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  1. Christopher D. Green, Classics in the History of Psychology.
    Psychology as the behaviorist views it is a purely objective experimental branch of natural science. Its theoretical goal is the prediction and control of behavior. Introspection forms no essential part of its methods, nor is the scientific value of its data dependent upon the readiness with which they lend themselves to interpretation in terms of consciousness. The behaviorist, in his efforts to get a unitary scheme of animal response, recognizes no dividing line between man and brute. The behavior of man, (...)
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  2. Christopher D. Green, Statistics of Mental Imagery.
    An outline is given in the following memoir of some of the earlier results of an inquiry which I am still prosecuting, and a comparatively new statistical process will be used in it for the first time in dealings with psychological data. It is that which I described under the title of "Statistics by Intercomparison" in the Philosophical Magazine of Jany., 1875.
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  3. Christopher D. Green (2009). The Curious Rise and Fall of Experimental Psychology in Mind. History of the Human Sciences 22 (1):37-57.
    The journal Mind is now a wholly philosophical journal. At the time of its founding, in 1876, however, its mission was rather different in character. Its aim was to discover whether scientific psychology was a truly viable enterprise and, if so, what its boundaries with philosophy, with other scientific disciplines, and with the earlier generation of discredited attempts at `scientific' studies of the mind (e.g. phrenology, mesmerism) might be. Although at first Mind published mostly philosophical pieces and literature reviews, by (...)
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  4. Christopher D. Green (2003). Early Psychological Thought: Ancient Accounts of Mind and Soul. Praeger.
  5. Christopher D. Green, Will the Real James Mark Baldwin Stand Up?: A Comment on Griffiths (2001).
    Griffiths (2001) make a number of comments about James Mark Baldwin's motivations and character at the time that he was developing what later became known as the "Baldwin effect." Some of these comments I found to be misleading. I attempt to correct the historical record concerning the origins of the "Baldwin effect.".
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  6. Christopher D. Green (2002). Comment on Chow's "Issues in Statistical Inference". Philosophical Explorations.
    Contrary to Chow, Wilkinson's report, though more tentative than it might have been, is a reasoned and valuable contribution to psychological science. For those who are quite familiar with the details of statistical methods, it confirms much of what has been happening in the literature over the past few decades. For those who have not been keeping abreast of new developments on the statistical scene, it alerts them in a gentle way that there have been some important changes since they (...)
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  7. Christopher D. Green (2001). Scientific Models, Connectionist Networks, and Cognitive Science. Philosophical Explorations.
    The employment of a particular class of computer programs known as "connectionist networks" to model mental processes is a widespread approach to research in cognitive science these days. Little has been written, however, on the precise connection that is thought to hold between such programs and actual in vivo cognitive processes such that the former can be said to "model" the latter in a scientific sense. What is more, this relation can be shown to be problematic. In this paper I (...)
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  8. Christopher D. Green (2000). Is AI the Right Method for Cognitive Science? Psycoloquy 11 (61).
  9. Christopher D. Green (1999). David W. Green and Others, Cognitive Science: An Introduction. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 9 (3):437-443.
  10. Christopher D. Green (1998). The Thoroughly Modern Aristotle: Was He Really a Functionalist? [Journal (on-Line/Unpaginated)].
    In recent years a debate has developed over whether Aristotle's theory of the psuchê is properly characterized as having been "functionalist" in the sense that contemporary computational cognitive scientists claim to be adherents of that position. It is argued here that there are indeed some similarities between Aristotle's theory and that of contemporary functionalists, but that the differences between them make it misleading, at best, for functionalists to look to Aristotle for ancient support. In particular, it is argued that Aristotle (...)
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  11. Christopher D. Green & John Vervaeke (1997). But What Have You Done for Us Lately?: Some Recent Perspectives on Linguistic Nativism. In David Martel Johnson & Christina E. Erneling (eds.), The Future of the Cognitive Revolution, Chapter 11. Oxford University Press. 149-163.
