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Profile: Christine Tappolet (Université de Montréal)
  1. Mauro Rossi & Christine Tappolet (forthcoming). Emotions and Wellbeing. Topoi:1-14.
    In this paper, we consider the question of whether there exists an essential relation between emotions and wellbeing. We distinguish three ways in which emotions and wellbeing might be essentially related: constitutive, causal, and epistemic. We argue that, while there is some room for holding that emotions are constitutive ingredients of an individual’s wellbeing, all the attempts to characterise the causal and epistemic relations in an essentialist way are vulnerable to some important objections. We conclude that the causal and epistemic (...)
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  2. Christine Tappolet (forthcoming). Emotions, Values, and Agency. Oxford University Press.
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  3. Christine Tappolet (forthcoming). La vertu. In Emma Dayer-Tieffenbach & Julien Deonna (eds.), Dictionnaire des valeurs. Edition d’Ithaque.
    I argue on the basis of a discussion of Aristotelian and Humean accounts of virtue that virtue is fundamentally a disposition to undergo appropriate emotions.
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  4. Christine Tappolet (forthcoming). Reasons and Emotions. In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity.
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  5. Christine Tappolet (forthcoming). Self-Control and Akrasia. In Meghan Griffith, Kevin Timpe & Neil Levy (eds.), Routledge Companion to Free Will. Routledge.
    Akratic actions are often being thought to instantiate a paradigmatic self-control failure. . If we suppose that akrasia is opposed to self-control, the question is how akratic actions could be free and intentional. After all, it would seem that it is only if an action manifests self-control that it can count as free. My plan is to explore the relation between akrasia and self-control. The first section presents what I shall call the standard conception, according to which akrasia and self-control (...)
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  6. Christine Tappolet (forthcoming). Values and Emotions. In Iwao Hirose & Jonas Olson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory.
    Evaluative concepts and emotions appear closely connected. According to a prominent account, this relation can be expressed by propositions of the form ‘something is admirable if and only if feeling admiration is appropriate in response to it’. The first section discusses various interpretations of such ‘Value-Emotion Equivalences’, for example the Fitting Attitude Analysis, and it offers a plausible way to read them. The main virtue of the proposed way to read them is that it is well-supported by a promising account (...)
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  7. Christine Tappolet (forthcoming). What is Value? Where Does It Come From? A Philosophical Perspective. In Tobias Brosch & David Sander (eds.), The Value Handbook: The Affective Sciences of Values and Valuation.
    Are values objective or subjective? To clarify this question we start with an overview of the main concepts and debates in the philosophy of values. We then discuss the arguments for and against value realism, the thesis that there are objective evaluative facts. By contrast with value anti-realism, which is generally associated with sentimentalism, according to which evaluative judgements are grounded in sentiments, value realism is commonly coupled with rationalism. Against this common view, we argue that value realism can be (...)
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  8. Julien Deonna, Christine Tappolet & Fabrice Teroni (2015). Emotions: Philosophical Issues About. WIREs Cognitive Science 1:193-207.
    We start this overview by discussing the place of emotions within the broader affective domain – how different are emotions from moods, sensations and affective dispositions? Next, we examine the way emotions relate to their objects, emphasizing in the process their intimate relations to values. We move from this inquiry into the nature of emotion to an inquiry into their epistemology. Do they provide reasons for evaluative judgements and, more generally, do they contribute to our knowledge of values? We then (...)
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  9. Fabrice Correia & Christine Tappolet (2014). Plus on Monte Plus on s’Amuse : Introduction. Les Ateliers de l'Éthique / the Ethics Forum 9 (2):149-151.
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  10. Christine Tappolet (2014). Emotions, Reasons, and Autonomy. In Andrea Veltman & Mark C. Piper (eds.), Autonomy, Oppression and Gender. Oxford University Press. 163-180.
    Personal autonomy is often taken to consist in self-government or self-determination. Personal autonomy thus seems to require self-control. However, there is reason to think that autonomy is compatible with the absence of self-control. Akratic action, i.e., action performed against the agent’s better judgement, can be free. And it is also plausible to think that free actions require autonomy. It is only when you determine what you do yourself that you act freely. It follows that akratic actions can be autonomous. At (...)
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  11. Christine Tappolet (2014). The Normativity of Evaluative Concepts. In Anne Reboul (ed.), Mind, Values, and Metaphysics. Philosophical Essays in Honor of Kevin Mulligan, volume 2. 39-54.
