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  1. Christine M. Korsgaard, A Kantian Case for Animal Rights.
    Most legal systems divide the world into persons and property, treating human beings as persons, and pretty much everything else, including non-human animals, as property. Persons are the subjects of both rights and obligations, including the right to own property, while objects of property, being by their very nature for the use of persons, have no rights at all. I will call this the “legal bifurcation.” We might look to Immanuel Kant’s moral and political philosophy to provide a philosophical vindication (...)
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  2. Christine M. Korsgaard, Conscience.
    Conscience is the psychological faculty by which we aware of and respond to the moral character of our own actions. It is most commonly thought of as the source of pains we suffer as a result of doing what we believe is wrong --- the pains of guilt, or “pangs of conscience.” It may also be seen, more controversially, as the source of our knowledge of what is right and wrong, or as a motive for moral conduct. Thus (...)
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  3. Christine M. Korsgaard, Christine M. Korsgaard.
    In response to Arroyo, I explain my position on the concept of ‘‘natural goodness’’ and how my use of that concept compares to that of Geach and Foot. An Aristotelian or functional notion of goodness provides the material for Kantian endorsement in a theory of value that avoids a metaphysical commitment to intrinsic values. In response to Cummiskey, I review reasons for thinking Kantianism and consequentialism incompatible, especially those objections to aggregation that arise from the notion of the natural good (...)
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  4. Christine M. Korsgaard, On Having a Good.
    You are the kind of entity for whom things can be good or bad. This is one of the most important facts about you. It provides you with the grounds for taking a passionate interest in your own life, for you are deeply concerned that things should go well for you. Presumably, you also want to do well, but that may be in part because you think that doing well is good for you, and that your life would be impoverished (...)
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  5. Christine M. Korsgaard & Samuel Freeman, Rawls, John (1921- ).
    Born and raised in Baltimore, Maryland, John Rawls received his undergraduate and graduate education at Princeton. After earning his Ph.D. in philosophy in 1950, Rawls taught at Princeton, Cornell, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and, since 1962, at Harvard, where he is now emeritus. Rawls is best known for A Theory of Justice (1971) and for developments of that theory he has published since. Rawls believes that the utilitarian tradition has dominated modern political philosophy in English-speaking countries because its critics (...)
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  6. Christine M. Korsgaard, An Index to the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals : The Academy Edition.
    When I prepared the edition of Mary Gregor's translation of the Groundwork for Cambridge's "Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy" series, I did an index that included both the pages of that edition and the pages of the Academy edition. Cambridge, however, declined to publish the Academy page numbers in their edition. Rather than let the effort go to waste, I am posting a version of the index with the Academy edition page numbers here. If you have corrections or (...)
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  7. Christine M. Korsgaard, Human Beings and the Other Animals.
    Human ethical practices and attitudes with respect to the other animals exhibit a curious instability. On the one hand, most people believe that it is wrong to inflict torment or death on a non-human animal for a trivial reason. Skinning a cat or setting it on fire by way of a juvenile prank is one of the standard examples of obvious wrongdoing in the philosophical literature. Like torturing infants, it is the kind of example that philosophers use when we are (...)
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  8. Christine M. Korsgaard, Moral Animals.
    Why is there such a thing as value? Those who believe that intrinsic values simply exist – that some things just have the property of being valuable - don’t feel a need to answer that question. But I believe that all value is dependent on the existence of valuing beings. In these lectures, I explore the roots of the good in animal nature and the roots of the right in human nature. I then consider the implications of these accounts for (...)
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  9. Christine M. Korsgaard, Natural Motives and the Motive of Duty: Hume and Kant on Our Duties to Others.
    In this paper I argue that the ground of this disagreement is different than philosophers have traditionally supposed. On the surface, the disagreement appears to be a matter of substantive moral judgment: Hume admires the sort of person who rushes to the aid of another from motives of sympathy or humanity, while Kant thinks that a person who helps with the thought that it is his duty is the better character. While a moral disagreement of this kind certainly follows from (...)
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  10. Christine M. Korsgaard, Interview with Korsgaard: Internalism and the Sources of Normativity (Corrected Version).
    This is the version of the interview with Professor Korsgaard that was supposed to have appeared in Constructions of Practical Reason: Interviews on Moral and Political Philosophy, edited by Herlinde Pauer-Studer (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002). Due to an unfortunate accident, the first edition of that volume contains an unedited transcript of that interview rather than the corrected version below.
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  11. Christine M. Korsgaard (forthcoming). Acting for a Reason. In V. Bradley Lewis (ed.), Studies in Practical Reason. Catholic University Press.
