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Profile: Christopher Peacocke (Columbia University)
  1. Christopher Peacocke (1992). A Study of Concepts. MIT Press.
  2.  67
    Christopher Peacocke (2004). The Realm of Reason. Oxford University Press.
    The Realm of Reason develops a new, general theory of what it is for a thinker to be entitled to form a given belief. The theory locates entitlement in the nexus of relations between truth, content, and understanding. Peacocke formulates three principles of rationalism that articulate this conception. The principles imply that all entitlement has a component that is justificationally independent of experience. The resulting position is thus a form of rationalism, generalized to all kinds of content. To show how (...)
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  3.  49
    Christopher Peacocke (1999). Being Known. Oxford University Press.
    Being Known is a response to a philosophical challenge which arises for every area of thought: to reconcile a plausible account of what is involved in the truth of statements in a given area with a credible account of how we can know those statements. Christopher Peacocke presents a framework for addressing the challenge, a framework which links both the theory of knowledge and the theory of truth with the theory of concept-possession.
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  4. Christopher Peacocke (1983). Sense and Content: Experience, Thought, and Their Relations. Oxford University Press.
    Introduction This book is about the nature of the content of psychological states. Examples of psychological states with content are: believing today is a ...
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  5.  62
    Christopher Peacocke (2008). Truly Understood. Oxford University Press.
    A theory of understanding -- Truth's role in understanding -- Critique of justificationist and evidential accounts -- Do pragmatist views avoid this critique? -- A realistic account -- How evidence and truth are related -- Three grades of involvement of truth in theories of understanding -- Anchoring -- Next steps -- Reference and reasons -- The main thesis and its location -- Exposition and four argument-types -- Significance and consequences of the main thesis -- The first person as a case (...)
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  6. Christopher Peacocke (2001). Does Perception Have a Nonconceptual Content? Journal of Philosophy 98 (5):239-264.
  7. Paul Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.) (2000). New Essays on the A Priori. Oxford University Press.
    A stellar line-up of leading philosophers from around the world offer new treatments of a topic which has long been central to philosophical debate, and in ...
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  8. Christopher Peacocke (2015). Magnitudes: Metaphysics, Explanation, and Perception. In Annalisa Coliva, Volker Munz & Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (eds.), Mind, Language and Action: Proceedings of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium. De Gruyter 357-388.
    I am going to argue for a robust realism about magnitudes, as irreducible elements in our ontology. This realistic attitude, I will argue, gives a better metaphysics than the alternatives. It suggests some new options in the philosophy of science. It also provides the materials for a better account of the mind’s relation to the world, in particular its perceptual relations.
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  9.  32
    Christopher Peacocke (2007). Mental Action and Self-Awareness. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell
    Book description: Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind showcases the leading contributors to the field, debating the major questions in philosophy of mind today. * Comprises 20 newly commissioned essays on hotly debated issues in the philosophy of mind * Written by a cast of leading experts in their fields, essays take opposing views on 10 central contemporary debates * A thorough introduction provides a comprehensive background to the issues explored * Organized into three sections which explore the ontology of (...)
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  10. Christopher Peacocke (1998). Nonconceptual Content Defended. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):381-388.
  11.  64
    Christopher Peacocke (2008). Mental Action and Self-Awareness. In Lucy F. O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental Action. Oxford University Press
    We often know what we are judging, what we are deciding, what problem we are trying to solve. We know not only the contents of our judgements, decidings and tryings; we also know that it is judgement, decision and attempted problem-solving in which we are engaged. How do we know these things?
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  12.  20
    Christopher Peacocke (2014). The Mirror of the World: Subjects, Consciousness, and Self-Consciousness. OUP Oxford.
    Christopher Peacocke presents a new theory of subjects of consciousness, together with a theory of the nature of first person representation. He identifies three sorts of self-consciousness--perspectival, reflective, and interpersonal--and argues that they are key to explaining features of our knowledge, social relations, and emotional lives.
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  13. Christopher Peacocke (2001). Phenomenology and Nonconceptual Content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):609-615.
    This note aims to clarify which arguments do, and which arguments do not, tell against Conceptualism, the thesis that the representational content of experience is exclusively conceptual. Contrary to Sean Kelly’s position, conceptualism has no difficulty accommodating the phenomena of color constancy and of situation-dependence. Acknowledgment of nonconceptual content is also consistent with holding that experiences have nonrepresentational subjective features. The crucial arguments against conceptualism stem from animal perception, and from a distinction, elaborated in the final section of the paper, (...)
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  14. Christopher Peacocke (2003). Implicit Conceptions, Understanding, and Rationality. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Philosophical Issues. MIT Press 43-88.
  15.  72
    Christopher Peacocke (1981). Demonstrative Thought and Psychological Explanation. Synthese 49 (2):187-217.
  16. Christopher Peacocke (2008). Sensational Properties: Theses to Accept and Theses to Reject. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 62:7-24.
    The subjective properties of an experience are those which specify what having the experience is like for its subject. The sensational properties of an experience are those of its subjective properties that it does not possess in virtue of features of the way the experience represents the world as being (its representational content). Perhaps no topic in the philosophy of mind has been more vigorously debated in the past quarter-century than whether there are any sensational properties, so conceived. The existence (...)
