Search results for 'Chelsey Norton' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Cynthia Frantz, F. Stephan Mayer, Chelsey Norton & Mindi Rock (2005). There is No "I" in Nature: The Influence of Self-Awareness on Connectedness to Nature. Journal of Environmental Psychology 25 (4):427-436.score: 240.0
  2. John Norton, Vol. 3, No. 4: John D. Norton, "Causation as Folk Science".score: 120.0
    I deny that the world is fundamentally causal, deriving the skepticism on non-Humean grounds from our enduring failures to find a contingent, universal principle of causality that holds true of our science. I explain the prevalence and fertility of causal notions in science by arguing that a causal character for many sciences can be recovered, when they are restricted to appropriately hospitable domains. There they conform to loose and varying collections of causal notions that form folk sciences of causation. This (...)
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  3. W. Norton, Michael P. Brown, Paul Cloke, Jo Little, Verena Andermatt Conley, Irene Diamond, Peter Dickens, Roger Gottlieb, Olavi Grano & Anssi Paasi (1999). Adams, Guy and Balfour, Danny (1998) Unmasking Administrative Evil, Thousand Oaks: Sage. Allen, Beverly and Russo, Mary (1997) Revisioning Italy: National Identity and Global Culture, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Bowler, Peter (1992) The Norton History of the Environmental Sciences, New York: W. [REVIEW] Ethics, Place and Environment 2 (1).score: 120.0
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  4. David Fate Norton (1989). Hume* David Fate Norton. In Robert J. Cavalier, James Gouinlock & James P. Sterba (eds.), Ethics in the History of Western Philosophy. St. Martin's Press.score: 120.0
     
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  5. John Norton, Do the Causal Principles of Modern Physics Contradict Causal Anti-Fundamentalism?score: 60.0
    In Norton(2003), it was urged that the world does not conform at a fundamental level to some robust principle of causality. To defend this view, I now argue that the causal notions and principles of modern physics do not express some universal causal principle, brought to light by discoveries in physics. Rather they merely assert that, according to relativity theory, spacetime has an invariant velocity, that of light; and that theories of matter admit no propagations faster than light.
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  6. Greg Frost-Arnold, J. Brian Pitts, John Norton, John Manchak, D. Tulodziecki, P. D. Magnus, David Harker & Kyle Stanford, Synopsis and Discussion. Workshop: Underdetermination in Science 21-22 March, 2009. Center for Philosophy of Science.score: 60.0
    This document collects discussion and commentary on issues raised in the workshop by its participants. Contributors are: Greg Frost-Arnold, David Harker, P. D. Magnus, John Manchak, John D. <span class='Hi'>Norton</span> , J. Brian Pitts, Kyle Stanford, Dana Tulodziecki.
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  7. John D. Norton, The Inductive Significance of Observationally Indistinguishable Spacetimes: (Peter Achinstein has the Last Laugh).score: 60.0
    For several years, through the “material theory of induction,” I have urged that inductive inferences are not licensed by universal schemas, but by material facts that hold only locally (Norton, 2003, 2005). My goal has been to defend inductive inference against inductive skeptics by demonstrating when and how inductive inferences are properly made. Since I have always admired Peter Achinstein as a staunch defender of induction, it was a surprise when Peter..
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  8. J. S. Alper, M. Bridger, J. Earman & J. D. Norton (2000). What is a Newtonian System? The Failure of Energy Conservation and Determinism in Supertasks. Synthese 124 (2):281-293.score: 60.0
    Supertasks recently discussed in the literature purport to display a failure ofenergy conservation and determinism in Newtonian mechanics. We debatewhether these supertasks are admissible as Newtonian systems, with Earmanand Norton defending the affirmative and Alper and Bridger the negative.
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  9. Peter Norton (2011). A Historical Perspective on the Future of the Car. Metascience 20 (3):593-595.score: 60.0
    A historical perspective on the future of the car Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-3 DOI 10.1007/s11016-010-9479-z Authors Peter D. Norton, Department of Science, Technology and Society, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22904-4744, USA Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.
