The Capitalist Schema uses marxist philosophy to explain how money frames all social relations in our capitalist world and how money regulates and conditions social references to past and future social life. Consequently, modern life becomes ever more abstract and leveled, and all human desire becomes channeled towards profit and making money.

In this paper, I will present an argument against Husserl’s analysis of picture consciousness. Husserl’s analysis of picture consciousness (as it can be found primarily in the recently translated volume Husserliana 23) moves from a theory of depiction in general to a theory of perceptual imagination. Though, I think that Husserl’s thesis that picture consciousness is different from depictive and linguistic consciousness is legitimate, and that Husserl’s phenomenology avoids the errors of linguistic theories, such as Goodman’s, I submit that his (...) overall theory is unacceptable, especially when it is applied to works of art. Regarding art, the main problem of Husserl’s theory is the assumption that pictures are constituted primarily as a conflict between perception/physical picture thing and imagination/picture object. Against this mentalist claim, I maintain, from a hermeneutic point of view, that pictures are the result of perceptual formations [Bildungen]. I then claim that Husserl’s theory fails, since it does not take into account what I call “plastic perception” [Bildliches Sehen], which plays a prominent role not only within the German tradition of art education but also within German art itself. In this connection, “plastic thinking” [Bildliches Denken] was prominent especially in Klee, in Kandinsky, and in Beuys, as well as in the overall doctrine of the Bauhaus. Ultimately, I argue that Husserl’s notion of picture consciousness and general perceptive imaginary consciousness must be replaced with a more dynamic model of the perception of pictures and art work that takes into account (a) the constructive and plastic moment, (b) the social dimension and (c) the genetic dimension of what it means to see something in something (Wollheim). (shrink)

Christian Lotz shows in this book that Husserl's Phenomenology and its key concept--subjectivity--is based on a concrete anthropological structure, such as self-affection and the bodily experience of the other. The analysis of the sensual sphere and the lived Body forces Husserl to an ongoing correction of his strong methodological assumptions. Subjectivity turns out to be an ambivalent phenomenon, as the subject is unable to fully present itself to itself, and therefore is forced to allow for a fundamental non-transparency in itself.

The problem of distinguishing between willing and wishing and their significance for both the constitution of our consciousness as well as the constitution of our practical life runs all the way through the history of philosophy. Given the persuasiveness of the problem, it might be helpful to draw a sharp distinction between a metaphysical and a psychological or phenomenological approach to the problem. The first approach may be identified with the positions that Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche held, which (...) involved an identification of the will with reality/actuality in general, and which Heidegger tried to analyze in his later writings on the basis of his confrontation with Nietzsche. In this paper, however, I will not consider the metaphysical approach to the distinction; rather, I will focus on the second approach to distinguishing wishing and willing, which was initiated by Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics, and of which as we will see soon – Husserl and the early Heidegger are ultimately still heirs. Hence I will begin my consideration by recalling briefly the main claim in Aristotle’s discovery of the central position of will within our life. (shrink)

Hubert L. Dreyfus has worked out a critique of what he calls “representationalism” and “cognitivism,” one proponent of which, according to Dreyfus, is Husserl. But I think that Dreyfus misunderstands the Husserlian conception of practical intentionality and that his characterization of Husserl as a “representationalist” or as a “cognitivist” is thereby wrongheaded. In this paper I examine Dreyfus’s interpretation by offering a Husserlian critique of Dreyfus’s objections to Husserl, and then by outlining Husserl’s account of practical intentionality and the practical (...) lived Body. I sketch the critique and the approach of Dreyfus in three steps. First, I deal with his objections against Husserl’s theory by arguing that Dreyfus understands neither the role of the reduction nor the function of background-awareness in Husserl’s phenomenology. Second, I elucidate the central role that the “practical lived Body” plays in practical intentionality for Husserl, and, third, I highlight the consequences that follow from the analyses offered in the previous sections. (shrink)

