I think we’re all at our most philosophical when we’re teenagers, aren’t we? There is something fascinating in those teenage years about questioning themoral order or the society you find yourself in, and I think it is a time when very strong and possibly violent dislikes and feelings of anger are coming up.
J. Y. T. Greig's two-volume edition, first published in 1932, presents the correspondence of one of the great men of the 18th century. This first volume contains David Hume's letters from 1727 to 1765. Hume correspondents include such famous thinkers and public figures as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Adam Smith, James Boswell, and Benjamin Franklin. The edition offers a rich picture of the man and his age, and is a uniquely valuable resource to anyone with an interest in early modern thought.
J. Y. T. Greig's two-volume edition, first published in 1932, presents the correspondence of one of the great men of the 18th century. This second volume contains David Hume's letters from 1766 to 1776. Hume correspondents include such famous thinkers and public figures as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Adam Smith, James Boswell, and Benjamin Franklin. The edition offers a rich picture of the man and his age, and is a uniquely valuable resource to anyone with an interest in early modern thought.
This paper presents the intelligent virtual animals that inhabit Omosa, a virtual learning environment to help secondary school students learn how to conduct scientific inquiry and gain concepts from biology. Omosa supports multiple agents, including animals, plants, and human hunters, which live in groups of varying sizes and in a predator-prey relationship with other agent types (species). In this paper we present our generic agent architecture and the algorithms that drive all animals. We concentrate on two of our animals to (...) present how different parameter values affect their movements and inter/intra-group interactions. Two evaluations studies are included: one to demonstrate the effect of different components of our architecture; another to provide domain expert validation of the animal behavior. (shrink)
: Hannah Arendt's and Charlotte Delbo's writings about the Holocaust trouble our preconceptions about those who do evil and those who suffer evil. Their jarring terms "banal evil" and "useless knowledge" point to limitations and temptations facing scholars of evil. While Arendt helps us to resist the temptation to mythologize evil, Delbo helps us to resist the temptation to domesticate suffering.
We read the roots of contemporary ecofeminism through the lens of feminist pragmatism. After indicating the general relation between ecofeminism and feminist pragmatism, we provide a detailed analysis of Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s saga Herland and With Her in Ourland to document the strong connection between these two traditions. Gilman’s congruencies with ecofeminism make clear that she was a forerunner and perhaps a foundation for contemporary ecofeminism. However, further analyses are needed to reveal the full import of this link between (...) ecofeminism and “ecofeminist pragmatism,” as well as bridge the gap between ecofeminist pragmatism and ecopragmatism, including environmental pragmatism. (shrink)
We read the roots of contemporary ecofeminism through the lens of feminist pragmatism. After indicating the general relation between ecofeminism and feminist pragmatism, we provide a detailed analysis of Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s saga Herland and With Her in Ourland to document the strong connection between these two traditions. Gilman’s congruencies with ecofeminism make clear that she was a forerunner and perhaps a foundation for contemporary ecofeminism. However, further analyses are needed to reveal the full import of this link between (...) ecofeminism and “ecofeminist pragmatism,” as well as bridge the gap between ecofeminist pragmatism and ecopragmatism, including environmental pragmatism. (shrink)
Charlotte Witt University of New Hampshire Abstract: In this paper I distinguish among different theories of gender essentialism and sketch out a taxonomy of gender essentialisms. I focus primarily on the difference between essentialism about a kind and essentialism about an individual. I propose that there is an interesting and useful form of gender essentialism that pertains to social individuals. And I argue that this form of gender essentialism, which I call uniessentialism, is not vulnerable to standard, feminist criticisms (...) of gender essentialism. (shrink)
On the observational equivalence of continuous-time deterministic and indeterministic descriptions Content Type Journal Article Pages 193-225 DOI 10.1007/s13194-010-0011-5 Authors Charlotte Werndl, Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE UK Journal European Journal for Philosophy of Science Online ISSN 1879-4920 Print ISSN 1879-4912 Journal Volume Volume 1 Journal Issue Volume 1, Number 2.