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  10. John D. Norton, Infinite Idealizations.score: 60.0
    In my talk at the celebration of the 20th Anniversary of the Vienna Circle Institute, I sketched results of recent work on approximation and idealization (Norton, forthcoming). A goal of that work was to clarify the widespread use of infinite limits in statistical physics to introduce what are informally described as idealizations. This literature examines the behavior of systems composed of very many—but always finitely many—components. Certain properties of these systems settle down to stable values if the number of (...)
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  11. John Norton (2000). What Is a Newtonian System? The Failure of Energy Conservation and Determinism in Supertasks. Synthese 124 (2):281 - 293.score: 60.0
    Supertasks recently discussed in the literature purport to display a failure of energy conservation and determinism in Newtonian mechanics. We debate whether these supertasks are admissible as Newtonian systems, with Earman and Norton defending the affirmative and Alper and Bridger the negative.
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  12. David Fate Norton & Mary J. Norton (eds.) (2007). David Hume: A Treatise of Human Nature (Two-Volume Set). Clarendon Press.score: 60.0
    David and Mary Norton present the definitive scholarly edition of Hume's Treatise, one of the greatest philosophical works ever written. This set comprises the two volumes of texts and editorial material, which are also available for purchase separately. -/- David Hume (1711 - 1776) is one of the greatest of philosophers. Today he probably ranks highest of all British philosophers in terms of influence and philosophical standing. His philosophical work ranges across morals, the mind, metaphysics, epistemology, religion, and aesthetics; (...)
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  13. David Hume, David Fate Norton & Mary J. Norton (eds.) (2007). David Hume: A Treatise of Human Nature: Volume 1: Texts. Clarendon Press.score: 60.0
    David and Mary Norton present the definitive scholarly edition of one of the greatest philosophical works ever written. This first volume contains the critical text of David Hume's Treatise of Human Nature (1739/40), followed by the short Abstract (1740) in which Hume set out the key arguments of the larger work; the volume concludes with A Letter from a Gentleman to his Friend in Edinburgh (1745), Hume's defence of the Treatise when it was under attack from ministers seeking to (...)
     
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  14. David Hume, David Fate Norton & Mary J. Norton (eds.) (2007). David Hume: A Treatise of Human Nature: Volume 2: Editorial Material. Clarendon Press.score: 60.0
    David and Mary Norton present the definitive scholarly edition of one of the greatest philosophical works ever written. This second volume begins with their 'Historical Account' of the Treatise, an account that runs from the beginnings of the work to the period immediately following Hume's death in 1776, followed by an account of the Nortons' editorial procedures and policies and a record of the differences between the first-edition text of the Treatise and the critical text that follows. The volume (...)
     
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  15. David Fate Norton & Mary J. Norton (eds.) (2011). David Hume: A Treatise of Human Nature: Volume 1: Texts. OUP Oxford.score: 60.0
    David and Mary Norton present the definitive scholarly edition of one of the greatest philosophical works ever written. This first volume contains the critical text of David Hume's Treatise of Human Nature (1739/40), followed by the short Abstract (1740) in which Hume set out the key arguments of the larger work; the volume concludes with A Letter from a Gentleman to his Friend in Edinburgh (1745), Hume's defence of the Treatise when it was under attack from ministers seeking to (...)
     
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  16. David Fate Norton & Mary J. Norton (eds.) (2011). David Hume: A Treatise of Human Nature: Volume 2: Editorial Material. OUP Oxford.score: 60.0
    David and Mary Norton present the definitive scholarly edition of one of the greatest philosophical works ever written. This second volume begins with their 'Historical Account' of the Treatise, an account that runs from the beginnings of the work to the period immediately following Hume's death in 1776, followed by an account of the Nortons' editorial procedures and policies and a record of the differences between the first-edition text of the Treatise and the critical text that follows. The volume (...)