    It is generally accepted that there are two kinds of normative concepts: evaluative concepts, such as good, and deontic concepts, such as ought. The question that is raised by this distinction is how it is possible to claim that evaluative concepts are normative. Given that deontic concepts appear to be at the heart of normativity, the bigger the gap between evaluative and deontic concepts, the less it appears plausible to say that evaluative concepts are normative. After having presented the main (...)
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  12. Christine Tappolet (2013). Comment la procrastination est-elle possible? Procrastination, souci de soi et identité personnelle. Repha 7:13-43.
    As common experience confirms, procrastination seems not only possible, but widespread. However, procrastination should not be taken for granted. Often, the procrastinator harms herself knowingly. It thus clearly seems that such a person lacks the self-concern that usually characterises us. After having spelled out what procrastination is, and having explored its main varieties, I consider the relation between procrastination and risk-taking. After this, I discuss the implications of this phenomenon for the debates about personal identity. The upshot, I argue, is (...)
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  13. Christine Tappolet (2013). Evaluative Vs. Deontic Concepts. In Hugh Lafollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell. 1791-99.
    Ethical thought is articulated around normative concepts. Standard examples of normative concepts are good, reason, right, ought, and obligatory. Theorists often treat the normative as an undifferentiated domain. Even so, it is common to distinguish between two kinds of normative concepts: evaluative or axiological concepts, such as good, and deontic concepts, such as ought. This encyclopedia entry discusses the many differences between the two kinds of concepts.
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  14. Christine Tappolet (2013). Weakness of Will. In Hugh LaFolette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell. 4412-21.
    One difficulty in understanding recent debates is that not only have many terms been used to refer to weakness of will – “akrasia” and “incontinence” have often been used as synonyms of “weakness of will” – but quite different phenomena have been discussed in the literature. This is why the present entry starts with taxonomic considerations. The second section turns to the question of whether it is possible to freely and intentionally act against one’s better judgment.
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  15. Christine Tappolet (2012). Emotions, Perceptions, and Emotional Illusions. In Calabi Clotilde (ed.), Perceptual Illusions. Philosophical and Psychological Essays, Palgrave-Macmillan. 207-24.
    Emotions often misfire. We sometimes fear innocuous things, such as spiders or mice, and we do so even if we firmly believe that they are innocuous. This is true of all of us, and not only of phobics, who can be considered to suffer from extreme manifestations of a common tendency. We also feel too little or even sometimes no fear at all with respect to very fearsome things, and we do so even if we believe that they are fearsome. (...)
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  16. Christine Tappolet (2012). Mais où va l'éthique fondamentale ? Introduction. Les Ateliers de l'Éthique / the Ethics Forum 7 (3):89-91.
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  17. Christine Tappolet (2012). Valeurs Et Émotions, les Perspectives du Néo-Sentimentalisme. Dialogue 51 (1):7-30.
    ABSTRACT: Neo-sentimentalism is the view that to judge that something has an evaluative property is to judge that some affective or emotional response is appropriate to it, but this view allows for radically different versions. My aim is to spell out what I take to be its most plausible version. Against its normative version, I argue that its descriptive version can best satisfy the normativity requirement that follows from Moore’s Open Question Argument while giving an answer to the Wrong Kind (...)
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  18. Christine Tappolet & Bruce Maxwell (2012). Gloomy Duck or Cheerful Rabbit? Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 19 (1):21-23.
  19. Christine Tappolet & Bruce Maxwell (2012). Rethinking Cognitive Mediation: Cognitive Behavioral Therapy and the Perceptual Theory of Emotion. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 19 (1):1-12.
    Empirical assessments of Cognitive Behavioral Theory and theoretical considerations raise questions about the fundamental theoretical tenet that psychological disturbances are mediated by consciously accessible cognitive structures. This paper considers this situation in light of emotion theory in philosophy. We argue that the “perceptual theory” of emotions, which underlines the parallels between emotions and sensory perceptions, suggests a conception of cognitive mediation that can accommodate the observed empirical anomalies and one that is consistent with the dual-processing models dominant in cognitive psychology.
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  20. Christine Tappolet (2011). Les Mauvaises Émotions. In Fabrice Teroni, Christine Tappolet & Anita Konzelman Ziv (eds.), Les Ombres de l'âme. Penser les émotions négatives. 37-51.