Hubert L. Dreyfus has worked out a critique of what he calls “representationalism” and “cognitivism,” one proponent of which, according to Dreyfus, is Husserl. But I think that Dreyfus misunderstands the Husserlian conception of practical intentionality and that his characterization of Husserl as a “representationalist” or as a “cognitivist” is thereby wrongheaded. In this paper I examine Dreyfus’s interpretation by offering a Husserlian critique of Dreyfus’s objections to Husserl, and then by outlining Husserl’s account of practical intentionality and the practical (...) lived Body. I sketch the critique and the approach of Dreyfus in three steps. First, I deal with his objections against Husserl’s theory by arguing that Dreyfus understands neither the role of the reduction nor the function of background-awareness in Husserl’s phenomenology. Second, I elucidate the central role that the “practical lived Body” plays in practical intentionality for Husserl, and, third, I highlight the consequences that follow from the analyses offered in the previous sections. (shrink)

In this paper, I will perform a "step back" by showing how Derrida's analysis of forgiveness is rooted in Kantian moral philosophy and in Derrida's interpretation of Kierkegaard's concept of decision. This will require a discussion of the distinction that Kant draws in his Groundwork between price (the economic) and dignity (the incomparable), as well as a discussion of the underlying notion of singularity in Kant's text. In addition, Derrida universalizes Kierkegaard's concept of the agent so that, with this perspective (...) in view, the interpretation of Kantian morality as something that must be described in a paradoxical way, becomes fully transparent. Whereas the interpretation of Kantian morality will provide us with a concept of morality that remains a "blind spot" for the agent, with the help of Derrida's Kierkegaard interpretation we can see that the concept of decision remains ultimately ambivalent. In conclusion, both (a) the deconstructed concept of morality and (b) the concept of decision will finally (c) let us understand Derrida's radical concept of forgiveness, which is both a non-economic act of morality in the sense explained and an unpredictable, uncontrollable decision and event. (shrink)

This essay is concerned with the central issue of philosophical anthropology: the relation between nature and culture. Although Rousseau was the first thinker to introduce this topic within the modern discourse of philosophy and the cultural sciences, it has its origin in Diogenes the Cynic, who was a disciple of Socrates. In my essay I (1) historically introduce a few aspects of philosophical anthropology, (2) deal with the nature–culture exchange, as introduced in Kant, then I (3) relate this topic to (...) the Ancient Cynic Diogenes. Surprisingly, although we usually identify Critical Theory and Freudian psychoanalysis as theories that have shown that cultural progress should not be comprehended as a development from nature to culture, and that instead it should be conceived as a development from culture against (external as well as internal) nature, I show that Cynicism can be conceived as a vivid example within the history of our culture that reveals a double sense of repression and alienation, which is part of human civilization and mankind. (shrink)

In den Cartesianischen Meditationen von Edmund Husserl heißt es: "Der Andere ist Spiegelung meiner selbst und doch nicht eigentlich Spiegelung." . Man kann den Satz nicht nur als einen Reflex der Leibniz-Lektüre Husserls auslegen, sondern ihn auch als sachlichen Hinweis auf die Erfahrung der Spiegelung verstehen. Meine Überlegungen beschränken sich auf eine Grundskizze einer Phänomenologie der Spiegelerfahrung, die die konkrete Fremderfahrung, also abgesehen von ihrer Grundlegungsdimension, genauer beleuchten hilft. Man kann die ursprüngliche Assoziation, die Husserl unter dem Titel "Paarung" anführt, (...) im Sinne einer leiblichen Spiegelung interpretieren. Mit der Bestimmung einer solchen unmittelbaren leiblichen "Übereinkunft" wäre ein erster rudimentärer Begriff des Mitmachens gewonnen, bei dessen Bestimmung kognitive Muster vermieden werden können. Die passive Fremderfahrung läßt sich verstehen als eine passive Einigung der Leiber und Bewegungssysteme, die spiegelverkehrt verläuft. Dieser Aufweis kann nicht nur helfen kann, den psychologischen Begriff der Nachahmung phänomenologisch zur reinterpretieren, sondern auch als Voraussetzung jeder intersubjektiven Erfahrung angesehen werden. (shrink)