Feminist work in the history of philosophy has come of age as an innovative field in the history of philosophy. This volume marks that accomplishment with original essays by leading feminist scholars who ask basic questions: What is distinctive of feminist work in the history of philosophy? Is there a method that is distinctive of feminist historical work? How can women philosophers be meaningfully included in the history of the discipline? Who counts as a philosopher? This collection is a unique (...) collaboration among philosophers from North America and the Nordic Countries, including papers written from both analytic and continental philosophical perspectives and discussing both ancient and modern philosophers. Feminist Reflections on the History of Philosophy will be of interest to historians of philosophy, feminist theorists, women's studies faculty and students, and humanists interested in canon formation and transformation. (shrink)
Aristotle's defense of Dunamis -- Power and potentiality -- Rational and nonrational powers -- The priority of actuality -- Ontological hierarchy, normativity, and gender.
How can we enhance police integrity? The authors surveyed over 3000 police officers from 30 U.S. police departments on how they would respond to typical scenarios where integrity is challenged. They studied three police agencies which scored highly on the integrity scale: Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina; Charleston, South Carolina; and St. Petersburg, Florida. The authors conclude that enhancing police integrity goes well beyond culling out "bad apple" police officers. Police administrators should focus on four aspects: organizational rulemaking; detecting, investigating and (...) disciplining rule violations; circumscribing the informal "code of silence" that prohibits police from reporting the misconduct of their colleagues; and understanding the influence of public expectations and agency history. (shrink)
From the beginning of chaos research until today, the unpredictability of chaos has been a central theme. It is widely believed and claimed by philosophers, mathematicians and physicists alike that chaos has a new implication for unpredictability, meaning that chaotic systems are unpredictable in a way that other deterministic systems are not. Hence, one might expect that the question ‘What are the new implications of chaos for unpredictability?’ has already been answered in a satisfactory way. However, this is not the (...) case. I will critically evaluate the existing answers and argue that they do not fit the bill. Then I will approach this question by showing that chaos can be defined via mixing, which has never before been explicitly argued for. Based on this insight, I will propose that the sought-after new implication of chaos for unpredictability is the following: for predicting any event, all sufficiently past events are approximately probabilistically irrelevant. (shrink)
Entropy is ubiquitous in physics, and it plays important roles in numerous other disciplines ranging from logic and statistics to biology and economics. However, a closer look reveals a complicated picture: entropy is defined differently in different contexts, and even within the same domain different notions of entropy are at work. Some of these are defined in terms of probabilities, others are not. The aim of this chapter is to arrive at an understanding of some of the most important notions (...) of entropy and to clarify the relations between them. In particular, we discuss the question what kind of probabilities are involved whenever entropy is defined in terms of probabilities. (shrink)
The past twenty five years have seen an explosion of feminist writing on the philosophical canon, a development that has clear parallels in other disciplines like literature and art history. Since most of the writing is, in one way or another, critical of the tradition, a natural question to ask is: Why does the history of philosophy have importance for feminist philosophers? This question assumes that the history of philosophy is of importance for feminists, an assumption that is warranted by (...) the sheer volume of recent feminist writing on the canon. This entry explores the different ways that feminist philosophers are interacting with the Western philosophical tradition. (shrink)
In thinking about Aristotle in relation to the idea of natural kinds it is useful to begin with his definition of nature or what is natural, and then to consider his discussion of biological kinds or ?????. In recent philosophy, there is a tendency to contrast natural kinds with linguistic or conventional kinds, but we do not find that contrast in Aristotle. Instead, he distinguishes natural beings from artifacts, and that contrast, in turn, draws upon his theory of causation or (...) explanation. Natural beings, animals and plants for example, have an internal origin of motion and change whereas the origin of motion and change of artifacts is external. (Phys. ii, 1 192b 8-23) The origin of motion, or efficient cause, is one of Aristotle’s four causes; it is grouped by Aristotle with the formal and final causes and contrasted with the material cause. To call something natural in Aristotle’s parlance, then, is to locate its causal or explanatory principles within the thing itself.