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  1. Jon Altschul, Anthony Brueckner & Christopher Buford (2014). Vahid, Burge, and Perceptual Entitlement. Metaphilosophy 45 (3):325-330.
    Hamid Vahid criticizes Tyler Burge's account of perceptual entitlement. Vahid argues that Burge's account fails to satisfy a criterion of adequacy that any correct account of perceptual warrant must satisfy. According to Vahid, a correct account of perceptual warrant must allow for perceptual beliefs which are produced by a properly functioning perceptual system yet which lack warrant. The present article argues that Vahid's critique of Burge fails. It presents numerous examples of such beliefs that are consistent with Burge's account of (...)
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  2. Anthony Brueckner & Christopher T. Buford (2013). Becker on Epistemic Luck. Philosophical Studies 163 (1):171-175.
    Kelly Becker has argued that in an externalist anti-luck epistemology, we must hold that knowledge requires the satisfaction of both a modalized tracking condition and a process reliability condition. We raise various problems for the examples that are supposed to establish this claim.
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  3. Chris Buford & Anthony Brueckner (2013). Resisting Resisting Externalism. Episteme:1-7.
    In Jonathan Vogel addresses some important, foundational questions about the nature of justification. Vogel's focus is on Ernest Sosa's case against internalism about justification in Epistemic Justification. We defend Sosa against criticism leveled by Vogel. We also question whether Vogel himself can accept what he labels the connection thesis, a thesis that figures prominently in his arguments against Sosa.
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  4. Christopher Buford (2013). Centering on Demonstrative Thought. Philosophia 41 (4):1135-1147.
    The nature of perceptual demonstratives, the ‘that F’ component of judgments of the form ‘that F is G’ based on perceptual input, has been a topic of interest for many philosophers. Another related, though distinct, question concerns the nature of demonstrative judgments based not on current perceptual input, but instead derived from memory. I argue that the account put forward by John Campbell fails to adequately account for memory-based demonstrative thought.
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  5. Christopher T. Buford (2013). Does Indeterminacy Matter? Theoria 79 (2):155-166.
    Derek Parfit has offered numerous arguments in an attempt to establish that identity is not what matters. Jens Johannson has recently argued that Parfit's various arguments for the claim that identity is not what matters fail to establish what Parfit takes such arguments to establish. Johannson contends that this is due in part to the invalidity of one of Parfit's key arguments, and the fact that Parfit ignores a position that is compatible with the conclusions of his successful arguments and (...)
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  6. Anthony Brueckner & Christopher T. Buford (2012). A Tale of Two Fallibilists: On an Argument for Infallibilism. Thought 1 (3):195-199.
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  7. Yuval Avnur, Anthony Brueckner & Christopher Buford (2011). No Closure On Skepticism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (4):439-447.
    This article is a response to an important objection that Sherrilyn Roush has made to the standard closure-based argument for skepticism, an argument that has been studied over the past couple of decades. If Roush's objection is on the mark, then this would be a quite significant finding. We argue that her objection fails.
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  8. Christopher Buford (2011). Review of Philosophy of Personal Identity and Multiple Personality – Logi Gunnarsson. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 61 (243):418-420.
  9. Christopher T. Buford (2010). Reply to Baumann on Factivity and Contextualism. Analysis 70 (3):486-489.
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  10. Anthony Brueckner & Christopher T. Buford (2009). Bootstrapping and Knowledge of Reliability. Philosophical Studies 145 (3):407–412.
    This is a critical discussion of a paper on the problem of bootstrapping by Jose Zalabardo.
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  11. Anthony Brueckner & Christopher T. Buford (2009). Contextualism, SSI and the Factivity Problem. Analysis 69 (3):431-438.
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  12. Anthony Brueckner & Christopher T. Buford (2009). Thinking Animals and Epistemology. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (3):310-314.