    Emotions have long been accused of all sorts of mischief. In recent years, however, many have argued that far from constituting an obstacle to reason and morality, emotions possess important virtues. According to a plausible conception, emotions would have a crucial cognitive function: they would consist in the perceptual experience of evaluative properties. To fear a dog, for instance, would consist in having the perceptual experience of the dog as fearsome. There has been and still is a lively debate about (...)
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  21. Christine Tappolet (2011). La normativité des concepts évaluatifs. Philosophiques 38 (1):157-176.
    On admet en général qu’il y a deux sortes de concepts normatifs : les concepts évaluatifs, comme bon, et les concepts déontiques, comme devoir. La question que soulève cette distinction est celle de savoir comment il est possible d’affirmer que les concepts évaluatifs sont normatifs. En effet, comme les concepts déontiques semblent constituer le coeur du domaine normatif, plus le fossé entre les deux sortes de concepts est grand, moins il paraîtra plausible d’affirmer que les concepts évaluatifs sont normatifs. Après (...)
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  22. Christine Tappolet (2011). Neo-Sentimentalism's Prospects. In Carla Bagnoli (ed.), Morality and the Emotions. Oxford University Press. 117.
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  23. Christine Tappolet (2011). Truth as One and Many, by Michael P. Lynch. Mind 119 (476):1193-1198.
    For someone who is inclined towards truth monism and moral realism, reading this book is like journeying through a foreign country: somewhat disconcerting, but nonetheless enjoyable. Michael Lynch’s world is a stoutly naturalistic world, in which representation is conceived in terms of causal or teleological relations. This is a world in which it is hard to fit normative facts. Thus, the reader is told that there are good reasons to think that ‘moral properties, should they exist, would not be the (...)
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  24. Christine Tappolet (2011). Values and Emotions: Neo-Sentimentalism's Prospects. In Carla Bagnoli (ed.), Morality and the Emotions. Oxford University Press.
    Neo-sentmentalism is the view that to judge that something has an evaluative property is to judge that some affective or emotional response is appropriate with respect to it. The difficulty in assessing neo-sentimentalism is that it allows for radically different versions. My aim is to spell out what I take to be its most plausible version. I distinguish between a normative version, which takes the concepts of appropriateness to be normative, and a descriptive version, which claims that appropriateness in emotions (...)
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  25. Christine Tappolet, Fabrice Teroni & Anita Konzelmann Ziv (eds.) (2011). Les Ombres de L'Âme: Penser les Émotions Négatives. Markus Haller.
    Les émotions peuvent être pénibles, voire néfastes. Pensons par exemple à la peur, la colère, la haine, la jalousie ou au mépris. De telles émotions sont souvent qualifiées de négatives. Mais que sont les émotions négatives et comment se distinguent-elles des émotions positives ? Plus généralement, qu’impliquent-elles pour notre compréhension des émotions ? Et quels sont concrètement leurs effets sur nos pensées et nos vies ? De plus, comment analyser l’ambivalence affective, comme quand on ressent à la fois de l’amour (...)
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  26. Christine Tappolet & Alain Voizard (2011). La philosophie de la normativité ou comment tenter de faire un peu d'ordre. Dialogue 50 (02):239-246.
    Cette introduction à une collection d'articles sur la normativité propose d'adopter les divisions trouvées habituellement en éthique pour aborder la normativité. Ainsi, il semble utile de diviser les questions en cinq groupes: l'ontologie normative, la sémantique normative, l'épistémologie normative, la psychologie normative, et finalement, les questions normatives substantielles.
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  27. Christine Tappolet & Alan Voizard (2011). The Philosophy of Normativity, or How to Try Clearing Things Up a Little. Dialogue 50 (02):233-238.
    This introduction to a collection of papers on normativity provides a framework modelled on the division in ethics to approach normative issues. It suggests that is is useful to divide questions about normativity into five groups: normative ontology, normative semantics, normative epistemology, normative psychology, and substantial normative theory.
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  28. Christine Tappolet (2010). Emotion, Motivation and Action: The Case of Fear. In Goldie Peter (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. 325-45.
