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Charles Siewert [31]Charles Peter Siewert [1]
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Profile: Charles Siewert (Rice University)
  1.  76
    Charles Siewert (1998). The Significance of Consciousness. Princeton University Press.
    "This is a marvelous book, full of subtle, thoughtful, and original argument.
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  2. Charles Siewert (2006). Is the Appearance of Shape Protean? Psyche 12 (3):1-16.
    This commentary focuses on shape constancy in vision and its relation to sensorimotor knowledge. I contrast “Protean” and “Constancian” views about how to describe perspectival changes in the appearance of an object’s shape. For the Protean, these amount to changes in apparent shape; for Constance, things are not merely judged, but literally appear constant in shape. I give reasons in favor of the latter view, and argue that Noë’s attempt to combine aspects of both views in a “dual aspect” account (...)
     
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  3. Charles Siewert (2013). Phenomenality and Self-Consciousness. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press 235.
  4. Charles Siewert (2012). On the Phenomenology of Introspection. In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press 129.
  5. Charles Siewert (2011). Socratic Introspection and the Abundance of Experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (1):63-91.
    I examine the prospects of using Hurlburt's DES method to justify his very 'thin'view of experience, on which visual experience is so infrequent as to be typically absent when reading and speaking. Such justification would seem to be based on the claim that, in DES 'beeper' samples, subjects often deny they just had any visual experi-ence. But if the question of 'visual experience' is properly construed, then it is doubtful they are deny-ing this. And even if they were, that would (...)
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  6. Charles Siewert (2004). Is Experience Transparent? Philosophical Studies 117 (1-2):15-41.
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  7.  22
    Charles Siewert (2011). Phenomenal Thought. In Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague (ed.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press 236.
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  8. Charles Siewert (2007). In Favor of (Plain) Phenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):201-220.
  9. Charles Siewert (2001). Self-Knowledge and Phenomenal Unity. Noûs 35 (4):542-68.
  10. Charles Siewert (2002). Is Visual Experience Rich or Poor? Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5-6):131-40.
  11. Charles Siewert (2001). Plato's Division of Reason and Appetite. History of Philosophy Quarterly 18 (4):329 - 352.
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  12.  98
    Charles Siewert, Consciousness and Intentionality. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  13. Charles Siewert (2008). Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3):840-843.
  14.  75
    Charles Siewert (2005). Attention and Sensorimotor Intentionality. In David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press 270.
  15. Charles Siewert (2000). Precis of The Significance of Consciousness. Psyche 6 (12).
    The aims of this book are: to explain the notion of phenomenal consciousness in a non-metaphorical way that minimizes controversial assumptions; to characterize the relationship between the phenomenal character and intentionality of visual experience, visual imagery and non-imagistic thought; and to clarify the way in which conscious experience is intrinsically valuable to us. It argues for the legitimacy of a first-person approach to these issues--one which relies on a distinctively first-person warrant for judgments about one's own experience. Thought experiments are (...)
     
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  16.  18
    Charles Siewert (2003). Self-Knowledge and Rationality: Shoemaker on Self-Blindness. In Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate 131.
  17.  53
    Charles Siewert (2008). Review of Evan Thompson, Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (1).
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  18.  31
    Charles Siewert (1993). What Dennett Can't Imagine and Why. Inquiry 36 (1-2):93-112.
    Woven into Dennett's account of consciousness is his belief that certain possibilities are not conceivable. This is manifested in his view that we are not conscious in any sense in which we can imagine that philosophers? ?zombies? might not be conscious, and also in his claims about ?Hindsight?, and what possibilities this can coherently suggest to us. If the possibilities Dennett denies none the less seem conceivable to us, then if he does not give us reason to think they are (...)
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  19.  19
    Charles Siewert (2008). Subjectivity and Selfhood. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3):840-843.
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  20. Charles Siewert (2004). Replies. Psyche.
     
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  21. Charles Siewert (2011). Embodied Consciousness and the Explanatory Gap. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (5-6):117 - 138.
     
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  22. Charles Siewert (2002). Consciousness, Intentionality, and Self-Knowledge Replies to Ludwig and Thomasson. Psyche 8.
    Both Ludwig and Thomasson question my claim that many phenomenal features are intentional features. Further, Ludwig raises numerous objections to my claim that higher order mental representation is not essential to phenomenal consciousness. While Thomasson does not share those objections, she wonders how my view permits me to make first-person knowledge of mind depend on phenomenal consciousness. I respond to these challenges, drawing together questions about the forms of mental representation, the phenomenal character of sensory experience, rational agency, and introspection.
     
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  23. Charles Siewert (2001). Consciousness Neglect and Inner Sense: A Reply to Lycan. Psyche 7.
    Lycan is concerned that I fail to explain my sense of 'phenomenal consciousness' sufficiently, and that I would unjustifiably criticize his "inner sense" theory for consciousness neglect. In response, I argue that my explanation of what I mean provides an adequate basis for disambiguating and answering Lycan's questions about the relation of phenomenal consciousness to "visual awareness" and the like. While I do not charge Lycan's theory with consciousness neglect, I do argue it employs a notion of non-conceptual higher order (...)
     
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  24. Charles Siewert (2003). Eliminativism, First-Person Knowledge and Phenomenal Intentionality A Reply to Levine. Psyche 9.
    Levine suggests the following criticisms of my book. First, the absence of a positive account of first-person knowledge in it makes it vulnerable to eliminativist refutation. Second, it is a relative strength of the higher order representation accounts of consciousness I reject that they offer explanations of the subjectivity of conscious states and their special availability to first-person knowledge. Further, the close connection I draw between the phenomenal character of experience and intentionality is unwarranted in the case of both color (...)
     
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  25. Charles Siewert (2003). First-Person Reflection and Hidden Physical Features: A Reply to Witmer. Psyche 9.
    My response to Witmer comes in three sections: In the first I address concerns about my book's blindsight thought-experiment, remarking specifically on the role imagination plays in it, and my grounds for thinking that a first-person approach is valuable here. In Section Two I consider the relation of the thought-experiment to theses regarding possibility and necessity, and Witmer's discussion of ways of arguing for the impossibility of "Belinda-style" blindsight, despite its apparent conceivability. Finally, in Section Three, I consider Witmer's suggestion (...)
     
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  26. Charles Siewert (2012). Respecting Appearances: A Phenomenological Approach to Consciousness. In Dan Zahavi (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Phenomenology. Oxford University Press
     
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  27. Charles Siewert (2009). Saving Appearances : A Dilemma for Physicalists. In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays. Oxford University Press
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  28. Charles Siewert (2001). Spontaneous Blindsight and Immediate Availability: A Reply to Carruthers. Psyche 7.
    Carruthers' "immediate availability" theory of consciousness is criticized on the grounds that it offers no reasonable alternative to asserting the metaphysical impossibility of spontaneous blindsight. In defense, Carruthers says he can admit a spontaneous blindsight that relies on unconscious behavioral cues, and deny only its possibility without such mechanisms. I argue: This involves him in an unwarranted denial of the possibility that conscious visual discrimination could depend on behavioral cues. We can conceive of blindsight without behavioral cuing; if we can, (...)
     
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