     
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  17. David Fate Norton & Mary J. Norton (eds.) (2011). David Hume: A Treatise of Human Nature: Two-Volume Set. OUP Oxford.score: 60.0
    David and Mary Norton present the definitive scholarly edition of Hume's Treatise, one of the greatest philosophical works ever written. This set comprises the two volumes of texts and editorial material, which are also available for purchase separately.
     
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  18. John D. Norton, What Can We Learn About the Ontology of Space and Time From the Theory of Relativity?score: 30.0
    In the exuberance that followed Einstein’s discoveries, philosophers at one time or another have proposed that his theories support virtually every conceivable moral in ontology. I present an opinionated assessment, designed to avoid this overabundance. We learn from Einstein’s theories of novel entanglements of categories once held distinct: space with time; space and time with matter; and space and time with causality. We do not learn that all is relative, that time in the fourth dimension in any non-trivial sense, that (...)
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  19. John D. Norton (2006). How the Formal Equivalence of Grue and Green Defeats What is New in the New Riddle of Induction. Synthese 150 (2):185 - 207.score: 30.0
    That past patterns may continue in many different ways has long been identified as a problem for accounts of induction. The novelty of Goodman’s ”new riddle of induction” lies in a meta-argument that purports to show that no account of induction can discriminate between incompatible continuations. That meta-argument depends on the perfect symmetry of the definitions of grue/bleen and green/blue, so that any evidence that favors the ordinary continuation must equally favor the grue-ified continuation. I argue that this very dependence (...)
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  20. John Norton (1988). The Hole Argument. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:56 - 64.score: 30.0
    I give an informal outline of the hole argument which shows that spacetime substantivalism leads to an undesirable indeterminism in a broad class of spacetime theories. This form of the argument depends on the selection of differentiable manifolds within a spacetime theory as representing spacetime. I consider the conditions under which the argument can be extended to address versions of spacetime substantivalism which select these differentiable manifolds plus some further structure to represent spacetime. Finally, I respond to the criticisms of (...)
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  21. John Earman & John Norton (1987). What Price Spacetime Substantivalism? The Hole Story. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (4):515-525.score: 30.0
    Spacetime substantivalism leads to a radical form of indeterminism within a very broad class of spacetime theories which include our best spacetime theory, general relativity. Extending an argument from Einstein, we show that spacetime substantivalists are committed to very many more distinct physical states than these theories' equations can determine, even with the most extensive boundary conditions.
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  22. John D. Norton (2009). How Hume and Mach Helped Einstein Find Special Relativity. In Michael Friedman, Mary Domski & Michael Dickson (eds.), Discourse on a New Method: Reinvigorating the Marriage of History and Philosophy of Science. Open Court. 359--86.score: 30.0
    In recounting his discovery of special relativity, Einstein recalled a debt to the philosophical writings of Hume and Mach. I review the path Einstein took to special relativity and urge that, at a critical juncture, he was aided decisively not by any specific doctrine of space and time, but by a general account of concepts that Einstein found in Hume and Mach’s writings. That account required that concepts, used to represent the physical, must be properly grounded in experience. In so (...)
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  23. John D. Norton, The Formal Equivalence of Grue and Green and How It Undoes the New Riddle of Induction.score: 30.0
    The hidden strength of Goodman's ingenious "new riddle of induction" lies in the perfect symmetry of grue/bleen and green/blue. The very same sentence forms used to define grue/bleen in terms of green/blue can be used to define green/blue in terms of grue/bleen by permutation of terms. Therein lies its undoing. In the artificially restricted case in which there are no additional facts that can break the symmetry, grue/bleen and green/blue are merely notational variants of the same facts; or, if they (...)
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  24. John D. Norton, Chasing the Light Einsteinʼs Most Famous Thought Experiment.score: 30.0
    At the age of sixteen, Einstein imagined chasing after a beam of light. He later recalled that the thought experiment had played a memorable role in his development of special relativity. Famous as it is, it has proven difficult to understand just how the thought experiment delivers its results. It fails to generate problems for an ether-based electrodynamics. I propose that Einstein’s canonical statement of the thought experiment from his 1946 “Autobiographical Notes,” makes most sense not as an argument against (...)
