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Profile: Christian Piller (University of York)
  1. Christian Piller (forthcoming). Practical Philosophy and the Gettier Problem: Is Virtue Epistemology on the Right Track? Philosophical Studies:1-19.
    One of the guiding ideas of virtue epistemology is to look at epistemological issue through the lens of practical philosophy. The Gettier Problem is a case in point. Virtue epistemologists, like Sosa and Greco, see the shortcoming in a Gettier scenario as a shortcoming from which performances in general can suffer. In this paper I raise some doubts about the success of this project. Looking more closely at practical philosophy, will, I argue, show that virtue epistemology misconceives the significance of (...)
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  2. Christian Piller (2013). Against Absolute Goodness, by Richard Kraut. Mind 122 (488):1124-1129.
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  3. Christian Piller (2013). The Bootstrapping Objection. Organon F 20 (4):612-631.
    If our mental attitudes were reasons, we could bootstrap anything into rationality simply by acquiring these mental attitudes. This, it has been argued, shows that mental attitudes cannot be reasons. In this paper, I focus on John Broome’s development of the bootstrapping objection. I distinguish various versions of this objection and I argue that the bootstrapping objection to mind-based accounts of reasons fails in all its versions.
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  4. Christian Piller (2009). Desiring the Truth and Nothing but the Truth. Noûs 43 (2):193-213.
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  5. Christian Piller (2009). Reliabilist Responses to the Value of Knowledge Problem. Grazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1):121-135.
    After sketching my own solution to the Value of Knowledge Problem, which argues for a deontological understanding of justification and understands the value of knowing interesting propositions by the value we place on believing as we ought to believe, I discuss Alvin Goldman's and Erik Olsson's recent attempts to explain the value of knowledge within the framework of their reliabilist epistemology.
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  6. Christian Piller (2009). Valuing Knowledge: A Deontological Approach. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):413 - 428.
    The fact that we ought to prefer what is comparatively more likely to be good, I argue, does, contrary to consequentialism, not rest on any evaluative facts. It is, in this sense, a deontological requirement. As such it is the basis of our valuing those things which are in accordance with it. We value acting (and believing) well, i.e. we value acting (and believing) as we ought to act (and to believe). In this way, despite the fact that our interest (...)
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  7. Christian Piller (2008). Morality's Place: Kierkegaard and Frankfurt. Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 64 (2/4):1207 - 1219.
    The aim of this paper is to look at Søren Kierkegaard's defence of an ethical way of life in the light of Harry Frankfurt's work. There are salient general similarities connecting Kierkegaard and Frankfurt: Both are sceptical towards the Kantian idea of founding morality in the laws of practical reason. They both deny that the concerns, which shape our lives, could simply be validated by subject-independent values. Furthermore, and most importantly, they both emphasize the importance of reflective endorsement of one's (...)
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  8. Christian Piller (2006). Content-Related and Attitude-Related Reasons for Preferences. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 81 (59):155-.
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  9. Christian Piller (2006). Particularism and the Structure of Reasons. Acta Analytica 21 (2):87-102.
    I argue that particularism (or holism) about reasons, i.e., the view that a feature that is a reason in one case need not be a reason in another case, is true, but uninterestingly so. Its truth is best explained by principles that govern a weaker notion than that of being a reason: one thing can be ‘normatively connected’ to something else without its being a reason for what it is normatively connected to. Thus, even though true, particularism about reasons does (...)
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  10. Christian Piller (2006). Schwierige Metaethik. Grazer Philosophische Studien 70 (1):241-252.
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  11. Christian Piller (2003). Practical Reality, by Jonathan Dancy. Oxford University Press 2000. Pp. XII + 187. Philosophy 78 (3):414-425.
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  12. Christian Piller (2003). Two Accounts of Objective Reasons. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):444–451.
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  13. Christian Piller (2001). Normative Practical Reasoning. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 75 (1):175 - 216.
    Practical reasoning is a process of reasoning that concludes in an intention. One example is reasoning from intending an end to intending what you believe is a necessary means: 'I will leave the next buoy to port; in order to do that I must tack; so I'll tack', where the first and third sentences express intentions and the second sentence a belief. This sort of practical reasoning is supported by a valid logical derivation, and therefore seems uncontrovertible. A more contentious (...)
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  14. Christian Piller (2001). Ways of Being Good. Acta Analytica 27:153-168.
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  15. Christian Piller (2000). Doing What is Best. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (199):208-226.
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  16. Christian Piller (1996). Critical Notice. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (2):347-367.
    Critical notice of Smith, Michael, The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994) pp. xiii, 226, A$49.95 (cloth), A$21.95 (paper).
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  17. Christian Piller (1996). Vann McGee's Counterexample to Modus Ponens. Philosophical Studies 82 (1):27 - 54.
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  18. Christian Piller (1994). Book Reviews. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 41 (1):127-133.
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  19. Johannes Brandl, Wolfgang Gombocz & Christian Piller (1991). Preface. Grazer Philosophische Studien 40:1-2.
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  20. Christian Piller (1991). Comment on Keith Lehrer and Vann McGee's Solution of Newcomb's Problem. Grazer Philosophische Studien 40:221-228.
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  21. Christian Piller (1991). On Keith Lehrer's Belief in Acceptance. Grazer Philosophische Studien 40:37-61.
    Keith Lehrer's notion of acceptance and its relation to the notion of belief is analyzed in a way that a person only accepts some proposition p if she decides to believe it in order to reach the epistemic aim. This view of acceptance turns out to be untenable: Under the empirical claim that we don't have the power to decide what to beheve it follows that we cannot accept anything. If reaching the truth is the epistemic aim acceptance proves ill-formed, (...)
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  22. Christian Piller (1988). Antikritische Bemerkungen. Grazer Philosophische Studien 32:197-204.
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  23. Christian Piller (1987). Choices. Grazer Philosophische Studien 30:197-207.
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  24. Christian Piller (1987). Das Vindizierungsargument — seine Wichtigkeit, seine Wirksamkeit, seine Widerlegung. Grazer Philosophische Studien 29:35-58.
    Es wird versucht, die Stellung des Vindizierungsarguments im Gesamtzusammenhang des Induktionsproblems genauer festzulegen, und eine neue Sichtweise dieses Arguments als entscheidungstheoretisches Dominanzargument wird vorgeschlagen. Diese neue Interpretation bewährt sich in der Konfrontation mit alten Einwänden, doch zeigt sich schließlich, daß sich auch gegen diese Form des Vindizierungsarguments ein erfolgreicher Widerlegungsversuch führen läßt. Eine allgemeine Formulierung des vorgebrachten Einwandes erweist sich als stark genug, um auch die dem Vindizierungsargument analogen Rechtfertigungsversuche in anderen Bereichen zurückweisen zu können.
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