Der vorliegende Band versammelt Beiträge von Philosophen und Philosophinnen innerhalb der phänomenologischen Forschung, speziell derjenigen Husserls. Die Beiträge zeichnen sich durch ihre innovative Kraft aus, da sie Neuland betreten und der phänomenologischen Forschung neue Wege eröffnen. Die Beiträge repräsentieren den gegenwärtigen Forschungsstand auf internationalem Niveau. Forscher und Forscherinnen aus Österreich, Deutschland, Dänemark, Japan, Taiwan, Italien und den USA sind versammelt. Dieser Band enthält fünf Beiträge in englischer Sprache.

„Der sittliche Wert eines Menschen beginnt erst dort, wo er bereit ist, für seine Überzeugung sein Leben zu geben.“ [The moral worth of a human being emerges when she is willing to give her life for her convictions] - Henning von Tresckows -.

In this essay, I offer thoughts on the constitution of images in art, especially as they are constituted in painting and in photography. Utilizing ideas from Gadamer, Derrida and Adorno, I shall argue that representation should be conceived as a performative concept and as an act of formation; i.e., as a process rather thanas something "fixed." My reflections will be carried out in connection with a careful analysis of Gerhard Richter's painting Reader, which is a painting of a photograph that (...) depicts a female who is reading. I demonstrate how a close analysis of this fascinating painting leads us deeper into the problem of painted images, insofar as it enacts what it is about, namely, the constitution of itself as an innige by means of a complex and enigmatic relationship between seeing, reading, memory, inner, outer, gaze and blindness. (shrink)

An essay concerning the representation of images in art, photography, and painting concerning analysis of Gerhard Richter's painting reader. It offers a debate that representation should be regarded as an act of formation and a performative concept. The author presents analysis of painting which leads the reader into the problem of painted images, such as the constitution of an image by a complex relationship among memory, reading, and blindness.

In this essay, I offer thoughts on the constitution of images in art, especially as they are constituted in painting and in photography. Utilizing ideas from Gadamer, Derrida and Adorno, I shall argue that representation should be conceived as a performative concept and as an act of formation; i.e., as a process rather thanas something "fixed." My reflections will be carried out in connection with a careful analysis of Gerhard Richter's painting Reader (1994), which is a painting of a photograph (...) that depicts a female who is reading. I demonstrate how a close analysis of this fascinating painting leads us deeper into the problem of painted images, insofar as it enacts what it is about, namely, the constitution of itself as an innige by means of a complex and enigmatic relationship between seeing, reading, memory, inner, outer, gaze and blindness. (shrink)

In this essay, I shall attempt to shed light on central practical concepts, such as action and decision, in Heidegger’s existentialism and in Fichte’s idealism. BothFichte and Heidegger, though from different philosophical frameworks and with different results, address the practical moment by developing [1] a non-epistemic concept of certainty, in connection with [2] a temporal analysis of the conditions of action, which leads to the primacy of future in their analyses. Both [1] and [2] shed light on their concept of (...) the self, and on the concept of freedom. In addition, my paper offers a further clarification of what was called before Fichte’s “proto-existentialism” (G. Zöller, D. Henrich). The ontological framework of both philosophies and their concept of the practical self, finally, leads to the proposal to merge both perspectives into what I would like to call “existential idealism.” Fichte’s and Heidegger’s practical philosophies can be taken as two sides of the same coin. (shrink)

