54 found
Order:
See also:
Profile: Chrisoula Andreou (University of Utah)
  1.  62
    Chrisoula Andreou (2015). Parity, Comparability, and Choice. Journal of Philosophy 112 (1):5-22.
    It is often supposed that, given two potential objects of choice X and Y, a specific set of circumstances, and a specific choosing agent, one of the following must be true: (1) opting for X is a better choice than opting for Y, (2) opting for Y is a better choice than opting for X, or (3) opting for X and opting for Y are exactly equally good choices. My aim in this paper is to show how some philosophical insights (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2.  21
    Chrisoula Andreou (2015). The Real Puzzle of the Self-Torturer: Uncovering a New Dimension of Instrumental Rationality. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5-6):562-575.
    The puzzle of the self-torturer raises intriguing questions concerning rationality, cyclic preferences, and resoluteness. Interestingly, what makes the case puzzling has not been clearly pinpointed. The puzzle, it seems, is that a series of rational choices foreseeably leads the self-torturer to an option that serves his preferences worse than the one with which he started. But this is a very misleading way of casting the puzzle. I pinpoint the real puzzle of the self-torturer and, in the process, reveal a neglected (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3.  14
    Chrisoula Andreou & Sergio Tenenbaum (2015). Foreword. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5-6):561-561.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4.  54
    Chrisoula Andreou (2010). A Shallow Route to Environmentally Friendly Happiness: Why Evidence That We Are Shallow Materialists Need Not Be Bad News for the Environment(Alist). Ethics, Place and Environment 13 (1):1 – 10.
    It is natural to assume that we would not be willing to compromise the environment if the conveniences and luxuries thereby gained did not have a substantial positive impact on our happiness. But there is room for skepticism and, in particular, for the thesis that we are compromising the environment to no avail in that our conveniences and luxuries are not having a significant impact on our happiness, making the costs incurred for them a waste. One way of defending the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  5.  17
    Chrisoula Andreou (forthcoming). Cashing Out the Money-Pump Argument. Philosophical Studies:1-5.
    The money-pump argument figures as the staple argument in support of the view that cyclic preferences are irrational. According to a prominent way of understanding the argument, it is grounded in the assumption that it is irrational to make choices that lead one to a dispreferred alternative. My aim in this paper is to motivate diffidence with respect to understanding the money-pump argument in this way by suggesting that if it is so understood, the argument emerges as question-begging and as (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6.  57
    Chrisoula Andreou (2006). Environmental Damage and the Puzzle of the Self-Torturer. Philosophy and Public Affairs 34 (1):95–108.
    I show, building on Warren Quinn's puzzle of the self-torturer, that destructive conduct with respect to the environment can flourish even in the absence of interpersonal conflicts. As Quinn's puzzle makes apparent, in cases where individually negligible effects are involved, an agent, whether it be an individual or a unified collective, can be led down a course of destruction simply as a result of following its informed and perfectly understandable but intransitive preferences. This is relevant with respect to environmental ethics, (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  7.  3
    Chrisoula Andreou (2016). Cashing Out the Money-Pump Argument. Philosophical Studies 173 (6):1451-1455.
    The money-pump argument figures as the staple argument in support of the view that cyclic preferences are irrational. According to a prominent way of understanding the argument, it is grounded in the assumption that it is irrational to make choices that lead one to a dispreferred alternative. My aim in this paper is to motivate diffidence with respect to understanding the money-pump argument in this way by suggesting that if it is so understood, the argument emerges as question-begging and as (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8.  65
    Chrisoula Andreou (2006). Getting On in a Varied World. Social Theory and Practice 32 (1):61-73.
    The core argument in favor of the view that immorality is a natural defect for human beings, which has been developed by Foot, assumes that if justice and compassion have important functions in human survival and reproduction, then injustice and cruelty are natural defects in human beings. But this ignores possibilities and results that cannot reasonably be ignored. Multiple and mixed naturally sound types can and do occur in nature. Moreover, research in the life sciences suggests that at least some (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  9.  82
    Chrisoula Andreou (2007). Morality and Psychology. Philosophy Compass 2 (1):46–55.