    Consider a typical fear episode. You are strolling down a lonely mountain lane when suddenly a huge wolf leaps towards you. A number of different interconnected elements are involved in the fear you experience. First, there is the visual and auditory perception of the wild animal and its movements. In addition, it is likely that given what you see, you may implicitly and inarticulately appraise the situation as acutely threatening. Then, there are a number of physiological changes, involving a variety (...)
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  29. Christine Tappolet (2010). Introduction: Les vertus de l’imagination. Les Ateliers de l'Éthique / the Ethics Forum 5 (1):23-25.
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  30. Christine Tappolet (2010). Procrastination and Personal Identity. In Andreou Chrisoula & Marck D. White (eds.), The Thief of Time. Philosophical Essays on Procrastination. Oxford University Press. 115-29.
    The special concern we have for our future selves is often seen as making for a problem for psychological continuity theories, such as Derek Parfit's. On the basis of an account of the various kinds of procrastination, and of the ways imprudent procrastination involves harm to future selves, the paper argues that procrastinators often impose an uncompensated burden on their future selves, something that is best explained by a lack of concern for their future selves. Given this, the objections to (...)
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  31. Christine Tappolet (2010). Review of Michael P. Lynch, Truth as One and Many. [REVIEW] Mind 119:1193-1198.
    Review of Michael P. Lynch's "Truth as One and Many".
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  32. Christine Tappolet (2009). Ambivalent Emotions. In David Sander & Klaus R. Scherer (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Emotion and the Affective Sciences. Oxford University Press. 27.
    This encyclopedia entry spells out the concept of ambivalence in emotions.
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  33. Christine Tappolet (2009). Constructivism. In David Sander & Klaus R. Scherer (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Emotion and the Affective Sciences.
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  34. Christine Tappolet (2009). Desires and Practical Judgments in Action: Sergio Tenenbaum's Scholastic View. Dialogue 48 (02):395-.
    In his book Appearances of the Good, Sergio Tenenbaum has offered an impressive new defence of a classical account of practical reason, which marks him as heir to a philosophical tradition going back to Aristotle and Kant or, more recently, to Anscombe and Davidson. This account has come under heavy attack in the past twenty years, and it would be no exaggeration to say that it is now a minority view. This is at least so if one counts the number (...)
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  35. Christine Tappolet (2009). Emotions and Motivation: The Case of Fear. In Peter Goldie (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. Oup Oxford.
     
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  36. Christine Tappolet (2009). Faiblesse de la Volonté Et Autonomie. In René Lefebvre & Alonso Tordesillas (eds.), Faiblesse de la volonté et maîtrise de soi. Presses Universitaires de Rennes. 191-203.
    Autonomy seems to require self-control. It also seems that acratic action results from a lack of self-control. Such actions would thus lack autonomy. However, there are reasons to think that acratic actions can be free. Since it is plausible to think that free actions necessarily are autonomous, one would have to conclude that acratic actions are autonomous. My aim is to evaluate the main solutions to this paradox.
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  37. Christine Tappolet (2009). Value. In David Sander & Klaus R. Scherer (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Emotion and the Affective Sciences. Oxford University Press.
    This entry specifies the possible relations between values and emotions.
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  38. Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (2008). Facts and Values in Emotional Plasticity. In Louis Charland & Peter Zachar (eds.), Fact and Value in Emotion; Consciousness and Emotion Book Series. John Benjamins Publishing Company. 101--137.
    How much can we shape the emotions we experience? Or to put it another way, how plastic are our emotions? It is clear that the exercise of identifying the degree of plasticity of emotion is futile without a prior specification of what can be plastic, so we first propose an analysis of the components of emotions. We will then turn to empirical data that might be used to assess the degree of plasticity of emotions.
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  39. Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.) (2008). The Modularity of Emotions. University of Calgary Press.
    Can emotions be rational or are they necessarily irrational? Are emotions universally shared states? Or are they socio-cultural constructions? Are emotions perceptions of some kind? Since the publication of Jerry Fodor’s The Modularity of Mind (1983), a new question about the philosophy of emotions has emerged: are emotions modular? A positive answer to this question would mean, minimally, that emotions are cognitive capacities that can be explained in terms of mental components that are functionally dissociable from other parts of the (...)
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  40. Christine Tappolet (2008). Friendship and Partiality in Ethics. Les Ateliers de l'Éthique / the Ethics Forum 3 (1).
    Special volume on Friendship and Partiality. Christine Tappolet, Guest Editor.