[1] In the Parts of Animals, Aristotle emphasizes and explains the importance of the final cause in relation to understanding animals, although the material cause also plays a secondary role. Animal parts, like other instruments, are “for the sake of” a goal or end, and Aristotle identifies that end with an action or activity that is central to the life of the animal. Aristotle illustrates this point with an artifact: “For sawing is not for the sake of the saw, but the saw for sawing; for sawing is a certain use. So the body too is in a way for the sake of the soul, and the parts are for the sake of the functions in relation to which each of them has naturally developed.” (P.A. 645b 17-20) For example, eyes naturally develop for the sake of seeing, and it is for the sake of that activity that Aristotle thinks we should explain the development of eyes in animals. Unlike the artifact (the saw), however, the parts of animals have an internal teleological principle because the activity of seeing (the final cause) is just one of the life activities of the animal itself. In contrast, the shaping of the saw’s parts for the sake of sawing is accomplished by an external agent, who must be mentioned in an explanation of its creation and its purpose. Combining Aristotle’s notion of a natural being with his understanding of the “for the sake of which”, or final cause, a picture of animals (and their functional parts) emerges.. (shrink)
In this paper, I propose a principle of doxastic rationality based on Bernard Williams's argument against doxastic voluntarism. This principle, I go on to show, undermines a number of notions of epistemic duty which have been put forth within the framework of virtue theory. I then suggest an alternative formulation which remains within the bounds of rationality allowed for by my principle. In the end, I suggest that the failure of the earlier formulations and the adoption of the latter tend (...) to vindicate the initial grounding of virtue epistemology in reliabilist intuitions. (edited). (shrink)
This paper addresses the actual practice of justifying definitions in mathematics. First, I introduce the main account of this issue, namely Lakatos's proof-generated definitions. Based on a case study of definitions of randomness in ergodic theory, I identify three other common ways of justifying definitions: natural-world justification, condition justification, and redundancy justification. Also, I clarify the interrelationships between the different kinds of justification. Finally, I point out how Lakatos's ideas are limited: they fail to show how various kinds of justification (...) can be found and can be reasonable, and they fail to acknowledge the interplay among the different kinds of justification. (shrink)
Corballis seems to have not considered two points: (1) the importance of direct selection pressures for the evolution of handedness; and (2) the evolutionary significance of the polymorphism of handedness. We provide arguments for the need to explain handedness in terms of adaptation and natural selection.
This paper reports on an ongoing ARC Discovery Project that is conducting design research into learning in collaborative virtual worlds (CVW).The paper will describe three design components of the project: (a) pedagogical design, (b)technical and graphics design, and (c) learning research design. The perspectives of each design team will be discussed and how the three teams worked together to produce the CVW. The development of productive failure learning activities for the CVW will be discussed and there will be an interactive (...) demonstration of the project's CVW. (shrink)
This paper empirically examines the financial performance of a UK unit trust that was initially “conventional” and later adopted socially responsible investment (SRI) principles (ethical investment principles). Comparison is made with three similar conventional funds whose investment objectives remained unchanged. Analysis techniques employed in previous studies find similar results: mean risk-adjusted performance is unchanged by the switch to SRI, with no evidence of over-or under-performance relative to the benchmark market index by any of the four funds. More interestingly, changes in (...) variability of returns over time are also modelled using generalised autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity models, not previously applied to SRI funds so far as is known. Results show a temporary increase in variability of returns, followed by a return to previous levels after around 4 years. Evidence shows the increased variability to be associated with the adoption of SRI rather than with a change in fund management. Possible explanations for the subsequent reduction in variability include the spread of corporate social responsibility activities by firms and learning by fund managers. In addition to reporting on a previously unobserved phenomenon, this paper raises questions for further research. (shrink)
when it is actually heating water; an object is perceptible only when it is actually being 1 perceived-- and so on. But, it is part of the notion of a causal power that it exists whether or not it is active. In order to respond to this challenge Aristotle draws a distinction between two ways of being a power; when it is active the power exists actually; when it is inactive it exists potentially. Contemporary writers have noted that we need (...) a way of understanding powers that includes their present but inactive existence (Harre 1970,p. 84), although Aristotle’s ontological response to this difficulty might seem wrong-headed or unnecessary. One objectionable aspect to his solution is the inherently teleological relationship between being x potentially and being x actually. Second, Aristotle does not draw an ontological distinction between those powers that operate with reason (e.g. crafts like housebuilding or arts like medicine), and those that do not. He does provide different conditions of realization for the two kinds of powers, but those conditions are variants within the same ontology of causal powers. In this regard, Aristotle offers one