Search results for 'Chris Buck' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  26
    Chris Buck (2004). Sartre, Fanon, and the Case for Slavery Reparations. Sartre Studies International 10 (2):123-138.
    In this article I argue that Fanon articulates a more complex relationship between his notion of radical freedom and slavery reparations that allows for the possibility of demanding the latter without sacrificing the former. While at times Fanon seems to posit a simple dilemma according to which one must choose between freedom and reparations, he also describes a vicious cycle in which the taking of material reparations appears to be a precondition for freedom, yet the claim for reparations appears to (...)
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  2. Ross Buck (1986). A Psychologist's Reply Ross Buck LeDoux and I Clearly Agree That Psychologists Studying Emotion Must Be Aware of the Work of Neuroscientists to Provide a Framework for Their Ideas, and That Psychological Theory and Research May Provide Leads for Neuroscientists. In David A. Oakley (ed.), Mind and Brain. Methuen 359.
     
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  3.  9
    Therese Buck (2012). Gaudium Et Spes and Marriage: A Conjugal Covenant. The Australasian Catholic Record 89 (4):444.
    Buck, Therese This article explores some of the factors that led to Vatican II's teaching that marriage is a covenant [foedus] in Gaudium et spes when, in the 1917 Code of Canon Law marriage is referred to as a contract [contractus]. As a background to the developments in Gaudium et spes, I will first outline the teaching on marriage in the 1917 Code and in Pius XI's 1930 encyclical Casti connubii. This will be followed by the inclusion of marriage (...)
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  4. Roger C. Buck (1963). Rejoinder to Grünbaum. Philosophy of Science 30 (4):373-374.
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  5.  11
    Katharina Henke, Valerie Treyer, Eva T. Nagy, Stefan Kneifel, Max Düsteler, Roger M. Nitsch & Alfred Buck (2003). Active Hippocampus During Nonconscious Memories. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (1):31-48.
    The hippocampal formation is known for its importance in conscious, declarative memory. Here, we report neuroimaging evidence in humans for an additional role of the hippocampal formation in nonconscious memory. We maskedly presented combinations of faces and written professions such that subjects were not aware of them. Nevertheless, the masked presentations activated many of the brain regions that unmasked presentations of these stimuli did. To induce a nonconscious retrieval of the faces and face-associated occupational information, subjects were instructed to view (...)
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  6.  33
    Roger C. Buck (1963). Reflexive Predictions. Philosophy of Science 30 (4):359-369.
    Certain predictions are such that their accuracy can be affected by their dissemination, by their being believed and acted upon. Examples of such reflexive predictions are presented. Various approaches to the precise delineation of this category of predictions are explored, and a definition is proposed and defended. Next it is asked whether the possible reflexivity of predictions creates a serious methodological problem for the social sciences. A distinction between causal and logical reflexivity helps support a negative answer. Finally, we consider (...)
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  7.  42
    Roger Buck (1951). Referring Uses and Self-Enforcing Directives. Mind 60 (238):252-256.
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  8.  33
    Richard M. Buck (2008). Religion, Identity, and Political Legitimacy: Toward Democratic Inclusion. Journal of Social Philosophy 39 (3):340-358.
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  9.  4
    Jane L. Buck (2006). Why Ask If Tenure is Necessary? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (6):570-570.
    Although the target article is groundbreaking and creatively conceived, there are troubling questions regarding its methodology and conclusions. The sample in the authors' study was drawn from a popular magazine's lists; there is no recognition of the fact that most faculty are now off the tenure track; and comparisons are made with the British system with no supporting data. (Published Online February 8 2007).
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  10.  26
    Richard M. Buck (2004). Shaun P. Young, Beyond Rawls: An Analysis of the Concept of Political Liberalism. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 2002, 207 Pp. ISBN 0-7618-2241-0, $36.00 (Pb). [REVIEW] Journal of Value Inquiry 38 (3):425-431.
  11.  25
    Ross Buck (2000). Conceptualizing Motivation and Emotion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):195-196.