    The use of the English word “reason” in all of these contexts, and the way we translate equivalent terms from other languages, suggests a connection, but what exactly is it? Aristotle and Kant’s conception of what practical reasons are, I believe, can help us to answer this question, by bringing out what is distinctive, and distinctively active, about acting for a reason. That, at least, is what I am going to argue.
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  12. Christine M. Korsgaard (2013). Kantian Ethics, Animals, and the Law. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 33 (4):629-648.
    Legal systems divide the world into persons and property, treating animals as property. Some animal rights advocates have proposed treating animals as persons. Another option is to introduce a third normative category. This raises questions about how normative categories are established. In this article I argue that Kant established normative categories by determining what the presuppositions of rational practice are. According to Kant, rational choice presupposes that rational beings are ends in themselves and the rational use of the earth’s resources (...)
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  13. Christine M. Korsgaard (2013). The Relational Nature of the Good. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 8:1.
  14. Christine M. Korsgaard (2011). Natural Goodness, Rightness, and the Intersubjectivity of Reason: Reply to Arroyo, Cummiskey, Moland, and Bird-Pollan. Metaphilosophy 42 (4):381-394.
    Abstract: In response to Arroyo, I explain my position on the concept of “natural goodness” and how my use of that concept compares to that of Geach and Foot. An Aristotelian or functional notion of goodness provides the material for Kantian endorsement in a theory of value that avoids a metaphysical commitment to intrinsic values. In response to Cummiskey, I review reasons for thinking Kantianism and consequentialism incompatible, especially those objections to aggregation that arise from the notion of the natural (...)
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  15. Christine M. Korsgaard (2011). Valorar nuestra humanidad. Signos Filosóficos 13 (26):13-41.
    En este artículo discuto las diferentes actitudes implícitas en "valorar" nuestra humanidad, según lo entiende Kant. El atributo distintivo de la humanidad es la capacidad de la elección moral racional. Según mi argumento, valorar nuestra capacidad moral nos compromete con el bien moral, lo cual no ..
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  16. Christine M. Korsgaard (2009). Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity. Oxford University Press.
    Agency and identity -- Necessitation -- Acts and actions -- Aristotle and Kant -- Agency and practical identity -- The metaphysics of normativity -- Constitutive standards -- The constitution of life -- In defense of teleology -- The paradox of self-constitution -- Formal and substantive principles of reason -- Formal versus substantive -- Testing versus weighing -- Maximizing and prudence -- Practical reason and the unity of the will -- The empiricist account of normativity -- The rationalist account of normativity (...)
     
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  17. Christine M. Korsgaard (2009). The Activity of Reason. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 83 (2):23 - 43.
    Then you have a look around, and see that none of the uninitiated are listening to us—I mean the people who think that nothing exists but what they can grasp with both hands; people who refuse to admit that actions and processes and the invisible world in general have any place in reality.
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  18. Christine M. Korsgaard (2008). The Constitution of Agency: Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology. Oxford University Press.
    Christine M. Korsgaard is one of today's leading moral philosophers: this volume collects ten influential papers by her on practical reason and moral psychology ...
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  19. Christine M. Korsgaard (2007). Autonomy and the Second Person Within: A Commentary on Stephen Darwall's the Second‐Person Standpoint. Ethics 118 (1):8-23.
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  20. Christine M. Korsgaard, R. Jay Wallace, Gary Watson, Stephen Darwall & David Shoemaker (2007). 10. Thomas C. Schelling, Strategies of Commitment and Other Essays Thomas C. Schelling, Strategies of Commitment and Other Essays (Pp. 176-181). In Laurie DiMauro (ed.), Ethics. Greenhaven Press.
     
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  21. Christine M. Korsgaard (2004). The Myth of Egoism Christine M. Korsgaard. In Peter Baumann & Monika Betzler (eds.), Practical Conflicts: New Philosophical Essays. Cambridge. 57.
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  22. Christine M. Korsgaard (2003). John Rawls. The Harvard Review of Philosophy 11 (1):4-6.
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  23. Christine M. Korsgaard (2003). Realism and Constructivism in Twentieth-Century Moral Philosophy. Journal of Philosophical Research 28 (Supplement):99-122.
    In this paper I trace the development of one of the central debates of late twentieth-century moral philosophy—the debate between realism and what Rawls called “constructivism.” Realism, I argue, is a reactive position that arises in response to almost every attempt to give a substantive explanation of morality. It results from the realist’s belief that such explanations inevitably reduce moral phenomena to natural phenomena. I trace this belief, and the essence of realism, to a view about the nature of concepts—that (...)
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  24. Christine M. Korsgaard (2003). The Dependence of Value on Humanity. In Jay Wallace (ed.), The Practice of Value. Oxford University Press. 63--85.