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  41. Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (2007). Introduction: Modularity and the Nature of Emotions. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (5S).
    In this introduction, we give a brief overview of the main concepts of modularity that have been offered in recent literature. After this, we turn to a summary of the papers collected in this volume. Our primary aim is to explain how the modularity of emotion question relates to traditional debates in emotion theory.
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  42. Christine Tappolet & Luc Faucher (2007). Facts and Values in Emotional Plasticity. Les Cahiers du Lanci 6 (2007-02):1-37.
    Le Laboratoire d’ANalyse Cognitive de l’Information (LANCI) effectue des recherches sur le traitement cognitif de l’information. La recherche fondamentale porte sur les multiples conceptions de l’information. Elle s’intéresse plus particulièrement aux modèles cognitifs de la classification et de la catégorisation, tant dans une perspective symbolique que connexionniste. La recherche appliquée explore les technologies informatiques qui manipulent l’information. Le territoire privilégié est celui du texte. La recherche est de nature interdisciplinaire. Elle en appelle à la philosophie, à l’informatique, à la linguistique (...)
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  43. Christine Tappolet (2006). Robert C. Roberts, Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology. Ethics 117 (1):143-147.
    A critical review of Robert C. Roberts' "Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology", Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003.
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  44. Christine Tappolet (2006). Autonomy and the Emotions. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2 (2):45-59.
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  45. Christine Tappolet (2005). Ambivalent Emotions and the Perceptual Account of Emotions. Analysis 65 (287):229-233.
    This paper replies to an argument due to Greenspan (1980) and to Morton (2002) against the view that emotions are perceptions of values. The argument holds that this view cannot make room for ambivalent emotions both of which are appropriate, such as when it is appropriate to feel fear and attraction towards something. This would make for a contradiction, for appropriate emotions are supposed to present things as they are. The problem, I argue, is that this line of thoughts forgets (...)
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  46. Christine Tappolet (2005). Value, Reasons, and Oughts. In Maria E. Reicher & Johan C. Marek (eds.), Experience and Analysis, The Proceedings of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Öbv&hpt.
    What’s the relation between values and reasons for action ? According to some all reasons are grounded in values. If one adds to this the thought that values themselves depend on non-evaluative or factual features of things, one gets what one can call after Jonathan Dancy the “layer-cake conception”. According to others, we should replace the layer-cake picture by what he calls the “buck-passing account of values” (Scanlon 1998). The main characteristic of this conception is that it denies that reasons (...)
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  47. Christine Tappolet (2004). Through Thick and Thin: Good and its Determinates. Dialectica 58 (2):207–221.
    What is the relation between the concept good and more specific or ‘thick’ concepts such as admirable or courageous? I argue that good or more precisely good pro tanto is a general concept, but that the relation between good pro tanto and the more specific concepts is not that of a genus to its species. The relation of an important class of specific evaluative concepts, which I call ‘affective concepts’, to good pro tanto is better understood as one between a (...)
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  48. Fabienne Pironet & Christine Tappolet (2003). Faiblesse de la raison ou faiblesse de volonté: peut-on choisir? Dialogue 42 (04):627-.
    This introduction consists in a historical overview of the debate about practical irrationality, as illustrated by weakness of will. After a brief reminder of the discussions after Davidson, we consider three important moments of the debate: the ancient debate from Socrates to Xenophon, the medieval debate from Augustine to Buridan, and the modern debate after Descartes. We suggest that it is useful to distinguish weakness of will (a failure to act as one wills) from so-called strict akrasia (a failure to (...)
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  49. Stroud Sarah & Christine Tappolet (eds.) (2003/2007). Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    Sarah Stroud and Christine Tappolet present eleven original essays on weakness of will, a topic straddling the divide between moral philosophy and philosophy of mind, and the subject of much current attention. An international team of established scholars and younger talent provide perspectives on all the key issues in this fascinating debate; the book will be essential reading for anyone working in the area.
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  50. Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.) (2003/2007). Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality. Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press ;.
    Sarah Stroud and Christine Tappolet present eleven original essays on weakness of will, a topic straddling the divide between moral philosophy and philosophy of mind, and the subject of much current attention. An international team of established scholars and younger talent provide perspectives on all the key issues in this fascinating debate; the book will be essential reading for anyone working in the area. Issues covered include classical questions, such as the distinction between weakness and compulsion, the connection between evaluative (...)
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