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  25. John Norton, Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity and the Problems in the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies That Led Him to It.score: 30.0
    Modern readers turning to Einstein’s famous 1905 paper on special relativity may not find what they expect. Its title, “On the electrodynamics of moving bodies,” gives no inkling that it will develop an account of space and time that will topple Newton’s system. Even its first paragraph just calls to mind an elementary experimental result due to Faraday concerning the interaction of a magnet and conductor. Only then does Einstein get down to the business of space and time and lay (...)
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  26. John D. Norton (2003). A Material Theory of Induction. Philosophy of Science 70 (4):647-670.score: 30.0
    Contrary to formal theories of induction, I argue that there are no universal inductive inference schemas. The inductive inferences of science are grounded in matters of fact that hold only in particular domains, so that all inductive inference is local. Some are so localized as to defy familiar characterization. Since inductive inference schemas are underwritten by facts, we can assess and control the inductive risk taken in an induction by investigating the warrant for its underwriting facts. In learning more facts, (...)
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  27. John D. Norton, Discovering the Relativity of Simultaneity How Did Einstein Take "the Step"?score: 30.0
    It is routinely assumed that Einstein discovered the relativity of simultaneity by thinking about how clocks can be synchronized by light signals, much in accord with the analysis he gave in his 1905 special relativity paper. Yet that is just supposition. We have no real evidence that it actually happened this way. In later recollections, Einstein stressed the importance of several thought experiments in the thinking that led up to the final theory. They include his chasing a light beam thought (...)
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  28. John Earman & John D. Norton (1993). Forever is a Day: Supertasks in Pitowsky and Malament-Hogarth Spacetimes. Philosophy of Science 60 (1):22-42.score: 30.0
    The standard theory of computation excludes computations whose completion requires an infinite number of steps. Malament-Hogarth spacetimes admit observers whose pasts contain entire future-directed, timelike half-curves of infinite proper length. We investigate the physical properties of these spacetimes and ask whether they and other spacetimes allow the observer to know the outcome of a computation with infinitely many steps.
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  29. John D. Norton (2013). A Material Dissolution of the Problem of Induction. Synthese 191 (4):1-20.score: 30.0
    In a formal theory of induction, inductive inferences are licensed by universal schemas. In a material theory of induction, inductive inferences are licensed by facts. With this change in the conception of the nature of induction, I argue that the celebrated “problem of induction” can no longer be set up and is thereby dissolved. Attempts to recreate the problem in the material theory of induction fail. They require relations of inductive support to conform to an unsustainable, hierarchical empiricism.
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  30. John D. Norton, Einstein's Investigations of Galilean Covariant Electrodynamics Prior to 1905.score: 30.0
    Einstein learned from the magnet and conductor thought experiments how to use field transformation laws to extend the covariance to Maxwell’s electrodynamics. If he persisted in his use of this device, he would have found that the theory cleaves into two Galilean covariant parts, each with different field transformation laws. The tension between the two parts reflects a failure not mentioned by Einstein: that the relativity of motion manifested by observables in the magnet and conductor thought experiment does not extend (...)
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  31. John D. Norton, Paradoxes of Sailing.score: 30.0
    Paradoxes have long been a driving force in philosophy. They compel us to think more clearly about what we otherwise take for granted. In Antiquity, Zeno insisted that a runner could never complete the course because he’d first need to go half way, and then half way again; and so on indefinitely. Zeno also argued that matter could not be infinitely divisible, else it would be made of parts of no size at all. Even infinitely many nothings combined still measure (...)
