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Profile: Chris Tillman (University of Manitoba)
  1. Ben Caplan, Chris Tillman & Patrick Reeder (2010). Parts of Singletons. Journal of Philosophy 107 (10):501-533.
  2. Chris Tillman & Gregory Fowler (2012). Propositions and Parthood: The Universe and Anti-Symmetry. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):525 - 539.
    It is plausible that the universe exists: a thing such that absolutely everything is a part of it. It is also plausible that singular, structured propositions exist: propositions that literally have individuals as parts. Furthermore, it is plausible that for each thing, there is a singular, structured proposition that has it as a part. Finally, it is plausible that parthood is a partial ordering: reflexive, transitive, and anti-symmetric. These plausible claims cannot all be correct. We canvass some costs of denying (...)
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  3. Chris Tillman (2005). A Millian Propositional Guise for One Puzzling English Gal. Analysis 65 (287):251–258.
  4.  45
    Ben Caplan & Chris Tillman (2013). Benacerraf's Revenge. Philosophical Studies 166 (1):111-129.
    In a series of recent publications, Jeffrey King (The nature and structure of content, 2007; Proc Aristot Soc 109(3):257–277, 2009; Philos Stud, 2012) argues for a view on which propositions are facts. He also argues against views on which propositions are set-theoretical objects, in part because such views face Benacerraf problems. In this paper, we argue that, when it comes to Benacerraf problems, King’s view doesn’t fare any better than its set-theoretical rivals do. Finally, we argue that his view faces (...)
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    Chris Tillman (2016). The Matter of Serial Fiction. Res Philosophica 93 (2):1-15.
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    Ben Caplan, Chris Tillman, Brian McLean & Adam Murray (2014). Not the Optimistic Type. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (5-6):575-589.
    (2013). Not the optimistic type. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 43, Essays on the Nature of Propositions, pp. 575-589.
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    Chris Tillman (2012). Reconciling Justificatory Internalism and Content Externalism. Synthese 187 (2):419-440.
    At first pass, internalism about justification is the view that there is no justificatory difference without an internal difference. Externalism about mental content is the view that there are differences in mental content without an internal difference. Assuming mental contents are the primary bearers of justificatory features, the two views are in obvious tension. The goal of this paper is to determine how the tension is best resolved. The paper proceeds as follows. In §1 I explain the threat to justificatory (...)
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