    This article briefly discusses the connection between moral philosophy and moral psychology, and then explores three intriguing areas of inquiry that fall within the intersection of the two fields. The areas of inquiry considered focus on (1) debates concerning the nature of moral judgments and moral motivation; (2) debates concerning good and bad character traits and character-based explanations of actions; and (3) debates concerning the role of moral rules in guiding the morally wise agent.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  10.  20
    Chrisoula Andreou (2005). Going From Bad (Or Not so Bad) to Worse: On Harmful Addictions and Habits. American Philosophical Quarterly 42 (4):323 - 331.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  11. Chrisoula Andreou (2007). Understanding Procrastination. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 37 (2):183–193.
    Procrastination is frustrating. Because the procrastinator's frustration is self-imposed, procrastination can also be quite puzzling. I consider attempts at explaining, or explaining away, what appear to be genuine cases of procrastination. According to the position that I propose and defend, genuine procrastination exists and is supported by preference loops, which can be either stable or evanescent.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  12.  61
    Chrisoula Andreou (2014). Temptation, Resolutions, and Regret. Inquiry 57 (3):275-292.
    Discussion of temptation has figured prominently in recent debates concerning instrumental rationality. In light of some particularly interesting cases in which giving in to temptation involves acting in accordance with one’s current evaluative rankings, two lines of thought have been developed: one appeals to the possibility of deviating from a well-grounded resolution, and the other appeals to the possibility of being insufficiently responsive to the prospect of future regret. But the current appeals to resolutions and regret and some of the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13.  25
    Chrisoula Andreou (2004). Instrumentally Rational Myopic Planning. Philosophical Papers 33 (2):133-145.
    Abstract I challenge the view that, in cases where time for deliberation is not an issue, instrumental rationality precludes myopic planning. I show where there is room for instrumentally rational myopic planning, and then argue that such planning is possible not only in theory, it is something human beings can and do engage in. The possibility of such planning has, however, been disregarded, and this disregard has skewed related debates concerning instrumental rationality.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  14.  46
    Chrisoula Andreou (2012). Self-Defeating Self-Governance. Philosophical Issues 22 (1):20-34.
    My aim in this paper is to initiate and contribute to debate concerning the possibility of behavior that is both self-defeating and self-governed. In the first section of the paper, I review a couple of points that figure in the literature as platitudes about (the relevant notion of) self-governance. In the second section, I explain how these points give rise to what seems to be a dilemma that suggests that informed self-defeating behavior, wherein one is aware of the consequences of (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  15.  64
    Chrisoula Andreou (2014). The Good, the Bad, and the Trivial. Philosophical Studies 169 (2):209-225.
    Dreadful and dreaded outcomes are sometimes brought about via the accumulation of individually trivial effects. Think about inching toward terrible health or toward an environmental disaster. In some such cases, the outcome is seen as unacceptable but is still gradually realized via an extended sequence of moves each of which is trivial in terms of its impact on the health or environment of those involved. Cases of this sort are not only practically challenging, they are theoretically challenging as well. For, (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16.  86
    Chrisoula Andreou (2005). The Voices of Reason. American Philosophical Quarterly 42 (1):33 - 45.
    It is widely held that instrumental reasoning to a practical conclusion is parasitic on non-instrumental practical reasoning. This conclusion is based on the claim that when there is no reason to adopt a certain end, there is no reason to take the means (qua means) to that end. But, as will be argued, while there is a sense of reason according to which the previous statement is true, there is another sense according to which it is false. Furthermore, in both (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  17.  67
    Chrisoula Andreou (2005). Incommensurable Alternatives and Rational Choice. Ratio 18 (3):249–261.
    I consider the implications of incommensurability for the assumption, in rational choice theory, that a rational agent’s preferences are complete. I argue that, contrary to appearances, the completeness assumption and the existence of incommensurability are compatible. Indeed, reflection on incommensurability suggests that one’s preferences should be complete over even the incommensurable alternatives one faces.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  18.  50
    Chrisoula Andreou (2006). Might Intentions Be the Only Source of Practical Imperatives? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (3):311 - 325.