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  32. Bryan G. Norton (2008). Beyond Positivist Ecology: Toward an Integrated Ecological Ethics. Science and Engineering Ethics 14 (4):581-592.score: 30.0
    A post-positivist understanding of ecological science and the call for an “ecological ethic” indicate the need for a radically new approach to evaluating environmental change. The positivist view of science cannot capture the essence of environmental sciences because the recent work of “reflexive” ecological modelers shows that this requires a reconceptualization of the way in which values and ecological models interact in scientific process. Reflexive modelers are ecological modelers who believe it is appropriate for ecologists to examine the motives for (...)
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  33. Bryan G. Norton (1984). Environmental Ethics and Weak Anthropocentrism. Environmental Ethics 6 (2):131-148.score: 30.0
    The assumption that environmental ethics must be nonanthropocentric in order to be adequate is mistaken. There are two forms of anthropocentrism, weak and strong, and weak anthropocentrism is adequate to support an environmental ethic. Environmental ethics is, however, distinctive vis-a-vis standard British and American ethical systems because, in order to be adequate, it must be nonindividualistic.Environmental ethics involves decisions on two levels, one kind of which differs from usual decisions affecting individual fairness while the other does not. The latter, called (...)
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  34. John Norton (2008). The Dome: An Unexpectedly Simple Failure of Determinism. Philosophy of Science 75 (5):786-798.score: 30.0
    Newton’s equations of motion tell us that a mass at rest at the apex of a dome with the shape specified here can spontaneously move. It has been suggested that this indeterminism should be discounted since it draws on an incomplete rendering of Newtonian physics, or it is “unphysical,” or it employs illicit idealizations. I analyze and reject each of these reasons. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA (...)
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  35. John Norton, Einstein for Everyone.score: 30.0
    For over a decade I have taught an introductory, undergraduate class, "Einstein for Everyone," at the University of Pittsburgh to anyone interested enough to walk through door. The course is aimed at people who have a strong sense that what Einstein did changed everything. However they do not know enough physics to understand what he did and why it was so important. The course presents just enough of Einstein's physics to give students an independent sense of what he achieved and (...)
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  36. John D. Norton (forthcoming). Must Evidence Underdetermine Theory. The Challenge of the Social and the Pressure of Practice:17--44.score: 30.0
    According to the underdetermination thesis, all evidence necessarily underdetermines any scientific theory. Thus it is often argued that our agreement on the content of mature scientific theories must be due to social and other factors. Drawing on a long standing tradition of criticism, I shall argue that the underdetermination thesis is little more than speculation based on an impoverished account of induction. A more careful look at accounts of induction does not support an assured underdetermination or the holism usually associated (...)
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  37. John D. Norton (2004). On Thought Experiments: Is There More to the Argument? Philosophy of Science 71 (5):1139-1151.score: 30.0
    Thought experiments in science are merely picturesque argumentation. I support this view in various ways, including the claim that it follows from the fact that thought experiments can err but can still be used reliably. The view is defended against alternatives proposed by my cosymposiasts.
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  38. John D. Norton (1995). Did Einstein Stumble? The Debate Over General Covariance. Erkenntnis 42 (2):223 - 245.score: 30.0
    The objection that Einstein's principle of general covariance is not a relativity principle and has no physical content is reviewed. The principal escapes offered for Einstein's viewpoint are evaluated.
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  39. John Norton (1996). Are Thought Experiments Just What You Thought? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26 (3):333 - 366.score: 30.0
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 26, pp. 333-66. 1996.
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  40. John D. Norton, The Inductive Significance of Observationally Indistinguishable Spacetimes.score: 30.0
    Results on the observational indistinguishability of spacetimes demonstrate the impossibility of determining by deductive inference which is our spacetime, no matter how extensive a portion of the spacetime is observed. These results do not illustrate an underdetermination of theory by evidence, since they make no decision between competing theories and they make little contact with the inductive considerations that must ground such a decision. Rather, these results express a variety of indeterminism in which a specification of the observable past always (...)