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  25. Christine M. Korsgaard (1999). Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant. Journal of Ethics 3 (1):1-29.
    Plato and Kant advance a constitutional model of the soul, in which reason and appetite or passion have different structural and functional roles in the generation of motivation, as opposed to the familiar Combat Model in which they are portrayed as independent sources of motivation struggling for control. In terms of the constitutional model we may explain what makes an action different from an event. What makes an action attributable to a person, and therefore what makes it an action, is (...)
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  26. Christine M. Korsgaard (1999). The General Point of View. Hume Studies 25 (1/2):3-41.
    Hume thinks moral judgments are based on sentiments of approval and disapproval we feel when we contemplate someone from a "general point of view." We view her through the eyes of her "narrow circle" and judge her in accordance with general rules. Why do we take up the general point of view? Hume also argues that approval is a calm form of love, love of character, which sets a normative standard for other forms of love. In this paper I explain (...)
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  27. Christine M. Korsgaard (1999). The General Point of View: Love and Moral Approval in Hume's Ethics. Hume Studies 25 (1-2):3-42.
    Hume thinks moral judgments are based on sentiments of approval and disapproval we feel when we contemplate someone from a "general point of view." We view her through the eyes of her "narrow circle" and judge her in accordance with general rules. Why do we take up the general point of view? Hume also argues that approval is a calm form of love, love of character, which sets a normative standard for other forms of love. In this paper I explain (...)
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  28. Hannah Ginsborg, Paul Guyer, J. B. Schneewind, Christine M. Korsgaard, Michael Byron, Michael Weber, Patrick Fitzgerald & Claudia Mills (1998). 10. David Braybrooke, Bryson Brown, and Peter K. Schotch, with Laura Byrne, Logic on the Track of Social Change David Braybrooke, Bryson Brown, and Peter K. Schotch, with Laura Byrne, Logic on the Track of Social Change (Pp. 190-193). [REVIEW] In Stephen Everson (ed.), Ethics. Cambridge University Press.
     
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  29. Christine M. Korsgaard (1998). Motivation, Metaphysics, and the Value of the Self: A Reply to Ginsborg, Guyer, and Schneewind. Ethics 109 (1):49-66.
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  30. Christine M. Korsgaard (1997). The Normativity of Instrumental Reason. In Garrett Cullity & Berys Gaut (eds.), Ethics and Practical Reason. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    This paper criticizes two accounts of the normativity of practical principles: the empiricist account and the rationalist or realist account. It argues against the empiricist view, focusing on the Humean texts that are usually taken to be its locus classicus. It then argues both against the dogmatic rationalist view, and for the Kantian view, through a discussion of Kant's own remarks about instrumental rationality in the second section of the Groundwork. It further argues that the instrumental principle cannot stand alone. (...)
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  31. Andrews Reath, Barbara Herman, Christine M. Korsgaard & John Rawls (eds.) (1997). Reclaiming the History of Ethics: Essays for John Rawls. Cambridge University Press.
    The essays in this volume offer an approach to the history of moral and political philosophy that takes its inspiration from John Rawls. All the contributors are philosophers who have studied with Rawls and they offer this collection in his honor. The distinctive feature of this approach is to address substantive normative questions in moral and political philosophy through an analysis of the texts and theories of major figures in the history of the subject: Aristotle, Hobbes, Hume, Rousseau, Kant, and (...)
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  32. Christine M. Korsgaard (1996). From Duty and for the Sake of the Noble: Kant and Aristotle on Morally Good Action. In Stephen Engstrom & Jennifer Whiting (eds.), Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics: Rethinking Happiness and Duty. Cambridge University Press.
    Aristotle believes that an agent lacks virtue unless she enjoys the performance of virtuous actions, while Kant claims that the person who does her duty despite contrary inclinations exhibits a moral worth that the person who acts from inclination lacks. Despite these differences, this chapter argues that Aristotle and Kant share a distinctive view of the object of human choice and locus of moral value: that what we choose, and what has moral value, are not mere acts, but actions: acts (...)
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  33. Christine M. Korsgaard (1996). Creating the Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge University Press.
    Christine Korsgaard has become one of the leading interpreters of Kant's moral philosophy. She is identified with a small group of philosophers who are intent on producing a version of Kant's moral philosophy that is at once sensitive to its historical roots while revealing its particular relevance to contemporary problems. She rejects the traditional picture of Kant's ethics as a cold vision of the moral life which emphasises duty at the expense of love and value. Rather, Kant's work is seen (...)
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  34. Christine M. Korsgaard (1996). The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge University Press.