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  17. Christopher Peacocke (1998). Conscious Attitudes, Attention, and Self-Knowledge. In C. Wright, B. Smith & C. Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press 83.
    What is involved in the consciousness of a conscious, "occurrent" propositional attitude, such as a thought, a sudden conjecture or a conscious decision? And what is the relation of such consciousness to attention? I hope the intrinsic interest of these questions provides sufficient motivation to allow me to start by addressing them. We will not have a full understanding either of consciousness in general, nor of attention in general, until we have answers to these questions. I think there are constitutive (...)
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  18. Christopher Peacocke (1987). Depiction. Philosophical Review 96 (3):383-410.
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  19.  34
    Christopher Peacocke (2014). Interpersonal Self-Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 170 (1):1-24.
    If one were to write a book titled TheVarieties of Self-Consciousness, one would start off with some distinctions. It will help to locate my topic in relation to those distinctions.The first distinction concerns that kind of self-consciousness which involves only the minimal ability on the part of a subject to self-represent, to be in mental states with first person content, be it conceptual or nonconceptual. This minimal ability involves very little as compared with the more sophisticated states of which humans (...)
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  20. Christopher Peacocke (1984). Colour Concepts and Colour Experience. Synthese 58 (March):365-82.
  21.  64
    Christopher Peacocke (1993). How Are A Priori Truths Possible? European Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):175-199.
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  22. Christopher Peacocke (2005). The Realm of Reason. Oxford University Press Uk.
    The Realm of Reason develops a new, general theory of what it is for a thinker to be entitled to form a given belief. The theory locates entitlement in the nexus of relations between truth, content, and understanding. Peacocke formulates three principles of rationalism that articulate this conception. The principles imply that all entitlement has a component that is justificationally independent of experience. The resulting position is thus a form of rationalism, generalized to all kinds of content.To show how these (...)
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  23.  34
    Christopher Peacocke (1979). Holistic Explanation. Clarendon Press.
    INTRODUCTION The philosophy of action and the philosophy of space and time may well seem to be unconnected areas. I will argue that in each of these areas ...
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  24.  55
    Christopher Peacocke (1986). Explanation in Computational Psychology: Language, Perception and Level. Mind and Language 1 (2):101-23.
  25.  86
    Christopher Peacocke (2005). Joint Attention: Its Nature, Reflexivity, and Relation to Common Knowledge. In Naomi M. Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds. Oxford University Press 298.
    The openness of joint awareness between two or more subjects is a perceptual phenomenon. It involves a certain mutual awareness between the subjects, an awareness that makes reference to that very awareness itself. Properly characterized, such awareness can generate iterated awareness ‘x is aware that y is aware that x is aware...’ to whatever level the subjects can sustain. The openness should not be characterized in terms of Lewis–Schiffer common knowledge, the conditions for which are not met in many basic (...)
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  26.  75
    Christopher Peacocke (2002). Principles for Possibilia. Noûs 36 (3):486–508.
    It seems to be an obvious truth that There could be something that doesn't actually exist. That is, it seems to be obiously true that ◊∃×). It is sufficient for the truth of that there could be more people, or trees, or cars, than there actually are. It is also sufficient for the truth of that there could be some pepole, or trees, or cars that are distinct from all those that actually exist. Do and suchlike statements involve a commitment (...)
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  27.  57
    Christopher Peacocke (2004). Understanding Logical Constants: A Realist's Account. In T. J. Smiley & Thomas Baldwin (eds.), Studies in the Philosophy of Logic and Knowledge. Published for the British Academy by Oxford University Press 163.
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  28.  71
    Christopher Peacocke (2009). Mental Action and Self-Awareness : Epistemology. In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental Actions. Oxford University Press
    We often know what we are judging, what we are deciding, what problem we are trying to solve. We know not only the contents of our judgements, decidings and tryings; we also know that it is judgement, decision and attempted problem-solving in which we are engaged. How do we know these things?
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  29. Christopher Peacocke (1991). The Metaphysics of Concepts. Mind 100 (399):525-46.
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  30. Christopher Peacocke (2008). Truly Understood. Oxford University Press Uk.
    In Truly Understood, Christopher Peacocke argues that truth and reference have a much deeper role in the explanation of meaning and understanding than has hitherto been appreciated. Examination of specific concepts shows that a grasp of these concepts has to be characterized in terms of reference, identity, and relations to the world. Peacocke develops a positive general theory of understanding based on the idea that concepts are individuated by their fundamental reference rules, which contrasts sharply with conceptual-role, inferentialist, and pragmatist (...)
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  31.  81
    Christopher Peacocke (2005). Rationale and Maxims in the Study of Concepts. Noûs 39 (1):167-78.
    Is there any good reason for thinking that a concept is individuated by the condition for a thinker to possess it? Why is that approach superior to alternative accounts of the individuation of concepts? These are amongst the fundamental questions raised by Wayne Davis.
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  32. Christopher Peacocke (2005). Justification, Realism and the Past. Mind 114 (455):639-670.
