Search results for 'Chinese Room' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Larry Hauser (1997). Searle's Chinese Box: Debunking the Chinese Room Argument. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 7 (2):199-226.score: 240.0
    John Searle's Chinese room argument is perhaps the most influential andwidely cited argument against artificial intelligence (AI). Understood astargeting AI proper – claims that computers can think or do think– Searle's argument, despite its rhetorical flash, is logically andscientifically a dud. Advertised as effective against AI proper, theargument, in its main outlines, is an ignoratio elenchi. It musterspersuasive force fallaciously by indirection fostered by equivocaldeployment of the phrase "strong AI" and reinforced by equivocation on thephrase "causal powers" (at (...)
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  2. Michael J. Shaffer (2009). A Logical Hole in the Chinese Room. Minds and Machines 19 (2):229-235.score: 240.0
    Searle’s Chinese Room Argument (CRA) has been the object of great interest in the philosophy of mind, artificial intelligence and cognitive science since its initial presentation in ‘Minds, Brains and Programs’ in 1980. It is by no means an overstatement to assert that it has been a main focus of attention for philosophers and computer scientists of many stripes. It is then especially interesting to note that relatively little has been said about the detailed logic of the argument, (...)
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  3. Ricardo Restrepo (2012). Computers, Persons, and the Chinese Room. Part 1: The Human Computer. Journal of Mind and Behavior 33 (1):27-48.score: 240.0
    Detractors of Searle’s Chinese Room Argument have arrived at a virtual consensus that the mental properties of the Man performing the computations stipulated by the argument are irrelevant to whether computational cognitive science is true. This paper challenges this virtual consensus to argue for the first of the two main theses of the persons reply, namely, that the mental properties of the Man are what matter. It does this by challenging many of the arguments and conceptions put forth (...)
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  4. Simone Gozzano (1997). The Chinese Room Argument: Consciousness and Understanding. In Matjaz Gams, M. Paprzycki & X. Wu (eds.), Mind Versus Computer: Were Dreyfus and Winograd Right? Amsterdam: IOS Press. 43--231.score: 240.0
    In this paper I submit that the “Chinese room” argument rests on the assumption that understanding a sentence necessarily implies being conscious of its content. However, this assumption can be challenged by showing that two notions of consciousness come into play, one to be found in AI, the other in Searle’s argument, and that the former is an essential condition for the notion used by Searle. If Searle discards the first, he not only has trouble explaining how we (...)
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  5. Jerome C. Wakefield (2003). The Chinese Room Argument Reconsidered: Essentialism, Indeterminacy, and Strong AI. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 13 (2):285-319.score: 240.0
    I argue that John Searle's (1980) influential Chinese room argument (CRA) against computationalism and strong AI survives existing objections, including Block's (1998) internalized systems reply, Fodor's (1991b) deviant causal chain reply, and Hauser's (1997) unconscious content reply. However, a new ``essentialist'' reply I construct shows that the CRA as presented by Searle is an unsound argument that relies on a question-begging appeal to intuition. My diagnosis of the CRA relies on an interpretation of computationalism as a scientific theory (...)
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  6. Simone Gozzano (1995). Consciousness and Understanding in the Chinese Room. Informatica 19:653-56.score: 240.0
    In this paper I submit that the “Chinese room” argument rests on the assumption that understanding a sentence necessarily implies being conscious of its content. However, this assumption can be challenged by showing that two notions of consciousness come into play, one to be found in AI, the other in Searle’s argument, and that the former is an essential condition for the notion used by Searle. If Searle discards the first, he not only has trouble explaining how we (...)
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  7. Ricardo Restrepo (2012). Computers, Persons, and the Chinese Room. Part 2: Testing Computational Cognitive Science. Journal of Mind and Behavior 33 (3):123-140.score: 240.0
    This paper is a follow-up of the first part of the persons reply to the Chinese Room Argument. The first part claims that the mental properties of the person appearing in that argument are what matter to whether computational cognitive science is true. This paper tries to discern what those mental properties are by applying a series of hypothetical psychological and strengthened Turing tests to the person, and argues that the results support the thesis that the Man performing (...)
