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Charles Sayward [137]Charles Warren Sayward [1]
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Profile: Charles Sayward (University of Nebraska, Lincoln)
  1. George Englebretsen & Charles Sayward (2010). Philosophical Logic: An Introduction to Advanced Topics. continuum.
    This title introduces students to non-classical logic, syllogistic, to quantificational and modal logic. The book includes exercises throughout and a glossary of terms and symbols. Taking students beyond classical mathematical logic, "Philosophical Logic" is a wide-ranging introduction to more advanced topics in the study of philosophical logic. Starting by contrasting familiar classical logic with constructivist or intuitionist logic, the book goes on to offer concise but easy-to-read introductions to such subjects as quantificational and syllogistic logic, modal logic and set theory. (...)
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  2. Charles Sayward (2010). Dialogues Concerning Natural Numbers. Peter Lang.
    Two philosophical theories, mathematical Platonism and nominalism, are the background of six dialogues in this book. There are five characters in these dialogues: three are nominalists; the fourth is a Platonist; the main character is somewhat skeptical on most issues in the philosophy of mathematics, and is particularly skeptical regarding the two background theories.
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  3. Charles Sayward (2007). Quine and His Critics on Truth-Functionality and Extensionality. Logic and Logical Philosophy 16 (1):45-63.
    Quine argues that if sentences that are set theoretically equivalent are interchangeable salva veritate, then all transparent operators are truth-functional. Criticisms of this argument fail to take into account the conditional character of the conclusion. Quine also argues that, for any person P with minimal logical acuity, if ‘belief’ has a sense in which it is a transparent operator, then, in that sense of the word, P believes everything if P believes anything. The suggestion is made that he intends that (...)
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  4. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (2006). Arithmetic and Ontology: A Non-Realist Philosophy of Arithmetic. rodopi.
    In this book a non-realist philosophy of mathematics is presented. Two ideas are essential to its conception. These ideas are (i) that pure mathematics--taken in isolation from the use of mathematical signs in empirical judgement--is an activity for which a formalist account is roughly correct, and (ii) that mathematical signs nonetheless have a sense, but only in and through belonging to a system of signs with empirical application. This conception is argued by the two authors and is critically discussed by (...)
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  5. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (2006). Analytical Table of Contents. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90:31-33.
     
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  6. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (2006). Chapter 6: Arithmetic and Necessity. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90:159-182.
     
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  7. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (2006). Chapter 7: Arithmetic and Rules. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90:183-211.
     
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  8. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (2006). Chapter 5: Existence, Number, and Realism. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90:129-155.
     
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  9. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (2006). Chapter 1: Introduction. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90:35-42.
     
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  10. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (2006). Chapter 2: Notes to Grundlagen. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90:45-72.
     
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  11. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (2006). Chapter 3: Objectivism and Realism in Frege's Philosophy of Arithmetic. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90:73-101.
     
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  12. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (2006). Chapter 10: Thesis Three. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90:254-283.
     
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  13. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (2006). Chapter 8: Thesis One. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90:215-240.
     
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  14. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (2006). Chapter 4: The Peano Axioms. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90:105-128.
     
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  15. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (2006). Chapter 9: Thesis Two. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90:241-253.
     
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  16. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (2006). Editor's Introduction. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90:11-21.
     
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  17. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (2006). Preface. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90:27-29.
     
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  18. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (2006). References. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90:285-287.
     