    The problem with many contemporary criticisms of Chomsky and linguistic nativism is that they are based upon features of the theory that are no longer germane; aspects that have either been superseded by more adequate proposals, or that have been dropped altogether under the weight of contravening evidence. In this paper, rather than rehashing old debates that are voluminously documented elsewhere, we intend to focus on more recent developments. To this end, we have put a premium on references from the (...)
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  12. Christopher D. Green (1996). Fodor, Functions, Physics, and Fantasyland: Is Ai a Mickey Mouse Discipline? [Journal (on-Line/Unpaginated)].
    It is widely held that the methods of AI are the appropriate methods for cognitive science. Fodor, however, has argued that AI bears the same relation to psychology as Disneyland does to physics. This claim is examined in light of the widespread but paradoxical acceptance of the Turing Test--a behavioral criterion of intelligence--among advocates of cognitivism. It is argued that, given the recalcitrance of certain deep conceptual problems in psychology, and disagreements concerning psychology's basic vocabulary, it is unlikely that AI (...)
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  13. Christopher D. Green (1996). Where Did the Word "Cognitive" Come From Anyway? [Journal (on-Line/Unpaginated)].
    Cognitivism is the ascendant movement in psychology these days. It reaches from cognitive psychology into social psychology, personality, psychotherapy, development, and beyond. Few psychologists know the philosophical history of the term, "cognitive," and often use it as though it were completely synonymous with "psychological" or "mental." In this paper, I trace the origins of the term "cognitive" in the ethical theories of the early 20th century, and through the logical positivistic philosophy of science of this century's middle part. In both (...)
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  14. Christopher D. Green & John Vervaeke, What Kind of Explanation, If Any, is a Connectionist Net?
    Connectionist models of cognition are all the rage these days. They are said to provide better explanations than traditional symbolic computational models in a wide array of cognitive areas, from perception to memory to language to reasoning to motor action. But what does it actually mean to say that they "explain" cognition at all? In what sense do the dozens of nodes and hundreds of connections in a typical connectionist network explain anything? It is the purpose of this paper to (...)
     
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  15. Christopher D. Green & Grant R. Gillett (1995). Are Mental Events Preceded by Their Physical Causes? Philosophical Psychology 8 (4):333-340.
    Libet's experiments, supported by a strict one-to-one identity thesis between brain events and mental events, have prompted the conclusion that physical events precede the mental events to which they correspond. We examine this claim and conclude that it is suspect for several reasons. First, there is a dual assumption that an intention is the kind of thing that causes an action and that can be accurately introspected. Second, there is a real problem with the method of timing the mental events (...)
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  16. Christopher D. Green & C. McGreery (1994). Lucid Dreaming: The Paradox of Consciousness During Sleep. Routledge.
    Throughout, there are many case histories to illustrate the text.
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  17. Christopher D. Green, Of Immortal Mythological Beasts: Operationism in Psychology.
    It is practically an article of faith in psychology that in order to do empirical research one must first operationally define one's variables. However, the 'operational attitude', first advocated by the physicist Percy Bridgman in the 1920s, has since been rejected by virtually every serious philosopher of science as unworkable. Furthermore. 'operationism' -- as developed by psychologists in the 1930s and 1940s -- was based on a misunderstanding of Bridgman's intent from the outset. Nevertheless, contemporary textbooks continue to extol the (...)
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  18. Christopher D. Green, Are Connectionist Models Theories of Cognition?
    This paper explores the question of whether connectionist models of cognition should be considered to be scientific theories of the cognitive domain. It is argued that in traditional scientific theories, there is a fairly close connection between the theoretical (unobservable) entities postulated and the empirical observations accounted for. In connectionist models, however, hundreds of theoretical terms are postulated -- viz., nodes and connections -- that are far removed from the observable phenomena. As a result, many of the features of any (...)
     
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