    Motivation and emotion are not clearly defined and differentiated in Rolls's The brain and emotion, reflecting a widespread problem in conceptualizing these phenomena. An adequate theory of emotion cannot be based upon reward and punishment alone. Basic mechanisms of arousal, agonistic, and prosocial motives-emotions exist in addition to reward-punishment systems.
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  12.  19
    Ross Buck (2005). Adding Ingredients to the Self-Organizing Dynamic System Stew: Motivation, Communication, and Higher-Level Emotions – and Don't Forget the Genes! Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):197-198.
    Self-organizing dynamic systems (DS) modeling is appropriate to conceptualizing the relationship between emotion and cognition-appraisal. Indeed, DS modeling can be applied to encompass and integrate additional phenomena at levels lower than emotional interpretations (genes), at the same level (motives), and at higher levels (social, cognitive, and moral emotions). Also, communication is a phenomenon involved in dynamic system interactions at all levels.
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  13.  19
    Ross Buck (2002). “Choice” and “Emotion” in Altruism: Reflections on the Morality of Justice Versus the Morality of Caring. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):254-255.
    Rachlin uses the word “choice” 80 times, whereas “emotion” does not appear. In contrast, “Empathy: Its ultimate and proximate bases” by Preston and de Waal, uses the word “emotion” 139 times and “choice” once. This commentary compares these ways of approaching empathy and altruism, relating Rachlin's approach to Gilligan's Morality of Justice and Preston and de Waal's to the Morality of Caring.
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  14.  5
    Roger C. Buck & W. Seeman (1955). Clinical Judges and Clinical Insight in Psychology. Philosophy of Science 22 (2):73-85.
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  15. R. Buck (1962). Non-Other Minds. In Ronald J. Butler (ed.), Analytic Philosophy. Barnes and Noble
     
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  16.  16
    Margaret Macintyre Latta & Gayle Buck (2008). Enfleshing Embodiment: 'Falling Into Trust' with the Body's Role in Teaching and Learning. Educational Philosophy and Theory 40 (2):315-329.
    Embodiment as a compelling way to rethink the nature of teaching and learning asks participants to see fundamentally what is at stake within teaching/learning situations, encountering ourselves and our relations to others/otherness. Drawing predominantly on the thinking of John Dewey and Maurice Merleau-Ponty the body's role within teaching and learning is enfleshed through the concrete experiences of one middle-school science teacher attempting to teach for greater student inquiry. Personal, embodied understandings of the lived terms of inquiry enable the science teacher (...)
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  17. R. Buck (1993). What is This Thing Called Subjective Experience? Reflections on the Neuropsychology of Qualia. Neuropsychology 7:490-99.
  18. R. C. Buck & R. S. Cohen (eds.) (1971). Psa 1970. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science Viii. D. Reidel.
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  19.  7
    M. Buck (2001). Musical Worlds: New Directions in the Philosophy of Music. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (4):593-593.
    Book Information Musical Worlds: New Directions in the\nPhilosophy of Music. Edited by Philip Alperson.\nPennsylvania State University Press. University Park. 1998.\nPp. 188. Paperback.
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  20.  8
    Roger C. Buck (1965). Comments: Clark on Natural Necessity. Journal of Philosophy 62 (21):625-629.
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  21.  6
    Eric Buck (2006). Love and Tectonics: Epikurean Philosophy and Reparative Architecture. Philosophical Forum 37 (4):457–476.
    To highlight care in architecture, I resuscitate Epicurus’ valorization of friendship in philosophy, contending that friendly love of wisdom is a practice of well-being, ataractic know-how. I emphasize the body as the instrument of the ataractic project of living. John McDermott and architect Christopher Alexander argue that affection has a place in contemporary design: what a person feels love for in the initial situation guides design. I argue that friendship with things leads us to care for and repair them. Repair (...)
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  22.  4
    Roger Buck (1968). Critical Notices. Mind 77 (308):588-593.
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  23.  1
    Roger C. Buck (1954). Book Review:The Logic of Personality. Bernard Mayo. [REVIEW] Ethics 64 (2):144-.