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  19. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (2006). Replies to Commentaries. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90 (1):369-386.
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  20. Charles Sayward (2006). What Truth is There in Psychological Egoism? Facta Philosophica 8 (1-2):145-159.
    Psychological egoism says that a purposive action is self-interested in a certain sense. The trick is to say in what sense. On the one hand, the psychological egoist wants to avoid a thesis that can be falsified by trivial examples. On the other hand, what is wanted is a thesis that lacks vacuity. The paper’s purpose is to arrive at such a thesis and show that it is a reasonable guess with empirical content.
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  21. Charles Sayward (2006). What is the Logic of Propositional Identity? Logic and Logical Philosophy 15 (1):3-15.
    Propositional identity is not expressed by a predicate. So its logic is not given by the ordinary first order axioms for identity. What are the logical axioms governing this concept, then? Some axioms in addition to those proposed by Arthur Prior are proposed.
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  22. Charles Sayward (2005). A Wittgensteinian Philosophy of Mathematics. Logic and Logical Philosophy 15 (2):55-69.
    Three theses are gleaned from Wittgenstein’s writing. First, extra-mathematical uses of mathematical expressions are not referential uses. Second, the senses of the expressions of pure mathematics are to be found in their uses outside of mathematics. Third, mathematical truth is fixed by mathematical proof. These theses are defended. The philosophy of mathematics defined by the three theses is compared with realism, nominalism, and formalism.
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  23. Charles Sayward (2005). Steiner Versus Wittgenstein: Remarks on Differing Views of Mathematical Truth. Theoria 20 (3):347-352.
    Mark Steiner criticizes some remarks Wittgenstein makes about Gödel. Steiner takes Wittgenstein to be disputing a mathematical result. The paper argues that Wittgenstein does no such thing. The contrast between the realist and the demonstrativist concerning mathematical truth is examined. Wittgenstein is held to side with neither camp. Rather, his point is that a realist argument is inconclusive.
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  24. Charles Sayward (2005). Steiner Versus Wittgenstein. Theoria 20 (3):347-352.
    Mark Steiner criticizes some remarks Wittgenstein makes about Gödel. Steiner takes Wittgenstein to be disputing a mathematical result. The paper argues that Wittgenstein does no such thing. The contrast between the realist and the demonstrativist concerning mathematical truth is examined. Wittgenstein is held to side with neither camp. Rather, his point is that a realist argument is inconclusive.
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  25. Charles Sayward (2005). Thompson Clarke and the Problem of Other Minds. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 13 (1):1-14.
    The force of sceptical inquiries into out knowledge of other people is a paradigm of the force that philosophical views can have. Sceptical views arise out of philosophical inquiries that are identical in all major respects with inquiries that we employ in ordinary cases. These inquiries employ perfectly mundane methods of making and assessing claims to know. This paper tries to show that these inquiries are conducted in cases that lack certain contextual ingredients found in ordinary cases. The paper concludes (...)
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  26. Charles Sayward (2005). Why Axiomatize Arithmetic? Sorites 16:54-61.
    This is a dialogue in the philosophy of mathematics that focuses on these issues: Are the Peano axioms for arithmetic epistemologically irrelevant? What is the source of our knowledge of these axioms? What is the epistemological relationship between arithmetical laws and the particularities of number?
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  27. Charles Sayward (2004). Malcolm on Criteria. Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2):349-358.
    Consider the general proposition that normally when people pain-behave they are in pain. Where a traditional philosopher like Mill tries to give an empirical proof of this proposition (the argument from analogy), Malcolm tries to give a transcendental proof. Malcolm’s argument is transcendental in that he tries to show that the very conditions under which we can have a concept provide for the application of the concept and the knowledge that the concept is truly as well as properly applied. The (...)
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  28. Charles Sayward (2004). Roman Suzuko on Situational Identity. Sorites 15:42-49.
    This paper gives a semantical account for the (i)ordinary propositional calculus, enriched with quantifiers binding variables standing for sentences, and with an identity-function with sentences as arguments; (ii)the ordinary theory of quantification applied to the special quantifiers; and (iii)ordinary laws of identity applied to the special function. The account includes some thoughts of Roman Suszko as well as some thoughts of Wittgenstein's Tractatus.
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  29. Charles Sayward (2003). A Defense of Mill on Other Minds. Dialectica 57 (3):315–322.