possible realist framework of causal powers that sees human action (and hence the social sciences) on a continuum with the physical sciences rather than as categorically (ontologically) different from them, and therefore requiring an entirely different explanatory framework. It is important to note, however, that Aristotle’s paradigmatic physical science is biology and his framework for understanding natural living beings (organisms) is teleological. Perhaps a better way to put this is that Aristotle’s understanding of the physical sciences (e.g. chemistry) is entirely different from ours, and it is a good question how relevant Aristotle’s unified framework of causal powers is given current conceptions of the physical sciences, and the centrality of physics and chemistry as models of the physical sciences. The common theme that unites both of these aspects of Aristotle’s ontology of causal powers is the central presence of teleology.. (shrink)
Following Linda Zagzebski's discussion of the paradoxical implications of moral luck for Christian morality, I explore the role of religious luck in two accounts of divine election – that of Paul the Apostle and that of the sixteenth-century Jewish thinker, Rabbi Judah Loeb of Prague. On both accounts, special religious status is conferred unrelated to the deserts of the beneficiary. What sense does it make to ascribe religious worth to someone if it simply came his way? Both accounts appeal to (...) the notion of religious virtue to answer this question. On Rabbi Judah's account, like ethical virtues, religious virtues inhere within the essence of their bearer and thus belong to him necessarily; on Paul's they are accidental, a matter of luck. Thus Paul's account, more than Rabbi Judah's, suffers from the paradox troubling Zagzebski. (Published Online February 17 2004). (shrink)
The number of people diagnosed with autism has risen exponentially in recent years. Are the diagnostic labels currently in use adequate to describe such a vast range of symptoms? Should we reconsider the appropriateness of the language we use to discuss autism? A mother of two autistic sons describes what the autism label has meant for her and her family.
The central question of this paper is: are deterministic and indeterministic descriptions observationally equivalent in the sense that they give the same predictions? I tackle this question for measure-theoretic deterministic systems and stochastic processes, both of which are ubiquitous in science. I first show that for many measure-theoretic deterministic systems there is a stochastic process which is observationally equivalent to the deterministic system. Conversely, I show that for all stochastic processes there is a measure-theoretic deterministic system which is observationally equivalent (...) to the stochastic process. Still, one might guess that the measure-theoretic deterministic systems which are observationally equivalent to stochastic processes used in science do not include any deterministic systems used in science. I argue that this is not so because deterministic systems used in science even give rise to Bernoulli processes. Despite this, one might guess that measure-theoretic deterministic systems used in science cannot give the same predictions at every observation level as stochastic processes used in science. By proving results in ergodic theory, I show that also this guess is misguided: there are several deterministic systems used in science which give the same predictions at every observation level as Markov processes. All these results show that measure-theoretic deterministic systems and stochastic processes are observationally equivalent more often than one might perhaps expect. Furthermore, I criticise the claims of the previous philosophy papers Suppes (1993, 1999), Suppes and de Barros (1996) and Winnie (1998) on observational equivalence. (shrink)
There is a surprising number of deformed animal kinds mentioned in Aristotle’s biological works. The number is surprising because, according to the standard understanding of deformed animals in Aristotle, it should be zero. And the number is significant because there are just too many deformed kinds at too many classificatory levels mentioned in too many works to dismiss them as a minor aberration or as an infiltration of folk belief into biology proper. This paper has two goals. The first is (...) to develop an interpretation of deformed animal kinds in Aristotle, which focuses on the meaning of deformity applied to kinds. To my knowledge there is no adequate interpretation of the meaning of deformity applied to kinds in the scholarly literature. (shrink)
The term flow refers to a particular type of experience characterized by feelings of fusion with an on-going activity, effortlessness and fluidity. This article concerns the results of an empirical investigation and phenomenological analysis of this type of experience. The analysis yields a distinction between three phenomenological structures, identified as arising in different combinations within concrete experiences of flow. These results are discussed in relation to the theories of Alfred Schutz and Erving Goffman regarding the organization of experience in everyday (...) life, and in relation to the theory of Otto Friedrich Bollnow regarding moods in everyday life. The results of the analysis are also discussed in relation to different uses of the flow concept in a variety of contexts found in recent theoretical contributions. These differences of usage and approach are explained in the light of the results of the phenomenological analysis, which distinguishes qualitatively different varients within the phenomenon termed flow experience. In conclusion, the need to adopt a broader concept of experience in sociological analysis is emphasized, as well as the need for further empirical studies of the contextual frames of different variants of flow experiences. (shrink)