    I focus on the broadly instrumentalist view that all genuine practical imperatives are hypothetical imperatives and all genuine practical deliberation is deliberation from existing motivations. After indicating why I see instrumentalism as highly plausible, I argue that the most popular version of instrumentalism, according to which genuine practical imperatives can take desires as their starting point, is problematic. I then provide a limited defense of what I see as a more radical but also more compelling version of instrumentalism. According to (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  19.  63
    Chrisoula Andreou (2013). Agency and Awareness. Ratio 26 (2):117-133.
    I focus on the idea that if, as a result of lacking any conscious goal related to X-ing and any conscious anticipation or awareness of X-ing, one could sincerely reply to the question ‘Why are you X-ing?’ with ‘I didn't realize I was doing that,’ then one's X-ing is not intentional. My interest is in the idea interpreted as philosophically substantial (rather than merely stipulative) and as linked to the familiar view that there is a major difference, relative to the (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20.  78
    Chrisoula Andreou (2006). Temptation and Deliberation. Philosophical Studies 131 (3):583 - 606.
    There is a great deal of plausibility to the standard view that if one is rational and it is clear at the time of action that a certain move, say M1, would serve one’s concerns better than any other available move, then one will, as a rational agent, opt for move M1. Still, this view concerning rationality has been challenged at least in part because it seems to conflict with our considered judgments about what it is rational to do in (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  21.  21
    Chrisoula Andreou (2005). Phillipa Foot, Natural Goodness (Oxford: Clarendon Press 2001), Pp. 125. Utilitas 17 (3):359-361.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  22.  98
    Chrisoula Andreou (2009). Taking on Intentions. Ratio 22 (2):157-169.
    I propose a model of intention formation and argue that it illuminates and does justice to the complex and interesting relationships between intentions on the one hand and practical deliberation, evaluative judgements, desires, beliefs, and conduct on the other. As I explain, my model allows that intentions normally stem from pro-attitudes and normally control conduct, but it is also revealing with respect to cases in which intentions do not stem from pro-attitudes or do not control conduct. Moreover, it makes the (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23.  39
    Mariam Thalos & Chrisoula Andreou (2009). Of Human Bonding: An Essay on the Natural History of Agency. Public Reason 1 (2).
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  24. Chrisoula Andreou (2007). There Are Preferences and Then There Are Preferences. In Barbara Montero and Mark D. White (ed.), Economics and the Mind.
    This paper draws a distinction between two closely related conceptions of 'preference' that is of great significance relative to a set of interrelated debates in rational choice theory. The distinction is particularly illuminating in relation to the idea that there is a rational defect inherent in individuals with intransitive preferences and, relatedly, in democratic collectives. I use the distinction to show that things are more complicated than they seem.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  25.  75
    Chrisoula Andreou (2008). Addiction, Procrastination, and Failure Points in Decision-Making Systems. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (4):439-440.
    Redish et al. suggest that their failures-in-decision-making framework for understanding addiction can also contribute to improving our understanding of a variety of psychiatric disorders. In the spirit of reflecting on the significance and scope of their research, I briefly develop the idea that their framework can also contribute to improving our understanding of the pervasive problem of procrastination.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26.  62
    Chrisoula Andreou (2008). The Newxin Puzzle. Philosophical Studies 139 (3):415 - 422.
    A variety of thought experiments suggest that, if the standard picture of practical rationality is correct, then practical rationality is sometimes an obstacle to practical success. For some, this in turn suggests that there is something wrong with the standard picture. In particular, it has been argued that we should revise the standard picture so that practical rationality and practical success emerge as more closely connected than the current picture allows. In this paper, I construct a choice situation—which I refer (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27.  60
    Chrisoula Andreou (2006). Standards, Advice, and Practical Reason. Journal of Moral Philosophy 3 (1):57-67.
