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Charles Siewert [30]Charles Peter Siewert [1]
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Profile: Charles Siewert (Rice University)
  1. Charles Siewert (forthcoming). ťConsciousness and IntentionalityŤ, U. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  2. Charles Siewert (2013). Phenomenality and Self-Consciousness. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press. 235.
  3. Charles Siewert (2012). On the Phenomenology of Introspection. In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press. 129.
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  4. Charles Siewert (2012). Respecting Appearances: A Phenomenological Approach to Consciousness. In Dan Zahavi (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Phenomenology. Oxford University Press.
     
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  5. Charles Siewert (2011). Embodied Consciousness and the Explanatory Gap. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (5-6):117 - 138.
     
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  6. Charles Siewert (2011). Phenomenal Thought. In Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague (ed.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press. 236.
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  7. Charles Siewert (2011). Socratic Introspection and the Abundance of Experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (1):63-91.
    I examine the prospects of using Hurlburt's DES method to justify his very 'thin'view of experience, on which visual experience is so infrequent as to be typically absent when reading and speaking. Such justification would seem to be based on the claim that, in DES 'beeper' samples, subjects often deny they just had any visual experi-ence. But if the question of 'visual experience' is properly construed, then it is doubtful they are deny-ing this. And even if they were, that would (...)
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  8. Charles Siewert (2009). Saving Appearances : A Dilemma for Physicalists. In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
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  9. Charles Siewert (2008). Review of Evan Thompson, Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (1).
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  10. Charles Siewert (2008). Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3):840-843.
  11. Charles Siewert (2008). Subjectivity and Selfhood. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3):840-843.
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  12. Charles Siewert (2007). In Favor of (Plain) Phenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):201-220.
  13. Charles Siewert, Consciousness and Intentionality. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  14. Charles Siewert (2006). Is the Appearance of Shape Protean? Psyche 12 (3):1-16.
    This commentary focuses on shape constancy in vision and its relation to sensorimotor knowledge. I contrast “Protean” and “Constancian” views about how to describe perspectival changes in the appearance of an object’s shape. For the Protean, these amount to changes in apparent shape; for Constance, things are not merely judged, but literally appear constant in shape. I give reasons in favor of the latter view, and argue that Noë’s attempt to combine aspects of both views in a “dual aspect” account (...)
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  15. Charles Siewert (2005). Attention and Sensorimotor Intentionality. In David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 270.
  16. Charles Siewert (2004). Is Experience Transparent? Philosophical Studies 117 (1-2):15-41.
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  17. Charles Siewert (2004). Replies. Psyche.
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  18. Charles Siewert (2003). Self-Knowledge and Rationality: Shoemaker on Self-Blindness. In Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate. 131.
  19. Charles Siewert (2002). Is Visual Experience Rich or Poor? Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5-6):131-40.
  20. Charles Siewert (2001). Plato's Division of Reason and Appetite. History of Philosophy Quarterly 18 (4):329 - 352.
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  21. Charles Siewert (2001). Self-Knowledge and Phenomenal Unity. Noûs 35 (4):542-68.
  22. Charles Siewert (2000). Precis of The Significance of Consciousness. Psyche 6 (12).
    The aims of this book are: to explain the notion of phenomenal consciousness in a non-metaphorical way that minimizes controversial assumptions; to characterize the relationship between the phenomenal character and intentionality of visual experience, visual imagery and non-imagistic thought; and to clarify the way in which conscious experience is intrinsically valuable to us. It argues for the legitimacy of a first-person approach to these issues--one which relies on a distinctively first-person warrant for judgments about one's own experience. Thought experiments are (...)
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  23. Charles Siewert (1998). The Significance of Consciousness. Princeton University Press.
    "This is a marvelous book, full of subtle, thoughtful, and original argument.
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  24. Charles Siewert (1993). What Dennett Can't Imagine and Why. Inquiry 36 (1-2):93-112.
    Woven into Dennett's account of consciousness is his belief that certain possibilities are not conceivable. This is manifested in his view that we are not conscious in any sense in which we can imagine that philosophers? ?zombies? might not be conscious, and also in his claims about ?Hindsight?, and what possibilities this can coherently suggest to us. If the possibilities Dennett denies none the less seem conceivable to us, then if he does not give us reason to think they are (...)
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