Drawing from midcentury and contemporary theoretical work on propaganda, this study provides an analysis of the propagandistic properties of the "Shared Values" initiative developed by Charlotte Beers, former chief of public diplomacy under U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell. The campaign was broadcast in several Muslim countries before it was abandoned in 2003. The campaign's utilization of truth, its treatment of Muslim audiences as means to serve broader policy objectives rather than as a population to be engaged on its (...) own terms, and its use of palaver all suggest the "Shared Values" videos, as an example of mass communication, had serious ethical shortcomings. (shrink)
: This paper addresses the appropriation of theories of evolution by nineteenth-century feminists, focusing on the critical response to Darwin's The Descent of Man by Eliza Burt Gamble (The Evolution of Woman, 1893) and Antoinette Brown Blackwell (The Sexes Throughout Nature, 1875) and Charlotte Perkins Gilman's social evolutionism. For Gilman, evolutionism was a revolutionary resource for feminism, one of its greatest hopes. Gamble and Blackwell revisit Darwin's data with the aim of locating, amidst his ostensive conclusions to the contrary, (...) his implicit "defense" of either the equality (Blackwell) or the superiority (Gamble) of women. This article identifies the reasons for, and limitations of, this enthusiasm. To some extent, the basis of this feminism is provided by its keen perception of disparities between what a text does, and what it says it is doing. But these feminists did not think through the implications for their own rhetoric about race hierarchy. Darwin's trope of the "savage" would return in the work of some of these feminists, occasionally displaced or rejected, but usually reiterated, and sometimes integral to the feminism in question. (shrink)
Method in Ancient Philosophy brings together fifteen new, specially written essays by leading scholars on a broad subject of central importance. The ancient Greeks recognized that different forms of human activity are guided by different methods of reasoning; examination of how they reasoned, and how they thought about their own reasoning, helps us to see how they came to hold the views they did, and how our own methods of enquiry have developed under their influence. Contributors include Terence Irwin, Patricia (...) Curd, Ian Mueller, Robert Bolton, A.A. Long, Gail Fine, Constance C. Meinwald, Lesley Brown, Gisela Striker, C.D.C. Reeve, Charlotte Witt, Richard Kraut, Sarah Broadie, James Allen, and G.E.R. Lloyd. (shrink)
In his ethical writings Aristotle restricts moral responsibility to those actions an agent performs voluntarily. Only voluntary actions are candidates for praise and blame, reward and punishment. Voluntary actions meet two conditions: they have their causal origin in the agent, and they are performed knowingly.1 In the Poetics Aristotle tells us that actions are the primary ingredient of tragedy, and that the pivotal action of an exemplary tragedy is an hamartia or error.2 An error, like Oedipus’ murder of his father, (...) is committed unknowingly, and so does not satisfy Aristotle’s epistemic condition for voluntary action. It would seem, therefore, that the heroes and heroines of tragedy, in Aristotle’s opinion, are simply not responsible for their deeds and the awful consequences of what they have done.3 Bad things happen to them. This conclusion is problematic. The difficulty appears once we consider the kinds of dramatic plots Aristotle prefers. Aristotle favours plots in which a good person’s reversal of fortune is brought about unintentionally by his own actions over plots in which the reversal occurs because of the agent’s bad character or by accident or external cause. (Poet. 1452a32-33; 1453a7-12)4 The choice of unknowing action rather than intentional wrongdoing or sheer accident raises the question of agent responsibility. Indeed, it seems intended to do so. In the finest kind of tragedy the moment of recognition depicts a character coming to understand what he has unknowingly done, and coming to understand that his own actions have precipitated his change in fortune. (Poet. 1452a29-33) That Aristotle requires a moment of recognition, in addition to a reversal of.. (shrink)
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivaks seminal contribution to contemporary thought defies disciplinary boundaries. From her early translations of Derrida to her subsequent engagement with Marxism, feminism and postcolonial studies and her recent work on human rights, the war on terror and globalization, she has proved to be one of the most vital of present-day thinkers. In this book Stephen Morton offers a wide-ranging introduction to and critique of Spivaks work. He examines her engagements with philosophers and other thinkers from Kant to Paul (...) de Man, feminists from Cixous to Helie-Lucas and literary texts by Charlotte Bronte, J. M. Coetzee, Mahasweta Devi and Jean Rhys. Spivaks thought is also situated in relation to subaltern studies. Throughout the book, Morton interrogates the materialist basis of Spivaks thought and demonstrates the ethical and political commitment which lies at the heart of her work. Stephen Morton provides an ideal introduction to the work of this complex and increasingly important thinker. (shrink)
* INTRODUCTION This book seeks to add dimension to our understanding of Greek Skepticism by concentrating attention on a particular area that is of ...