    Is there a mode of sincere advice in which the standards of the adviser are put aside in favor of the standards of the advisee? I consider two sorts of cases that appear to be such that the adviser is evaluating things from within the advisee’s system of standards even though this system conflicts with her own; and I argue that these cases are best interpreted in ways that dissolve this appearance. I then argue that the nature of sincere advice (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28.  48
    Chrisoula Andreou (2007). Environmental Preservation and Second-Order Procrastination. Philosophy and Public Affairs 35 (3):233–248.
    I argue that procrastination with respect to environmental preservation is in the class of procrastination problems that are particularly difficult to overcome because of the presence of factors that support second-order procrastination. If my reasoning is correct, then second-order procrastination can help explain the distressing fact — assuming it is a fact — that, despite widespread professions of serious concern, the issue of environmental preservation is not getting as much of our attention as it deserves. My reasoning also suggests that (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29.  46
    Chrisoula Andreou (2008). Making a Clean Break: Addiction and Ulysses Contracts. Bioethics 22 (1):25–31.
    I examine current models of self-destructive addictive behaviour, and argue that there is an important place for Ulysses contracts in coping with addictive behaviour that stems from certain problematic preference structures. Given the relevant preference structures, interference based on a Ulysses contract need not involve questionably favouring an agent’s past preferences over her current preferences, but can actually be justified in terms of the agent’s current concerns and commitments.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30.  28
    Chrisoula Andreou & Mariam Thalos (2007). Sense and Sensibility. American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (1):71 - 80.
    We consider two versions of the view that the person of good sense has good sensibility and argue that at least one version of the view is correct. The version we defend is weaker than the version defended by contemporary Aristotelians; it can be consistently accepted even by those who find the contemporary Aristotelian version completely implausible. According to the version we defend, the person of good sense can be relied on to act soundly in part because, with the guidance (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31.  41
    Chrisoula Andreou (2005). Review of Phillipa Foot's Natural Goodness (Oxford: Clarendon Press 2001). [REVIEW] Utilitas 17 (3):359-361.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32.  37
    Chrisoula Andreou, Dynamic Choice. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Sometimes a series of choices do not serve one's concerns well even though each choice in the series seems perfectly well suited to serving one's concerns. In such cases, one has a dynamic choice problem. Otherwise put, one has a problem related to the fact that one's choices are spread out over time. This survey reviews some of the challenging choice situations and problematic preference structures that can prompt dynamic choice problems. It also reviews some proposed solutions, and explains how (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33. Chrisoula Andreou (2003). Amartya Sen, Rationality and Freedom Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 23 (3):217-220.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34.  33
    Chrisoula Andreou (2010). Rehabilitating Human Nature. Bioethics 24 (9):461-469.
    I review the main models of disability and introduce a line of reasoning that has been neglected in the debate concerning disability and disadvantage. My reasoning suggests that while disablism can and should be combated, success will require more challenging transformations than those featured in the literature.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35.  22
    Chrisoula Andreou (2007). Non-Relative Reasons and Humean Thought: If What is a Reason for You is a Reason for Me, Where Does That Leave the Humean? Metaphilosophy 38 (5):654-668.
    A variety of strategies have been used to oppose the influential Humean thesis that all of an agent’s reasons for action are provided by the agent’s current wants. Among these strategies is the attempt to show that it is a conceptual truth that reasons for action are non-relative. I introduce the notion of a basic reason- giving consideration and show that the non-relativity thesis can be understood as a corollary of the more fundamental thesis that basic reason-giving considerations are generalizable. (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36. Chrisoula Andreou (2011). Choosing Well: Value Pluralism and Patterns of Choice. In Thom Brooks (ed.), New Waves in Ethics.