    This paper begins by considering Dummett's justificationist treatment of statements about the past in his book Truth and the Past (2004). Contrary to Dummett's position, there is no way of applying the intuitionistic distinction in the arithmetical case between direct and indirect methods of establishing a content to the case of past-tense statements. Attempts to do so either give the wrong truth conditions, or rely on notions not available to a justificationist position. A better, realistic treatment makes ineliminable use of (...)
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  33. Christopher Peacocke (1983). Sense and Content: Experience, Thought and Their Relations. Oxford University Press Uk.
    The topics of this book lie in the intersection of three areas: the philosophy of mind, the theory of meaning and content, and the philosophy of psychology. The book grew out of a desire to treat the nature of the content of psychological states in much greater detail than was attempted in Holistic Explanation. The present work is based on material presented in classes at Oxford University in the years 1979 to 1982.
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  34.  56
    Christopher Peacocke (1993). Externalist Explanation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 67:203-30.
  35.  74
    Christopher Peacocke (1995). Content, Computation, and Externalism. Philosophical Issues 6 (3):227-264.
  36.  66
    Christopher Peacocke (2012). Descartes Defended. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86 (1):109-125.
    Drawing upon a conception of the metaphysics of conscious states and of first-person content, we can argue that Descartes's transition ‘Cogito ergo sum’ is both sound and one he is entitled to make. We can nevertheless formulate a version of Lichtenberg's objection that can still be raised after Bernard Williams's discussion. I argue that this form of Lichtenberg's revenge can also be undermined. In doing so it helps to compare the metaphysics of subjects, worlds and times. The arguments also apply (...)
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  37. Christopher Peacocke (1976). What is a Logical Constant? Journal of Philosophy 73 (9):221-240.
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  38.  87
    Christopher Peacocke (1998). Implicit Conceptions, Understanding and Rationality. Philosophical Issues 9:43-88.
  39.  62
    Christopher Peacocke (1978). Necessity and Truth Theories. Journal of Philosophical Logic 7 (1):473 - 500.
  40.  56
    Tyler Burge & Christopher Peacocke (1996). Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge: II. Christopher Peacocke: Entitlement, Self-Knowledge and Conceptual Redeployment. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96:117 - 158.
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  41.  61
    Christopher Peacocke (1994). Nonconceptual Content: Kinds, Rationales, and Relations. Mind and Language 4 (4):419-29.
  42. Christopher Peacocke (1992). Scenarios, Concepts, and Perception. In Tim Crane (ed.), The Contents of Experience. Cambridge University Press
     
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  43. Christopher Peacocke (2011). Understanding, Modality, Logical Operators. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):472 - 480.
    where F is a contradiction (I use his numbering). Tim says about these equivalences: (1) “modulo the implicit recognition of this equivalence, the epistemology of metaphysically modal thinking is a special case of the epistemology of counterfactual thinking. Whoever has what it takes to understand the counterfactual conditional and the elementary logical auxiliaries ~ and F has what it takes to understand possibility and necessity operators.” (158) (2) The idea that we evaluate metaphysically modal claims “by some quite different means (...)
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  44. Christopher Peacocke (2009). Perception, Content and Rationality. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):475 - 481.
    Anil Gupta's Empiricism and Experience is a stylish and stimulating contribution to our subject. My expectation is that those who disagree with some of its central theses will, like me, learn greatly from thinking through where and why they part company with Gupta's lucidly presented position. For the purposes of a Symposium, I select three points of disagreement. Each point in one way or another concerns the epistemic role of the content of experience.
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  45. Christopher Peacocke (1991). Demonstrative Content: A Reply to John McDowell. Mind 100 (1):123-133.
  46.  96
    Christopher Peacocke (2000). Fodor on Concepts: Philosophical Aspects. Mind and Language 15 (2-3):327-340.
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  47.  44
    Christopher Peacocke (1999). Computation as Involving Content: A Response to Egan. Mind and Language 14 (2):195-202.
    Only computational explanations of a content‐involving sort can answer certain ‘how’‐questions; can support content‐involving counterfactuals; and have the generality characteristic of psychological explanations. Purely formal characteriza‐tions of computations have none of these properties, and do not determine content. These points apply not only to psychological explanation, but to Turing machines themselves. Computational explanations which involve content are not opposed to naturalism. They are also required if we are to explain the content‐involving properties of mental states.
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  48. Christopher Peacocke (2009). Objectivity. Mind 118 (471):739 - 769.
    Judgement, perception, and other mental states and events have a minimal objectivity in this sense: making the judgement or being in the mental state does not in general thereby make the judgement correct or make the perception veridical. I offer an explanation of this minimal objectivity by developing a form of constitutive transcendental argument. The argument appeals to the proper individuation of the content of judgements and perceptions. In the case of the conceptual content of judgements, concepts are individuated by (...)
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  49.  7
    Christopher Peacocke (1986). Thoughts: An Essay on Content. Blackwell.
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  50.  84
    Christopher Peacocke (2004). Interrelations: Concepts, Knowledge, Reference and Structure. Mind and Language 19 (1):85-98.
    What are the relations between the items mentioned in my title? This question is raised by Jerry Fodor.
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