Using a nationwide survey, this study compared the ethical values and decision processes ofFortune executives and MBA students. Statistically significant differences in ethical values were found by class of respondent, gender, and professed decision approach. MBAs were also found to process ethical decisions differently than business professionals.
In Metaphysics Theta 6 Aristotle introduces the ontological distinction between energeia and dunamis by means of the following examples: it is as (a) what is building to what is capable of building and (b) the waking to the sleeping, and (c) what is seeing to what has its eyes shut but has sight and (d) that which has been shaped out of the matter to the matter and (e) what has been worked up to the not thoroughly worked. Let actuality (...) be set down as one side of this and let the potential be the other. (1048a37-1048b5) 1.. (shrink)
The guiding question of this paper is: how similar are deterministic descriptions and indeterministic descriptions from a predictive viewpoint? The deterministic and indeterministic descriptions of concern in this paper are measure-theoretic deterministic systems and stochastic processes, respectively. I will explain intuitively some mathematical results which show that measure-theoretic deterministic systems and stochastic processes give more often the same predictions than one might perhaps have expected, and hence that from a predictive viewpoint these descriptions are quite similar.
The Metaphysics of Gender is a book about gender essentialism: what it is and why it might be true. It opens with the question: What is gender essentialism? After distinguishing between essentialism about gender viewed as a kind and essentialism about gender in relation to individuals and their lived experiences, successive chapters introduce the ingredients for a theory of gender essentialism about individuals, called uniessentialism. Gender uniessentialism claims that a social individual's gender is uniessential to that individual. It is modeled (...) on Aristotle's essentialism in which the form or essence of an individual is the principle of unity of that individual. For example, the form or essence of an artifact, like a house, is what unifies the material parts of the house into a new individual (over and above a sum of parts). Since an individual's gender is a social role (or set of social norms) the kind of unity in question is not the unity of material parts, as it is in the artifact example. Instead, the central claim of gender uniessentialism is that an individual's gender provides that individual with a principle of normative unity -- a principle that orders and organizes all of that individual's other social roles. An important ingredient in gender uniessentialism concerns exactly which individuals are at issue -- human organisms, persons or social individuals? Given the view of gender as a social role the claim of gender essentialism can only be coherently expressed of social individuals. The Metaphysics of Gender argues that a social individual's gender is uniessential to it. (shrink)
In the context of health care the aim of the article is to bring another meaning to the concept “need” that goes beyond the human activity; the drive to satisfy needs. Another meaning incorporates an ethical and existential nature of life phenomena. An example from empirical research on living with a chronic disease as seen from the patient’s point of view provides the basis for arguing another meaning of the concept “need”. The meanings and nuances in the life phenomena of (...) hope, doubt and life courage are exemplified in qualitative interviews with chronic sufferers. A combination of empirical research and Danish life philosophy. Research has shown that the interaction between the professional health care provider and the patient and family may lead to a more or less unconscious and inappropriate administration of power. Research also indicates that by overlooking or ignoring the existential qualities in human life and suffering, the professional health care provider may deprive the patient and family of their room for action. To add a deeper understanding of the existential meaning of being a person with an illness, the article shows the different human dimensions concerning life phenomena and needs. Developing sensitive, situation-specific attention offers a response to the challenge faced by health care providers in collaboration with the patient: How can we open our eyes to the most significant features of the situation which arise on the onset of illness. (shrink)
Recently some results have been presented which show that certain kinds of deterministic descriptions and indeterministic descriptions are observationally equivalent (Werndl 2009a, 2010). This paper focuses on some philosophical questions prompted by these results. More specifically, first, I will discuss the philosophical comments made by mathematicians about observational equivalence, in particular Ornstein and Weiss (1991). Their comments are vague, and I will argue that, according to a reasonable interpretation, they are misguided. Second, the results on observational equivalence raise the question (...) of whether the deterministic or indeterministic description is preferable relative to all evidence. If none of them is preferable, there is underdetermination. I will criticize Winnie's (1998) argument that, by appealing to different observations, one finds that the deterministic description is preferable. In particular, I will clarify a confusion in this argument. Furthermore, I will argue that if the concern is a strong kind of underdetermination, the argument delivers the desired conclusion but this conclusion is trivial; and for other kinds of underdetermination of interest the argument fails. (shrink)