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  8. William J. Rapaport (2006). How Helen Keller Used Syntactic Semantics to Escape From a Chinese Room. Minds and Machines 16 (4):381-436.score: 240.0
    A computer can come to understand natural language the same way Helen Keller did: by using “syntactic semantics”—a theory of how syntax can suffice for semantics, i.e., how semantics for natural language can be provided by means of computational symbol manipulation. This essay considers real-life approximations of Chinese Rooms, focusing on Helen Keller’s experiences growing up deaf and blind, locked in a sort of Chinese Room yet learning how to communicate with the outside world. Using (...)
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  9. Norman Y. Teng (2000). A Cognitive Analysis of the Chinese Room Argument. Philosophical Psychology 13 (3):313-24.score: 240.0
    Searle's Chinese room argument is analyzed from a cognitive point of view. The analysis is based on a newly developed model of conceptual integration, the many space model proposed by Fauconnier and Turner. The main point of the analysis is that the central inference constructed in the Chinese room scenario is a result of a dynamic, cognitive activity of conceptual blending, with metaphor defining the basic features of the blending. Two important consequences follow: (1) Searle's recent (...)
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  10. Donald Nute (2011). A Logical Hole the Chinese Room Avoids. Minds and Machines 21 (3):431-433.score: 240.0
    Searle’s Chinese room argument (CRA) was recently charged as being unsound because it makes a logical error. It is shown here that this charge is based on a misinterpretation of the modal scope of a major premise of the CRA and that the CRA does not commit the logical error with which it is charged.
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  11. Jason Ford (2011). Helen Keller Was Never in a Chinese Room. Minds and Machines 21 (1):57-72.score: 240.0
    William Rapaport, in “How Helen Keller used syntactic semantics to escape from a Chinese Room,” (Rapaport 2006), argues that Helen Keller was in a sort of Chinese Room, and that her subsequent development of natural language fluency illustrates the flaws in Searle’s famous Chinese Room Argument and provides a method for developing computers that have genuine semantics (and intentionality). I contend that his argument fails. In setting the problem, Rapaport uses his own preferred definitions (...)
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  12. Slawomir J. Nasuto, John Mark Bishop, Etienne B. Roesch & Matthew C. Spencer (forthcoming). Zombie Mouse in a Chinese Room. Philosophy and Technology:1-15.score: 240.0
    John Searle’s Chinese Room Argument (CRA) purports to demonstrate that syntax is not sufficient for semantics, and, hence, because computation cannot yield understanding, the computational theory of mind, which equates the mind to an information processing system based on formal computations, fails. In this paper, we use the CRA, and the debate that emerged from it, to develop a philosophical critique of recent advances in robotics and neuroscience. We describe results from a body of work that contributes to (...)
