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Profile: Charles Travis (King's College London)
  1. Charles S. Travis (2004). The Silence of the Senses. Mind 113 (449):57-94.
    There is a view abroad on which perceptual experience has representational content in this sense: in it something is represented to the perceiver as so. On the view, a perceptual experience has a face value at which it may be taken, or which may be rejected. This paper argues that that view is mistaken: there is nothing in perceptual experience which makes it so that in it anything is represented as so. In that sense, the senses are silent, or, in (...)
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  2. Charles Travis & Rom Harre (1985). Personal Being. Philosophical Quarterly 35 (140):322.
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  3.  63
    Charles S. Travis (2000). Unshadowed Thought: Representation in Thought and Language. Harvard University Press.
  4.  22
    Charles Travis (forthcoming). Deliverances. Topoi:1-18.
    What makes a veil of perception? Is it merely would-be objects of perceptual awareness, extraneous to the ‘environmental realities’ of which we judge? Or is it merely the presence of something extraneous along the route from perceptual awareness to awareness that our environment is thus and so? In his Mark Sacks lecture John McDowell seems to suppose something like the first answer. This essay argues for the second, thus that he himself imposes such a veil.
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  5. Charles Travis (2008). Occasion-Sensitivity: Selected Essays. Oxford University Press.
    Charles Travis presents a series of essays in which he has developed his distinctive view of the relation of thought to language. The key idea is "occasion-sensitivity": what it is for words to express a given concept is for them to be apt for contributing to any of many different conditions of correctness (notably truth conditions). Since words mean what they do by expressing a given concept, it follows that meaning does not determine truth conditions. This view ties thoughts (...)
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  6.  19
    Charles Travis (2013). Perception: Essays After Frege. OUP Oxford.
    Charles Travis presents a series of essays on philosophy of perception, inspired by the insights of Gottlob Frege. He engages with a range of contemporary thinkers, and explores key issues including how perception can make the world bear on what we do or think, and what sorts of capacities we draw on in representing something as (being) something.
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  7. Charles Travis (1997). Pragmatics. In Bob Hale & Crispin Wright (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Blackwell 87--107.
     
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  8.  75
    Charles Travis (1989). The Uses of Sense: Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press.
    This book provides a novel interpretation of the ideas about language in Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. Travis places the "private language argument" in the context of wider themes in the Investigations, and thereby develops a picture of what it is for words to bear the meaning they do. He elaborates two versions of a private language argument, and shows the consequences of these for current trends in the philosophical theory of meaning.
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  9.  66
    Charles Travis (1985). On What Is Strictly Speaking True. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 15 (2):187 - 229.
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  10. Mark Eli Kalderon & Charles Travis, Oxford Realism: Perception.
    This is the third and final section of a paper, "Oxford Realism", co-written with Charles Travis. -/- A concern for realism motivates a fundamental strand of Oxford reflection on perception. Begin with the realist conception of knowledge. The question then will be: What must perception be like if we can know something about an object without the mind by seeing it? What must perception be if it can, on occasion, afford us with proof concerning a subject matter independent of the (...)
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  11.  80
    Charles Travis (2011). Objectivity and the Parochial. Oxford University Press.
    What laws of logic say -- Frege's target -- The twilight of empiricism -- Psychologism -- Morally alien thought -- To represent as so -- The proposition's progress -- Truth and merit -- The shape of the conceptual -- Thought's social nature -- Faust's way.
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  12. Charles Travis, Siegel's Contents.
    This is a draft of what became a contribution to a virtual symposium on Susanna Siegel's "The Content of Visual Experience". It takes issue with her claims, and arguments, that perceptual experience has representational content.
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  13.  37
    Charles Travis (2006). Thought's Footing: A Theme in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. Oxford University Press.
    Thought's Footing is an enquiry into the relationship between the ways things are and the way we think and talk about them. It is also a study of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations: Charles Travis develops his account of certain key themes into a unified view of the work as a whole. The central question is: how does thought get its footing? How can the thought that things are a certain way be connected to things being that way?
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  14.  94
    Charles Travis (2005). A Sense of Occasion. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):286–314.