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  24.  1
    Peter Buck (1983). Reviews. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 34 (1):88-97.
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  25.  2
    M. Buck (2002). Music In The Moment. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (1):133-133.
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  26.  42
    John Skorupski (2007). Buck-Passing About Goodness. In J. Josefsson D. Egonsson (ed.), Hommage à Wlodek. Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz.
    Defends the buck-passing account of value from the wrong kind of reason objection by arguing that in the cases proposed there are no reasons to value the intuitively worthless object, but there are practical reasons to bring it about that one values it. Also extends the account to other evaluative concepts.
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  27.  43
    Alex Gregory (2014). A Very Good Reason to Reject the Buck-Passing Account. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):287-303.
    This paper presents a new objection to the buck-passing account of value. I distinguish the buck-passing account of predicative value from the buck-passing account of attributive value. According to the latter, facts about attributive value reduce to facts about reasons and their weights. But since facts about reasons’ weights are themselves facts about attributive value, this account presupposes what it is supposed to explain. As part of this argument, I also argue against Mark Schroeder's recent account of (...)
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  28. Guy Fletcher (2012). Resisting Buck-Passing Accounts of Prudential Value. Philosophical Studies 157 (1):77-91.
    This paper aims to cast doubt upon a certain way of analysing prudential value (or good for ), namely in the manner of a ‘buck-passing’ analysis. It begins by explaining why we should be interested in analyses of good for and the nature of buck-passing analyses generally (§I). It moves on to considering and rejecting two sets of buck-passing analyses. The first are analyses that are likely to be suggested by those attracted to the idea of analysing (...)
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  29. Andrew Reisner (2009). Abandoning the Buck Passing Analysis of Final Value. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):379 - 395.
    In this paper it is argued that the buck-passing analysis (BPA) of final value is not a plausible analysis of value and should be abandoned. While considering the influential wrong kind of reason problem and other more recent technical objections, this paper contends that there are broader reasons for giving up on buck-passing. It is argued that the BPA, even if it can respond to the various technical objections, is not an attractive analysis of final value. It is (...)
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  30. Jussi Suikkanen (2005). Reasons and Value – in Defence of the Buck-Passing Account. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (5):513 - 535.
    In this article, I will defend the so-called buck-passing theory of value. According to this theory, claims about the value of an object refer to the reason-providing properties of the object. The concept of value can thus be analyzed in terms of reasons and the properties of objects that provide them for us. Reasons in this context are considerations that count in favour of certain attitudes. There are four other possibilities of how the connection between reasons and value might (...)
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  31.  7
    Dale Miller, Compunction, Buck-Passing, and Moral Reasons: Reply to Darwall.
    In “’But It Would Be Wrong,’” Stephen Darwall advances a mixed view regarding “deontic buck-passing.” He holds that a wrong action’s “wrong-making features” are our reasons for reactive attitudes like blame; with respect to these reasons, the action’s wrongness “passes the buck” to these features. Yet the action’s being wrong is itself an additional reason for the agent not to do the action, Darwall contends, a “second-personal” moral reason. So with respect to reasons for action, the buck (...)
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  32. S. Matthew Liao (2010). The Buck-Passing Account of Value: Lessons From Crisp. Philosophical Studies 151 (3):421 - 432.
    T. M. Scanlon's buck-passing account of value (BPA) has been subjected to a barrage of criticisms. Recently, to be helpful to BPA, Roger Crisp has suggested that a number of these criticisms can be met if one makes some revisions to BPA. In this paper, I argue that if advocates of the buck-passing account accepted these revisions, they would effectively be giving up the buck-passing account as it is typically understood, that is, as an account concerned with (...)
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  33.  71
    Francesco Orsi (2006). Naturalism and the Buck-Passing Account of Value. Philosophical Writings 32 (2):58-77.