    This paper seeks to explain why the argument from analogy seems strong to an analogist such as Mill and weak to the skeptic. The inference from observed behavior to the existence of feelings, sensations, etc., in other subjects is justified, but its justification depends on taking observed behavior and feelings, sensations, and so on, to be not merely correlated, but connected. It is claimed that this is what Mill had in mind.
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  30. Charles Sayward (2003). Applying the Concept of Pain. Iyyun 52 (July):290-300.
    This paper reaches the conclusion that, while there are ordinary cases in which the pretending possibility is reasonable, these cases always contain some element that makes it reasonable. This will be the element we ask for when we ask why pretending possibility is raised. Knowledge that someone else is in pain is a matter of eliminating the proposed element or neutralizing its pain-negating aspect.
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  31. Charles Sayward (2003). Does Scientific Realism Entail Mathematical Realism? Facta Philosophica 5:173-182.
    Hilary Putnam suggests that the essence of the realist conception of mathematics is that the statements of mathematics are objective so that the true ones are objectively true. An argument for mathematical realism, thus conceived, is implicit in Putnam's writing. The first premise is that within currently accepted science there are objective truths. Next is the premise that some of these statements logically imply statements of pure mathematics. The conclusion drawn is that some statements of pure mathematics are objectively true. (...)
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  32. Charles Sayward (2003). Notes and Discussions. Dialectica 57 (3):315-322.
    This paper seeks to explain why the argument from analogy seems strong to an analogist such as Mill and weak to the skeptic. The inference from observed behavior to the existence of feelings, sensations, etc., in other subjects is justified, but its justification depends on taking observed behavior and feelings, sensations, and so on, to be not merely correlated, but connected. It is claimed that this is what Mill had in mind.
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  33. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (2002). There Is A Problem with Substitutional Quantification. Theoria 68 (1):4-12.
    Whereas arithmetical quantification is substitutional in the sense that a some-quantification is true only if some instance of it is true, it does not follow (and, in fact, is not true) that an account of the truth-conditions of the sentences of the language of arithmetic can be given by a substitutional semantics. A substitutional semantics fails in a most fundamental fashion: it fails to articulate the truth-conditions of the quantifications with which it is concerned. This is what is defended in (...)
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  34. Charles Sayward (2002). A Conversation About Numbers. Philosophia 29 (1-4):191-209.
    This is a dialogue in which five characters are involved. Various issues in the philosophy of mathematics are discussed. Among those issues are these: numbers as abstract objects, our knowledge of numbers as abstract objects, a proof as showing a mathematical statement to be true as opposed to the statement being true in virtue of having a proof.
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  35. Charles Sayward (2002). A Conversation About Numbers and Knowledge. American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (3):275-287.
    This is a dialogue in the philosophy of mathematics. The dialogue descends from the confident assertion that there are infinitely many numbers to an unresolved bewilderment about how we can know there are any numbers at all. At every turn the dialogue brings us only to realize more fully how little is clear to us in our thinking about mathematics.
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  36. Charles Sayward (2002). Convention T and Basic Law V. Analysis 62 (4):289–292.
    It is argued that Convention T and Basic Law V of Frege’s Grungesetze share three striking similarities. First, they are universal generalizations that are intuitively plausible because they have so many obvious instances. Second, both are false because they yield contradictions. Third, neither gives rise to a paradox.
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  37. Charles Sayward (2002). Geach on Generalization. Dialogue 41 (02):221-.
    There are plausible objections to substitutional construals of generalization. But these objections do not apply to a substitutional construal of generalization proposed by Peter Geach several years ago. This paper examines Geach’s conception.
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  38. Charles Sayward (2002). Is an Unpictorial Mathematical Platonism Possible? Journal of Philosophical Research 27:199-212.
    In his book 'Wittgenstein on the foundations of Mathematics', Crispin Wright notes that remarkably little has been done to provide an unpictorial, substantial account of what mathematical platoninism comes to. Wright proposes to investigate whether there is not some more substantial doctrine than the familiar images underpinning the platonist view. He begins with the suggestion that the essential element in the platonist claim is that mathematical truth is objective. Although he does not demarcate them as such, Wright proposes several different (...)
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  39. Charles Sayward (2001). Austin and Perception. Acta Analytica 16 (27):169-193.