    A continuous Oxford tradition on knowledge runs from John Cook Wilson to John McDowell. A central idea is that knowledge is not a species of belief, or that, in McDowell's terms, it is not a hybrid state; that, moreover, it is a kind of taking in of what is there that precludes one's being, for all one can see, wrong. Cook Wilson and McDowell differ on what this means as to the scope of knowledge. J.L. Austin set out the requisite (...)
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  15. Charles Travis (1991). Annals of Analysis. [REVIEW] Mind 100 (398):237-264.
  16. Charles Travis (2005). Frege, Father of Disjunctivism. Philosophical Topics 33 (1):307-334.
  17.  38
    Charles Travis (1994). On Constraints of Generality. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 94:165 - 188.
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  18. Charles Travis (2007). Reason's Reach. European Journal of Philosophy 15 (2):225–248.
  19.  74
    Charles Travis (2013). Susanna Siegel, The Contents of Visual Experience. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):837-846.
  20.  19
    Charles Travis (1981). The True and the False: The Domain of the Pragmatic. Benjamins.
    The main thrust of the present work is to show why truth and truth bearers lie essentially beyond the descriptive reach of semantics, and to outline a theory of ...
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  21.  77
    Charles Travis, As A Matter of Fact. Truth (Aristotelian Society Publication).
    This expounds J.L. Austin's treatment of truth, and compares it with Frege's.
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  22. Charles Travis (1997). Reply to Simmons. Mind 106 (421):119-120.
  23.  67
    Charles Travis (forthcoming). How Logic Speals. In Alan Berger (ed.), a Festschrift for Hilary Putnam. ??
    This is to appear in a Festschrift for Hilary Putnam on his 85th birthday. This is a pre-publication, not final, version.
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  24.  65
    Charles Travis (forthcoming). Intentionally Suffering? In Michael O'Sullivan (ed.), ?? OUP
    This is a response to Marie McGinn, who, roughly, lined me up with J. L. Austin over against GEM Anscombe and Wittgenstein on the issue whether perception is (or can be) intentional. I do not mind being aligned with Austin, but argue that this is the wrong way to line things up. I stand equally with Wittgenstein. Anscombe turns out to be odd man out on this one.
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  25. Charles Travis (2006). Insensitive Semantics. Mind and Language 21 (1):39–49.
    What is insensitive semantics (also semantic minimalism, henceforth SM)? That will need to emerge, if at all, from the authors’ (henceforth C&L) objections to what they see as their opponents. They signal two main opponents: moderate contextualists (henceforth MCs); and radical contextualists (henceforth RCs). I am signaled as a main RC. I will thus henceforth represent that position in propria persona. In most general lines the story is this: MC collapses into RC; RC is incoherent, or inconsistent, on various counts; (...)
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  26.  59
    Charles Travis (forthcoming). Where Words Fail. In Sofia Miguens (ed.), The Logical Alien at 20. HUP
  27. Charles S. Travis (2005). The Face of Perception. In Hilary Putnam (Contemporary Philosophy in Focus). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
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  28.  68
    Charles Travis (1985). Vagueness, Observation, and Sorites. Mind 94 (375):345-366.
  29. Charles Travis (2002). Unshadowed Thought. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):96-106.
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  30. Charles Travis, Reply to Critics.
    Introductory Remarks Reading these excellent commentaries we already wish we had written another book – a more comprehensive, clearer, and better defended one than what we have. We are, however, quite fond of the book we ended up with, and so we've decided that, rather than to yield, we'll clarify. These contributions have helped us do that, and for that we are grateful to our critics. We're lucky in that many (so far about twenty1) extremely able philosophers have read (...)
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  31.  96
    Charles Travis (2011). Desperately Seeking Ψ. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):505-557.
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  32. Charles Travis (2011). Thought's Social Nature. European Journal of Philosophy 19 (4):585-606.
    Abstract: Wittgenstein, throughout his career, was deeply Fregean. Frege thought of thought as essentially social, in this sense: whatever I can think is what others could think, deny, debate, investigate. Such, for him, was one central part of judgement's objectivity. Another was that truths are discovered, not invented: what is true is so, whether recognised as such or not. (Later) Wittgenstein developed Frege's idea of thought as social compatibly with that second part. In this he exploits some further Fregean ideas: (...)