    It has been thought that the prospects for non-naturalism about normativity may be significantly advanced if non-naturalists take the relation of being a reason as the basic normative entity, and so if, inter alia, they endorse a buck-passing account of value. This is thought to yield theoretical benefits regarding (i) the open question argument, (ii) the defence against the charge of queerness, and (iii) demands of parsimony. In the paper I contest these claims. Non- naturalists need not focus on (...)
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  34.  44
    Francesco Orsi (2013). What's Wrong with Moorean Buck-Passing? Philosophical Studies 164 (3):727-746.
    In this paper I discuss and try to remove some major stumbling blocks for a Moorean buck-passing account of reasons in terms of value (MBP): There is a pro tanto reason to favour X if and only if X is intrinsically good, or X is instrumentally good, or favouring X is intrinsically good, or favouring X is instrumentally good. I suggest that MBP can embrace and explain the buck-passing intuition behind the far more popular buck-passing account of (...)
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  35.  28
    Andrew Moore (2012). The Buck-Passing Stops Here. In Rationis Defensor.
    Thomas Scanlon influentially argues that, in the provision of reasons to act or believe, goodness and value ‘pass the buck’ to other properties. This paper first extends his arguments: if Scanlon shows that goodness and value pass the buck, then relevantly analogous arguments show that, contrary to Scanlon, duty and wrongness too pass this same buck. The paper then reverses Scanlon’s buck-passing arguments: if they show that goodness and value pass the reason-providing buck, then reasons (...)
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  36.  3
    Chris Harman (2011). Chris Wickham's Framing the Early Middle Ages. Historical Materialism 19 (1):98-108.
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  37.  9
    Carlos Astarita (2011). Peasant-Based Societies in Chris Wickham's Thought. Historical Materialism 19 (1):194-220.
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  38.  77
    Sven Danielsson & Jonas Olson (2007). Brentano and the Buck-Passers. Mind 116 (463):511 - 522.
    According to T. M. Scanlon's 'buck-passing' analysis of value, x is good means that x has properties that provide reasons to take up positive attitudes vis-à-vis x. Some authors have claimed that this idea can be traced back to Franz Brentano, who said in 1889 that the judgement that x is good is the judgement that a positive attitude to x is correct ('richtig'). The most discussed problem in the recent literature on buckpassing is known as the 'wrong kind (...)
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  39. Jonas Olson (2004). Buck-Passing and the Wrong Kind of Reasons. Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):295–300.
    According to T.M. Scanlon's buck-passing account of value, to be valuable is not to possess intrinsic value as a simple and unanalysable property, but rather to have other properties that provide reasons to take up an attitude in favour of their owner or against it. The 'wrong kind of reasons' objection to this view is that we may have reasons to respond for or against something without this having any bearing on its value. The challenge is to explain why (...)
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  40.  99
    Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2006). Buck-Passing and the Right Kind of Reasons. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):114–120.
    The ‘buck-passing’ account equates the value of an object with the existence of reasons to favour it. As we argued in an earlier paper, this analysis faces the ‘wrong kind of reasons’ problem: there may be reasons for pro-attitudes towards worthless objects, in particular if it is the pro-attitudes, rather than their objects, that are valuable. Jonas Olson has recently suggested how to resolve this difficulty: a reason to favour an object is of the right kind only if its (...)
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  41.  21
    Philip Stratton-Lake, The Buck Passing Account of Value: Assessing the Negative Thesis.
    The buck-passing account of value involves a positive and a negative claim. The positive claim is that to be good is to have reasons for a pro-attitude. The negative claim is that goodness itself is not a reason for a pro-attitude. Unlike Scanlon, Parfit rejects the negative claim. He maintains that goodness is reason-providing, but that the reason provided is not an additional reason, additional, that is, to the reason provided by the good-making property. I consider various ways in (...)
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  42. Fred Dretske (2012). Chris Hill's Consciousness. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 161 (3):497-502.
    Chris Hill’s consciousness Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-6 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9812-4 Authors Fred Dretske, 212 Selkirk, Durham, NC 27707, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  43. Jussi Suikkanen (2009). Buck-Passing Accounts of Value. Philosophy Compass 4 (5):768-779.