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  13. Chinese Room (2011). As Opposed to Cognitive-Experiential Content, 297, 304–11 Cognitive-Experiential; See Experience, Cognitive Conceptual 6, 38–44, 47–51, 250. [REVIEW] In Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague (ed.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press. 125--7.score: 240.0
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  14. Herbert A. Simon & Stuart A. Eisenstadt (2003). A Chinese Room That Understands. In John M. Preston & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press.score: 240.0
     
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  15. B. Jack Copeland (2003). The Chinese Room From a Logical Point of View. In John M. Preston & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press.score: 240.0
     
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  16. Diane Proudfoot (2003). Wittgenstein's Anticipation of the Chinese Room. In John M. Preston & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press.score: 240.0
  17. Chinese Room (2008). Tama Coutts. In Benjamin Hale (ed.), Philosophy Looks at Chess. Open Court Press. 25.score: 240.0
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  18. John G. Taylor (2003). Do Virtual Actions Avoid the Chinese Room? In John M. Preston & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press.score: 240.0
     
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  19. Robert I. Damper (2004). The Chinese Room Argument--Dead but Not yet Buried. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (5-6):159-169.score: 210.0
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  20. C. Kaernbach (2005). No Virtual Mind in the Chinese Room. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (11):31-42.score: 210.0
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  21. Graham Button, Jeff Coutler & John R. E. Lee (2000). Re-Entering the Chinese Room. Minds and Machines 10 (1):149-152.score: 210.0
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  22. Dimitris Gavalas (2007). From Searle's Chinese Room to the Mathematics Classroom: Technical and Cognitive Mathematics. Studies in Philosophy and Education 26 (2):127-146.score: 210.0
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  23. Josef Moural (2003). The Chinese Room Argument. In Barry Smith (ed.), John Searle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 214--260.score: 210.0
     
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  24. Koji Tanaka (2004). Minds, Programs, and Chinese Philosophers: A Chinese Perspective on the Chinese Room. Sophia 43 (1):61-72.score: 192.0
    The paper is concerned with John Searle’s famous Chinese room argument. Despite being objected to by some, Searle’s Chinese room argument appears very appealing. This is because Searle’s argument is based on an intuition about the mind that ‘we’ all seem to share. Ironically, however, Chinese philosophers don’t seem to share this same intuition. The paper begins by first analysing Searle’s Chinee room argument. It then introduces what can be seen as the (implicit) (...) view of the mind. Lastly, it demonstrates a conceptual difference between Chinese and Western philosophy with respect to the notion of mind. Thus, it is shown that one must carefully attend to the presuppositions underlying Chinese philosophising in interpreting Chinese philosophers. (shrink)
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  25. Stevan Harnad (2001). What's Wrong and Right About Searle's Chinese Room Argument? In Michael A. Bishop & John M. Preston (eds.), [Book Chapter] (in Press). Oxford University Press.score: 180.0
    Searle's Chinese Room Argument showed a fatal flaw in computationalism (the idea that mental states are just computational states) and helped usher in the era of situated robotics and symbol grounding (although Searle himself thought neuroscience was the only correct way to understand the mind).
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  26. Hanoch Ben-Yami (1993). A Note on the Chinese Room. Synthese 95 (2):169-72.score: 180.0
    Searle's Chinese Room was supposed to prove that computers can't understand: the man in the room, following, like a computer, syntactical rules alone, though indistinguishable from a genuine Chinese speaker, doesn't understand a word. But such a room is impossible: the man won't be able to respond correctly to questions like What is the time?, even though such an ability is indispensable for a genuine Chinese speaker. Several ways to provide the room with (...)
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  27. David J. Chalmers (1992). Subsymbolic Computation and the Chinese Room. In J. Dinsmore (ed.), The Symbolic and Connectionist Paradigms: Closing the Gap. Lawrence Erlbaum. 25--48.score: 180.0
    More than a decade ago, philosopher John Searle started a long-running controversy with his paper “Minds, Brains, and Programs” (Searle, 1980a), an attack on the ambitious claims of artificial intelligence (AI). With his now famous _Chinese Room_ argument, Searle claimed to show that despite the best efforts of AI researchers, a computer could never recreate such vital properties of human mentality as intentionality, subjectivity, and understanding. The AI research program is based on the underlying assumption that all important aspects of (...)
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  28. John McCarthy, John Searle's Chinese Room Argument.score: 180.0
    John Searle begins his (1990) ``Consciousness, Explanatory Inversion and Cognitive Science'' with
    ``Ten years ago in this journal I published an article (Searle, 1980a and 1980b) criticising what I call Strong
    AI, the view that for a system to have mental states it is sufficient for the system to implement the right sort of
    program with right inputs and outputs. Strong AI is rather easy to refute and the basic argument can be
    summarized in one sentence: {it a system, (...)