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  33.  91
    Charles Travis (2004). The Twilight of Empiricism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (3):245–270.
    There is a principle that both generates and destroys empiricism. It is a plausible principle, thus often appealed to. (Bernard Williams and Michael Dummett are notable subscribers.) Its consequences prove it wrong. This is a story of empiricism's rise and fall (a fall Frege mapped out for it). It is historically sketchy. But one should focus on the principle.
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  34.  8
    Charles Travis (2011). Philosophy of Language. The Proposition's Progress. In Marie McGinn & Oskari Kuusela (eds.), Grazer Philosophische Studien. OUP Oxford 143-169.
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  35. Charles Travis (2006). Psychologism. In Barry C. Smith (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press 103--26.
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  36.  75
    Charles Travis (2009). The Inward Turn. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 84 (65):313-.
    Seeing is, or affords, a certain sort of awareness – visual – of one's surroundings. The obvious strategy for saying what one sees, or what would count as seeing something would be to ask what sort of sensitivity to one's surroundings – e.g. the pig before me – would so qualify. Alas, for more than three centuries – at least from Descartes to VE day – it was not so. Philosophers were moved by arguments, rarely stated which concluded that one (...)
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  37.  13
    Charles Travis (1977). Philosophy of Language. Grazer Philosophische Studien 4:143-169.
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  38.  49
    Charles Travis (1978). Meaning Versus Truth. Dialogue 17 (3):401-430.
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  39. Charles Travis (2008). To Represent as So. In David K. Levy & Edoardo Zamuner (eds.), Wittgenstein's Enduring Arguments. Routledge
    Throughout Wittgenstein had Frege in mind. We should too, to understand him. This is as true for Philosophical Investigations as for the Tractatus. In fact, the later work is, in an important way, closer to Frege than the first—even though the Investigations makes a target of what seems a central Fregean idea. It directs Frege’s own ideas at that target, using something deeply right in Frege to undo a misreading of what, rightly read, are mere truisms.
     
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  40.  8
    Charles Travis (2015). Keep It Real. In Annalisa Coliva, Volker Munz & Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (eds.), Mind, Language and Action: Proceedings of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium. De Gruyter 77-104.
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  41.  79
    Charles Travis (1995). Order Out of Messes. Mind 104 (413):133-144.
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  42.  2
    David Holdcroft & Charles Travis (1977). Saying and Understanding: A Generative Theory of Illocutions. Philosophical Quarterly 27 (106):82.
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  43.  42
    Charles Travis (2000). Philosophy's Twentieth Century: A Revolutionary Path. Disputatio (June):1-14.
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  44.  3
    Charles Travis (2014). That Object of Obscure Desire. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 4 (3-4):288-316.
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  45.  16
    Charles Travis (1990). Relevance. [REVIEW] Canadian Journal of Philosophy 20 (2):277-304.
  46.  10
    Charles Travis (2002). Frege's Target. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 51:305-343.
    ‘Hostility to psychologism’, John McDowell writes, 'is not hostility to the psychological. ‘Psychologism’ is an accusation. But it may be either of several. The psychologism McDowell is master of detecting is, as he sometimes puts it, a form of scientism. It is a priori psychology where, at best, only substantive empirical psychology would do. It often represents itself as describing the way any thinker must be; as describing requirements on being a thinker at all. But it misses viable alternatives. It (...)
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  47. Charles Travis (2008). Viewing the Inner. In Anthony E. Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press
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  48.  17
    Charles Travis (1978). Why? American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (4):285 - 293.
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  49.  5
    Charles Travis (1998). Sublunary Intuitionism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 55:169-194.
    In "Truth" Michael Dummett presents a case for intuitionist logic as the logic of ordinary discourse. The case depends on a supposed need to make two intuitions mesh: first, that it is senseless to suppose, of any statement, that it is neither true nor false; second, that there is no guarantee, for every statement, that either there is something in the world to make it true, or there is something to make it false. This paper argues, developing a notion of (...)
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  50.  10
    Charles Travis (2001). Mind dependence. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4:503-524.
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