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Christoph Kelp [24]Christoph F. F. Kelp [1]
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Profile: Christoph Kelp (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven)
  1. Christoph Kelp (2014). No Justification for Lottery Losers. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (1).
    Igor Douven has recently developed a challenge for accounts of justification according to which beliefs about lottery losers are never justified. This article argues that champions of such accounts can rise to Douven's challenge and, what's more, that they can turn Douven's argument around in the sense that they can legitimately take it to provide a vindication of their preferred view.
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  2. Lieven Decock, Igor Douven, Christoph Kelp & Sylvia Wenmackers (2013). Knowledge and Approximate Knowledge. Erkenntnis:1-22.
    Traditionally, epistemologists have held that only truth-related factors matter in the question of whether a subject can be said to know a proposition. Various philosophers have recently departed from this doctrine by claiming that the answer to this question also depends on practical concerns. They take this move to be warranted by the fact that people’s knowledge attributions appear sensitive to contextual variation, in particular variation due to differing stakes. This paper proposes an alternative explanation of the aforementioned fact, one (...)
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  3. Igor Douven & Christoph Kelp (2013). Proper Bootstrapping. Synthese 190 (1):171-185.
    According to a much discussed argument, reliabilism is defective for making knowledge too easy to come by. In a recent paper, Weisberg aims to show that this argument relies on a type of reasoning that is rejectable on independent grounds. We argue that the blanket rejection that Weisberg recommends of this type of reasoning is both unwarranted and unwelcome. Drawing on an older discussion in the philosophy of science, we show that placing some relatively modest restrictions on the said type (...)
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  4. Christoph Kelp (2013). A Practical Explication of the Knowledge Rule of Informative Speech Acts. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (3):367-383.
    : This paper defends the knowledge rule of informative speech acts. It is argued that Edward Craig's insightful practical explication of the concept of knowledge can be extended to motivate the knowledge rule. A number of problem cases for the knowledge rule are addressed and accommodated.
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  5. Christoph Kelp (2013). Extended Cognition and Robust Virtue Epistemology. Erkenntnis 78 (2):245-252.
    Pritchard (Synthese 175,133–51, 2010) and Vaesen (Synthese forthcoming) have recently argued that robust virtue epistemology does not square with the extended cognition thesis that has enjoyed an increasing degree of popularity in recent philosophy of mind. This paper shows that their arguments fail. The relevant cases of extended cognition pose no new problem for robust virtue epistemology. It is shown that Pritchard’s and Vaesen’s cases can be dealt with in familiar ways by a number of virtue theories of knowledge.
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  6. Christoph Kelp (2013). Extended Cognition and Robust Virtue Epistemology: Response to Vaesen. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 78 (2):1-4.
    In a recent exchange, Vaesen (Synthese 181: 515–529, 2011; Erkenntnis 78:963–970, 2013) and Kelp (Erkenntnis 78:245–252, 2013a) have argued over whether cases of extended cognition pose (part of) a problem for robust virtue epistemology. This paper responds to Vaesen’s (Erkenntnis 78:963–970, 2013) most recent contribution to this exchange. I argue that Vaesen latest argument against the kind of virtue epistemology I favour fails.
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  7. Christoph Kelp (2013). Knowledge: The Safe-Apt View. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):265-278.
    According to virtue epistemology, knowledge involves cognitive success that is due to cognitive competence. This paper explores the prospects of a virtue theory of knowledge that, so far, has no takers in the literature. It combines features from a couple of different virtue theories: like Pritchard's [forthcoming; et al. 2010] view, it qualifies as what I call an ?impure? version of virtue epistemology, according to which the competence condition is supplemented by an additional (safety) condition; like Sosa's 2007, 2010 view, (...)
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  8. Igor Douven & Christoph Kelp (2012). In Defense of the Rational Credibility Account: A Reply to Casalegno. Dialectica 66 (2):289-297.
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  9. Christoph Kelp (2012). Do 'Contextualist Cases' Support Contextualism? Erkenntnis 76 (1):115-120.
    This paper addresses the argument from ‘contextualist cases’—such as for instance DeRose’s Bank cases—to attributor contextualism. It is argued that these cases do not make a decisive case against invariantism and that the debate between contextualists and invariantists will have to be settled on broader theoretical grounds.
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  10. Christoph Kelp (2012). How and How Not to Take on Brueckner's Sceptic. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 62 (247):386-391.
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  11. Christoph Kelp (2012). Skepticism Against the Value of Knowledge. Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 74 (3):513-521.
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  12. Christoph Kelp & Igor Douven (2012). Sustaining a Rational Disagreement. In H. DeRegt, S. Hartmann & S. Okasha (eds.), EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. Springer. 101--110.