    What should I do? Philosophical reflection on this question has raised a variety of puzzles concerning the nature of ethics and of practical reasoning. In this paper, I focus on some new complications raised by current discussions concerning value pluralism, incomparability, and the nature of all-things-considered judgments. I suggest that part of the debate has proceeded in a way that obscures aspects of how we make good decisions in the face of a plurality of values (and identities) pulling us in (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37. Chrisoula Andreou (2002). Joseph Heath, Communicative Action and Rational Choice Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 22 (1):41-43.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38. Theodor W. Adorno, Steven G. Affeldt, Rogers Albritton, Alice Ambrose, Erich Ammereller, Alan R. Anderson, Chrisoula Andreou, Julia Annas, Elizabeth Anscombe & Karl-Otto Apel (2007). Bouwsma, Oets K. Braithwaite, Richard Brandom, Robert 33 Brouwer, Luitzen EJ 275–277, 279–280, 284. In Guy Kahane, Edward Kanterian & Oskari Kuusela (eds.), Wittgenstein and His Interpreters: Essays in Memory of Gordon Baker. Blackwell Pub. 345.
    No categories
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39. C. Fred Alford, Michael J. Almeida, Chrisoula Andreou, Maria Antonaccio, Christopher Bennett, Ben Bradley, Elizabeth Brake, Sarah Broadie, Baruch Brody & Nicholas Buccola (2008). Referees for Volume 5. Journal of Moral Philosophy 5:465-466.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40. Chrisoula Andreou (2003). Amartya Sen, Rationality and Freedom. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 23:217-220.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41. Chrisoula Andreou (2012). Add to Cart: Environmental ‘Amenities’ and Cost-Benefit Analysis. In Michael O'Rourke and Matthew H. Slater William P. Kabasenche (ed.), The Environment, vol. 9 of Topics in Contemporary Philosophy.
  42. Chrisoula Andreou & Sergio Tenenbaum (eds.) (2016). Belief, Action and Rationality Over Time. Routledge.
    Action theorists and formal epistemologists often pursue parallel inquiries regarding rationality, with the former focused on practical rationality, and the latter focused on theoretical rationality. In both fields, there is currently a strong interest in exploring rationality in relation to time. This exploration raises questions about the rationality of certain patterns over time. For example, it raises questions about the rational permissibility of certain patterns of intention; similarly, it raises questions about the rational permissibility of certain patterns of belief. While (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43. Chrisoula Andreou (2010). Coping with Procrastination. In Chrisoula Andreou and Mark D. White (ed.), The Thief of Time.
    This paper focuses on a puzzling but familiar strategy for coping with procrastination that has not yet been analyzed in the literature on that topic. The strategy involves leveraging control. In employing the strategy, we take advantage of the possibility that poor self-control can be a local trait rather than a robust character trait.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44. Chrisoula Andreou (2006). Environmental Damage and the Puzzle of the Self-Torturer. Philosophy and Public Affairs 34 (1):95-108.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. Chrisoula Andreou (2002). Joseph Heath, Communicative Action and Rational Choice. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 22:41-43.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46. Chrisoula Andreou (2006). Might Intentions Be the Only Source of Practical Imperatives? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (3):311-325.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47. Chrisoula Andreou (2006). Temptation and Deliberation. Philosophical Studies 131 (3):583-606.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48. Chrisoula Andreou (2001). The Moral Grip. Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
    Implicit in common views about morality is the assumption that the grip of morality is inescapable in the sense that moral considerations give reasons for acting to everyone. On the basis of this assumption, it is claimed that there is a necessity associated with behaving morally, even when we are not compelled to do so, and that while one may reasonably dismiss certain non-moral requirements with a "So what?" one cannot reasonably offer this in response to a statement about the (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49. Chrisoula Andreou (2008). The Newxin Puzzle. Philosophical Studies 139 (3):415-422.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50. Chrisoula Andreou & Mark D. White (eds.) (2010). The Thief of Time: Philosophical Essays on Procrastination. Oxford University Press Usa.
    When we fail to achieve our goals, procrastination is often the culprit. But how exactly is procrastination to be understood? It has been described as imprudent, irrational, inconsistent, and even immoral, but there has been no sustained philosophical debate concerning the topic. This edited volume starts in on the task of integrating the problem of procrastination into philosophical inquiry. The focus is on exploring procrastination in relation to agency, rationality, and ethics-topics that philosophy is well-suited to address. Theoretically and empirically (...)
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 54