To be sure, Hans-Georg Gadamer's philosophy has received increased attention in recent philosophical debates. For although older confrontations, such as Gadamer's debate with Habermas, have receded in the background, scholars such as John McDowell, Cristina Lafont, Ruth Sonderegger, Albrecht Wellmer, and Günther Figal have revitalized some of Gadamer's main philosophical insights and demonstrated the importance of hermeneutics for contemporary philosophy. In addition, the newly-founded Society for Philosophical Hermeneutics has helped to give this recent attention a new academic forum for fresh (...) and vibrant work on Gadamer.Kristin Gjesdal's book fits neatly into this newly-discovered interest in Gadamer's philosophy, especially since it focuses on important, but less frequently discussed, historical sources of Gadamer's philosophy and their systematic impact on both hermeneutics in general and a theory of interpretation in particular. Gjesdal's book is lucidly written, paying much attention to the underlying arguments that are implied in Gadamer's critical and often reductive accounts of philosophers who belong to the tradition of "German Idealism." However, having said this, the title of her book is misleading: though the reader might expect an extensive discussion of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, the author focuses mainly on the sources of. (shrink)

This volume explores of the history of figures, issues, and debates in Continental philosophy to re-frame our understanding of how modern and recent philosophy has unfolded, especially through the investigation of understudied ideas and thinkers.

In this paper I shall present an argument against Deleuze’s philosophy of painting. Deleuze’s main thesis in Logic of Sensation is twofold: [1] he claims that painting is based on a non-representational level; and [2] he claims that this level comes out of the materiality of painting. I shall claim that Deleuze’s theses should be rejected for the following reasons: first, the difference between non-intentional life and the representational world is too strict. I submit that the non-intentional relation that painting (...) opens up is itself part of and emerges out of the representational force of painting. If this would not be the case, then the criterion for differentiating between paintings and other objects cannot be developed. Indeed, Deleuze fails to give us a criterion. Second, Deleuze’s way of dealing with materiality in painting remains unsatisfactory, insofar as he is unable to take into account how materiality is charged with an “attitude towards the world.” In sum, materiality can only be painting’s materiality if we understand it as being formed and disclosed in representation. (shrink)

In this paper, I shall present an argument against Deleuze’s philosophy of painting. Deleuze’s main thesis in Logic of Sensation is twofold: [1] he claims that painting is based on a non-representational level; and [2] he claims that this level comes out of the materiality of painting. I shall claim that Deleuze’s theses should be rejected for the following reasons: first, the difference between non-intentional life and the representational world is too strict. I submit that the nonintentional relation that painting (...) opens up is itself part of andemerges out of the representational force of painting. If this would not be the case, then the criterion for differentiating between paintings and other objects cannot be developed. Indeed, Deleuze fails to give us a criterion. Second, Deleuze’s way of dealing with materiality in painting remains unsatisfactory insofar as he is unable to take into account how materiality is charged with an “attitude toward the world.” In sum, materiality can only be painting’s materiality if we understand it as being formed and disclosed in representation. (shrink)

In this paper, I shall present an argument against Deleuze’s philosophy of painting. Deleuze’s main thesis in Logic of Sensation is twofold: [1] he claims that painting is based on a non-representational level; and [2] he claims that this level comes out of the materiality of painting. I shall claim that Deleuze’s theses should be rejected for the following reasons: first, the difference between non-intentional life and the representational world is too strict. I submit that the nonintentional relation that painting (...) opens up is itself part of andemerges out of the representational force of painting. If this would not be the case, then the criterion for differentiating between paintings and other objects cannot be developed. Indeed, Deleuze fails to give us a criterion. Second, Deleuze’s way of dealing with materiality in painting remains unsatisfactory insofar as he is unable to take into account how materiality is charged with an “attitude toward the world.” In sum, materiality can only be painting’s materiality if we understand it as being formed and disclosed in representation. (shrink)