    Some of Austin's general statements about the doctrines of sense-datum philosophy are reviewed. It is concluded that Austin thought that in these doctrines "directly see" is given a new but inadequately explained and defined use. Were this so, the philosophical use of "directly see" would lack a definite sense and this would correspondingly affect the doctrines. They would lack definite truth-value. Against this, it is argued that the philosopher's use of "directly see" does not support Austin's general thesis that the (...)
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  40. Charles Sayward (2001). On Some Much Maligned Remarks of Wittgenstein on Gödel. Philosophical Investigations 24 (3):262–270.
    In "Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics" Wittgenstein discusses an argument that goes from Gödel’s incompleteness result to the conclusion that some truths of mathematics are unprovable. Wittgenstein takes issue with this argument. Wittgenstein’s remarks in this connection have received very negative reaction from some very prominent people, for example, Gödel and Dummett. The paper is a defense of what Wittgenstein has to say about the argument in question.
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  41. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (2000). Frege on Identities. History and Philosophy of Logic 21 (3):195-205.
    The idea underlying the Begriffsschrift account of identities was that the content of a sentence is a function of the things it is about. If so, then if an identity a=b is about the content of its contained terms and is true, then a=a and a=b have the same content. But they do not have the same content; so, Frege concluded, identities are not about the contents of their contained terms. The way Frege regarded the matter is that in an (...)
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  42. Charles Sayward (2000). Remarks on Peano Arithmetic. Russell 20 (1):27-32.
    Russell held that the theory of natural numbers could be derived from three primitive concepts: number, successor and zero. This leaves out multiplication and addition. Russell introduces these concepts by recursive definition. It is argued that this does not render addition or multiplication any less primitive than the other three. To this it might be replied that any recursive definition can be transformed into a complete or explicit definition with the help of a little set theory. But that is a (...)
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  43. Charles Sayward (2000). Understanding Sentences. Philosophical Investigations 23 (1):48–53.
    Doubts are raised about the claim that on mastering a finite vocabulary and a finitely stated set of rules we are prepared to understand a potential infinitude of sentences. One doubt is about understanding a potential infinitude of sentences. A second doubt is about the assumption that understanding a sentence must be a matter of figuring out its meaning from an antecedent knowledge of the meaning of its words and applying rules.
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  44. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1999). Did the Greeks Discover the Irrationals? Philosophy 74 (2):169-176.
    A popular view is that the great discovery of Pythagoras was that there are irrational numbers, e.g., the positive square root of two. Against this it is argued that mathematics and geometry, together with their applications, do not show that there are irrational numbers or compel assent to that proposition.
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  45. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1999). Null Sentences. Iyyun, The Jewish Philosophical Quarterly 48:23-36.
    In Tractatus, Wittgenstein held that there are null sentences – prominently including logical truths and the truths of mathematics. He says that such sentences are without sense (sinnlos), that they say nothing; he also denies that they are nonsensical (unsinning). Surely it is what a sentence says which is true or false. So if a sentence says nothing, how can it be true or false? The paper discusses the issue.
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  46. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1998). A Fregean Principle. History and Philosophy of Logic 19 (3):125-135.
    Frege held that the result of applying a predicate to names lacks reference if any of the names lack reference. We defend the principle against a number of plausible objections. We put forth an account of consequence for a first-order language with identity in which the principle holds.
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  47. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1998). Kripke on Necessity and Identity. Philosophical Papers 27 (3):151-159.
    It may be that all that matters for the modalities, possibility and necessity, is the object named by the proper name, not which proper name names it. An influential defender of this view is Saul Kripke. Kripke’s defense is criticized in the paper.
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  48. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1996). Intentionality and Truth: An Essay on the Philosophy of Arthur Prior. kluwer.
    This book says Prior claims: (1) that a sentence never names; (2) what a sentence says cannot be otherwise signified; and (3) that a sentence says what it says whatever the type of its occurrence; (4) and that quantifications binding sentential variables are neither eliminable, substitutional, nor referential. The book develops and defends (1)-(3). It also defends (4) against the sorts of strictures on quantification of such philosophers as Quine and Davidson.
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