * Consolidated Bibliography * Index. (shrink)

Abstract Conspiracy theories should be neither believed nor investigated - that is the conventional wisdom. I argue that it is sometimes permissible both to investigate and to believe. Hence this is a dispute in the ethics of belief. I defend epistemic “oughts” that apply in the first instance to belief-forming strategies that are partly under our control. But the beliefforming strategy of not believing conspiracy theories would be a political disaster and the epistemic equivalent of selfmutilation. I discuss several variations (...) of this strategy, interpreting “conspiracy theory” in different ways but conclude that on all these readings, the conventional wisdom is deeply unwise. (shrink)

Nihilism, Nietzsche and the Doppelganger Problem Was Nietzsche a nihilist? Yes, because, like J. L. Mackie, he was an error-theorist about morality, including the elitist morality to which he himself subscribed. But he was variously a diagnostician, an opponent and a survivor of certain other kinds of nihilism. Schacht argues that Nietzsche cannot have been an error theorist, since meta-ethical nihilism is inconsistent with the moral commitment that Nietzsche displayed. Schacht’s exegetical argument parallels the substantive argument (advocated in recent years (...) by Wright and Blackburn) that Mackie’s error theory can’t be true because if it were, we would have to give up morality or give up moralizing. I answer this argument with a little bit of help from Nietzsche. I then pose a problem, the Doppelganger Problem, for the meta-ethical nihilism that I attribute to Mackie and Nietzsche. (If A is a moral proposition then not-A is a moral proposition: hence not all moral propositions can be false.) I solve the problem by reformulating the error theory and also deal with a variant of the problem, the Reinforced Doppelganger, glancing at a famous paper of Ronald Dworkin’s. Thus, whatever its demerits, the error theory, is not self-refuting, nor does it require us to give up morality. (shrink)

Bertrand Russell was a meta-ethical pioneer, the original inventor of both emotivism and the error theory. Why, having abandoned emotivism for the error theory, did he switch back to emotivism in the 1920s? Perhaps he did not relish the thought that as a moralist he was a professional hypocrite. In addition, Russell's version of the error theory suffers from severe defects. He commits the naturalistic fallacy and runs afoul of his own and Moore's arguments against subjectivism. These defects could be (...) repaired, but only by abandoning Russell's semantics.Russell preferred to revert to emotivism. (shrink)

In his celebrated 'Good and Evil' (l956) Professor Geach fights a war on two fronts. On the one hand, he wants to establish, as against the nonnaturalists, that the predicative 'good', as used by Moore, is senseless. 'Good' when properly used is attributive. 'There is no such thing as being just good or bad, [that is, no predicative 'good'] there is only being a good or bad so and so'. (GE, page 65) The predicative 'good' is a philosopher's word and (...) we cannot be 'asked to take it for granted from the outset that a peculiarly philosophical use of words means anything at all'! (GE, page 67.) Attempts to define this phantom have foundered for the simple reason that there is really no such use to be defined. The search for a property for which 'good' stands - a 'way out of the Naturalistic Fallacy' - is a vain one. The idea that 'it' stands for a non-natural property is thus a pseudo-solution to a pseudo-problem. (GE, pages 66-67.) On the other hand, Geach insists, as against non-cognitivists, that good-judgements are entirely 'descriptive'. By a consideration of what it is to be an A, we can determine what it is to be a good A. (shrink)

In every system of morality I have hitherto met with, I have always remark'd that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions is and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought or ought not. This change is imperceptible, but (...) is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought or ought not expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it should be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time a reason should be given for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others which are entirely different from it. (shrink)

The Quine/Putnam indispensability argument is regarded by many as the chief argument for the existence of platonic objects. We argue that this argument cannot establish what its proponents intend. The form of our argument is simple. Suppose indispensability to science is the only good reason for believing in the existence of platonic objects. Either the dispensability of mathematical objects to science can be demonstrated and, hence, there is no good reason for believing in the existence of platonic objects, or their (...) dispensability cannot be demonstrated and, hence, there is no good reason for believing in the existence of mathematical objects which are genuinely platonic. Therefore, indispensability, whether true or false, does not support platonism. Mathematical platonists claim that at least some of the objects which are the subject matter of pure mathematics (e.g. numbers, sets, groups) actually exist. Furthermore, they claim that these objects differ radically from the concrete objects (trees, cats, stars, molecules) which inhabit the material world. We take the standard platonistic position to include the claim that platonic objects lack spatio-temporal location and causal powers. Many (perhaps most) mathematical platonists subscribe to this view.1 But some who call themselves (or might be called) mathematical platonists.. (shrink)