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  41. John D. Norton, A Little Survey of Induction.score: 30.0
    My purpose in this chapter is to survey some of the principal approaches to inductive inference in the philosophy of science literature. My first concern will be the general principles that underlie the many accounts of induction in this literature. When these accounts are considered in isolation, as is more commonly the case, it is easy to overlook that virtually all accounts depend on one of very few basic principles and that the proliferation of accounts can be understood as efforts (...)
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  42. Bryan Norton, Paul B. Thompson, David Schmidtz, Elizabeth Willott & Mark Sagoff (2006). Mark Sagoff 's Price, Principle, and the Environment: Two Comments. Ethics, Place and Environment 9 (3):337 – 372.score: 30.0
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  43. John D. Norton (2013). Brownian Computation Is Thermodynamically Irreversible. Foundations of Physics 43 (11):1-27.score: 30.0
    Brownian computers are supposed to illustrate how logically reversible mathematical operations can be computed by physical processes that are thermodynamically reversible or nearly so. In fact, they are thermodynamically irreversible processes that are the analog of an uncontrolled expansion of a gas into a vacuum.
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  44. John D. Norton (2010). There Are No Universal Rules for Induction. Philosophy of Science 77 (5):765-777.score: 30.0
    In a material theory of induction, inductive inferences are warranted by facts that prevail locally. This approach, it is urged, is preferable to formal theories of induction in which the good inductive inferences are delineated as those conforming to some universal schema. An inductive inference problem concerning indeterministic, non-probabilistic systems in physics is posed and it is argued that Bayesians cannot responsibly analyze it, thereby demonstrating that the probability calculus is not the universal logic of induction.
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  45. John D. Norton, Philosophy in Einstein's Science.score: 30.0
    Albert Einstein read philosophy. It was not an affectation of a celebrity-physicist trying to show his adoring public that he was no mere technician, but a cultured thinker. It was an interest in evidence from the start. In 1902, Einstein was a poorly paid patent examiner in Bern seeking to make a few extra Francs by offering tutorials in physics. Maurice Solovine answered the advertisement. The tutorials quickly vanished when they discovered their common fascinations in reading and talking. They were (...)
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  46. Kenneth T. Barnes & G. Norton (1977). Ontological Commitment. Philosophia 7 (1):181-196.score: 30.0
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  47. John D. Norton (2012). Approximation and Idealization: Why the Difference Matters. Philosophy of Science 79 (2):207-232.score: 30.0
    It is proposed that we use the term “approximation” for inexact description of a target system and “idealization” for another system whose properties also provide an inexact description of the target system. Since systems generated by a limiting process can often have quite unexpected, even inconsistent properties, familiar limit systems used in statistical physics can fail to provide idealizations, but are merely approximations. A dominance argument suggests that the limiting idealizations of statistical physics should be demoted to approximations.
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  48. John Norton (2008). Ignorance and Indifference. Philosophy of Science 75 (1):45-68.score: 30.0
    The epistemic state of complete ignorance is not a probability distribution. In it, we assign the same, unique, ignorance degree of belief to any contingent outcome and each of its contingent, disjunctive parts. That this is the appropriate way to represent complete ignorance is established by two instruments, each individually strong enough to identify this state. They are the principle of indifference (PI) and the notion that ignorance is invariant under certain redescriptions of the outcome space, here developed into the (...)
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  49. John D. Norton (2004). Why Thought Experiments Do Not Transcend Empiricism. In Christopher Hitchcock (ed.), Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Science. Blackwell. 44-66.score: 30.0
    Thought experiments are ordinary argumentation disguised in a vivid pictorial or narrative form. This account of their nature will allow me to show that empiricism has nothing to fear from thought experiments. They perform no epistemic magic. In so far as they tell us about the world, thought experiments draw upon what we already know of it, either explicitly or tacitly; they then transform that knowledge by disguised argumentation. They can do nothing more epistemically than can argumentation. I defend my (...)
     
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  50. Sam Baron, Kristie Miller & James Norton (2014). Groundless Truth. Inquiry 57 (2):175-195.score: 30.0
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