    The Chinese Room Argument can be refuted in one sentence. (shrink)
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  29. Robert I. Damper (2006). The Logic of Searle's Chinese Room Argument. Minds and Machines 16 (2):163-183.score: 180.0
    John Searle’s Chinese room argument (CRA) is a celebrated thought experiment designed to refute the hypothesis, popular among artificial intelligence (AI) scientists and philosophers of mind, that “the appropriately programmed computer really is a mind”. Since its publication in 1980, the CRA has evoked an enormous amount of debate about its implications for machine intelligence, the functionalist philosophy of mind, theories of consciousness, etc. Although the general consensus among commentators is that the CRA is flawed, and not withstanding (...)
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  30. Stevan Harnad (2003). Minds, Machines, and Searle 2: What's Right and Wrong About the Chinese Room Argument. In John M. Preston & John Mark Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press.score: 180.0
    When in 1979 Zenon Pylyshyn, associate editor of Behavioral and Brain Sciences (BBS, a peer commentary journal which I edit) informed me that he had secured a paper by John Searle with the unprepossessing title of [XXXX], I cannot say that I was especially impressed; nor did a quick reading of the brief manuscript -- which seemed to be yet another tedious "Granny Objection"[1] about why/how we are not computers -- do anything to upgrade that impression.
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  31. Selmer Bringsjord & Ron Noel (2003). Real Robots and the Missing Thought-Experiment in the Chinese Room Dialectic. In John Preston & John Mark Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press. 144--166.score: 180.0
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  32. Stevan Harnad (2001). Rights and Wrongs of Searle's Chinese Room Argument. In M. Bishop & J. Preston (eds.), Essays on Searle's Chinese Room Argument. Oxford University Press.score: 180.0
    "in an academic generation a little overaddicted to "politesse," it may be worth saying that violent destruction is not necessarily worthless and futile. Even though it leaves doubt about the right road for London, it helps if someone rips up, however violently, a.
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  33. John M. Preston & John Mark Bishop (eds.) (2002). Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press.score: 180.0
    The most famous challenge to computational cognitive science and artificial intelligence is the philosopher John Searle's "Chinese Room" argument.
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  34. Larry Hauser, The Chinese Room Argument.score: 180.0
    _The Chinese room argument_ - John Searle's (1980a) thought experiment and associated (1984) derivation - is one of the best known and widely credited counters to claims of artificial intelligence (AI), i.e., to claims that computers _do_ or at least _can_ (someday might) think. According to Searle's original presentation, the argument is based on two truths: _brains cause minds_ , and _syntax doesn't_ _suffice for semantics_ . Its target, Searle dubs "strong AI": "according to strong AI," according to (...)
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  35. William Rapaport (2011). Yes, She Was! Reply to Ford’s “Helen KellerWas Never in a Chinese Room”. Minds and Machines 21 (1):3-17.score: 180.0
    Ford’s <span class='Hi'>Helen</span> <span class='Hi'>Keller</span> Was Never in a Chinese Room claims that my argument in How <span class='Hi'>Helen</span> <span class='Hi'>Keller</span> Used Syntactic Semantics to Escape from a Chinese Room fails because Searle and I use the terms ‘syntax’ and ‘semantics’ differently, hence are at cross purposes. Ford has misunderstood me; this reply clarifies my theory.
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  36. Peter Kugel (2004). The Chinese Room is a Trick. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (1):153-154.score: 180.0
    To convince us that computers cannot have mental states, Searle (1980) imagines a “Chinese room” that simulates a computer that “speaks” Chinese and asks us to find the understanding in the room. It's a trick. There is no understanding in the room, not because computers can't have it, but because the room's computer-simulation is defective. Fix it and understanding appears. Abracadabra!