In this paper, I shall present an argument against Deleuze’s philosophy of painting. Deleuze’s main thesis in Logic of Sensation is twofold: [1] he claims that painting is based on a non-representational level; and [2] he claims that this level comes out of the materiality of painting. I shall claim that Deleuze’s theses should be rejected for the following reasons: first, the difference between non-intentional life and the representational world is too strict. I submit that the nonintentional relation that painting (...) opens up is itself part of andemerges out of the representational force of painting. If this would not be the case, then the criterion for differentiating between paintings and other objects cannot be developed. Indeed, Deleuze fails to give us a criterion. Second, Deleuze’s way of dealing with materiality in painting remains unsatisfactory insofar as he is unable to take into account how materiality is charged with an “attitude toward the world.” In sum, materiality can only be painting’s materiality if we understand it as being formed and disclosed in representation. (shrink)

Es ist bekannt, daß Husserl Fichtes theoretischer Philosophie keine gute Seite abgewinnen konnte. In den 1917 vor Kriegsheimkehrern gehaltenen und 1918 wiederholten Vorträgen über Fichte spricht Husserl von »abstrusen Konstruktionen«, die in der Wissenschaftslehre Fichtes zu finden seien. Nichtsdestotrotz kann man sehen, daß beide Ansätze mehr als bloße Strukturanalogien aufweisen. Es wurde - wenn auch nicht häufig - darauf hingewiesen, daß sachliche Verweise beider Ansätze aufeinander möglich sind. Die Berührungspunkte in der praktischen Philosophie dagegen fallen eher ins Auge. In seinen (...) Vorträgen orientiert sich Husserl insbesondere an Fichtes populären und religionsphilosophischen Schriften und es ist inzwischen bekannt, daß sich Husserl in den 20er Jahren vermehrt der praktischen Philosophie im Sinne Fichtes zuwendet, über deren Verhältnis zu der seinen er in einem Brief an Adolf Grimme meint, »daß die religions-philosophischen Perspektiven, die mir die Phänomenologie eröffnete, überraschend nahe Beziehung zu Fichtes späterer Gotteslehre zeigen«. Ich möchte mich an dieser Stelle auf den theoretischen Zugang konzentrieren und dabei speziell den Begriff der Affektion bei Fichte und Husserl näher untersuchen. (shrink)

Es ist bekannt, daß Husserl Fichtes theoretischer Philosophie keine gute Seite abgewinnen konnte. In den 1917 vor Kriegsheimkehrern gehaltenen und 1918 wiederholten Vorträgen über Fichte spricht Husserl von »abstrusen Konstruktionen«, die in der Wissenschaftslehre Fichtes zu finden seien. Nichtsdestotrotz kann man sehen, daß beide Ansätze mehr als bloße Strukturanalogien aufweisen. Es wurde - wenn auch nicht häufig - darauf hingewiesen, daß sachliche Verweise beider Ansätze aufeinander möglich sind. Die Berührungspunkte in der praktischen Philosophie dagegen fallen eher ins Auge. In seinen (...) Vorträgen orientiert sich Husserl insbesondere an Fichtes populären und religionsphilosophischen Schriften und es ist inzwischen bekannt, daß sich Husserl in den 20er Jahren vermehrt der praktischen Philosophie im Sinne Fichtes zuwendet, über deren Verhältnis zu der seinen er in einem Brief an Adolf Grimme meint, »daß die religions-philosophischen Perspektiven, die mir die Phänomenologie eröffnete, überraschend nahe Beziehung zu Fichtes späterer Gotteslehre zeigen«. Ich möchte mich an dieser Stelle auf den theoretischen Zugang konzentrieren und dabei speziell den Begriff der Affektion bei Fichte und Husserl näher untersuchen. (shrink)

In his new book, Lambert Zuidervaart argues that the concept of propositional truth remains one-dimensional and needs to be extended by and embedded in several versions of what the author calls “existential truth,” which he discusses in relation to phenomenology and critical theory. Zuidervaart focuses on key figures of twentieth-century German philosophy, such as Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Theodor Adorno, Jürgen Habermas, and Max Horkheimer. According to the author, his book “does not intend to be a historical narrative” ; nor (...) does it intend to present “a few nuggets of insights from continental writings”. Instead, Zuidervaart tries to reconstruct the primary material and immanently criticizes the... (shrink)