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Charles Wallis [10]Charles S. Wallis [1]
  1. Charles Wallis (2008). Consciousness, Context, and Know-How. Synthese 160 (1):123 - 153.
    In this paper I criticize the most significant recent examples of the practical knowledge analysis of knowledge-how in the philosophical literature: David Carr [1979, Mind, 88, 394–409; 1981a, American Philosophical Quarterly, 18, 53–61; 1981b, Journal of Philosophy of Education, 15(1), 87–96] and Stanley & Williamson [2001, Journal of Philosophy, 98(8), 411–444]. I stress the importance of know-how in our contemporary understanding of the mind, and offer the beginnings of a treatment of know-how capable of providing insight in to the use (...)
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  2. Charles Wallis (1998). Subjunctive Conditionals and Uncertain Inference. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (4):621 – 624.
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  3. Charles Wallis (1995). Asymmetric Dependence, Representation, and Cognitive Science. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (3):373-401.
  4. Charles Wallis (1994). Ceteris Paribus Laws and Psychological Explanations. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:388 - 397.
    I argue that Fodor's (1991) analysis of ceteris paribus laws fails to underwrite his appeal to such laws in his sufficient conditions for representation. It also renders his appeal to ceteris paribus laws impotent against the major problem for his theory of representation. Finally, Fodor's analysis fails to provide useful solutions to the traditional problems associated with a thoroughgoing understanding of ceteris paribus clauses. The analysis, therefore, fails to bolster Fodor's (1975, 1990) position that special science (...) are of necessity ceteris paribus laws and that one must recognize them as scientifically legitimate. (shrink)
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  5. Charles Wallis (1994). Representation and the Imperfect Ideal. Philosophy of Science 61 (3):407-28.
    This paper examines the nomic covariationist strategy of using idealization to define representation. While the literature has focused upon the possibility of defining ideal conditions for perception, I argue that nomic covariationist appeals to idealization are pseudoscientific and contrary to a foundational and empirically well-supported methodological presupposition in cognitive science. Moreover, one major figure in this camp fails to come to grips with its role and its problems in mainstream science. Thus he forwards a false dichotomy of the sciences and (...)
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  6. Charles Wallis (1994). Truth-Ratios, Process, Task, and Knowledge. Synthese 98 (2):243 - 269.
    In this paper, I delineate two major problems facing reliabilist approaches in epistemology. I argue that Alvin Goodman's (1986) position fails to solve either problem. I then suggest an alternative reliabilist approach that ties truth-ratio assessments to particular, well-specified cognitive tasks. I claim that a well-specified cognitive task is an empirical hypothesis about a system that involves the specification of input and output types and nomic correlations (including statistical correlations) that underlie the system's performance. On my approach, one characterizes processes (...)
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  7. Charles Wallis (1994). Using Representation to Explain. In Eric Dietrich (ed.), Thinking Computers and Virtual Persons. Academic Press.
     
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  8. 1Imre Balogh, Brian Beakley, Paul Churchland, Michael Gorman, Stevan Harnad, David Mertz, H. H. Pattee, William Ramsey, John Ringen, Georg Schwarz, Brian Slator, Alan Strudler & Charles Wallis (1990). Responses to 'Computationalism'. Social Epistemology 4 (2):155 – 199.
  9. Charles S. Wallis (1990). Stich, Content, Prediction, and Explanation in Cognitive Science. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:327 - 340.
    In this paper I consider Stich's principle of autonomy argument (From Folk Psychology To Cognitive Science) as an argument that computationalism is an incorrect approach to explanation and prediction in cognitive science. After considering the principle of autonomy argument in light of several computational systems and psychological examples, I conclude that the argument is unsound. I formulate my reasons for rejecting Stich's argument as unsound into the conjunction argument. Finally, I argue that the conjunction argument is sound, and that its (...)
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  10. Robert Ackermann, Brian Baigrie, Harold I. Brown, Michael Cavanaugh, Paul Fox-Strangways, Gonzalo Munevar, Stephen David Ross, Philip Pettit, Paul Roth, Frederick Schmitt, Stephen Turner & Charles Wallis (1988). Responses to 'in Defense of Relativism'. Social Epistemology 2 (3):227 – 261.
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