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  37. Dale Jacquette (1990). Fear and Loathing (and Other Intentional States) in Searle's Chinese Room. Philosophical Psychology 3 (2 & 3):287-304.score: 180.0
    John R. Searle's problem of the Chinese Room poses an important philosophical challenge to the foundations of strong artificial intelligence, and functionalist, cognitivist, and computationalist theories of mind. Searle has recently responded to three categories of criticisms of the Chinese Room and the consequences he attempts to conclude from it, redescribing the essential features of the problem, and offering new arguments about the syntax-semantics gap it is intended to demonstrate. Despite Searle's defense, the Chinese (...) remains ineffective as a counterexample, and poses no real threat to artificial intelligence or mechanist philosophy of mind. The thesis that intentionality is a primitive irreducible relation exemplified by biological phenomena is preferred in opposition to Searle's contrary claim that intentionality is a biological phenomenon exhibiting abstract properties. (shrink)
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  38. Ronald L. Chrisley, Weak Strong AI: An Elaboration of the English Reply to the Chinese Room.score: 180.0
    Searle (1980) constructed the Chinese Room (CR) to argue against what he called \Strong AI": the claim that a computer can understand by virtue of running a program of the right sort. Margaret Boden (1990), in giving the English Reply to the Chinese Room argument, has pointed out that there isunderstanding in the Chinese Room: the understanding required to recognize the symbols, the understanding of English required to read the rulebook, etc. I elaborate on (...)
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  39. Larry Hauser, Chinese Room Argument. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 180.0
    The Chinese room argument is a thought experiment of John Searle (1980a) and associated (1984) derivation. It is one of the best known and widely credited counters to claims of artificial intelligence (AI)—that is, to claims that computers do or at least can (someday might) think. According to Searle’s original presentation, the argument is based on two key claims: brains cause minds and syntax doesn’t suffice for semantics. Its target is what Searle dubs “strong AI.” According to strong (...)
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  40. Natika Newton (1989). Machine Understanding and the Chinese Room. Philosophical Psychology 2 (2):207-15.score: 180.0
    John Searle has argued that one can imagine embodying a machine running any computer program without understanding the symbols, and hence that purely computational processes do not yield understanding. The disagreement this argument has generated stems, I hold, from ambiguity in talk of 'understanding'. The concept is analysed as a relation between subjects and symbols having two components: a formal and an intentional. The central question, then becomes whether a machine could possess the intentional component with or without the formal (...)
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  41. Natika Newton (1988). Machine Understanding and the Chinese Room. Philosophical Psychology 1 (2):207 – 215.score: 180.0
    John Searle has argued that one can imagine embodying a machine running any computer program without understanding the symbols, and hence that purely computational processes do not yield understanding. The disagreement this argument has generated stems, I hold, from ambiguity in talk of 'understanding'. The concept is analysed as a relation between subjects and symbols having two components: a formal and an intentional. The central question, then becomes whether a machine could possess the intentional component with or without the formal (...)
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  42. Philip Murray McCullough (2010). Otto in the Chinese Room. Spontaneous Generations 4 (1):129-137.score: 180.0
    The purpose of this paper is to explore a possible resolution to one of the main objections to machine thought as propounded by Alan Turing in the imitation game that bears his name. That machines will, at some point, be able to think is the central idea of this text, a claim supported by a schema posited by Andy Clark and David Chalmers in their paper, “The Extended Mind” (1998). Their notion of active externalism is used to support, strengthen and (...)
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  43. Alison Adam (2003). Cyborgs in the Chinese Room: Boundaries Transgressed and Boundaries Blurred. In John M. Preston & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press. 319--337.score: 180.0
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  44. Igor L. Aleksander (2003). Neural Depictions of "World" and "Self": Bringing Computational Understanding Into the Chinese Room. In John M. Preston & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press.score: 180.0
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  45. Jeff Coulter & S. Sharrock (2003). The Hinterland of the Chinese Room. In John M. Preston & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press.score: 180.0
     
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  46. Jeff Coulter & Wes Sharrock (2002). The Hinterland of the Chinese Room. In John M. Preston & John Mark Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press. 181.score: 180.0
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  47. A. Herbert (2002). A Chinese Room That Understands. In John M. Preston & John Mark Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press. 95.score: 180.0
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  48. Roger Penrose (2003). Consciousness, Computation, and the Chinese Room. In John M. Preston & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press.score: 180.0
     
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  49. John R. Searle (2002). Twenty-One Years in the Chinese Room. In John M. Preston & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press.score: 180.0
     
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