    This paper explores the so-called buck-passing accounts of value. These views attempt to use normative notions, such as reasons and ought to explain evaluative notions, such as goodness and value . Thus, according to Scanlon's well-known view, the property of being good is the formal, higher-order property of having some more basic properties that provide reasons to have certain kind of valuing attitudes towards the objects. I begin by tracing some of the long history of such accounts. I then (...)
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  44. Mark Schroeder (2011). Buck-Passers' Negative Thesis. Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):341-347.
    Buck-passers about value accept two theses about value, a negative thesis and a positive. The negative thesis is that the fact that something is valuable is not itself a reason to promote or appreciate it. The positive thesis is that the fact that something is valuable consists in the fact that there are other reasons to promote or appreciate it. Buck-passers suppose that the negative thesis follows from the positive one, and sometimes insist on it as if it (...)
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  45.  22
    Ulrike Heuer (2006). Explaining Reasons: Where Does the Buck Stop? Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 (3):1-25.
    The buck-passing account of values offers an explanation of the close relation of values and reasons for action: of why it is that the question whether something that is of value provides reasons is not ”open.” Being of value simply is, its defenders claim, a property that something has in virtue of its having other reason-providing properties. The generic idea of buck-passing is that the property of being good or being of value does not provide reasons. It is (...)
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  46. Martijn Boven (2012). Review of Chris Danta's Literature Suspends Death: Sacrifice and Storytelling in Kierkegaard, Kafka and Blanchot. [REVIEW] Radical Philosophy 174 (july/august):51-53.
    In 'Literature Suspends Death: Sacrifice and Storytelling in Kierkegaard, Kafka and Blanchot' Chris Danta takes Genesis 22 as the starting point for an investigation of the role of literary imagination. His aim is to read the Genesis story from a literary-theoretical perspective in order to show how it can 'illuminate the secular situation of the literary writer.' To do this, Danta stages a fruitful confrontation between Søren Kierkegaard as defender of religion and inwardness and Franz Kafka and Maurice Blanchot (...)
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  47.  30
    Johan Brännmark (2008). Excellence and Means: On the Limits of Buck-Passing. [REVIEW] Journal of Value Inquiry 42 (3):301-315.
    The article explores the limits of buck-passing analysis in evaluating value or goodness. It talks about the inability of back-passers to account for two important types of value or goodness, which include excellence and means. The use of delimiting strategy in buck-passing analysis in order to be in possession of goodness is discussed.
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  48. Pekka Väyrynen (2006). Resisting the Buck-Passing Account of Value. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 1. Oxford University Press 295-324.
    I first distinguish between different forms of the buck-passing account of value and clarify my target in other respects on buck-passers' behalf. I then raise a number of problems for the different forms of the buck-passing view that I have distinguished.
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  49.  3
    Mats Volberg (2015). Implications of Paternalism and Buck-Passing: A Reply to Quong. Polish Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):91-108.
    In his latest book, Liberalism without Perfection (2011), Jonathan Quong argues against liberal perfectionism and defends Rawlsian political liberalism. In the course of his argumentation he presents us with a judgmental account of paternalism and the buck-passing account of truth in political philosophy. The aim of this paper is to critique both of those elements in Quong’s argumentation. I will first present the judgmental account of paternalism and then demonstrate that it will place impossible demands on us, insofar as (...)
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  50. Stephen T. Casper (2014). Chickens and Eggs A Commentary on Chris Renwick's “Completing the Circle of the Social Sciences? William Beveridge and Social Biology at London School of Economics During the 1930s”. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 44 (4):506-514.
    Why would anyone want there to be natural foundations for the social sciences? In a provocative essay exploring precisely that question, historian Chris Renwick uses an interwar debate featuring William Beveridge, Lancelot Hogben, and Friedrich Hayek to begin to imagine what might have been had such a program calling for biological knowledge to form the natural bases of the social sciences been realized at the London School of Economics. Yet perhaps Renwick grants too much attention to differences and “what-ifs” (...)
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