    Ethical concepts are, or purport to be, normative. They make claims on us: they command, oblige, recommend, or guide. Or at least when we invoke them, we make claims on one another; but where does their authority over us - or ours over one another - come from? Christine Korsgaard identifies four accounts of the source of normativity that have been advocated by modern moral philosophers: voluntarism, realism, reflective endorsement, and the appeal to autonomy. She traces their history, showing how (...)
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  35. Christine M. Korsgaard (1993). The Reasons We Can Share: An Attack on the Distinction Between Agent-Relative and Agent-Neutral Values. Social Philosophy and Policy 10 (1):24-51.
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  36. Christine M. Korsgaard (1992). Creating the Kingdom of Ends: Reciprocity and Responsibility in Personal Relations. Philosophical Perspectives 6:305-332.
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  37. Christine M. Korsgaard (1992). Kant, Immanuel (1724-1804). In Lawrence C. Becker & Charlotte B. Becker (eds.), The Encyclopedia of Ethics. Garland Publishing Inc. 664--74.
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  38. Christine M. Korsgaard (1990). The Standpoint of Practical Reason. Garland.
     
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  39. Christine M. Korsgaard (1989). Kant's Analysis of Obligation. The Monist 72 (3):311-340.
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  40. Christine M. Korsgaard (1989). Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency: A Kantian Response to Parfit. Philosophy and Public Affairs 18 (2):103-31.
  41. Christine M. Korsgaard (1986). Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value. Ethics 96 (3):486-505.
    Kant holds that the good will is a source of value, In the sense that other things acquire their values from standing in an appropriate relation to it. I argue that aristotle holds a similar view about contemplation, And that this explains his preference for the contemplative life. They differ about what the source of value is because they differ about which kind of activity, Ethical or contemplative, Discovers meaning and purpose in the world.
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  42. Christine M. Korsgaard (1986). Aristotle on Function and Virtue. History of Philosophy Quarterly 3 (3):259 - 279.
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  43. Christine M. Korsgaard (1986). Kant's Formula of Humanity. Kant-Studien 77 (1-4):183-202.
  44. Christine M. Korsgaard (1986). Skepticism About Practical Reason. Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):5-25.
    Content skepticism about practical reason is doubt about the bearing of rational considerations on the activities of deliberation and choice. Motivational skepticism is doubt about the scope of reason as a motive. Some people think that motivational considerations alone provide grounds for skepticism about the project of founding ethics on practical reason. I will argue, against this view, that motivational skepticism must always be based on content skepticism. I will not address the question of whether or not content skepticism is (...)
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  45. Christine M. Korsgaard (1986). The Right to Lie: Kant on Dealing with Evil. Philosophy and Public Affairs 15 (4):325-349.
    One 0f the great difficulties with Kant’s moral philosophy is that it seems to imply that our moral obligations leave us powerless in the face of evil. Kzmt’s theory sets a high ideal of conduct and tells us to live up to that ideal regardless of what other persons are doing. The results may be very bad. But Kant says that the law “1*em:1ins in full force, because it commands categoricaliy" (G, 438-39/57).* The most weI1—known example of..
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  46. Christine M. Korsgaard (1985). Kant's Formula of Universal Law. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 66 (1-2).
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  47. Christine M. Korsgaard (1983). Two Distinctions in Goodness. Philosophical Review 92 (2):169-195.
  48. Christine M. Korsgaard, A Reply to Carol Voeller and Rachel Cohon: “The Moral Law as the Source of Normativity” by Carol Voeller “the Roots of Reason” by Rachel Cohon By.
    I am going to begin today by bringing together one of the themes of Carol Voeller’s remarks with one of the criticisms raised by Rachel Cohon, because I see them as related, and want to address them together. Voeller argues that the moral law is constitutive of our nature as rational agents. To put it in her own words, “to be the kind of object it is, is for a thing to be under, or constituted by, the laws which are (...)
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  49. Christine M. Korsgaard, Fellow Creatures: Kantian Ethics and Our Duties to Animals.
    Christine M. Korsgaard is Arthur Kingsley Porter Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University. She was educated at the University of Illinois and received a Ph.D. from Harvard. She has held positions at Yale, the University of California at Santa Barbara, and the University of Chicago, and visiting positions at Berkeley and UCLA. She is a member of the American Philosophical Association and a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. She has published extensively on Kant, and about moral (...)
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  50. Christine M. Korsgaard, Interacting with Animals: A Kantian Account.
    1. Being an Animal Human beings are animals: phylum: chordata, class: mammalia, order: primates, family: hominids, species: homo sapiens, subspecies: homo sapiens sapiens. According to current scientific opinion, we evolved approximately 200,000 years ago in Africa from ancestors whom we share with the other great apes. What does it mean that we are animals? Scientifically speaking, an animal is essentially a complex, multicellular organism that feeds on other life forms. But what we share with the other animals is not just (...)
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