    Much recent discussion in social epistemology has focussed on the question of whether peers can rationally sustain a disagreement. A growing number of social epistemologists hold that the answer is negative. We point to considerations from the history of science that favor rather the opposite answer. However, we also explain how the other position can appear intuitively attractive.
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  13. Igor Douven & Christoph Kelp (2011). Truth Approximation, Social Epistemology, and Opinion Dynamics. Erkenntnis 75 (2):271-283.
  14. Christoph Kelp (2011). In Defence of Virtue Epistemology. Synthese 179 (3):409-33.
    In a number of recent papers Duncan Pritchard argues that virtue epistemology's central ability condition—one knows that p if and only if one has attained cognitive success (true belief) because of the exercise of intellectual ability—is neither necessary nor sufficient for knowledge. This paper discusses and dismisses a number of responses to Pritchard's objections and develops a new way of defending virtue epistemology against them.
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  15. Christoph Kelp (2011). A Problem for Contrastivist Accounts of Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 152 (2):287-92.
    This paper raises a problem for contrastivist accounts of knowledge. It is argued that contrastivism fails to succeed in providing a modest solution to the sceptical paradox—i.e. one according to which we have knowledge of a wide range of ordinary empirical propositions whilst failing to know the various anti-sceptical hypotheses entailed by them—whilst, at the same time, retaining a contrastivist version of the closure principle for knowledge.
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  16. Christoph Kelp (2011). Not Without Justification. Dialectica 65 (4):581-595.
    In this paper I take issue with Jonathan Sutton's attempt at defending the thesis that knowledge is justified belief. I argue, first, that the arguments he adduces in support of it fail. Second, I provide independent reason to believe that knowledge and justified belief come apart.
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  17. Christoph Kelp (2011). What's the Point of "Knowledge" Anyway? Episteme 8 (1):53-66.
    In Knowledge and the State of Nature Edward Craig defends the thesis that the function of the concept of knowledge is to flag good informants. This paper aims to show that Craig’s thesis (CT) is false. In order to establish this, I will point to some data that CT fails to explain in a satisfactory manner. I will then introduce an alternative thesis that is not only able to secure the acclaimed benefits of CT, but also provides a neat explanation (...)
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  18. Christoph Kelp & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (2010). Second-Order Knowledge. In D. Pritchard & S. Bernecker (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Routledge.
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  19. Christoph Kelp (2009). Knowledge and Safety. Journal of Philosophical Research 34:21-31.
    This paper raises a problem for so-called safety-based conceptions of knowledge: It is argued that none of the versions of the safety condition that can be found in the literature succeeds in identifying a necessary condition on knowledge. Furthermore, reason is provided to believe that the argument generalises at least in the sense that there can be no version of the safety condition that does justice to the considerations motivating a safety condition whilst, at the same time, being requisite for (...)
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  20. Christoph Kelp (2009). Learning From Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge – Jennifer Lackey. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (237):748-750.
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  21. Christoph Kelp (2009). Pritchard on Knowledge, Safety, and Cognitive Achievements. Journal of Philosophical Research 34:51-53.
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  22. Christoph Kelp (2009). Pritchard on Virtue Epistemology. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (4):583-87.
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  23. Christoph Kelp & Duncan Pritchard (2009). Two Deflationary Approaches to Fitch-Style Reasoning. In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press. 324--338.
    This paper considers two deflationary responses to the Fitch argument on behalf of the semantic anti-realistthat is, two responses which aim to evade the conclusion of that argument by, on a principled basis, weakening one of the principles essentially employed. The first deflationary approach that is consideredwhich proceeds by weakening the factivity principle for knowledgeis shown to be ultimately unpromising, but a second approachwhich proceeds by weakening the knowability principle that is at the heart of semantic anti-realismis shown to have (...)
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  24. Christoph Kelp (2008). Classical Invariantism and the Puzzle of Fallibilism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):221-44.
    This paper revisits a puzzle that arises for theories of knowledge according to which one can know on the basis of merely inductive grounds. No matter how strong such theories require inductive grounds to be if a belief based on them is to qualify as knowledge, there are certain beliefs (namely, about the outcome of fair lotteries) that are based on even stronger inductive grounds, while, intuitively, they do not qualify as knowledge. This paper discusses what is often regarded as (...)
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  25. Christoph F. F. Kelp, A Minimalist Approach to Epistemology.
    This thesis addresses the problem of the analysis of knowledge. The persistent failure of analyses of knowledge in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions is used to motivate exploring alternative approaches to the analytical problem. In parallel to a similar development in the theory of truth, in which the persistent failure to provide a satisfactory answer to the question as to what the nature of truth is has led to the exploration of deflationary and minimalist approaches to the theory of (...)
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