    We consider one of Eric Olson's chief arguments for animalism about personal identity: the view that we are each identical to a human animal. The argument was originally given in Olson's book The Human Animal . Olson's argument presupposes an epistemological premise which we examine in detail. We argue that the premise is implausible and that Olson's defense of animalism is therefore in trouble.
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  13. Christopher Buford (2009). Baker on the Psychological Account of Personal Identity. Acta Analytica 24 (3):197-209.
    Lynne Rudder Baker’s Constitution View of human persons has come under much recent scrutiny. Baker argues that each human person is constituted by, but not identical to, a human animal. Much of the critical discussion of Baker’s Constitution View has focused upon this aspect of her account. Less has been said about the positive diachronic account of personal identity offered by Baker. Baker argues that it is sameness of what she labels ‘first-person perspective’ that is essential to understanding personal identity (...)
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  14. Christopher Buford (2009). Contextualism, Closure, and the Knowledge Account of Assertion. Journal of Philosophical Research 34:111-121.
    This paper argues that Epistemic Contextualism, Knowledge Closure, and the Knowledge Account of Assertion are inconsistent. The argument is developed by considering an objection to Contextualism that is unsuccessful. Some Contextualist responses are canvassed and rejected. Finally, it is argued that an analogue of the inconsistency arises for those who accept that justification is closed under known entailment.
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  15. Christopher Buford (2009). Memory, Quasi-Memory, and Pseudo-Quasi-Memory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (3):465 – 478.
    Bishop Butler objected to Locke's theory of personal identity on the grounds that memory presupposes personal identity. Most of those sympathetic with Locke's account have accepted Butler's criticism, and have sought to devise a theory of personal identity in the spirit of Locke's that avoids Butler's circularity objection. John McDowell has argued that even the more recent accounts of personal identity are vulnerable to the kind of objection Butler raised against Locke's own account. I criticize McDowell's stance, drawing on a (...)
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  16. Anthony Brueckner & Christopher T. Buford (2008). The Psychological Approach to Personal Identity: Non-Branching and the Individuation of Person Stages. Dialogue 47 (02):377-.
    ABSTRACT: We begin by discussing some logical constraints on the psychological approach to personal identity. We consider a problem for the psychological approach that arises in fission cases. The problem engenders the need for a non-branching clause in a psychological account of the co-personality relation. We look at some difficulties in formulating such a clause. We end by rejecting a recently proposed formulation of non-branching. Our criticism of the formulation raises some interesting questions about the individuation of person stages.RÉSUMÉ: Ce (...)
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  17. Christopher Buford (2008). Advancing an Advance Directive Debate. Bioethics 22 (8):423-430.
    A challenge has recently been levelled against the legal and/or moral legitimacy of some advance directives. It has been argued that in certain cases an advance directive carries no weight in a decision on whether to withhold treatment, since the individual in the debilitating state is not the same person as the person who created the advance directive. In the first section of this paper, I examine two formulations of the argument against the moral legitimacy of the advance directives under (...)
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  18. Christopher T. Buford (2008). The Psychological Approach to Personal Identity. Dialogue 47 (2):377-386.
    We begin by discussing some logical constraints on the psychological approach to personal identity. We consider a problem for the psychological approach that arises in fission cases. The problem engenders the need for a non-branching clause in a psychological account of the co-personality relation. We look at some difficulties in formulating such a clause. We end by rejecting a recently proposed formulation of non-branching. Our criticism of the formulation raises some interesting questions about the individuation of person stages.
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  19. Fritz Allhoff, Françoise Baylis, Richard Glen Boire, Christopher Buford, Tom Buller, Raymond DeVries, Hubert Doucet, Kathinka Evers, Joseph Fins & Ruth L. Fischbach (2005). First Page Preview. American Journal of Bioethics 5 (2).
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  20. Chris Buford & Fritz Allhoff (2005). Neuroscience and Metaphysics. American Journal of Bioethics 5 (2):34 – 36.
  21. Christopher Buford (2005). DeRose and the Comparative Account of Epistemic Closure. Facta Philosophica 7 (2):255-259.
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