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  1. Christian Sachse (forthcoming). The New Puzzle of Biological Groups and Individuals. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences.
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  2. Michael Esfeld, Christian Sachse & Patrice Soom (2012). Marrying the Merits of Nagelian Reduction and Functional Reduction. Acta Analytica 27 (3):217-230.
    This paper points out the merit of Nagelian reduction, namely to propose a model of inter-theoretic reduction that retains the scientific quality of the reduced theory and the merit of functional reduction, namely to take multiple realization into account and to offer reductive explanations. By considering Lewis and Kim’s proposal for local reductions, we establish that functional reduction fails to achieve a theory reduction and cannot retain the scientific quality of the reduced theory. We improve on that proposal by showing (...)
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  3. Michael Esfeld & Christian Sachse (2011). Identität statt Emergenz: Plädoyer für einen konservativen Reduktionismus. In Jens Greve & Annette Schnabel (eds.), Emergenz: Zur Analyse Und Erklärung Komplexer Strukturen. Suhrkamp.
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  4. Christian Sachse (2011). Conservative Reduction of Biology. Philosophia Naturalis 47 (1-2):1-2.
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  5. Patrice Soom, Christian Sachse & Michael Esfeld (2010). Functional Sub-Types. Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (1-2):1-2.
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  6. Patrice Soom, Christian Sachse & Michael Esfeld, Psycho-Neural Reduction Through Functional Sub-Types.
    The paper argues that a functional reduction of ordinary psychology to neuropsychology is possible by means of constructing fine-grained functional, mental sub-types that are coextensive with neuropsychological types. We establish this claim by means of considering as examples the cases of the disconnection syndrome and schizophrenia. We point out that the result is a conservative reduction, vindicating the scientific quality of the mental types of ordinary psychology by systematically linking them with neuroscience. That procedure of conservative reduction by means of (...)
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  7. Michael Esfeld & Christian Sachse (2007). Theory Reduction by Means of Functional Sub-Types. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 21 (1):1 – 17.
    The paper sets out a new strategy for theory reduction by means of functional sub-types. This strategy is intended to get around the multiple realization objection. We use Kim's argument for token identity (ontological reductionism) based on the causal exclusion problem as starting point. We then extend ontological reductionism to epistemological reductionism (theory reduction). We show how one can distinguish within any functional type between functional sub-types. Each of these sub-types is coextensive with one type of realizer. By this means, (...)
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  8. Christian Sachse (2007). Reductionism in the Philosophy of Science. Ontos.
    Contrary to a widespread belief, this book establishes that ontological and epistemological reductionism stand or fall together.
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  9. Christian Sachse (2007). Université de Lausanne christian. sachse@ unil. ch. Erkenntnis 67:201-205.
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  10. Christian Sachse (2007). What About a Reductionist Approach? Comments on Terry Horgan. Erkenntnis 67 (2):201 - 205.
    In his work, Horgan argues for the compatibilism of agency, mental state-causation, and physical causal-closure. We generally assume a causally closed physical world that seems to exclude agency in the sense of mental state-causation in addition to physical causation. However, Horgan argues for an account of agency that satisfies the experience of our own as acting persons and that is compatible with physical causal-closure. Mental properties are causal properties but not identical with physical properties because there are different ontological levels. (...)
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  11. Christian Sachse & Michael Esfeld (2007). Theory Reduction by Means of Functional Sub-Types. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 21 (1):1-17.
    The paper sets out a new strategy for theory reduction by means of functional sub-types. This strategy is intended to get around the multiple realization objection. We use Kim’s argument for token identity (ontological reductionism) based on the causal exclusion problem as starting point. We then extend ontological reductionism to epistemological reductionism (theory reduction). We show how one can distinguish within any functional type between functional sub-types. Each of these sub-types is coextensive with one type of realizer. By this means, (...)
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  12. Christian Sachse (2006). Physicalism, or Something Near Enough – Jaegwon Kim. Dialectica 60 (4):508–512.
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  13. Christian Sachse (2005). Reduction of Biological Properties by Means of Functional Sub-Types. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 27 (3/4):435 - 449.
    The general aim of this paper is to propose a reductionist strategy to higher-level property types. Starting from a common ground in the philosophy of science, I shall elaborate on possible realizer differences of higher-level property types. Because of the realizer types' causal heterogeneity, an introduction of functional sub-types of higher-level properties will be suggested. Each higher-level functional sub-type corresponds to one realizer type. This means that there is the theoretical possibility to reach some kind of type-identity and this opens (...)
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